area handbook series 



Dominican Republic 

and Haiti 

country studies 




Dominican Republic 

and Haiti 

country studies 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Helen Chapin Metz 
Research Completed 
December 1999 



'North Atlantic Ocean 




Caribbean Sea 



On the cover: Hispaniola (La Isla Espariola) 



Third Edition, First Printing, 2001. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Dominican Republic and Haiti : country studies / Federal Research 
Division, Library of Congress ; edited by Helen Chapin Metz. 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) (DA pam ; 
550-36) 

"Research completed December 1999." 
Includes bibliographical references and index. 
ISBN 0-8444-1044-6 (alk. paper) 

1. Dominican Republic. 2. Haiti. I. Metz, Helen Chapin, 1928- . 
II. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. IV. 
Series: DA pam ; 550-36 

F1934.D64 2001 
972.93— dc21 

2001023524 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-36 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared 
by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress 
under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program spon- 
sored by the Department of the Army. The last two pages of this 
book list the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign coun- 
try, describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and 
national security systems and institutions, and examining the 
interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are 
shaped by historical and cultural factors. Each study is written 
by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists. The authors 
seek to provide a basic understanding of the observed society, 
striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular 
attention is devoted to the people who make up the society, 
their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their common inter- 
ests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature and 
extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should 
not be construed as an expression of an official United States 
government position, policy, or decision. The authors have 
sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. 
Corrections, additions, and suggestions for changes from read- 
ers will be welcomed for use in future editions. 

Robert L. Worden 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, DC 20540-4840 
E-mail: frds@loc.gov 



iii 



Acknowledgments 



The authors wish to acknowledge the work of Frederick J. 
Conway, Melinda Wheeler Cooke, Georges A. Fauriol, Richard 
A. Haggerty, Patricia Kluck, Daniel J. Seyler, Glenn R. Smucker, 
and Howard J. Wiarda, who contributed to the 1991 edition of 
Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies. Their work served 
as a framework for various chapters of the present volume. The 
authors also are grateful to individuals in various agencies of 
the United States government and international and private 
institutions who gave their time, research materials, and special 
knowledge to provide information and perspective. 

The authors also wish to thank those who contributed 
directly to the preparation of the manuscript. These include 
Sandra W. Meditz, who reviewed all drafts and served as liaison 
with the sponsoring agency and printer; Marilyn Majeska, who 
edited all chapters and managed production of the manu- 
script; and Janie L. Gilchrist, who did the word processing and 
prepared the camera-ready copy. 

Maryland Mapping and Graphics provided invaluable graph- 
ics support, including the preparation of maps, charts, photo- 
graphs, and cover and chapter illustrations. Kimberly A. Lord 
prepared the illustrations for the title pages of the chapters on 
Haiti. Various individuals, libraries, and public agencies, espe- 
cially the Inter-American Development Bank, provided photo- 
graphs. 

Finally, the authors would like to thank Tim Merrill, who 
checked the rendering of foreign names and terms. 



v 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xvii 

Introduction xix 

Dominican Republic: Country Profile 1 

Table A. Dominican Republic: Chronology of 

Important Events 9 

Chapter 1. Dominican Republic: Historical Setting. ... 11 

Jonathan Hartlyn 

THE FIRST COLONY 14 

THE STRUGGLE FOR FORMAL SOVEREIGNTY 19 

AMBIVALENT SOVEREIGNTY, CAUDILLO RULE, 

AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY 23 

The Infant Republic, 1844-61 23 

Annexation by Spain, 1861-65 27 

The Contest for Power, 1865-82 28 

ULISES HEUREAUX, GROWING FINANCIAL 

DEPENDENCE, AND CONTINUED INSTABILITY. 30 

Ulises Heureaux, 1882-99 30 

Growing Financial Dependence and Political 

Instability 33 

FROM THE UNITED STATES OCCUPATION (1916-24) 

TO THE EMERGENCE OF TRUJILLO (1930) 38 

THE TRUJILLO ERA, 1930-61 39 

DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLES AND FAILURES 43 

AUTHORITARIAN BALAGUER, 1966-78 45 

THE PRD IN POWER AND BALAGUER, AGAIN 47 

A NEW BEGINNING? 51 

Chapter 2. Dominican Republic: The Society 

and Its Environment 55 



vii 



Lamar C. Wilson and Patricia Kluck 

GEOGRAPHY. 58 

Natural Regions 58 

Drainage 60 

Climate 60 

POPULATION 61 

Size and Growth 61 

Population Distribution 63 

Migration 64 

Urbanization 68 

RACIAL AND ETHNIC GROUPS 70 

Ethnic Heritage 70 

Modern Immigration 72 

Haitians 74 

URBAN SOCIETY 76 

The Elite 76 

The Middle Sector 78 

The Urban Poor 79 

RURAL SOCIETY 81 

Family and Social Relationships 81 

Land and Poverty 82 

Sugar Plantations 85 

Mixed Farming 86 

FAMILY AND KIN 90 

RELIGION 92 

CULTURE 94 

Literature 94 

Historical Monuments and Architecture 96 

Popular Culture: Dance, Music, and Baseball. ....... 96 

EDUCATION 97 

Primary and Secondary 97 

University 99 

HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY. 101 

Health 101 

Social Security 105 

Chapter 3. Dominican Republic: The Economy 109 

Boulos A. Malik 

A DEVELOPING ECONOMY 112 

ECONOMIC POLICIES 116 

Fiscal Policy 118 

viii 



Government Role 120 

Privatization 121 

LABOR 122 

AGRICULTURE 126 

Land Policies 128 

Land Use 130 

Cash Crops 131 

Livestock 137 

Forestry and Fishing 138 

INDUSTRY 139 

Manufacturing 139 

Mining 141 

Construction 143 

Energy 145 

SERVICES 146 

Transportation 146 

Communications 148 

Tourism 149 

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 151 

Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments 151 

Foreign Assistance 154 

OUTLOOK. 155 

Chapter 4. Dominican Republic: Government and 

Politics 159 

Jonathan Hartlyn 

HISTORICAL LEGACIES OF AUTHORITARIAN RULE 161 

THE CONTEMPORARY STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY. ... 164 

SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 168 

The Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine 170 

The Executive 173 

The Legislature 176 

The Judiciary 179 

Public Administration 181 

Local Government 184 

Electoral System 187 

POLITICAL PARTIES 189 

INTEREST GROUPS AND SOCIAL ACTORS 194 

Economic Elites 195 

Middle Class 196 

Trade Unions and Popular Organizations 197 



Mass Media 199 

Roman Catholic Church 199 

Armed Forces 200 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 204 

Chapter 5. Dominican Republic: National Security . . 209 

Jean Tartter 

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED 

FORCES 213 

ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN PUBLIC LIFE 220 

MISSIONS . 222 

ARMED FORCES ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, 

AND EQUIPMENT 224 

Army 225 

Navy 229 

Air Force 231 

Manpower 232 

Defense Spending 233 

Ranks, Uniforms, and Insignia 234 

INTERNAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC ORDER 235 

National Police 239 

Criminal Justice System 241 

Respect for Human Rights 244 

Penal System 246 

Narcotics Trafficking 247 

Haiti: Country Profile 251 

Table B. Haiti: Chronology of Important Events 259 

Chapter 6. Haiti: Historical Setting 261 

Anne Greene 
SPANISH DISCOVERY AND COLONIZATION, 

1492-1697 263 

FRENCH COLONY OF SAINT-DOMINGUE, 

1697-1803 266 

FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE, 1791-1803 268 

EARLYYEARS OF INDEPENDENCE, 1804-43 272 

Partition of Haiti, 1811-20 273 

Jean-Pierre Boyer Reunites Haiti, 1820-43 275 

INCREASING INSTABILITY, 1843-1915 276 

UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN HAITI, 1915-34 .... 279 



x 



FROM THE END OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCCUPATION TO DUVALIER, 1934-57 284 

FRANCOIS DUVALIER, 1957-71 286 

JEAN-CLAUDE DUVALIER, 1971-86 290 

POST-DUVALIER ERA, 1986-90 294 

ARISTIDE PRESIDENCY, FEBRUARY 7, 1991- SEP- 
TEMBER 30, 1991 300 

MILITARYCOUP OVERTHROWS ARISTIDE, SEP- 
TEMBER 30, 1991-OCTOBER 1994 303 

DEMOCRACY RESTORED, 1994-96 307 

Chapter 7. Haiti: The Society and Its Environment 311 

Glenn R. Smucker 

GEOGRAPHY 314 

NATURAL RESOURCES 317 

Land Use and Water 317 

Forestry and Fuelwood 319 

Mining 320 

Coastal and Marine Resource 321 

Biodiversity 322 

Environmental Crisis 323 

POPULATION 325 

Demographic Profile 325 

Migration 326 

SOCIAL STRUCTURE 328 

The Upper Class 330 

The Middle Class 331 

Peasants 332 

Urban Lower Class 335 

GENDER ROLES AND MARRIAGE 336 

THE LANGUAGE QUESTION 339 

French and Creole 339 

Changes in Language Use 341 

Creole, Literacy, and Education 342 

RELIGIOUS LIFE 344 

Voodoo 344 

Roman Catholicism 346 

Protestantism 348 

EDUCATION 349 

Primary Schools 352 

Secondary Schools 353 



Higher Education 354 

HEALTH 355 

Fertility and Family Planning 355 

Nutrition and Disease 356 

Health Services 358 

Welfare 359 

Chapter 8. Haiti: The Economy 363 

BouloTA. Malik 

STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT 365 

ECONOMIC POLICIES 370 

Structural Policy 371 

Fiscal Policy 374 

Finance 377 

Balance of Payments 379 

External Debt 380 

Foreign Aid 382 

LABOR 384 

AGRICULTURE 387 

Land Tenure 389 

Cash Crops 391 

Food Crops 394 

Forestry 395 

Livestock and Fishing 395 

INDUSTRY 396 

Manufacturing 396 

Assembly Sector 398 

Construction 399 

Mining 399 

Energy 400 

Transportation and Communications 401 

Tourism 406 

OUTLOOK 406 

Chapter 9. Haiti: Government and Politics 411 

Robert E. Maguire 
FROM AN INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 
TO THE PRESIDENCY OF RENE PREVAL, 

SEPTEMBER 1 994-DECEMBER 1999 415 

Restoration of Constitutional Government, 

September 1994-September 1995 415 

xii 



Presidential Transition, October 1995- 

March 1997 418 

Balance of Power and Political Gridlock, 

April 1997-January 1999 420 

Unbalanced Power: January-December 1999 423 

Toward Municipal, Parliamentary, and 

Presidential Elections 425 

CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 427 

GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 429 

Governmental Institutions 430 

Functions of Government 432 

Urban Dominance, Rural Exclusion: 

Confronting Entrenched Patterns 434 

POLITICAL DYNAMICS 436 

Political Players and Patterns of Participation 437 

Maintenance and Transfer of Power 438 

The Presidency and Political Culture 439 

Perceptions of Democracy 440 

The Mass Media and the Spread of Information .... 441 

INTEREST GROUPS 443 

Political Parties 443 

Duvalierists and Makout 446 

The Elite 447 

Civil Society 448 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 449 

Relations with the United States 450 

Relations with the Dominican Republic 452 

Relations with Other Countries 453 

Chapter 10. Haiti: National Security 457 

Jean Tartter 

THE MILITARY IN HAITIAN HISTORY 462 

The Duvalier Era, 1957-86 463 

The Post-Duvalier Period 465 

Disintegration and Demobilization of the 

Haitian Army, 1993-95 468 

STRUCTURE AND CAPABILITIES OF THE 

PRE-1995 ARMED FORCES 469 

Military Spending and Foreign Assistance 471 

Role of the Army in Law Enforcement Prior 

to 1995 472 

xiii 



HAITI'S EXTERNAL AND DOMESTIC 

SECURITY CONCERNS 473 

INTERNAL SECURITY SINCE 1994 477 

National Police 477 

Recruitment, Training, and Equipment 480 

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 483 

MULTINATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE 484 

JUSTICE SYSTEM 486 

Prison System 488 

Narcotics Trafficking 489 

Appendix. Tables 493 

Bibliography 517 

Glossary 557 

Index 563 

Contributors 583 

List of Figures 

1 Dominican Republic and Haiti: Topography and 

Drainage xviii 

2 Dominican Republic: Administrative 

Divisions, 1999 8 

3 Dominican Republic: Population Distribution 

by Age and Sex, 1993 Census 62 

4 Dominican Republic: Transportation System, 1999 .... 150 

5 Dominican Republic: Structure of the 

Government, 1999 174 

6 Dominican Republic: Organization of the Armed 

Forces, 1999 227 

7 Dominican Republic: Military Bases and 

Headquarters, 1999 230 

8 Dominican Republic: Officer Ranks and 

Insignia, 1999 236 

9 Dominican Republic: Enlisted Ranks and 

Insignia, 1999 237 

10 Dominican Republic: Organization of Internal 

Security Agencies, 1999 242 

1 1 Haiti: Administrative Divisions, 1999 258 

12 Haiti: Population Distribution by Age and 

Sex, 1995 324 

xiv 



13 Haiti: Transportation System, 1999 402 

14 Organization of the Haitian National Police, 1999 478 



Preface 



Like its predecessors, these studies represent an attempt to 
treat in a compact and objective manner the dominant con- 
temporary social, political, economic, and military aspects of 
the Dominican Republic and Haiti. Sources of information 
included scholarly books, journals, and monographs; official 
reports of governments and international organizations; 
numerous periodicals; the authors' previous research and 
observations; and interviews with individuals who have special 
competence in Dominican, Haitian, and Latin American 
affairs. Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book; 
brief comments on sources recommended for further reading 
appear at the end of each chapter. To the extent possible, 
place-names conform with the system used by the United States 
Board on Geographic Names (BGN). Measurements are given 
in the metric system; a conversion table is provided to assist 
readers unfamiliar with metric measurements (see table 1, 
Appendix) . A glossary is also included. 

Although there are numerous variations, Spanish surnames 
generally consist of two parts: the patrilineal name followed by 
the matrilineal one. In the instance of Joaquin Balaguer 
Ricardo, for example, Balaguer is his father's surname and 
Ricardo, his mother's maiden name. In nonformal use, the 
matrilineal name is often dropped. Thus, after the first men- 
tion, just Balaguer is used. A minority of individuals use only 
the patrilineal name. 

Creole words used in the text may be presented in forms 
that are unfamiliar to readers who have done previous research 
on Haiti. The Creole orthography employed in this volume is 
that developed by the National Pedagogic Institute (Institut 
Pedagogique National-IPN) , which has been the standard in 
Haiti since 1978. 

The body of the text reflects information available as of 
December 1999. Certain other portions of the text, however, 
have been updated: the Introduction discusses significant 
events that have occurred since the completion of research, the 
Country Profiles and the tables include updated information 
as available, and the Bibliography lists recently published 
sources thought to be particularly helpful to the reader. 



xvii 




xviii 



Introduction 



THE HISTORIES OF THE TWO countries on the island of 
Hispaniola, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, have been 
inextricably intertwined. However, despite their similarities in 
some areas, they have important differences. The whole island, 
the first Spanish settlement in the New World and named 
Santo Domingo by Christopher Columbus in 1492, experi- 
enced decimation of its indigenous Indian, primarily Taino, 
population as a result of the Indians' treatment by colonial set- 
tlers. African slaves were brought to both sides of the island as 
early as the first part of the sixteenth century to supply the 
needed labor force for sugar plantations. Spain ruled the 
entire island until 1697, when, under the Treaty of Ryswick, it 
ceded the western third of the island, which then became 
known as Saint-Domingue, to France. 

During the eighteenth century, important demographic dif- 
ferences emerged. The population of Santo Domingo grew 
rapidly as trade reforms occurred, and by 1790 the country had 
some 100,000 people, roughly equal numbers of whites, free 
coloreds, and slaves. In contrast, Saint-Domingue, the most 
prosperous agricultural colony in the Western Hemisphere, 
had some 30,000 whites, 27,000 freedmen, and 400,000 black 
slaves. Differences in the economies of the two countries 
affected the makeup of the population. Santo Domingo 
engaged primarily in subsistence agriculture, requiring fewer 
slaves, and Spanish legislation enabled slaves to buy their free- 
dom for relatively small sums. The result was a more egalitarian 
society than that of Saint-Domingue, which featured a more 
racially stratified population. 

The resultant race-based tensions in Saint-Domingue, com- 
bined with the influences of the French Revolution, led to a 
struggle for independence from France that started in August 
1791. The rebellion began as a slave uprising against whites 
and developed into the Haitian Revolution, headed by such fig- 
ures as Toussaint Louverture. The uprising ultimately culmi- 
nated in Haiti's proclamation of independence in 1804. 
Meanwhile, Spain, which had suffered setbacks on the Euro- 
pean continent and was unable to maintain its hold on Santo 
Domingo, turned the area over to France in a peace treaty in 
1795. Toussaint entered Santo Domingo in January 1801 and 



xix 



abolished slavery; later, however, the French reinstituted sla- 
very in the area under their control in the east. The return of 
Spanish landowners to Santo Domingo in the early 1800s and 
the blockade by the British of the port of Santo Domingo led to 
the final departure of the French in 1809 and the return of 
Spanish rule. This rule was short-lived, however, because Jean- 
Pierre Boyer, as president of now independent Haiti, invaded 
Santo Domingo in 1822, and Haiti occupied the country for 
twenty-two years. 

Subsequent Dominican leaders have revived memories of 
Haiti's harsh treatment of the inhabitants during its occupation 
of Santo Domingo, fueling Dominican dislike of Haitians. 
Moreover, during the occupation, Haitians, who associated the 
Roman Catholic Church with their colonial oppressors, confis- 
cated Dominican Roman Catholic churches and property and 
severed the church's connection to the Vatican. Such historical 
experience caused Dominicans to see themselves as culturally 
and religiously different from Haitians and promoted a desire 
for independence. Building on this sentiment, Juan Pablo 
Duarte founded in 1838 a secret movement whose motto was 
"God, Country, and Liberty," defining Dominican nationality in 
religious and Hispanic terms. The overthrow of Boyer in the 
Haitian Revolution of 1843 further helped activate the Domini- 
can struggle for independence, which occurred in February 
1844. 

Independence, however, did not bring either the Dominican 
Republic or Haiti a democratic central government organiza- 
tion but rather the rule of a series of strong men, or caudillos. 
Independence was also accompanied by political instability and 
interspersed with interference and sometimes occupation by 
one or another of the major powers, including the United 
States. In addition to taking charge of the finances of both 
countries on different occasions to ensure that the United 
States sphere of influence was not invaded by European powers 
seeking to recover debts that had not been paid, the United 
States occupied Haiti from 1915 to 1934 and the Dominican 
Republic from 1916 to 1924. Although strongman rule was 
accompanied frequently by liberal-sounding constitutions 
(since 1844 the Dominican Republic has had thirty-two consti- 
tutions, while Haiti has had twenty-four constitutions since 
1804) , such documents were ignored when it was convenient to 
do so, altered unilaterally, or negated by sham plebiscites. 
Major instances of such strongman regimes were those of 



xx 



Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic from 1930 to 1961, 
and Francois Duvalier, followed by his son Jean-Claude Duva- 
lier, in Haiti from 1957 to 1986. 

Accompanying these political developments was the grind- 
ing poverty of the vast majority of the population in both coun- 
tries, apart from a small wealthy landowning class. Although 
the Dominican Republic has succeeded in improving its lot, 
Haiti today is considered by the World Bank (see Glossary) to 
be the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere, and exten- 
sive malnutrition continues to be a serious concern. Moreover, 
a 1998 study done under the auspices of the United Nations 
Population Fund concluded that at an average of 4.8 births per 
woman, Haiti had the highest birthrate in the Western Hemi- 
sphere, double that of Latin America as a whole. Haiti's infant 
mortality rate of seventy per 1,000 is twice as high as that of the 
Dominican Republic, and Haiti's gross domestic product 
(GDP — see Glossary), variously given as between $200 and 
$400 per person, is less than one-fourth that of the Dominican 
Republic. 

Haiti's high birth rate has put enormous pressure on the 
land, given the country's small amount of arable land in rela- 
tion to the size of the population. National data gathered in 
1995 revealed that 48 percent of the total land area in Haiti was 
being cultivated, although only 28 percent of the country's 
land is suitable for farming. The situation has resulted in seri- 
ous soil erosion, loss of forest cover, and meager incomes for 
rural dwellers, who are estimated to represent some 59 percent 
of the population. Agriculture produces only about 25 percent 
of gross national product (GNP — see Glossary), yet agricultural 
work engages about two-thirds of the national labor force. 

Haiti's economy has suffered not only from inefficiency and 
corruption but also from the three-year United Nations (UN) 
embargo placed on the country following the ouster of the 
democratically elected government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide 
(1991-94). To obtain needed funds from the United States and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary), Haiti 
promised in 1994 to make such reforms as privatization and 
reductions in the size of its civil service. In practice, however, 
the Haitian administration found it politically unwise to main- 
tain these commitments. Nevertheless, Haiti continues to 
receive international aid, including World Bank funding for 
two projects seeking to assist the poorest elements of the popu- 
lation — an Employment Generation Project and a Basic Infra- 



xxi 



structure Project designed to improve social services. In 
addition, the United States Agency for International Develop- 
ment spent more than US$300 million in Haiti over the period 
from 1994 to 1999, vaccinating people, providing food for 
school children, improving hillside agriculture to increase 
farmer income, grafting fruit trees, and repairing roads. In 
general, however, since the restoration of democratically 
elected government in 1994, Haiti has experienced political 
instability and as a consequence, difficulty in attracting foreign 
investment or tourists. 

Progress in the Dominican Republic's economic sphere, 
albeit more positive than Haiti's, has been uneven. Such sectors 
as the free-trade zones in which assembly plants are located 
and tourism are doing relatively well. Growth in tourism has 
been significant and steady, featuring an increase of 10 percent 
in 1999 over 1998 and an announcement by the Secretariat of 
State for Tourism that the number of tourists for the first three 
months of 2000 represented a 25 percent gain over 1999. 
Despite this progress, according to the Third National Survey 
of Household Expenditures and Incomes announced in 
November 1999, some 21 percent of the Dominican popula- 
tion is estimated to live in extreme poverty, including 33 per- 
cent of citizens in rural areas. Most residents of such areas lack 
access to potable water and some 25 percent lack electricity. 
Furthermore, a significant part of the population is affected by 
deficiencies in health care, housing, sanitation, and education. 
General dissatisfaction over lack of water supply, power out- 
ages, insufficient housing construction, and failure to repair 
roads led to strikes and popular demonstrations in 1999 and 
early 2000. The aftermath of Hurricane Georges that hit in 
September 1998 has aggravated the situation. Recovery is as yet 
incomplete despite international assistance, including the 
deployment of 3,000 United States Army personnel in 1999 to 
participate in Operation Caribbean Castle to rebuild destroyed 
bridges and rural schools. 

The economy of the Dominican Republic is strongly affected 
by the legacy of the country's troubled relationship with Haiti 
and its people. On the one hand, Haitian workers are needed 
for Dominican coffee and sugar harvests and for unskilled con- 
struction work. On the other hand, the Dominican govern- 
ment institutes regular deportations of Haitians and Dominico- 
Haitians born in the Dominican Republic. At present, some 
2,000 to 3,000 Haitians are deported monthly. In late 1999, 



xxii 



30,000 Haitians were reportedly deported, causing problems 
for the subsequent coffee harvest, which usually employs some 
35,000 Haitian coffeepickers. 

Recognizing that Haiti not only constitutes a significant 
source of the Dominican unskilled work force but also repre- 
sents a market for Dominican goods, some Dominican leaders 
have begun to urge that the Dominican Republic join other 
countries in providing aid to Haiti. In an address to a graduat- 
ing class of Dominican diplomats in 1999, President Leonel 
Fernandez Reyna stated that the international community 
needed to promote Haiti's social and economic development. 
Earlier, in August 1999, the Dominican deputy minister of state 
for foreign affairs predicted that Haitians would continue their 
illegal migration to the Dominican Republic until political sta- 
bility, economic progress, and a more equitable distribution of 
wealth were achieved in Haiti. However, in January 2000 the 
Dominican secretary of state for labor announced that no new 
work permits would be given to Haitians to enter the Domini- 
can Republic to cut sugarcane. Instead, he advised Dominican 
employers to improve working conditions in the cane fields in 
order either to induce Haitians already in the Dominican 
Republic — 500,000 Haitians are reportedly in the Dominican 
Republic — to work there or to attract indigenous Dominican 
workers. That a sizeable pool of potential Haitian workers 
exists in the Dominican Republic is suggested by the fact that 
in late 1999, the Haitian embassy in Santo Domingo issued 
44,000 birth certificates to Haitians living in the Dominican 
Republic. Although the possession of a birth certificate does 
not give a Haitian legal status in the Dominican Republic, it 
enables the person to acquire a Haitian passport, which is a 
prerequisite for obtaining temporary work. Concern over the 
living conditions of Haitian workers in the Dominican Repub- 
lic caused a number of Dominicans in the spring of 2000 to 
organize a peace march through Haiti to promote better con- 
ditions for such workers. 

Drug trafficking continues to plague both the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti. Concern over increased smuggling of 
cocaine and heroin from Colombia through the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti, to the greater New York area via Puerto 
Rico and South Florida for East Coast distribution, has resulted 
in a series of efforts to disrupt the traffic. One is a coordinated 
plan by the United States and the Dominican Republic to 
deploy soldiers in cities and military outposts along the 223- 



xxiii 



mile Dominican-Haitian border. The new Dominican inter- 
agency border patrol unit, which was formed in January 2000, 
will also act against illegal Haitian immigration and shipments 
of contraband weapons. In December 1999, the Dominican 
and Haitian police agreed to cooperate to fight drug traffick- 
ing, car theft, money laundering, and illegal immigration along 
their common border. To these ends, the Dominican Republic 
is setting up computerized police posts along the frontier. The 
chief of the United States Coast Guard visited the Dominican 
Republic in late March 2000 to coordinate implementation of 
the anti-drug efforts with the Dominican navy and the Secretar- 
iat of State for the Armed Forces. To date the various efforts 
are reportedly proving ineffective against corruption and the 
increased assault by traffickers on the vulnerable borders and 
institutions of Hispaniola. With regard to immigration control, 
in March 1999, the Dominican president and the governor of 
Puerto Rico met to strengthen measures against illegal Domin- 
ican immigration to Puerto Rico and thence to the United 
States mainland (Dominicans are the largest immigrant group 
in New York City) . 

Political instability and corruption have plagued both Haiti 
and the Dominican Republic. The problem has been particu- 
larly severe in Haiti since the end of the Duvalier regime. Fol- 
lowing Jean-Claude Duvalier's ouster in 1986, a group of 
generals, for years Duvalier loyalists, played a major role in the 
interim government. During elections in November 1987, 
Duvalierist supporters killed numerous Haitians waiting to 
vote, causing all the candidates to condemn the interim gov- 
ernment. Several fraudulent elections or seizures of power by 
military figures followed, prior to the election of a Roman 
Catholic priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, in December 1990. 
Identified with the poor, Aristide represented a threat to the 
country's establishment and was overthrown by a military coup 
after being in office less than a year. Following a United 
Nations-sanctioned, multilateral military intervention, Aristide 
was restored to office in October 1994. When Aristide's term 
expired in 1996, he was succeeded by Rene Preval. A bitter 
power struggle between Preval and the parliament, however, 
paralyzed Haiti's government and resulted in total governmen- 
tal gridlock in 1997 and 1998. In consequence, Haiti again 
began to experience popular unrest, opposition-incited inci- 
dents, and a stagnating economy. In December 1998, Preval's 
candidate for prime minister, Jacques Edouard Alexis, was con- 



xxiv 



firmed by a sharply divided legislature. In January 1999, Preval 
dissolved parliament because the electoral terms for most offi- 
cials had expired, appointed municipal officials as "interim 
executive agents" of the Ministry of Interior, and began to rule 
by decree until elections could be held. 

Complexities involved in setting up national elections 
resulted in three postponements from the original November 
1998 election date. To facilitate elections, the United States 
provided $3.5 million in aid for voter registration and allocated 
an additional $10-15 million toward the estimated election 
cost of $18.5 million. Haiti contributed a further $9 million. 

Haiti's sporadic violence, including shootings and other 
political disturbances — and the resulting danger to United 
States personnel — led Marine General Charles E. Wilhelm of 
the United States Southern Command, in February 1999 
closed-door testimony before a subcommittee of the House of 
Representatives Appropriations Committee, to advocate the 
withdrawal from Haiti of remaining United States troops. 
These 500 military personnel, remnants of the 20,000-strong 
force that went to Haiti during the international intervention 
of September 1994, had assisted Haiti by providing medical 
care to the populace, constructing schools, repairing wells, and 
training police. The last United States forces permanently sta- 
tioned in Haiti left in February 2000, but periodic training vis- 
its of United States military personnel, including the use of 
armed forces reservists, continue. 

A UN mission continues training the Haitian police force. 
Haitian faith in the rule of law has been severely tested, how- 
ever, because of police abuses that are exacerbated by a dys- 
functional judiciary. Violence can reach alarming levels in 
Haiti, as it did in the period preceding the May 2000 elections. 
Human rights activists have pressured former president Aris- 
tide to use his stature to denounce the use of violence. To date, 
Aristide has been unwilling to follow such a course, preferring 
to take steps behind the scenes as opposed to making public 
statements. 

In May 2000, Haiti held elections for 7,500 posts, including 
the entire Chamber of Deputies and two-thirds of the Senate as 
well as numerous municipal offices. Twenty-nine thousand can- 
didates from a wide spectrum of political parties and organiza- 
tions participated. Several hundred international observers 
joined a well organized national network of several thousand 
domestic observers. Voter turnout was at least 60 percent of the 



xxv 



4 million persons eligible. Despite delays, loud complaints 
from among the losing parties, some incidents, and various 
apparent irregularities in voting, the elections held on May 21 
were termed "credible" by international and domestic observ- 
ers and by the Organization of American States (OAS) Election 
Observation Mission. 

Although the Lavalas Family, the party of Aristide, appar- 
ently gained a substantial election victory at the ballot box, the 
OAS subsequently discovered a serious error in the method of 
determining the winners of Senate races as announced by the 
Provisional Electoral Council. The OAS asked the Council to 
recalculate the percentage of votes won by all candidates, an 
action that could force several declared Senate winners to take 
part in runoff voting. The runoff election was rescheduled for 
July 9. The Council, with strong support from the presidential 
palace, refused to accept the OAS recommendations, however, 
creating an emerging international confrontation. This con- 
flict is only the latest chapter in Haiti's troubled quest for post- 
dictatorial democracy. 

Conditions are somewhat better in the Dominican Republic, 
although there, too, political instability has existed. Leonel 
Fernandez won the 1996 runoff elections, but he has been 
unsuccessful in implementing many of his programs because of 
his party's small representation in Congress. In the 1998 elec- 
tions, following the death of Jose Peha Gomez, his opposition 
party, the Democratic Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucio- 
nario Dominicano — PRD), made sweeping gains. As a result, 
Congress in 1998 passed a new law abolishing the security of 
tenure of judges that Fernandez had achieved and making 
judges subject to reappointment every four years. A poll taken 
in April 2000 showed that no candidate for the May 2000 presi- 
dential elections had the just over 50 percent needed for elec- 
tion (Fernandez was ineligible to run again) . As it developed, 
with 99 percent of the ballots counted, the Electoral Council 
announced the evening of May 17 that the opposition PRD 
candidate, Hipolito Mejia, had received 49.87 percent of the 
vote. His nearest opponent, Danilo Medina of the governing 
Dominican Liberation Party, had 24.94 percent of the vote, and 
seven-time former president Joaquin Balaguer had 24.6 per- 
cent. At a press conference on May 18, Medina stated that a 
June 30 runoff election would cost too much in time, money, 
and tension and that a continued campaign would hurt the 
economy. Therefore he "acknowledged the victory of the 



xxvi 



PRD," laying the groundwork for Mejia's inauguration on 
August 16. 

The latest round of Hispaniola's elections indicates that 
while each side of the island has moved away markedly from 
the strong-man role of the past, the transition to the peaceful, 
transparent, and capable democratic governance required for 
much-needed sustained social and economic development will 
continue to be fraught with problems. 

June 30, 2000 Helen Chapin Metz 



xxvii 



Dominican Republic: Counry Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Dominican Republic. 
Short Form: Dominican Republic. 
Term for Citizens: Dominicans. 
Capital: Santo Domingo. 

Geography 

Size: Approximately 48,442 square kilometers. 



1 



Topography: Mountain ranges divide country into three 
regions: northern, central, and southwestern. Seven major 
drainage basins, most important that of Yaque del Norte River. 
Largest body of water, Lago Enriquillo (Lake Enriquillo), in 
southwest. Highest mountain peak, Pico Duarte, rises in 
Cordillera Central (Central Range) to height of 3,087 meters. 

Climate: Primarily tropical, with temperatures varying 
according to altitude. Seasons defined more by rainfall than by 
temperature. For most of country, rainy season runs roughly 
from May through October; dry season, from November 
through April. Rainfall not uniform throughout country 
because of mountain ranges. Tropical cyclones strike country 
on average of once every two years and usually have greatest 
impact along southern coast. 

Society 

Population: Annual rate of increase has been declining; was 1.6 
percent in mid-1990s. Total population estimated at just over 8 
million in 1997. 

Language: Spanish. 

Ethnic Groups: Approximately 75 percent of mid-1990s popu- 
lation mulatto, a legacy of black slavery during colonial period. 
Approximately 10 percent white; 15 percent black. 

Education and Literacy: An estimated 82 percent of population 
literate in 1997. Education system includes six years of 
compulsory primary education, an additional six years of 
secondary education, and higher education at one of more 
than twenty-seven postsecondary institutions. Major university 
and sole public institution is Autonomous University of Santo 
Domingo (Universidad Autonoma de Santo Domingo — 
UASD), with four regional centers in 1990s. 

Health: State-funded health programs reach 80 percent of 
population in theory (but 40 percent in reality). Facilities 
concentrated in Santo Domingo and Santiago de los 
Caballeros (Santiago); service in rural areas suffers 
accordingly. Main causes of death: pulmonary, circulatory, and 
cardiovascular diseases. Average life expectancy seventy years 
for 1990-95 period. 

Religion: More than 80 percent Roman Catholic. Protestant 
groups also active; evangelicals have been most successful in 



2 



attracting converts. 

Economy 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): About US$5.8 billion in 1996, 
or approximately US$716 per capita. 

Agriculture: Declining in significance since 1960s when 
agriculture employed almost 60 percent of workforce, 
accounted for 25 percent of GDP, and generated 80 to 90 
percent of total exports. By 1992 sector's share of exports had 
dropped to 43 percent and it employed 28 percent of labor 
force. By end 1995, agriculture's share of GDP at 12.7 percent 
and it employed 12.9 percent of workforce. Importance of 
sugar, traditionally major crop, has declined steadily; other 
significant crops: coffee, cocoa, and tobacco. Implementation 
of Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) (see Glossary) provided 
reduced tariff access to United States market for such items as 
ornamental plants, winter vegetables, spices, nuts, citrus, and 
tropical fruits. 

Industry: Domestic manufacturing and assembly operations in 
free zones accounted for 18.3 percent of GDP in 1998. 
Domestic manufacturing, including consumer goods, food, 
and cigar production, grew by 10.1 percent in first half 1998. 
Growth resulted partly from dramatic increase in United States 
demand for cigars, for which Dominican Republic is leading 
supplier. Industrial free zones numbered thirty-three by 1995 
and employed some 165,000 workers in 469 companies; 
number of employees increased to 182,000 in 1997, but 
number of firms operating in free zones dropped to 434. Free- 
zone exports generated needed foreign exchange: US$2 
billion in 1996 and US$3.8 billion in 1997 — almost 75 percent 
of total Dominican export earnings. 

Services: Tourism leading service industry; generated more 
than US$1.55 billion in foreign exchange in 1995 and US$2.1 
billion in 1997. Sector employed 44,000 hotel workers directly 
and additional 110,000 indirectly. Number of tourists almost 
tripled in ten years, from 278,000 in 1975 to 792,000 in 1985, 
surpassed 1 million in 1987, and jumped to 1,766,800 in 1994 
to 1,930,000 in 1996 to 2,211,000 in 1997. In 1997 country 
became second largest earner of tourism dollars in Caribbean, 
after Mexico. 

Currency: Issued by Central Bank of the Dominican Republic 



3 



since 1948, Dominican Republic peso (RD$) was officially 
maintained on par with US$ until 1985, when it was floated 
(and devalued) against the dollar until it stabilized at US$1 = 
RD$6.35 in 1989. After experiments with multiple exchange 
rates, all rates were unified in 1997 on free-market basis and at 
initial rate of US$1 = RD$14. After Hurricane Georges, official 
rate dropped to US$1 = RD$15.46. Commercial rate was US$1 
= RD$16.25 in January 2000. 

Imports: Total imports in 1998: US$3,403.1 million. Deep 
plunge in oil prices reduced Dominican fuel bill by about 20 
percent to US$336 million in first half 1998, but total value of 
imports increased by 15 percent over 1997 as aftermath of 
Hurricane Georges, which left 300 people dead and hundreds 
of thousands homeless. Government officials estimated surge 
in imports related to reconstruction effort at US$700 million 
through 1999. 

Exports: Total exports in 1998: US$2,457.6 million. Sharp de- 
cline in world commodity prices caused by 1997 Asian currency 
crisis created negative impact on trade deficit. Exports of 
nickel, major Dominican earner of foreign exchange, suffered 
27 percent price drop and fell 38.4 percent in 1998. Coffee 
exports adversely affected by 10 percent decline in inter- 
national prices. Export of sugar and sugar products in 1998 
decreased 29.6 percent, mainly as result of 24 percent cut in 
Dominican international sugar quota. 

Balance of Payments: Trade deficits continued into 1990s, 
hitting record US$1,639 billion in 1993, 1.4 percent increase 
over 1992, and exceeding US$1.5 billion in 1994. Deficits 
registered continued deterioration: from US$832 million in 
first half 1997 to US$945 million in first half 1998. 

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Fiscal Policy: President Leonel Fernandez Reyna's campaign 
against tax evasion (upon taking office in 1996) proved 
successful: budgetary income in 1997 was 31 percent highei 
than in 1996. Reforms in late 1990s included strengthening 
Central Bank's autonomy and tightening credit and wage 
systems. Inflation plunged from 80 percent in 1990 to 9 
percent in 1995. External public debt as share of GDP more 
than halved (to 33 percent) in same period. Unemployment 
rate declined from about 20 percent in 1991-93 to about 16 
percent in 1995. 



4 



Transportation and Communications 



Roads: Most roadways of 17,200-kilometer network narrow and 
flood easily. Worsening conditions prompted World Bank (see 
Glossary) and Inter-American Development Bank to finance 
better maintenance systems. Major road construction program 
initiated in late 1990s to develop intercity routes and urban 
projects in Santo Domingo. 

Railroads: 1,600-kilometer railroad system, one of longest in 
Caribbean, most of which owned by state sugar enterprise. 
Several private rail companies also serve sugar industry. 

Ports: Of fourteen ports, only five are major. Largest, Santo 
Domingo, handles 80 percent of imports; has cruiseliner berth 
enlarged in 1997. Other major ports include Haina, Boca 
Chica, and San Pedro de Macoris on south coast, and Puerta 
Plata on north coast. 

Airports: Five international airports: Santo Domingo, Puerta 
Plata, Punta Cana, La Romana, and Barahona. Sixth airport 
under construction at Samana in late 1990s. Puerto Plata and 
Punta Cana main airports for charter flights; Las Americas near 
Santo Domingo for scheduled flights. American Airlines 
dominant carrier, with routes to many United States cities, 
chiefly Miami and New York. 

Telecommunications: Industry fastest growing element of 
economy, doubling share of GDP to 4.6 percent since 
government opened sector to competition in 1990. In first half 
1998, grew by 20.8 percent. Telephone system includes direct 
domestic and international dialing, toll-free access to United 
States through 800 numbers, high-speed data transmission 
capabilities, fiber-optic cables, and digital switching. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Republic with elected representative 
governmental system. Executive is dominant branch. 
Presidents serve four-year terms and, following a 1994 
constitutional reform, cannot be reelected immediately. 
Legislature, known formally as Congress of the Republic, 
consists of Senate and Chamber of Deputies. Judicial power 
exercised by Supreme Court of Justice and by other courts 
created by 1966 constitution and by law. Following a 1994 



5 



constitutional reform, Supreme Court judges are chosen by a 
Council of the Magistrature, with membership from all three 
branches of government; other judges are chosen by the 
Supreme Court. Provincial (state) governors appointed by 
president; municipalities (counties) governed by elected 
mayors and municipal councils. 

Politics: Following independence from Haiti in 1844, country 
characterized by instability for almost a century. Dictator Rafael 
Leonidas Trujillo Molina took power in 1930 and ruled in 
repressive authoritarian fashion until his assassination in 1961. 
Brief civil war in 1965 between liberal Constitutionalists — 
supporters of 1963 constitution promulgated during short- 
lived presidency of Juan Bosch Gaviho — and conservative 
Loyalist military factions. Subsequent elections brought 
Trujillo protege Joaquin Balaguer Ricardo to presidency, an 
office he held for twelve years. Balaguer's attempt to nullify 
1978 elections thwarted by pressure from Washington, allowing 
Silvestre Antonio Guzman Fernandez of social democratic 
Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario 
Dominicano — PRD) to assume nation's leadership. PRD also 
won 1982 elections with lawyer Salvador Jorge Blanco as its 
standard bearer. Both PRD governments plagued by economic 
difficulties that forced them to institute austerity measures 
instead of social reforms they initially advocated. Declining 
popularity of Jorge Blanco government contributed to 
Balaguer's election for a fourth term beginning in 1986. 
Balaguer retained power through increasingly conflictual and 
questioned elections in 1990 and 1994; he agreed to shorten 
his term in 1994 to two years and accept constitutional reforms 
including no immediate reelection. Leonel Fernandez Reyna 
of the Party of Dominican Liberation (Partido de la Liberacion 
Dominicana — PLD) won 1996 presidential elections. 

International Relations: Diplomatic activities concentrated on 
Caribbean, Latin America, United States, and Western Europe. 
Relations with neighboring Haiti traditionally strained as a 
result of historical conflicts, cultural divergences, and most 
recently, increased migration into the Dominican Republic 
from Haiti. Most important international relationship with 
United States, on which Dominican Republic has political, 
economic, and strategic dependence. 

International Agreements and Memberships: Signatory of 
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) 



6 



and all major inter-American conventions. Member of United 
Nations and its specialized agencies, Organization of American 
States, International Monetary Fund (see Glossary), Inter- 
American Development Bank, and other multilateral financial 
institutions. Also member of World Trade Organization, 
African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of Nations, and other 
regional trade groupings. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Dominican armed forces consist of army, navy, 
and air force. Total personnel in 1999 reported to be 24,300. 

Organization: President is constitutional commander in chief. 
Chain of command extends downward to secretary of state for 
the armed forces, then to deputy secretaries of state for 
individual branches of service, each of which administered 
through a chief of staff and a general staff. Chiefs of staff 
exercise operational control except in emergencies. Country 
divided into three defense zones: Southern Defense Zone, 
Western Defense Zone, and Northern Defense Zone. 

Equipment: Army equipment includes twenty-four French and 
United States light tanks, armored vehicles, half-tracks, and 
towed howitzers, largely outmoded and poorly maintained. 
Dominican navy in 1999 consisted primarily of twelve armed 
patrol vessels, mostly United States-made craft of World War II 
vintage. Dominican air force organized into three flying 
squadrons: one of Cessna A-37B Dragonfly jets, one of C-47 
transports, and one of helicopters. 

Police: Internal security responsibility shared by armed forces 
and National Police. Total police manpower in 1998 about 
15,000. Commanded by director general subordinate to 
secretary of state for interior and police. National Department 
of Investigations, a domestic intelligence unit, and National 
Drug Control Directorate are independent bodies reporting 
directly to president. 



7 



9{prtft Mtantic Ocean 




1 

Dajabori* ~~V. ^ 1 o* 
\ 7 • ^ V 

: JSabaneta.i 

^12/^13/ 



International 

boundary 
Provincial boundary 
National capital 
Provincial capital 

20 40 Kilometers 



HAITI ;i 8 



.•— « E//as P/'na 



Santiago (jSqlcedo 

•f \5l •Sah£ranc 

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San Juan C 



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13 \Bonady. 



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20 

*zuaV? 1 ^ San \ 



17 




P/afa 



Dominican Republic: Administrative Divisions 

PROVINCES 

La Altagracia (11) 
Azua (20) 
Baoruco (27) 
Barahona (29) 
Dajabon (12) 
Duarte (6) 
Elias Piha (18) 
Espaillat (4) 
Hato Mayor (9) 
Independencia (28) 



Maria Trinidad 
Sanchez (7) 
Monsehor Nouel 
Monte Cristi (1) 
Monte Plata (17) 
National District (24) 
Pedernales (30) 
Peravia (21) 
Puerto Plata (3) 
La Romana (26) 
Salcedo (5) 



Samana (8) 
San Cristobal (23) 
Sanchez Ramirez (16) 
San Juan (19) 
San Pedro de 
Macoris (25) 
Santiago (14) 
Santiago Rodriguez (13) 
ElSeibo (10) 
Valverde (2) 
La Vega (15) 



Figure 2. Dominican Republic: Administrative Divisions, 1999 



8 



Table A. Dominican Republic: Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



1492 

1492-1697 
1503 

1586 

1697 

1801 
1802 

1809 
1818-43 

1821 

1838 

1844 

1849 

1861 
1865 
1882-99 
1905 

1916-24 
1930-61 

1937 

1942 

1965 April 28 

1966-78 

1978-82 

1982-86 
1986-96 
1996 



February 27 
July 12 



March 18 
March 3 



Columbus lands at present-day Mole Saint-Nicolas, Haiti; establishes 
first permanent Spanish New World settlement at site of Santo Dom- 
ingo. 

Spain colonizes Hispaniola. 

Nicolas de Ovando named governor and supreme justice; institutes 
encomienda system. Importation of African slaves begins. 

Sir Francis Drake captures city of Santo Domingo, collects ransom 
for returning it to Spain. 

Spain, under Treaty of Ryswick, cedes western third of Hispaniola 
(Saint-Domingue — modern Haiti) to France. 

Toussaint Louverture invades Santo Domingo, abolishes slavery. 

France occupies the Spanish-speaking colony, reinstituting slavery in 
that part of the island. 

Spanish rule is restored. 

Under presidency of Jean-Pierre Boyer, Haiti invades and occupies 
Santo Domingo; abolishes slavery. 

Spanish lieutenant governor Jose Nunez de Caceres declares col- 
ony's independence as Spanish Haiti. 

Juan Pablo Duarte creates secret independence movement, La Trini- 
taria. 

La Trinitaria members and others rebel; Santo Domingo gains inde- 
pendence. 

Pedro Santana's forces take Santo Domingo and proclaim Santana 
ruler. 

Buenaventura Baez Mendez becomes president; Santana expels him 
in 1853. (Baez resumes presidency 1865-66, 1868-74, 1878-79). 

Santana announces annexation of Dominican Republic by Spain. 

Queen of Spain approves repeal of Santo Domingo annexation. 

Ulises Heureaux rules as president/dictator. 

General Customs Receivership established; United States adminis- 
ters Dominican finances. 

United States marines occupy Dominican Republic 

Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, head of National Guard, becomes 
president/ dictator; rules directly or indirectly until assassinated. 

Dominican military massacre some 15,000-20,000 Haitians near 
Dominican-Haitian border. 

Dominican women given suffrage. 

United States intervenes, fearing a potential communist takeover 
because Dominican troops are unable to control a civil war. 

Joaquin Balaguer Ricardo becomes president in 1966, and United 
States troops leave. 

Antonio Guzman Fernandez becomes president; creates a more 
democratic regime. 

Salvador Jorge Blanco elected president. 
Balaguer returns to presidency. 

In free elections, Leonel Fernandez Reyna is elected in second 
round. 



9 



Table A. (Cont.) Dominican Republic: Chronology of Important Events 



Period 


Description 


1997 


Newly created Council of the Magistrature appoints a distinguished 




new Supreme Court. 


1998 May 


Fair congressional and municipal elections held one week after 


death of noted politician Jose Francisco Pena Gomez. 



10 



Chapter 1. Dominican Republic: 
Historical Setting 



Tomb of the three fathers of the Dominican Republic in Santo Domingo 



IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, the past has weighed 
heavily on current political practices. The country's historical 
evolution, for example, has proved particularly inimical to 
democratic development, deviating significantly from patterns 
viewed as optimum for the development of democracy. Politi- 
cal scientist Robert Dahl has argued that sequences in which 
successful experiences with limited liberalization are followed 
by gradually greater inclusiveness appear to favor democracy. 
The analyst Eric Nordlinger has asserted that the pattern most 
promising for the development of democracy is one in which 
national identity emerges first, then legitimate and authorita- 
tive state structures are institutionalized, and ultimately mass 
parties and a mass electorate emerge with the extension of citi- 
zenship rights to non-elite elements. 

The pattern followed by the Dominican Republic was very 
different. The country's colonial period was marked by the dec- 
imation of the indigenous population, and then by poverty and 
warfare. National integration was truncated, first by a Haitian 
invasion and then by the attempts of some Dominican elites to 
trade nascent Dominican sovereignty for security by having for- 
eign powers annex the country, while enriching themselves in 
the process. State building also suffered under the dual impact 
of international vulnerability and unstable, neopatrimonial, 
authoritarian politics. Both integration and state building were 
also impaired by bitter regional struggles based on different 
economic interests and desires for power that accentuated the 
politics of the country. In this context, the failure of early 
efforts to extend liberal guarantees and citizenship rights to 
vast sectors of the population served to reinforce past patterns 
of behavior. Nonetheless, reform efforts continually 
reemerged. 

Indeed, a Dominican state arguably did not emerge until the 
late nineteenth century or even the era of Rafael Leonidas 
Trujillo Molina (1930-61). Trujillo's emergence, in turn, was 
unquestionably facilitated by changes wrought by the eight- 
year United States occupation of the Dominican Republic at 
the beginning of the twentieth century. Trujillo's pattern of 
rule could not have been more hostile to democratic gover- 
nance. His centralization of power, monopolization of the 
economy, destruction or co-optation of enemies, and astonish- 



13 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

ing constitutional hypocrisy were, however, combined with the 
forging of national integration, the establishment of state insti- 
tutions, and the beginnings of industrialization, although in a 
distorted manner. 

Thus, the country essentially had no history of democratic 
rule prior to 1961, despite the presence of a liberal constitu- 
tional tradition. In the context of contradictory and extensive 
United States actions both to foster democracy and to block 
perceived communist threats, efforts toward democratic transi- 
tion following the death of Trujillo ultimately failed. The short- 
lived democratic regime of Juan Bosch Gavino (1962) was fol- 
lowed by unstable governments and ultimately by United States 
intervention in 1965 out of fear of a "second Cuba." A key fig- 
ure from the Trujillo era, Joaquin Balaguer Ricardo, was to 
govern the country for twenty-two of the next thirty years, from 
1966 to 1978 and again from 1986 to 1996. His rule combined 
political stagnation with dramatic socioeconomic transforma- 
tion. The 1978 democratic transition following Balaguer's 
authoritarian twelve-year period in office ended in return to 
the pre-democratic status quo. Although Balaguer was ushered 
back into office through democratic elections in 1986, his 
increasingly authoritarian rule finally ended when he stepped 
down from the presidency in 1996. 

The Dominican Republic is entering the new millennium 
bolstered by potential changes in political leadership, signifi- 
cant evolution in the country's social structure, and an interna- 
tional environment more favorable to political democracy. 
However, the country also faces formidable challenges in terms 
of continued political fragmentation, difficult economic adjust- 
ments, and corruption and criminal violence associated in part 
with drug trafficking. 

The First Colony 

The island of Hispaniola (La Isla Espanola) was the first New 
World colony settled by Spain. Christopher Columbus first 
sighted the island in 1492 toward the end of his first voyage to 
"the Indies." Columbus and his crew found the island inhab- 
ited by a large population of friendly Taino (Arawak) Indians, 
who made the explorers welcome. The land was fertile, but of 
greater importance to the Spaniards was the discovery that 
gold could be obtained either by barter with the natives or by 
extraction from alluvial deposits on the island. 



14 



Dominican Republic: Historical Setting 

Spain's first permanent settlement in the New World was 
established on the southern coast at the present site of Santo 
Domingo. Under Spanish sovereignty, the entire island bore 
the name Santo Domingo. Indications of the presence of 
gold — the lifeblood of the nascent mercantilist system — and a 
population of tractable natives who could be used as laborers 
combined to attract Spanish newcomers interested in acquir- 
ing wealth quickly during the early years. Their relations with 
the Taino Indians, whom they ruthlessly maltreated, deterio- 
rated from the beginning. Aroused by continued seizures of 
their food supplies, other exactions, and abuse of their women, 
the formerly peaceful Indians rebelled — only to be crushed 
decisively in 1495. 

Columbus, who ruled the colony as royal governor until 
1499, devised the repartimiento system of land settlement and 
native labor under which a settler, without assuming any obliga- 
tion to the authorities, could be granted in perpetuity a large 
tract of land together with the services of the Indians living on 
it. 

In 1503 the Spanish crown instituted the encomienda system. 
Under this system, all land became in theory the property of 
the crown, and the Indians were considered tenants on royal 
land. The crown's right to service from the tenants could be 
transferred in trust to individual Spanish settlers (encomenderos) 
by formal grant and the regular payment of tribute. The 
encomenderos were entitled to certain days of labor from the 
Indians, and they assumed the responsibility of providing for 
the physical well-being of the Indians and for their instruction 
in Christianity. Although an encomienda theoretically did not 
involve ownership of land, in practice it did — ownership was 
just gained through other means. 

The privations that the Indians suffered demonstrated the 
unrealistic nature of the encomienda system, which the Spanish 
authorities never effectively enforced. The Indian population 
died off rapidly from exhaustion, starvation, disease, and other 
causes. When the Spanish landed, they forced an estimated 
400,000 Tainos (out of a total Taino population of some 1 mil- 
lion) to work for them; by 1508 the Tainos numbered only 
around 60,000. By 1535 only a few dozen were still alive. The 
need for a new labor force to meet the growing demands of 
sugarcane cultivation in the 1520s prompted an increase in the 
importation of African slaves, which had begun in 1503. By 



L5 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

1546 the colony had some 12,000 slaves and a white population 
of under 5,000. 

The granting of land without any obligation to central 
authorities, as was done under the repartimiento system, led to a 
rapid decentralization of power. Power was also diffused 
because of the tendency of the capital city, Santo Domingo 
(which also served as the seat of government for the entire 
Spanish Indies) , to orient itself toward continental America, 
which provided gold for the crown, and toward Spain, which 
provided administrators, supplies, and immigrants to the colo- 
nies. With little contact existing between the capital and the 
hinterland, local government was doomed to be ineffective, 
and for practical purposes the countryside fell under the sway 
of the large local landowners. 

As early as the 1490s, the landowners among the Spanish col- 
onists successfully conspired against Columbus. His successor, 
Francisco de Bobadilla, was appointed chief justice and royal 
commissioner by the Spanish crown in 1499. Bobadilla sent 
Columbus back to Spain in irons; Queen Isabella soon ordered 
him released. Bobadilla, who had proved an inept administra- 
tor, was replaced in 1503 by the more efficient Nicolas de 
Ovando, who assumed the titles of governor and supreme jus- 
tice. Because of his success in initiating reforms desired by the 
crown — the encomienda system among them — Ovando received 
the title of Founder of Spain's Empire in the Indies. 

In 1509 Columbus's son, Diego, was appointed governor of 
the colony of Santo Domingo. Diego's ambition aroused the 
suspicions of the crown, which in 1511 established the audien- 
cia, a new political institution intended to check the power of 
the governor. The first audiencia was simply a tribunal com- 
posed of three judges whose jurisdiction extended over all the 
West Indies. The tribunal's influence grew, and in 1524 it was 
designated the Royal Audiencia of Santo Domingo (Audiencia 
Real de Santo Domingo), with jurisdiction in the Caribbean, 
the Atlantic coast of Central America and Mexico, and the 
northern coast of South America. As a court representing the 
crown, the audiencia was given expanded powers that encom- 
passed administrative, legislative, and consultative functions; 
the number of judges increased correspondingly. In criminal 
cases, the audiencia s decisions were final, but important civil 
suits could be appealed to the Royal and Supreme Council of 
the Indies (Real y Supremo Consejo de Indias) in Spain. 



16 



Dominican Republic: Historical Setting 

The Council of the Indies, created by Charles V in 1524, was 
the Spanish crown's main agency for directing colonial affairs. 
During most of its existence, the council exercised almost abso- 
lute power in making laws, administering justice, controlling 
finance and trade, supervising the church, and directing 
armies. 

The arm of the Council of the Indies that dealt with all mat- 
ters concerned with commerce between Spain and the colonies 
in the Americas was the House of Trade (Casa de Contra- 
tacion), organized in 1503. Control of commerce in general, 
and of tax collection in particular, was facilitated by the desig- 
nation of monopoly seaports on either side of the Atlantic 
Ocean. Trade between the colonies and countries other than 
Spain was prohibited. The crown also restricted trade among 
the colonies. These restrictions hampered economic activity in 
the New World and encouraged contraband traffic. 

The Roman Catholic Church became the primary agent in 
spreading Spanish culture in the Americas. The ecclesiastical 
organization developed for Santo Domingo and later estab- 
lished throughout Spanish America reflected a union of 
church and state closer than that which actually prevailed in 
Spain itself. The Royal Patronage of the Indies (Real Patronato 
de Indias, or, as it was called later, the Patronato Real) served as 
the organizational agent of this affiliation of the church and 
the Spanish crown. 

Santo Domingo's importance to Spain declined in the first 
part of the sixteenth century as the gold mines became 
exhausted and the local Indian population was decimated. 
With the conquest of Mexico by Hernan Cortes in 1521 and 
the discovery there, and later in Peru, of great wealth in gold 
and silver, large numbers of colonists left for Mexico and Peru, 
and new immigrants from Spain also largely bypassed Santo 
Do-mingo. 

The stagnation that prevailed in Santo Domingo for the next 
250 years was interrupted on several occasions by armed 
engagements, as the French and British attempted to weaken 
Spain's economic and political dominance in the New World. 
In 1586 the British admiral, Sir Francis Drake, captured the city 
of Santo Domingo and collected a ransom for its return to 
Spanish control. In 1655 Oliver Cromwell dispatched a British 
fleet commanded by Sir William Penn to take Santo Domingo. 
After meeting heavy resistance, the British sailed farther west 
and took Jamaica instead. 



17 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

The withdrawal of the colonial government from the north- 
ern coastal region opened the way for French buccaneers, who 
had a base on Tortuga Island (lie de la Tortue), off the north- 
west coast of present-day Haiti, to settle on Hispaniola in the 
mid-seventeenth century. The creation of the French West 
India Company in 1664 signaled France's intention to colonize 
western Hispaniola. Intermittent warfare went on between 
French and Spanish settlers over the next three decades; Spain, 
however, was hard-pressed by warfare in Europe and could not 
maintain a garrison in Santo Domingo sufficient to protect the 
entire island against encroachment. In 1697, under the Treaty 
of Ryswick, Spain ceded the western third of the island to 
France. The exact boundary of this territory (Saint- 
Domingue — modern Haiti) was not established at the time of 
cession and remained in question until 1929. 

During the first years of the eighteenth century, landowners 
in the Spanish colony did little with their huge holdings, and 
the sugar plantations along the southern coast were aban- 
doned because of harassment by pirates. Foreign trade all but 
ceased, and almost all domestic commerce took place in the 
capital city. 

The Bourbon dynasty replaced the Habsburgs in Spain in 
1700. The new regime introduced innovations — especially eco- 
nomic reforms — that gradually began to revive trade in Santo 
Domingo. The crown progressively relaxed the rigid controls 
and restrictions on commerce between the mother country 
and the colonies and among the colonies. By the middle of the 
century, both immigration and the importation of slaves had 
increased. 

In 1765 the Caribbean islands received authorization for 
almost unlimited trade with Spanish ports; permission for the 
Spanish colonies in America to trade among themselves fol- 
lowed in 1774. Soon duties on many commodities were greatly 
reduced or removed altogether. By 1790 traders from any port 
in Spain could buy and sell anywhere in Spanish America, and 
by 1800 Spain had opened colonial trade to all neutral vessels. 

As a result of the stimulus provided by the trade reforms, the 
population of the colony of Santo Domingo increased from 
about 6,000 in 1737 to approximately 100,000 in 1790, with 
roughly equal numbers of whites, free coloreds, and slaves. The 
size and composition of Santo Domingo's population con- 
trasted sharply, however, with that of the neighboring and far 
more prosperous French colony of Saint-Domingue, where 



18 



Dominican Republic: Historical Setting 

some 30,000 whites and 27,000 freedmen extracted labor from 
some 400,000 black slaves. 

The Struggle for Formal Sovereignty 

The nineteenth-century struggle for independence of what 
was to become the Dominican Republic was an incredibly diffi- 
cult process, conditioned by the evolution of its neighbor. 
Although they shared the island of Hispaniola, the colonies of 
Saint-Domingue and Santo Domingo followed disparate paths, 
primarily as a result of economic factors. Saint-Domingue was 
the most productive agricultural colony in the Western Hemi- 
sphere, and its output contributed heavily to the economy of 
France (see French Colony of Saint-Domingue, 1697-1803, 
ch.6.) Prosperous French plantation owners imported great 
numbers of slaves from Africa and drove this captive work force 
ruthlessly. By contrast, Santo Domingo was a small, unimpor- 
tant, and largely ignored colony with little impact on the econ- 
omy of Spain. 

Although by the end of the eighteenth century economic 
conditions were improving somewhat, landowners in Santo 
Domingo did not enjoy the same level of wealth attained by 
their French counterparts in Saint-Domingue. The absence of 
market-driven pressure to increase production enabled the 
domestic labor force to meet the needs of subsistence agricul- 
ture and to export at low levels. Thus, Santo Domingo 
imported far fewer slaves than did Saint-Domingue. Spanish 
law also allowed a slave to purchase his freedom and that of his 
family for a relatively small sum. This fact contributed to the 
higher proportion of freedmen in the Spanish colony than in 
Haiti; by the turn of the century, freedmen actually constituted 
the majority of the population. Again, in contrast to conditions 
in the French colony, this population profile contributed to a 
somewhat more egalitarian society, plagued much less by racial 
schisms. 

With a revolution against the monarchy well underway in 
France, the inevitable explosion took place in Saint-Domingue 
in August 1791 (see Fight for Independence, 1791-1803, ch. 
6). The initial reaction of many Spanish colonists to news of 
the slaughter of Frenchmen by armies of rebellious black slaves 
was to flee Hispaniola entirely. Spain, however, saw in the 
unrest an opportunity to seize all or part of the western third of 
the island through an alliance of convenience with the British. 
These intentions, however, did not survive encounters in the 



19 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

field with forces led by the former slave Francois Dominique 
Toussaint Louverture. By mid-1795, Spain had signed a peace 
treaty with France in which it surrendered the eastern part of 
the island; the terms of the treaty reflected Spain's setbacks in 
Europe and its relative decline as a world power. In recognition 
of his leadership against the Spanish (under whose banner he 
had begun his military career) , British, and rebellious royalists 
and mulattoes, Toussaint was named governor general of Saint- 
Domingue by the French Republic in 1796. After losing more 
than 25,000 troops, Britain withdrew from the island in April 
1798. Toussaint marched into Santo Domingo in January 1801; 
one of his first measures was to abolish slavery. 

France occupied the devastated Spanish-speaking colony in 
February 1802. The Spanish and Dominican elites on the Span- 
ish part of the island allied themselves with the French, who 
reinstituted slavery in that part of the island. However, the 
expeditionary force dispatched by Napoleon Bonaparte was 
defeated by the forces of the former French slaves, led by Tou- 
ssaint — and later by Jean-Jacques Dessalines. Yellow fever, 
malaria, and war led to the loss of 52,000 French soldiers. 
Upon defeating the French, Dessalines and his followers estab- 
lished the independent Republic of Haiti in January 1804 (see 
Fight for Independence, 1791-1803, ch.6). A small French 
presence, however, remained in the former Spanish colony, in 
spite of Haitian pressures. 

By 1808 a number of emigre Spanish landowners had 
returned to Santo Domingo. These royalists had no intention 
of living under French rule, however, and sought foreign aid 
and assistance to restore Spanish sovereignty. Help came from 
the Haitians, who provided arms, and the British, who occu- 
pied Samana and blockaded the port of Santo Domingo in 
1809. The remaining French representatives fled the island in 
July 1809. 

The 1809 restoration of Spanish rule ushered in an era 
referred to by some historians as Espaha Boba (Foolish Spain). 
Under the despotic rule of Ferdinand VII, the colony's econ- 
omy deteriorated severely. Some Dominicans began to wonder 
if their interests would not best be served by the sort of inde- 
pendence movement that was sweeping the South American 
colonies. In keeping with this sentiment, Spanish lieutenant 
governor Jose Nunez de Caceres announced the colony's inde- 
pendence as the state of Spanish Haiti on November 30, 1821. 
Caceres requested admission to the Republic of Gran Colom- 



bo 



Dominican Republic: Historical Setting 

bia (consisting of what later became Colombia, Ecuador, Vene- 
zuela, and Panama) , recently proclaimed established by Simon 
Bolivar and his followers. While the request was in transit, how- 
ever, the president of Haiti, Jean-Pierre Boyer, decided to 
invade Santo Domingo and to reunite the island under the 
Haitian flag. 

The twenty- two-year Haitian occupation that followed 
(1822-44) is recalled by Dominicans as a period of brutal mili- 
tary rule, although the reality is more complex. Haiti's policies 
toward Santo Domingo were induced in part by international 
financial pressures because Haiti had promised in an 1825 
treaty to indemnify former French settlers in return for French 
recognition of Haitian independence. Ultimately, it was a 
period of economic decline and of growing resentment of 
Haiti among Dominicans. The main activity was subsistence 
agriculture, and exports consisted of small amounts of tobacco, 
cattle hides, caoba wood (Dominican mahogany), molasses, 
and rum; the population, in turn, had declined precipitously 
by 1909 to some 75,000 people. Boyer attempted to enforce in 
the new territory the Rural Code (Code Rural) he had decreed 
in an effort to improve productivity among the Haitian yeo- 
manry; however, the Dominicans proved no more willing to 
adhere to its provisions than were the Haitians (see Early Years 
of Independence, 1804-43, ch. 6). Increasing numbers of 
Dominican landowners chose to flee the island rather than live 
under Haitian rule; in many cases, Haitian administrators 
encouraged such emigration. 

Dominicans also resented the fact that Boyer, the ruler of an 
impoverished country, did not (or could not) provision his 
army. The occupying Haitian forces lived off the land in Santo 
Domingo, commandeering or confiscating what they needed. 
Racial animosities also affected attitudes on both sides; black 
Haitian troops reacted with resentment toward lighter-skinned 
Dominicans, while Dominicans came to associate the Haitians' 
dark skin with the oppression and abuses of occupation. Fur- 
thermore, Haitians, who associated the Roman Catholic 
Church with the French colonists who had so cruelly exploited 
and abused them before independence, confiscated all church 
property in the east, deported all foreign clergy, and severed 
the ties of the remaining clergy to the Vatican. The occupation 
reinforced Dominicans' perception of themselves as different 
from Haitians with regard to culture, religion, race, and daily 
practices. 



21 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Scattered unrest and isolated confrontations between Hai- 
tians and Dominicans soon began; by 1838 significant orga- 
nized movements against Haitian domination formed. The 
most important was led by Juan Pablo Duarte of a prominent 
Santo Domingo family who returned from seven years of study 
in Europe to find his father's business had been ruined under 
Haitian occupation. Unlike many of the country's subsequent 
caudillo rulers, Duarte was an idealist, an ascetic, and a genu- 
ine nationalist. Although he played no significant part in its 
rule, he is considered the father of his country. He certainly 
provided the inspiration and impetus for achieving indepen- 
dence from Haiti. 

In July 1838, Duarte led the effort to create a secret move- 
ment, dubbed La Trinitaria (The Trinity). Its original nine 
members had organized themselves into cells of three; the cells 
went on to recruit as separate organizations, maintaining strict 
secrecy. At the same time, the name clearly evoked the Holy 
Trinity. Its motto was "Dios, Patria, y Libertad" (God, Country, 
and Liberty), and the movement's flag and shield had a cross 
and an open Bible — all of which became national symbols. 
Dominican nationality became defined in religious and His- 
panic terms, which permitted contrast to Haiti. As the coun- 
try's principal enemy was the anti-Catholic and non-Spanish- 
speaking Haiti, and perhaps because the Catholic Church was 
very weak in the country, Dominican liberals were largely pro- 
church, in contrast to their counterparts in the rest of Central 
and South America. 

The catalyst that helped set off the Dominican struggle for 
independence was the overthrow of Boyer in the Haitian Revo- 
lution of 1843. Initially good relations between liberal Haitians 
and liberal Dominicans in Dominican territory, however, soon 
grew tense. General Charles Riviere-Herard successfully 
cracked down on the Trinitarios, forcing Duarte to flee in 
August 1843. However, Francisco del Rosario Sanchez, Duarte's 
brother Vicente, and Ramon Mella helped to reestablish the 
Trinitaria movement. They planned an independence effort 
built around arms that a returning Duarte was to bring in late 
December; however, Duarte failed in his efforts to gain the nec- 
essary weapons and was forced to postpone his return home 
because of a serious illness. Concurrently, other conspiracies 
flourished, particularly one seeking to gain the support of 
France. When Duarte had not returned by February 1844, the 
rebels agreed to launch their uprising without him. 



22 



Dominican Republic: Historical Setting 

On February 27, 1844 — thereafter celebrated as Dominican 
Independence Day — the rebels seized the Ozama fortress in 
the capital. The Haitian garrison, taken by surprise and appar- 
ently betrayed by at least one of its sentries, retired in disarray. 
Within two days, all Haitian officials had departed Santo Do- 
mingo. Mella headed the provisional governing junta of the 
new Dominican Republic. Duarte returned to his country on 
March 14, and on the following day entered the capital amidst 
great adulation and celebration. However, the optimism gener- 
ated by revolutionary triumph would eventually give way to the 
more prosaic realities of the struggle for power. 

Ambivalent Sovereignty, Caudillo Rule, and Political 
Instability 

The decades following independence from Haiti were 
marked by complex interactions among Dominican governing 
groups, opposition movements, Haitian authorities, and repre- 
sentatives of France, Britain, Spain, and the United States. 
Duarte and the liberal merchants who had led the initial inde- 
pendence effort were soon swept out of office and into exile, 
and the independent tobacco growers and merchants of the 
northern Cibao valley, who tended to favor national indepen- 
dence, were unable to consolidate control of the center. Gov- 
ernment revolved largely around a small number of caudillo 
strongmen, particularly Pedro Santana Familias and Buenaven- 
tura Baez Mendez (allies who became rivals), and their 
intrigues involving foreign powers in defense against Haiti and 
for personal gain. All these factors meant that neither a coher- 
ent central state nor a strong sense of nationhood could 
develop during this period. 

The Infant Republic, 1844-61 

Santana's power base lay in the military forces mustered to 
defend the infant republic against Haitian retaliation. Duarte, 
briefly a member of the governing junta, for a time com- 
manded an armed force as well. However, the governing junta 
trusted the military judgment of Santana over that of Duarte, 
and he was replaced with General Jose Maria Imbert. Duarte 
assumed the post of governor of the Cibao, the northern farm- 
ing region administered from the city of Santiago de los Caba- 
lleros, commonly known as Santiago. In July 1844, Mella and a 
throng of other Duarte supporters in Santiago urged him to 



23 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

take the title of president of the republic. Duarte agreed to do 
so, but only if free elections could be arranged. Santana, who 
felt that only the protection of a great power could assure 
Dominican safety against the Haitian threat, did not share 
Duarte's enthusiasm for the electoral process. His forces took 
Santo Domingo on July 12, 1844, and proclaimed Santana 
ruler of the Dominican Republic. Mella, who attempted to 
mediate a compromise government including both Duarte and 
Santana, found himself imprisoned by the new dictator. Duarte 
and Sanchez followed Mella into prison and subsequently into 
exile. 

The country's first constitution in 1844 was a remarkably lib- 
eral document. It was influenced directly by the Haitian consti- 
tution of 1843 and indirectly by the United States constitution 
of 1789, by the liberal 1812 Cadiz constitution of Spain, and by 
the French constitutions of 1799 and 1804. Because of this 
inspiration, it called for presidentialism, a separation of pow- 
ers, and extensive "checks and balances." However, Santana 
proceeded to emasculate the document by demanding the 
inclusion of Article 210, which granted him extraordinary pow- 
ers "during the current war" against Haiti. 

Santana's dictatorial powers continued throughout his first 
term (1844-48), even though the Haitian forces had been 
repelled by December 1845. He consolidated his power by exe- 
cuting anti-Santana conspirators, by rewarding his close associ- 
ates with lucrative positions in government, and by printing 
paper money to cover the expenses of a large standing army, a 
policy that severely devalued the new nation's currency. 
Throughout his term, Santana also continued to explore the 
possibility of an association with a foreign power. The govern- 
ments of the United States, France, and Spain all declined the 
offer. 

Santana responded to a general discontent prompted 
mainly by the deteriorating currency and economy by resign- 
ing the presidency in February 1848 and retiring to his finca 
(ranch) in El Seibo. He was replaced in August 1848 by minis- 
ter of war Manuel Jimenez, whose tenure ended in May 1849. 
The violent sequence of events that culminated in Jimenez's 
departure began with a new invasion from Haiti, this time led 
by self-styled emperor Faustin Soulouque (see Increasing Insta- 
bility, 1843-1915, ch. 6). Santana returned to prominence at 
the head of the army that checked the Haitian advance at Las 
Carreras in April 1849. As the Haitians retired, Santana pressed 



24 



Dominican Republic: Historical Setting 

his advantage against Jimenez, taking control of Santo Dom- 
ingo and the government on May 30, 1849. 

Although Santana once again held the reins of power, he 
declined to formalize the situation by running for office. 
Instead, he renounced the temporary mandate granted him by 
the Congress and called for an election — carried out under an 
electoral college system with limited suffrage — to select a new 
president. Santana favored Santiago Espaillat, who won a ballot 
in the Congress on July 5, 1849; Espaillat declined to accept the 
presidency, however, knowing that he would have to serve as a 
puppet so long as Santana controlled the army. This refusal 
cleared the way for Baez, president of the Congress, to win a 
second ballot, which was held on August 18, 1849. 

Baez made even more vigorous overtures to foreign powers 
to establish a Dominican protectorate. Both France (Baez's per- 
sonal preference) and the United States, although still unwill- 
ing to annex the entire country, expressed interest in acquiring 
the bay and peninsula of Samana as a naval or commercial 
port. Consequently, in order to preserve its lucrative trade with 
the island nation and to deny a strategic asset to its rivals, Brit- 
ain became more actively involved in Dominican affairs. In 
1850 the British signed a commercial and maritime treaty with 
the Dominicans. The following year, Britain mediated a peace 
treaty between the Dominican Republic and Haiti. 

Baez's first term established the personal rivalry with San- 
tana that dominated Dominican politics until the latter's death 
in 1864. President Baez purged San tana's followers (santanis- 
tas) from the government and installed his own followers ( bae- 
cistas) in their place, pardoned a number of Santana's political 
opponents, reorganized the military in an effort to dilute San- 
tana's power base, and apparently conceived a plan to create a 
militia that would serve as a counterforce to the army. 

Seeing his influence clearly threatened, Santana returned to 
the political arena in February 1853, when he was elected to 
succeed Baez. The general moved quickly to deal with Baez, 
who had once been a colonel under his command, denounc- 
ing him for ties to the Haitians and as a threat to the nation's 
security. Exercising his authority under Article 210 of the con- 
stitution, Santana expelled the former president from the 
Dominican Republic. 

Although he enjoyed considerable popularity, Santana con- 
fronted several crises during his second term. In February 
1854, a constituent assembly promulgated a new, even more 



25 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

liberal constitution than that of 1844, which also eliminated 
the dictatorial powers granted by Article 210. However, it was 
almost immediately modified to place all control over the 
armed forces directly in the hands of the president. With his 
control over the army restored, Santana readily forced the 
adoption by the Congress of a much more authoritarian consti- 
tutional text later that year. 

On the international front, renewed annexation talks 
between the Dominican and United States governments 
aroused the concern of Haitian emperor Soulouque. Motivated 
at least in part by a desire to prevent the acquisition of any por- 
tion of Hispaniola by the slaveholding United States, Soulou- 
que launched a new invasion in November 1855. However, 
Dominican forces decisively defeated the Haitians in a number 
of engagements and forced them back across the border by 
January 1856. 

The final crisis of Santana's second term also originated in 
the foreign policy sphere. Shortly after the Haitian campaign, 
the Dominican and United States governments signed a com- 
mercial treaty that provided for the lease of a small tract in 
Samana for use as a coaling station. Although Santana delaved 
implementation of the lease, its negotiation provided his oppo- 
nents — including baecistas and the government of Spain — the 
opportunity to decry Yankee imperialism and demand the 
president's ouster. Pressure built to such an extent that Santana 
felt compelled to resign on May 26, 1856, in favor of his vice 
president, Manuel de la Regla Mota. 

Regla Mota's rule lasted almost five months. An empty trea- 
sury forced the new president to discharge most of the army. 
Thus deprived of the Dominican rulers' traditional source of 
power, his government all but invited the return of Baez. With 
the support of the Spanish, Baez was named vice president by 
Regla Mota, who then resigned in Baez's favor. Not a forgiving 
man by nature, Baez lost little time in denouncing ex-president 
Santana and expelling him from the country. Once again, Baez 
purged santanistas from the government and replaced them 
with his own men. 

Baez had little time in which to savor his triumph over his 
rival, however. Reverting to the policies of Baez's first term, the 
government flooded the country with what rapidly became all 
but worthless paper money. Farmers in the Cibao, who 
objected strongly to the purchase of their crops with this deval- 
ued currency, rose against Baez in what came to be known as 



26 



Dominican Republic: Historical Setting 

the Revolution of 1857. Their standard-bearer, not surprisingly, 
was Santana. 

Pardoned by a provisional government established at Santi- 
ago, Santana returned in August 1857 to join the revolution. 
He raised his own personal army and soon dominated the 
movement. A year of bloody conflict between the governments 
of Santiago and Santo Domingo took a heavy toll in lives and 
money. Under the terms of a June 1857 armistice, Baez once 
again fled to Curacao with all the government funds he could 
carry. Santana proceeded to betray the aspirations of some of 
his liberal revolutionary followers by restoring the dictatorial 
constitution of 1854. Santanismo again replaced baecismo; only a 
small group of loyalists realized any benefit from the exchange, 
however. Politically, the country continued to walk a treadmill. 
Economically, conditions had become almost unbearable for 
many Dominicans. The general climate of despair set the stage 
for the success of Santana's renewed efforts to obtain a protec- 
tor for his country. 

Annexation by Spain, 1861-65 

On March 18, 1861, Santana announced the annexation of 
the Dominican Republic by Spain. A number of conditions had 
combined to bring about this reversion to colonialism. The 
Civil War in the United States had lessened the Spanish fear of 
retaliation from the north. In Spain itself, the ruling Liberal 
Union of General Leopoldo O'Donnell had been advocating 
renewed imperial expansion. And in the Dominican Republic, 
both the ruler and a portion of the ruled were sufficiently con- 
cerned about the possibility of a renewed attack from Haiti or 
domestic economic collapse to find the prospect of annexation 
attractive. 

Support for annexation did not run as deep as Santana had 
represented to the Spanish, however. The first rebellion against 
Spanish rule broke out in May 1861, but was quashed in short 
order. A better organized revolt, under the leadership of bae- 
cista General Francisco del Rosario Sanchez, sprang up only a 
month later. Santana, now bearing the title of captain general 
of the Province of Santo Domingo, was forced to take to the 
field against his own countrymen as the representative of a for- 
eign power. The wily Santana lured Sanchez into an ambush, 
where he was captured and executed. Despite this service, San- 
tana found his personal power and his ability to dole out 
patronage to his followers greatly restricted under Spanish 



27 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

rule. As a result, he resigned the captaincy general in January 
1862. 

Resentment and rebellion continued, fed by racial tension, 
excessive taxation, the failure to stabilize the currency, the 
uncompensated requisition of supplies by the Spanish army, 
heavy-handed reform of local religious customs by an inflexible 
Spanish archbishop, and the restriction of trade to the benefit 
of the Spanish metropolis. The Spaniards quelled more upris- 
ings in 1863, but guerrilla actions continued. In response to 
the continuing unrest, a state of siege was declared in Februarv 
1863. 

Rebellious Dominicans set up a provisional government in 
Santiago, headed by General Jose Antonio Salcedo, on Septem- 
ber 14, 1863. Their proclamation of an Act of Independence 
launched what is known as the War of Restoration. For their 
part, the Spanish once again turned to Santana, who received 
command of a force made up largely of mercenaries. However, 
by this time, his popularity had all but disappeared. Indeed, the 
provisional government had denounced Santana and con- 
demned him to death for his actions against his countrymen. 
On June 14, 1864, a broken and despondent Santana saved the 
rebels the trouble of carrying out their sentence by dying (or, 
unproven speculation asserts, by committing suicide). 

Meanwhile, the guerrilla war against the Spanish continued. 
The rebels further formalized their provisional rule by replac- 
ing Salcedo (who had advocated the return of Baez to rule a 
restored republic), and then holding a national convention on 
February 27, 1865, which enacted a new constitution and 
elected Pedro Antonio Pimentel Chamorro president. 

Several circumstances began to favor a Spanish withdrawal. 
One was the conclusion of the Civil War in the United States, 
which promised new efforts by Washington to enforce the 
Monroe Doctrine. Another was that the Spanish military 
forces, unable to contain the spread of the insurrection, were 
losing even greater numbers of troops to disease. The O'Don- 
nell government had fallen, taking with it any dreams of a 
renewed Spanish empire. On March 3, 1865, the queen of 
Spain approved a decree repealing the annexation of Santo 
Do-mingo, and by July all Spanish soldiers had left the island. 

The Contest for Power, 1 865-82 

The Spanish left both economic devastation and political 
chaos in their wake. In the period from 1865 to 1879, there 



28 



Dominican Republic: Historical Setting 

were twenty-one different governments and at least fifty mili- 
tary uprisings. A power struggle began between the conserva- 
tive, cacique-dominated south and the more liberal Cibao, 
where the prevalence of medium-sized landholdings contrib- 
uted to a more egalitarian social structure. The two camps 
eventually coalesced under the banners of separate political 
parties. The cibaenos adhered to the National Liberal Party 
(Partido Nacional Liberal), which became known as the Blue 
Party (Partido Azul). The southerners rallied to Baez and the 
Red Party (Partido Rojo). 

The conservative Reds effectively employed their numerical 
superiority in the capital to force the restoration of Baez, who 
returned triumphantly from exile and assumed the presidency 
on December 8, 1865. However, he was unable to assert the 
kind of dictatorial control over the whole nation that he and 
San tana had once alternately enjoyed because power had been 
diffused, particularly between the opposing poles of the Cibao 
and the south. 

After a successful uprising that forced Baez to flee the coun- 
try in May 1866, a triumvirate of cibaeno military leaders, the 
most prominent of whom was Gregorio Luperon, assumed pro- 
visional power. General Jose Maria Cabral Luna, who had 
served briefly as president in 1865, was reelected to the post on 
September 29, 1866. The baecistas, however, were still a potent 
force in the republic; they forced Cabral out and reinstalled 
Baez on May 2, 1868. Once again, his rule was marked by pecu- 
lation and efforts to sell or lease portions of the country to for- 
eign interests. These included an intermittent campaign to 
have the entire country annexed by the United States, which 
President Ulysses S. Grant also strongly supported. However, 
the United States Senate rejected the 1869 treaty calling for 
annexation, giving President Grant his first major legislative 
defeat. Grant continued efforts to annex Dominican territory 
until 1873. Baez, in turn, was again overthrown by rebellious 
Blues in January 1874. 

After a period of infighting among the Blues, backing from 
Luperon helped Ulises Francisco Espaillat Quihones win elec- 
tion as president on March 24, 1876. Espaillat, a political and 
economic liberal and the first individual who was not a general 
to reach the presidency, apparently intended to broaden per- 
sonal freedoms and to set the nation's economy on a firmer 
footing. He never had the opportunity to do either, however. 
Rebellions in the south and east forced Espaillat to resign on 



29 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

December 20, 1876. Ever the opportunist, Baez returned once 
more to power. The most effective opposition to his rule came 
from guerrilla forces led by a politically active priest, Fernando 
Arturo de Merino. In February 1878, the unpopular Baez 
departed his country for the last time; he died in exile in 1882. 

Both Santana and Baez had now passed from the scene. 
They had helped create a nation where violence prevailed in 
the quest for power, where economic growth and financial sta- 
bility fell victim to the seemingly endless political contest, and 
where foreign interests still perceived parts of the national ter- 
ritory as available to the highest bidder. This divisive, chaotic 
situation invited the emergence of an able military leader and 
a shrewd, despotic political leader who would dominate the 
country over a seventeen-year period. 

Ulises Heureaux, Growing Financial Dependence, 
and Continued Instability 

Ulises Heureaux, 1882-99 

Ulises Heureaux, Luperon's lieutenant, stood out among his 
fellow Dominicans both physically and temperamentally. The 
illegitimate son of a Haitian father and a mother originally 
from St. Thomas, he, like Luperon, was one of the few black 
contenders for power. As events would demonstrate, he also 
possessed a singular thirst for power and a willingness to take 
any measures necessary to attain and to hold it. 

During the four years between Baez's final withdrawal and 
Heureaux's ascension to the presidency, seven individuals held 
or claimed national, regional, or interim leadership. Among 
them were Ignacio Maria Gonzalez Santin, who held the presi- 
dency from June to September 1878; Luperon, who governed 
from Puerto Plata as provisional president from October 1879 
to August 1880; and Merino, who assumed office in September 
1880 after apparently fraudulent general elections. Heureaux 
served as minister of interior under Merino; his behind-the- 
scenes influence on the rest of the cabinet apparently 
exceeded that of the president. Although Merino briefly sus- 
pended constitutional procedures in response to unrest 
fomented by some remaining baecistas, he abided by the two- 
year term established under Luperon and turned the reins of 
government over to Heureaux on September 1, 1882. 

Heureaux's first term as president was not particularly note- 
worthy. The administrations of Luperon and Merino had 



30 



Dominican Republic: Historical Setting 

achieved some financial stability for the country; political con- 
ditions had settled down to the point where Heureaux needed 
to suppress only one major uprising during his two-year tenure. 
By 1884, however, no single successor enjoyed widespread sup- 
port among the various caciques who constituted the republic's 
ruling group. Luperon, still the leader of the ruling Blue Party, 
supported General Segundo Imbert for the post, while Heu- 
reaux backed the candidacy of General Francisco Gregorio 
Billini. A consummate dissembler, Heureaux assured Luperon 
that he would support Imbert should he win the election, but 
Heureaux also had ballot boxes in critical precincts stuffed in 
order to assure Billini's election. 

Inaugurated president on September 1, 1884, Billini resisted 
Heureaux's efforts to manipulate him. Thus denied de facto 
rule, Heureaux undermined Billini by spreading rumors to the 
effect that the president had decreed a political amnesty so 
that he could conspire with ex-president Cesareo Guillermo 
Bastardo (February 27-December 6, 1879) against Luperon's 
leadership of the Blues. These rumors precipitated a govern- 
mental crisis that resulted in Billini's resignation on May 16, 
1885. Vice President Alejandro Woss y Gil succeeded Billini. 
Heureaux assumed a more prominent role under the new gov- 
ernment. A number of his adherents were included in the cabi- 
net, and the general himself assumed command of the national 
army in order to stem a rebellion led by Guillermo. The latter's 
death removed another potential rival for power and further 
endeared Heureaux to Luperon, a longtime enemy of Guill- 
ermo. 

Luperon accordingly supported Heureaux in the 1886 presi- 
dential elections. Opposed by Casimiro de Moya, Heureaux 
relied on his considerable popularity and his demonstrated 
skill at electoral manipulation to carry the balloting. The bla- 
tancy of the fraud in some areas, particularly the capital, 
inspired Moya's followers to launch an armed rebellion. Heu- 
reaux again benefited from Luperon's support in this struggle, 
which delayed his inauguration by four months but further 
narrowed the field of political contenders. Having again 
achieved power, Heureaux maintained his grip on it for the 
rest of his life. 

Several moves served to lay the groundwork for Heureaux's 
dictatorship. Constitutional amendments requested by the 
president and effected by the Congress extended the presiden- 
tial term from two to four years and eliminated direct elections 



31 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

in favor of the formerly employed electoral college system. To 
expand his informal power base, Heureaux (who became pop- 
ularly known as General Lilis, thanks to a common mispronun- 
ciation of his first name) incorporated both Reds and Blues 
into his government. The president also established an exten- 
sive network of secret police and informants in order to avert 
incipient rebellions. The press, previously unhampered, came 
under new restrictions. 

In the face of impending dictatorship, concerned Domini- 
can liberals turned to the only remaining figure of stature, 
Luperon. The elections of 1888 therefore pitted Heureaux 
against his political mentor. If the dictator felt any respect for 
his former commander, he did not demonstrate it during the 
campaign. Heureaux's agents attacked Luperon's campaigners 
and supporters, arresting and incarcerating considerable num- 
bers of them. Recognizing the impossibility of a free election 
under such circumstances, Luperon withdrew his candidacy, 
declined the entreaties of those of his followers who urged 
armed rebellion, and fled into exile in Puerto Rico. 

Although plots, intrigue, and abortive insurrections contin- 
ued under his rule, Heureaux faced no serious challenges until 
his assassination in 1899. He continued to govern in mock-con- 
stitutional fashion, achieving reelections through institutional- 
ized fraud, even as repression worsened. Like Santana and 
Baez before him, Heureaux sought the protection of a foreign 
power, principally the United States. Although annexation was 
no longer an option, the dictator offered to lease the Samana 
Peninsula to the United States. The arrangement was never 
consummated, however, because of opposition from the liberal 
wing of the Blue Party and a number of concerned European 
powers. In spite of protests from Germany, Britain, and France, 
in 1891 Washington and Santo Domingo concluded a reciproc- 
ity treaty that allowed twenty-six United States products free 
entry into the Dominican market in exchange for similar duty- 
free access for certain Dominican goods. 

Under Heureaux, the Dominican government considerably 
expanded its external debt, even as there was considerable 
blurring between his private holdings and the state's financial 
affairs. Some improvements in infrastructure resulted, such as 
the completion of the first railroads. Initial attempts at profes- 
sionalizing the army and bureaucratizing the state were made, 
and educational reforms were introduced. As a result of favor- 
able state policies, modern sugar estates began to replace cat- 



82 



Dominican Republic: Historical Setting 

tie-ranching estates, even as exports of coffee and cocoa 
expanded. Yet, onerous terms on the major external loan, cor- 
ruption and mismanagement, and a decline in world sugar 
markets, all exacerbated both domestic budget deficits and 
external balance of payments shortfalls. 

Despite the dictator's comprehensive efforts to repress oppo- 
sition — his network of spies and agents extended even to for- 
eign countries — opposition eventually emerged centered in 
the Cibao region, which had suffered under Heureaux's poli- 
cies favoring sugar interests in Santo Domingo and San Pedro 
de Macoris. An opposition group calling itself the Young Revo- 
lutionary Junta (Junta Revolucionaria de Jovenes) was estab- 
lished in Puerto Rico by Horacio Vasquez Lajara, a young 
adherent of Luperon. Other prominent members of the group 
included Federico Velasquez and Ramon Caceres Vasquez. The 
three returned to their plantations in the Cibao and began to 
lay the groundwork for a coordinated rebellion against the 
widely detested Heureaux. The impetuous Caceres, however, 
shot and fatally wounded the dictator when he passed through 
the town of Moca on July 26, 1899. Caceres escaped unharmed. 

Growing Financial Dependence and Political Instability 

Heureaux left two major legacies: debt and political instabil- 
ity. It was these legacies that finally helped usher in the United 
States military occupation of 1916. In the six years after Heu- 
reaux's assassination in 1899, the country experienced four 
revolts and five presidents. National politics came to revolve 
primarily around the conflict between the followers of Juan 
Isidro Jimenes Pereyra, called jimenistas, and the followers of 
Horacio Vasquez Lahara, called horacistas; both men and both 
groups had been involved in plots against Heureaux. 

After a brief period of armed conflict, Vasquez headed a 
provisional government established in September 1899. Elec- 
tions brought Jimenes to the presidency on November 15. The 
Jimenes administration faced a fiscal crisis when European 
creditors began to call in loans that had been contracted by 
Heureaux. Customs fees represented the only significant 
source of government revenue at that time. When the Jimenes 
government pledged 40 percent of its customs revenue to 
repay its foreign debt, it provoked the ire of the San Domingo 
Improvement Company. A United States-based firm, the 
Improvement Company, had lent large sums to the Heureaux 
regime. As a result, it not only received a considerable percent- 



33 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

age of customs revenue, but also had been granted the right to 
administer Dominican customs in order to ensure regular 
repayment. Stung by the Jimenes government's resumption of 
control over its customs receipts, the directors of the Improve- 
ment Company protested to the United States Department of 
State. The review of the case prompted a renewed interest in 
Washington in Dominican affairs. 

Cibao nationalists suspected the president of bargaining 
away Dominican sovereignty in return for financial settlements. 
Government forces led by Vasquez put down some early upris- 
ings. Eventually, however, personal competition between 
Jimenes and Vasquez brought them into conflict. Vasquez's 
forces proclaimed a revolution on April 26, 1902; with no real 
base of support, Jimenes fled his office and his country a few 
days later. However, conflicts among the followers of Vasquez 
and opposition to his government from local caciques grew 
into general unrest that culminated in the seizure of power by 
ex-president Alejandro Woss y Gil in April 1903. 

Dominican politics had once again polarized into two largely 
nonideological groups. Where once the Blues and Reds had 
contended for power, now two other personalist factions, the 
jimenistas (supporters of Jimenes) and the horacistas (support- 
ers of Vasquez and Caceres), vied for control. Woss y Gil, a 
jimenista, made the mistake of seeking supporters among the 
horacista camp and was overthrown by jimenista General Carlos 
Felipe Morales Languasco in December 1903. Rather than 
restore the country's leadership to Jimenes, however, Morales 
set up a provisional government and announced his own candi- 
dacy for the presidency — with Caceres as his running mate. 
The renewed fraternization with the horacistas incited another 
jimenista rebellion. This uprising proved unsuccessful, and 
Morales and Caceres were inaugurated on June 19, 1904. Yet, 
conflict within the Morales administration between supporters 
of the president and those of the vice president eventually led 
to the ouster of Morales, and Caceres assumed the presidency 
on December 29, 1905. 

As a backdrop to the continuing political turmoil in the 
Dominican Republic, United States influence increased consid- 
erably during the first few years of the twentieth century. Pres- 
sures by European creditors on the Dominican Republic and 
the Anglo-German blockade of Venezuela in 1902-03 led to 
President Theodore Roosevelt's "corollary" to the Monroe Doc- 
trine, which declared that the United States would assume the 



34 



Offices of the General Customs Receivership, 
Santo Domingo, 1907 
Courtesy National Archives 

police powers necessary in the region to ensure that creditors 
would be adequately repaid. United States military forces had 
intervened several times between 1900 and 1903, primarily to 
prevent the employment of warships by European govern- 
ments seeking immediate repayment of debt. In June 1904, the 
Roosevelt administration negotiated an agreement whereby 
the Dominican government bought out the holdings of the San 
Domingo Improvement Company. Then, following an interme- 
diate agreement, the Morales government ultimately signed a 
financial accord with the United States in February 1905. 
Under this accord, the United States government assumed 
responsibility for all Dominican debt as well as for the collec- 
tion of customs duties and the allocation of those revenues to 
the Dominican government and to the repayment of its domes- 
tic and foreign debt. Although parts of this agreement were 
rejected by the United States Senate, it formed the basis for the 
establishment in April 1905 of the General Customs Receiver- 
ship, the office through which the United States government 
administered the finances of the Dominican Republic. 



35 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

The Caceres government became the financial beneficiary 
of this arrangement. Freed from the burden of dealing with 
creditors, Caceres attempted to reform the political system. 
Constitutional reforms placed local ayuntamientos (town coun- 
cils) under the power of the central government, extended the 
presidential term to six years, and eliminated the office of vice 
president. Caceres also nationalized public utilities and estab- 
lished a bureau of public works to administer them. The cur- 
tailment of local authority particularly irked those caciques 
who had preferred to rule through compliant ayuntamientos. 
The continued financial sovereignty of the "Yankees" also out- 
weighed the economic benefits of the receivership in the 
minds of many Dominican nationalists. Intrigues fomented in 
exile by Morales, Jimenes, and others beset Caceres, who was 
assassinated on November 19, 1911. 

The assassination of Caceres led to another period of politi- 
cal turmoil and economic disorganization that was to culmi- 
nate in the republic's occupation by the United States. The 
fiscal stability that had resulted from the 1905 receivership 
eroded under Caceres's successor, Eladio Victoria y Victoria, 
with most of the increased outlays going to support military 
campaigns against rebellious partisans, mainly in the Cibao. 
The continued violence and instability prompted the adminis- 
tration of President William H. Taft to dispatch a commission 
to Santo Domingo on September 24, 1912, to mediate between 
the warring factions. The presence of a 750-member force of 
United States Marines apparently convinced the Dominicans of 
the seriousness of Washington's threats to intervene directly in 
the conflict; Victoria agreed to step down in favor of a neutral 
figure, Roman Catholic archbishop Adolfo Alejandro Nouel 
Bobadilla. The archbishop assumed office as provisional presi- 
dent on November 30. 

Nouel proved unequal to the burden of national leadership. 
Unable to mediate successfully between the ambitions of rival 
horacistas and jimenistas, he resigned on March 31, 1913. His 
successor, Jose Bordas Valdes, was equally unable to restrain the 
renewed outbreak of hostilities. Once again, Washington took 
a direct hand and mediated a resolution. The rebellious horacis- 
tas agreed to a cease-fire based on a pledge of United States 
oversight of elections for members of local ayuntamientos and a 
constituent assembly that would draft the procedures for presi- 
dential balloting. The process, however, was flagrantly manipu- 
lated and resulted in Bordas's reelection on June 15, 1914. 



36 



Dominican Republic: Historical Setting 

Bordas reached out to the jimenistas, naming one of their lead- 
ers, Desiderio Arias, as government delegate to the Cibao. 
However, horacistas soon revolted, declaring a new provisional 
government under Vasquez. Subsequent mediation by the 
United States government led to municipal and congressional 
elections in December 1913. However, these elections were bla- 
tantly manipulated by Bordas, leading to renewed tensions with 
not only horacistas but also jimenistas. 

The United States government, this time under President 
Woodrow Wilson, again intervened. The "Wilson Plan" — deliv- 
ered as an ultimatum — essentially stated: elect a president or 
the United States will impose one. Bordas resigned, and the 
Dominicans accordingly selected Ramon Baez Machado (the 
son of Buenaventura Baez) as provisional president on August 
27, 1914, to oversee elections. Comparatively fair presidential 
elections held on October 25 returned Jimenes to the presi- 
dency. 

However, a combination of continued internecine political 
infighting and United States pressure made Jimenes's position 
untenable soon after his inauguration on December 6, 1914. 
The United States government wished him to regularize the 
appointment of a United States comptroller, who was oversee- 
ing the country's public expenditures, and to create a new 
national guard, which would be under the control of the 
United States military, thus eliminating the existing army con- 
trolled by Arias. At the same time, Jimenes found himself with 
less and less political support, as he confronted opposition first 
from horacistas and then from his own secretary of war, Deside- 
rio Arias. Arias spearheaded an effort to have Jimenes removed 
by impeachment so that he could assume the presidency. 
Although the United States ambassador offered military sup- 
port to his government, Jimenes opted to step down on May 7, 
1916. At this point, the United States decided to take more 
direct action. United States forces had already occupied Haiti 
(see United States Involvement in Haiti, 1915-34, ch. 6), and 
this time Arias retreated from Santo Domingo on May 13, 
under threat of naval bombardment; the first Marines landed 
three days later. Although they established effective control of 
the country within two months, the United States forces did 
not proclaim a military government until November. 

The country occupied by the United States Marines was one 
marked not only by weak sovereignty, but also by unstable polit- 
ical rule, fragmented and fearful economic elites, a weak 



37 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

church, and the absence of a central state and of a national mil- 
itary institution independent of individual leaders or loyalties. 

From the United States Occupation (1916-24) to the 
Emergence of Trujillo (1930) 

The United States occupation of the Dominican Republic 
was to be a critical turning point in Dominican history, 
although not for the reasons intended by the occupying forces. 
Led by military governor Rear Admiral Harry S. Knapp, pro- 
grams were enacted in education, health, sanitation, agricul- 
ture, and communications; highways were built; and other 
public works were created. In addition, other programs crucial 
to strengthening state structures and a market economy were 
implemented, including both a census and a cadastral survey. 
The latter allowed land titles to be regularized and United 
States sugar companies to expand their holdings dramatically, 
even as infrastructure to facilitate exports was developed. The 
most significant measure was the establishment of a new 
Dominican constabulary force. 

Most Dominicans, however, greatly resented the loss of their 
sovereignty to foreigners, few of whom spoke Spanish or dis- 
played much real concern for the welfare of the republic. The 
most intense opposition to the occupation arose in the eastern 
provinces of El Seibo and San Pedro de Macoris. From 1917 to 
1921, the United States forces battled a guerrilla movement 
known as gavilleros in that area. Although the guerrillas enjoyed 
considerable support among the population and benefited 
from a superior knowledge of the terrain, they eventually 
yielded to the occupying forces' superior power. 

After World War I, however, public opinion in the United 
States began to run against the occupation, and in June 1921 
United States representatives presented a withdrawal proposal, 
known as the Harding Plan. The plan called for Dominican rat- 
ification of all acts of the military government, approval of a 
US$2.5-million loan for public works and other expenses, the 
acceptance of United States officers for the constabulary — now 
known as the National Guard (Guardia Nacional) — and the 
holding of elections under United States supervision. Popular 
reaction to the plan was overwhelmingly negative. Moderate 
Dominican leaders, however, used the plan as the basis for fur- 
ther negotiations that resulted in an agreement allowing for 
the selection of a provisional president to rule until elections 



38 



Dominican Republic: Historical Setting 

could be organized. Under the supervision of High Commis- 
sioner Sumner Welles, Juan Bautista Vicini Burgos assumed the 
provisional presidency on October 21, 1922. In the presidential 
election of March 15, 1924, Horacio Vasquez handily defeated 
Francisco J. Peynado; shortly after his inauguration in July, all 
United States marines withdrew. 

The aging Vasquez governed ineffectively and corruptly, dra- 
matically expanding public employment and extending his 
term in office by two years. As doubts emerged about the fair- 
ness of the 1930 elections, an uprising against the president led 
to the naming of Rafael Estrella Urena as provisional president 
pending the elections. Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, the 
head of the country's newly established military force, had 
played a critical, secretive role in ensuring the success of the 
rebellion against Vasquez. Trujillo soon emerged as the only 
presidential candidate in the elections, winning with 99 per- 
cent of the vote. 

Trujillo was able to gain power and quickly consolidate a 
much more solid grip on power than previous Dominican rul- 
ers because of domestic and international factors. He now led a 
far more powerful national military institution than had previ- 
ously existed while traditional powerholders remained weak 
and the population was largely disarmed. Moreover, he bene- 
fited from the improved transportation and communication 
infrastructure built during the occupation. In addition, in the 
1920s, the United States moved toward a policy of noninterven- 
tion, a policy facilitated by the absence of any perceived threat 
to continued United States influence in the area from an out- 
side power. 

The Trujillo Era, 1930-61 

Rafael Trujillo was born in 1891 and raised in San Cristobal, 
a small town near the capital, in a family of modest means of 
mixed Spanish, Creole, and Haitian background. In less than 
ten years, from 1919 to 1928, he emerged from being an 
obscure minor officer in a newly formed constabulary force to 
become head of the country's army. Over the period of his rule 
from 1930 to 1961, he formally held the presidency from 1930 
to 1938 and from 1942 to 1952; however, he always retained 
direct control over the military, allowing pliant individuals such 
as his brother Hector to serve as president. His thirst for power 
was combined with megalomania (for example, Santo Do- 
mingo was renamed Ciudad Trujillo and Pico Duarte, the high- 



39 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

est mountain in the Antilles, became Pico Trujillo) and a drive 
to accumulate massive wealth. 

Trujillo's regime quickly moved beyond the traditional 
Dominican caudillo regimes of the nineteenth century. Bv the 
end of his second term, it was evident that his regime's totalitar- 
ian features went beyond those of Heureaux, its historical pre- 
decessor. Occasionally partial liberalizations occurred in 
response to international pressures. Such liberal episodes were 
particularly evident in late 1937 and early 1938, following the 
outcry that came after the October 1937 massacre of some 
5,000 to 12,000 Haitians along the Dominican-Haitian border, 
and in the immediate post-World War II era. But Trujillo's 
accumulation of wealth and power would continue, reaching a 
peak in 1955. The regime's deterioration began shortly thereaf- 
ter, accelerating in 1958. 

Central to Trujillo's domination of the country was control 
over an expanding armed forces and police, which were his 
personal instrument rather than a national institution; the 
armed forces and the police grew from around 2,200 in 1932 to 
9,100 in 1948 to 18,000 in 1958. In the mid-1950s, Trujillo 
transferred the best troops and weapons to a military service 
known as Dominican Military Aviation, controlled by his son 
Ramfis. 

Yet, Trujillo's regime was not based purely on repression, 
although over time it increasingly became so. Ideologically, 
Trujillo portrayed himself with some success as a forger of the 
Dominican nation, builder of the state, and defender of its eco- 
nomic interests. His was the first prolonged period in the coun- 
try's history when the country was not directly attacked or 
occupied by Spain, the United States, or Haiti. Trujillo built 
upon the country's antipathy to Haiti to help articulate a 
nationalist ideology appealing to traditional Hispanic and 
Roman Catholic values, aided by intellectuals such as Joaquin 
Balaguer Ricardo. In the 1930s, especially, he also articulated a 
vision of discipline, work, peace, order, and progress. As these 
values became embodied in a number of large-scale public 
works and construction projects, and particularly as the econ- 
omy began moving out of the Great Depression of the late 
1930s, Trujillo almost certainly gained respect among some ele- 
ments of the population. In some cases, he also gained support 
because he presented himself in a messianic form. By the 
1950s, and particularly after signing a concordat with the Vati- 
can in 1954, Trujillo often attacked "international commu- 



40 



Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina 
Courtesy Library of Congress 




nism" as a threat to the country's traditional values that he 
claimed he was seeking to uphold. 

Trujillo also waved the ideological banner of economic 
nationalism, although it sometimes cloaked his own personal 
accumulation of wealth. Trujillo ended United States adminis- 
tration of Dominican customs (in 1941), retired the Domini- 
can debt (in 1947), and introduced a national currency to 
replace the dollar (also in 1947), even as he amassed a sizeable 
personal fortune. 

Economically, Trujillo eventually became the single domi- 
nant force in the country by combining abuse of state power, 
threats, and co-optation. Trujillo's initial schemes to enrich 
himself revolved around the creation of state or commercial 
monopolies. He then gradually moved into industry, forcing 
owners to allow him to buy up shares, while also enjoying 
healthy commissions on all public works contracts. After World 
War II, Trujillo expanded into industrial production. His most 
massive investments were made in sugar, which was largely for- 
eign-owned. The planning and implementation of Trujillo's 
sugar operations, however, were so poor that had it not been 
for the numerous state subsidies they received, they would have 
lost money. 



41 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Although some of the country's economic elite maintained a 
degree of individual autonomy, no possibility existed for inde- 
pendent organization. Trujillo enjoyed humiliating those who 
previously had enjoyed both social prestige and economic 
wealth; they intensely disliked him but were forced to conform. 
Only in Trujillo's last two years did any concerted opposition 
emerge from within the economic elite. Indeed, Trujillo's eco- 
nomic holdings at the time of his death were staggering. 
Almost 80 percent of the country's industrial production was 
controlled by him; and nearly 60 percent of the country's labor 
force depended directly or indirectly on him, 45 percent 
employed in his firms and another 15 percent working for the 
state. The only organization that retained any degree of auton- 
omy was the Roman Catholic Church; until the very end of his 
rule, it remained abjectly loyal to him. 

Politically, Trujillo combined guile, cynicism, ruthlessness, 
and co-optation. He cynically deployed constitutional norms 
and legal requirements, which ostensibly were followed faith- 
fully, and totally dominated a single-party apparatus. In addi- 
tion, Trujillo engaged in byzantine manipulation of 
individuals, who were shifted around public offices in a discon- 
certing fashion as personal rivalries were promoted and tested. 
At its apogee, the Dominican Party (Partido Dominicano) had 
branches throughout the country, helping to keep Trujillo 
apprised of local realities, needs, and potential threats to his 
rule. The party's charitable activities, homages to Trujillo, and 
campaign efforts were financed largely by a percentage taken 
from the salaries of public employees. Trujillo made voting 
mandatory (not voting could be risky), and in 1942 he 
expanded the suffrage to women. 

International factors were also important in helping Trujillo 
sustain his grip on power. Trujillo employed public relations 
firms and assiduously cultivated his military contacts and indi- 
vidual politicians in the United States to enhance his reputa- 
tion and sustain United States support. He went to elaborate 
lengths to demonstrate domestically that he retained support 
from the United States. In some periods, United States diplo- 
mats expressed their frustration at being manipulated by 
Trujillo even as United States military personnel openly 
praised his rule. At the same time, his complex web of conspir- 
acy, intrigue, and violence extended beyond Dominican bor- 
ders; he provided support for various regional dictators and 
plotted against perceived foreign enemies, such as Romulo Bet- 



42 



Dominican Republic: Historical Setting 

ancourt of Venezuela, who, in turn, provided support for exile 
groups plotting against Trujillo. 

By the late 1950s, Trujillo faced multiple challenges, even as 
the country's economy was suffering and his own mental acuity 
was declining. Domestic opposition, agitation by exiles, and 
international pressures began to reinforce each other. A failed 
invasion attempt in June 1959 from Cuba helped spawn a 
major underground movement, itself brutally crushed in Janu- 
ary 1960. As a gesture of liberalization, in August 1960 Trujillo 
removed his brother from the presidency, replacing him with 
then vice president Joaquin Balaguer. 

However, domestic opposition continued to grow, the 
Roman Catholic Church began to distance itself from the 
regime, and with concerns mounting about the Cuban Revolu- 
tion, the United States distanced itself as well. A summary of 
United States policy intentions during this period is provided 
in President John F. Kennedy's often-cited dictum that in 
descending order of preferences the United States would pre- 
fer a democratic regime, continuation of a Trujillo regime, or a 
Castro regime, and that the United States should aim for the 
first, but not renounce the second until it was sure the third 
could be avoided. Covert and overt pressure, including cutting 
off the United States sugar quota and Organization of Ameri- 
can States (OAS — see Glossary) sanctions, were applied to the 
Trujillo regime. Finally, conspirators, who for the most part 
had largely been supporters of the regime in the past, success- 
fully assassinated Trujillo on May 30, 1961. Following Trujillo's 
death, attention immediately focused on what kind of regime 
would replace him. It took additional threats of United States 
military intervention to force Trujillo's relatives from the island 
in November 1961 in order to allow opposition elements to 
emerge. 

Democratic Struggles and Failures 

As were the years following the assassination of Heureaux 
decades earlier, the immediate post-Trujillo period was a con- 
vulsive one for the country. The preexisting political institu- 
tions and practices from the Trujillo regime were clearly 
inimical to a successful democratic transition. Yet, a clear break 
with the Trujillos was achieved. In January 1962, Joaquin Bal- 
aguer, who as vice president had taken over upon Trujillo's 
death, was forced into exile by opposition elements. A provi- 
sional government was formed to prepare for democratic elec- 



43 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

tions. The upper-class opposition to Trujillo was organized in 
the National Civic Union (Union Civica Nacional — UCN) . The 
UCN dominated the provisional government and expected its 
candidate, Viriato Fiallo, to win the elections. To the UCN's 
surprise, it was defeated by Juan Bosch Gaviho, one of the 
founders of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido Revo- 
lucionario Dominicano — PRD) in exile in the late 1930s, and 
the UCN soon disappeared. The PRD was successfully con- 
verted into a mass party with both urban and rural appeal: 
Bosch campaigned as the candidate of the poor and promised 
to implement a variety of socioeconomic and political reforms. 

The Bosch administration represented a freely elected, lib- 
eral, democratic government concerned for the welfare of all 
Dominicans. The 1963 constitution separated church and 
state, guaranteed civil and individual rights, and endorsed civil- 
ian control of the military. These and other changes, such as 
land reform, struck conservative landholders and military 
officers as radical and threatening. The hierarchy of the 
Roman Catholic Church also resented the secular nature of the 
new constitution, in particular its provision for legalized 
divorce. The hierarchy, along with the military leadership and 
the economic elite, also feared communist influence in the 
republic, and they warned of the potential for "another Cuba." 

As a result, the conservative socioeconomic forces coalesced 
with political, military, and church figures to overthrow Presi- 
dent Bosch on September 25, 1963, only seven months after he 
assumed office; United States support for his government had 
also weakened. The institutional changes that Bosch, his new 
constitution, and his proposed reforms represented, in a situa- 
tion in which his party possessed an absolute majority, were 
perceived as too threatening; however, middle-sector and pop- 
ular-sector groups remained relatively weak and unorganized. 
If Bosch's regime was overthrown in 1963 ostensibly because of 
its alleged communist nature, weak radical leftist elements 
were in fact strengthened by the coup, and the country experi- 
enced further polarization over the next several years. 

Following the coup, a civilian junta known as the Triumvi- 
rate, dominated by the UCN and headed by Emilio de los San- 
tos, was formed. However, Santos resigned on December 23 
and was replaced by Donald Reid Cabral, who increasingly 
became the dominant figure. His regime lacked legitimacy or 
strong support, however, and on April 25, 1965, a civil-military 
conspiracy sought to return Bosch to power. The Dominican 



44 



Dominican Republic: Historical Setting 

government's action provoked a series of events leading to the 
"constitutionalist" uprising in support of Bosch. Three days 
later, on April 28, the United States intervened because the 
"loyalist" Dominican military troops led by General Elias 
Wessin y Wessin were unable to control the growing civil-mili- 
tary rebellion, often referred to as a civil war. The intervention 
was the result of an exaggerated fear on the part of the United 
States regarding a potential "second Cuba." Its unilateral 
nature was subsequently modified by the creation of an OAS- 
sponsored peace force, which supplemented the United States 
military presence in the republic. 

Ultimately, negotiations during 1965-66 arranged a peaceful 
surrender of the constitutionalist forces, which were sur- 
rounded by foreign troops in downtown Santo Domingo. The 
negotiations also prevented a new outbreak of hostilities and 
provided for elections, which were overseen by a provisional 
government led by Hector Garcia Godoy. However, many 
Dominicans viewed these elections, which permitted the 
United States to extricate its troops from the country, as 
tainted. Bosch and Balaguer (who had returned from exile in 
June 1965) were the two main candidates. Bosch felt betrayed 
by the United States, which had blocked his possible return to 
power and turned on his military supporters, and he ran a lack- 
luster campaign. Balaguer, at the head of his own conservative 
Reformist Party (Partido Reformista — PR) , campaigned skill- 
fully and energetically, promising peace and stability. Balaguer 
was clearly the candidate favored by most conservative business 
interests and by the officer corps that retained control of the 
armed forces; most Dominicans also were convinced he was the 
candidate strongly favored by the United States. Although the 
civil war had been confined to urban areas, it left some 3,000 
dead and the country polarized. Thus, for many Dominicans, 
Balaguer' s administration lacked legitimacy. 

Authoritarian Balaguer, 1 966-78 

In his authoritarian and patrimonial style, predilection for 
grandiose public construction projects, and emphasis on the 
country's Hispanic essence, Balaguer resembled Trujillo. How- 
ever, Balaguer's treatment of economic, military, and political 
power differed from that of the strongman under whom he 
had served, in part because of changes in Dominican society 
and international circumstances. 



45 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

The Balaguer period from 1966 to 1978 was one of high eco- 
nomic growth; the country averaged a 7.6 percent increase in 
real GDP over the period. Growth was based on increased 
export earnings, import-substitution in consumer goods pro- 
moted by generous tax incentives, and public investment 
projects. It was facilitated by the United States sugar quota and 
generous economic assistance, particularly in the early Bal- 
aguer years. Balaguer ruled in a patrimonial fashion, ensuring 
that he was the central axis around which all other major polit- 
ical and economic forces revolved. At the same time, he eventu- 
ally undermined his position by promoting the development of 
business groups separate from, even if dependent upon, the 
state. Such an approach sharply contrasted with the approach 
taken in the Trujillo period. However, organized labor 
remained extremely weak as a result of repression, co-optation, 
and very restrictive labor legislation. 

Relations between business and Balaguer were complicated 
by the growing incursions of the armed forces into business 
and into politics. Balaguer had a commanding presence within 
the military as a result of his ties to the Trujillo period, his anti- 
communism, his statesmanlike caudillo figure, and his accep- 
tance of military repression as well as large-scale corruption. 
However, he clearly was not the military figure Trujillo had 
been. He sought to manage the military by playing off the 
ambitions of the leading generals and shifting their assigned 
posts. Yet, he occasionally confronted serious challenges, such 
as a coup effort by EHas Wessin y Wessin in 1971, which he suc- 
cessfully dismantled. The two leaders were later to reconcile 
politically. 

The initial Balaguer years were a period of relative polariza- 
tion that saw government repression and sporadic terrorist 
activities by opposition groups. In a six-year period after the 
1965 occupation, some 2,000 additional Dominicans were 
killed. Following his electoral victory in 1966, Balaguer ran 
again and won in elections in 1970 and 1974. However, in these 
elections, the military placed strong pressure on opposition 
candidates, most of whom ultimately withdrew prior to election 
day. Balaguer also practiced a policy of co-optation, bringing 
opposition figures into government. The extent and the sever- 
ity of repression, particularly after 1976, were considerably less 
than in the Trujillo years. 

By the 1978 elections, Balaguer's drive for power, reelection- 
ist aspirations, and policy decisions had alienated a number of 



46 



Dominican Republic: Historical Setting 

his former supporters. His popularity was also affected by wors- 
ening economic conditions. An economic downturn finally 
affected the country around 1976, when the sugar boom that 
had offset oil price increases faded. In addition, the country's 
substantial growth, industrialization, and urbanization had 
expanded middle-sector and professional groups, which were 
disgruntled by Balaguer's method of rule and apparent dis- 
crimination against newer and regional groups. The PRD, feel- 
ing the mood of the population and sensing support from the 
administration of United States president Jimmy Carter, nomi- 
nated a moderate, Silvestre Antonio Guzman Fernandez, as its 
candidate to oppose Balaguer in the 1978 elections. 

For these elections, the PRD also projected a more moderate 
image and strengthened its international contacts, particularly 
with the United States government and the Socialist Interna- 
tional. The PRD's ability to project itself as a less threatening 
alternative to Balaguer in 1978 was facilitated by the decision of 
Bosch in 1973 to abandon his party and establish another, 
more radical and cadre-oriented party, the Party of Dominican 
Liberation (Partido de la Liberacion Dominicana — PLD). 
Bosch's exit followed upon his disillusionment with liberal 
democracy following the 1965 United States intervention. In 
the 1980s, however, he was to lead his party back into the elec- 
toral arena. 

Electoral victory did not come easily for the PRD. As it 
became evident early in the morning after election day that the 
party was winning by a wide margin, a military contingent 
stopped the vote count. In the end, the effort to thwart the 
elections was dismantled because of firm opposition by the 
Carter administration, other Latin American and European 
governments, and domestic groups. Yet, in the tense period 
between the election and the inauguration, congressional elec- 
toral results were "adjusted" to provide the exiting Balaguer 
with a guarantee that he would not be prosecuted. Principally 
this adjustment involved giving Balaguer's party, the PR, a 
majority in the Senate, which appointed judges, and thus was 
key to the successful prosecution of corruption charges. 

The PRD in Power and Balaguer, Again 

Unlike Balaguer, the leaders of the Dominican Revolution- 
ary Party (PRD) promoted a democratic agenda. During the 
electoral campaign of 1978, the PRD conveyed the image of 
being the party of change (el partido del cambio); the party 



47 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

pledged to improve the living standards of the less privileged, 
to include those who felt politically underrepresented, and to 
modernize state institutions and the rule of law. As a result, the 
PRD's rise to power generated expectations among the Domin- 
ican people for socioeconomic and political reforms that were 
largely not achieved. 

One threat to democracy that began to recede in 1978 was 
that of military incursion into politics, given that President 
Guzman dismissed many of the key generals associated with 
repression. The armed forces have remained under civilian 
control. However, this control resulted primarily from the per- 
sonal relations top military officers had with the president and 
the divided political loyalties within the officer corps. Even 
when Balaguer returned to power in 1986, however, the mili- 
tary did not regain the level of importance and influence it had 
had during his first twelve years in office. 

The Guzman administration (1978-82) was viewed as transi- 
tional because it faced a Senate controlled by Balaguer's party 
and growing intraparty rivalry in the PRD, which was led by Sal- 
vador Jorge Blanco. Yet, the PRD was able to unify around 
Jorge Blanco's presidential candidacy (Guzman had pledged 
not to seek reelection) and defeat Balaguer and Bosch in the 
May 1982 elections. Tragically, Guzman committed suicide in 
July 1982, apparently because of depression, isolation, and con- 
cerns that Jorge Blanco might pursue corruption charges 
against family members; vice president Jacobo Majluta Azar 
completed Guzman's term until the turnover of power in 
August. 

Initial hopes that the Jorge Blanco administration (1982-86) 
would be a less personalist, more institutional, reformist presi- 
dency were not realized. A major problem was the economic 
crisis that not only limited the resources the government had 
available and demanded inordinate attention, but also forced 
the government to institute unpopular policies, sometimes by 
executive decree. Problems had begun under Guzman: prices 
sharply increased following the second Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil shock, interest 
rates skyrocketed, and exports declined. In addition, sugar 
prices fell in 1977-79, rebounded in 1980, and then fell sharply 
again even as the United States sugar quota was being reduced 
and as prices of other Dominican exports also declined. 

Significant steps toward economic stabilization were taken 
under the Jorge Blanco administration, although not without 



48 



Dominican Republic: Historical Setting 



difficulty. In April 1984, the government imposed price 
increases on fuel, food, and other items as part of a package of 
measures negotiated with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF — see Glossary) to renew international credit flows. Pro- 
tests against these measures escalated into full-scale riots that 
were tragically mismanaged by the armed forces, leading to 
scores of deaths and the suspension of the measures. In the 
face of growing international constraints, the administration 
successfully complied with an IMF stand-by program over 1985 
and 1986. However, the economic measures induced a sharp 
recession in the country. Another problem was executive-con- 
gressional deadlock, now driven by intraparty factionalism. The 
PRD was increasingly divided between followers of Salvador 
Jorge Blanco and Jose Francisco Peha Gomez on the one hand, 
and Jacobo Majluta Azar, on the other. Other difficulties 
resulted from the reassertion of patronage and executive lar- 
gesse. 

The situation in the country was perhaps responsible for the 
outcome of the May 1986 elections: Balaguer emerged victori- 
ous with a slim plurality, defeating Majluta of the PRD and 
Bosch of the PLD; Bosch had nevertheless received 18 percent 
of the vote, double the percentage from four years earlier. Bal- 
aguer had merged his party with several smaller Christian Dem- 
ocratic parties to form the Reformist Social Christian Party 
(Partido Reformista Social Cristiano — PRSC). However, the 
promise of a more coherent ideological base for his party was 
never realized. 

Balaguer began his 1986 term by denouncing the mistakes 
and irregularities carried out by his predecessors. His denunci- 
ation led ultimately to the arrest of former president Jorge 
Blanco on corruption charges. The administration did nothing 
to remove the factors that fostered corruption, however, seem- 
ingly satisfied with discrediting the PRD and particularly Jorge 
Blanco. 

Balaguer also sought to revive the economy quickly, princi- 
pally by carrying out a number of large-scale public investment 
projects. He pursued a policy of vigorous monetary expansion, 
fueling inflationary pressures and eventually forcing the gov- 
ernment to move toward a system of exchange controls. Infla- 
tion, which had been brought down to around 10 percent in 
1986, steadily climbed through Balaguer's first term. Balaguer 
also faced increasing social unrest in the late 1980s. Numerous 
strikes, such as a one-day national strike in July 1987, another 



49 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

in March 1988, and another in June 1989, took place between 
1987-89; in 1990 Balaguer faced two general strikes in the sum- 
mer and two others in the fall. Through a patchwork quilt of 
policies, the administration was able to limp through the May 
1990 elections without a formal stabilization plan. 

In spite of the country's problems, Balaguer achieved a nar- 
row plurality 7 victory in 1990. In elections marred by irregulari- 
ties and charges of fraud, the eighty-three-year-old incumbent 
edged out his eighty-year-old opponent, Bosch, by a mere 
24,470 votes. Peha Gomez, the PRD candidate, emerged as a 
surprisingly strong third candidate. By 1990 the PRD was irrep- 
arably split along lines that had formed during the bitter strug- 
gle for the 1986 presidential nomination. Peha Gomez had 
stepped aside for Jacobo Majluta in 1986 but had vowed not to 
do so again. The failure of numerous efforts since 1986 to set- 
tle internal disputes, as well as extensive legal and political 
wrangling, eventually left Peha Gomez in control of the PRD 
apparatus. Majluta ran at the head of a new party and came in a 
distant fourth. 

Once Balaguer was reelected, he focused on resolving grow- 
ing tensions between his government and business and the 
international financial community. In August 1990, Balaguer 
commenced a dialogue with business leaders and signed a Soli- 
darity Pact. In this pact, Balaguer agreed to curtail (but not 
abandon) his state-led developmentalism in favor of more aus- 
terity and market liberalization. He reduced public spending, 
renegotiated foreign debt, and liberalized the exchange rate, 
but he did not privatize state enterprises. An agreement with 
the IMF was reached in 1991, and ultimately what had been his- 
torically high rates of inflation in the country (59 percent in 
1990 and 54 percent in 1991) receded. Levels of social protest 
also decreased, as the country looked toward the 1994 elec- 
tions. 

In the 1994 campaign, the main election contenders were 
Balaguer of the PRSC and Peha Gomez of the PRD, with Bosch 
of the PLD running a distant third. In spite of suspicion and 
controversies, hopes ran high that with international help to 
the Electoral Board, a consensus document signed by the lead- 
ing parties in place, and international monitoring, the 1994 
elections would be fair, ending a long sequence of disputed 
elections in the Dominican Republic. Much to the surprise of 
many Dominicans and international observers, irregularities in 
voter registry lists were detected early on election day, which 



50 



Dominican Republic: Historical Setting 



prevented large numbers of individuals from voting. In what 
turned out to be extremely close elections, the disenfranchised 
appeared disproportionately to be PRD voters, a situation that 
potentially affected the outcome. The prolonged post-election 
crisis resulted from the apparent fraud in the 1994 elections. 
Balaguer had ostensibly defeated Peha Gomez by an even nar- 
rower margin than that over Bosch in the 1990 elections. This 
situation caused strong reactions by numerous groups inside 
and outside the country: the United States government, the 
OAS, international observer missions, business groups, some 
elements of the Roman Catholic Church, and the PRD, among 
others. The severe criticism led to the signing of an agreement, 
known as the Pact for Democracy, reached among the three 
major parties on August 10, 1994. The agreement reduced Bal- 
aguer's presidential term to two years, after which new presi- 
dential elections would be held. The agreement also called for 
the appointment of a new Electoral Board as well as numerous 
constitutional reforms. The reforms included banning consec- 
utive presidential reelection, separating presidential and con- 
gressional-municipal elections by two years, holding a run-off 
election if no presidential candidate won a majority of the 
votes, reforming the judicial system, and allowing dual citizen- 
ship. 

A New Beginning? 

The 1994 agreement and constitutional reforms, reinforced 
by increased vigilance by elements of Dominican civil society 
and by international actors, led to successful, free elections in 
1996. None of the three main contenders in 1996 received the 
absolute majority necessary to win in the first round. Peria 
Gomez of the PRD reached the highest percentage with 45.9 
percent, followed by Leonel Fernandez of the PLD with 38.9 
percent (Bosch had finally stepped down as party leader 
because of age and health), and Jacinto Peynado of the PRSC 
with 15 percent. Balaguer, who had not endorsed his party's 
first-round candidate, in the second round joined with the 
PRSC to officially endorse the candidacy of Leonel Fernandez 
of the PLD in a "Patriotic Pact." The pact's spokesmen, who 
called for the preservation of national sovereignty and Domini- 
canness, were, in effect, articulating racial and anti-Haitian 
themes in their campaign against Pena Gomez, who was of Hai- 
tian ancestry. Aided by the PRSC endorsement, Leonel Fernan- 
dez Reyna was able to defeat Pena Gomez in the second round. 



51 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Fernandez's arrival to the presidency illustrated many of the 
dramatic changes that had taken place in the country. At the 
time of the death of Trujillo in 1961, the Dominican Republic 
was a predominantly rural country with a population isolated 
from international contact and an economy largely dependent 
on the export of sugar and other agricultural crops. By 1996 
the country was mostly urban, and its economy and culture 
were far more linked to the outside world. Sugar was fading in 
importance; the country's major sources of foreign exchange 
were now tourism, exports from free trade zones, and remit- 
tances from overseas migrants. Indeed, the new president had 
spent part of his youth as a migrant in New York, where as 
many as one in fourteen Dominicans currently live; he could 
converse comfortably in English or Spanish about the implica- 
tions of economic globalization, the threat of drug trafficking 
routes through the island republic, or the records of the doz- 
ens of Dominican baseball players in the major leagues of the 
United States. 

The 1996 elections were the first in the country since 1962 
when neither Balaguer nor Bosch was a candidate. Political 
change was evident, as were elements of continuity and con- 
flict. Fernandez obtained the presidency, but the new electoral 
calendar established by the 1994 reform meant that congres- 
sional elections would now be held at the midpoint of the pres- 
idential term. Indeed, his party had a very small representation 
in Congress because of its poor performance in the 1994 elec- 
tions. Soon after Fernandez's electoral victory, Balaguer's PRSC 
negotiated a pact with the PRD to obtain leadership positions 
in Congress. Without congressional support, however, as of 
mid-1998 the Fernandez administration was stymied in its 
efforts to pass legislation. 

Midway through his presidential term in office, Fernandez 
had been governing in a more democratic fashion than Bal- 
aguer. As of mid-1998, the Fernandez administration had had 
two major political successes. One was the appointment in 
August 1997 of a new Supreme Court — widely viewed as com- 
prising many distinguished jurists — in a much more open pro- 
cess through a Council of the Magistrature established by the 
constitutional reform of 1994. The other was the holding of 
fair congressional and municipal elections on May 16, 1998. At 
the same time, the death of Peha Gomez, one of the country's 
political leaders, on May 10, 1998, was an indicator of the tran- 
sition in Dominican politics at the close of the twentieth cen- 



52 



Dominican Republic: Historical Setting 



tury. Because of Peria Gomez's death one week before the 
elections, the PRD won by an even wider margin than polls had 
suggested, gaining 80 percent of Senate seats, 56 percent of 
seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and 83 percent of mayoral 
races. Although Fernandez's own PLD improved its congres- 
sional representation compared to 1994, it was not nearly to 
the level expected by the party; the PRSC also did very poorly. 

Thus, the Dominican Republic is entering the new century 
seeking to strengthen still fragile democratic institutions, build- 
ing on the successful democratic transition represented by the 
1996 elections. The country is also having to learn how to man- 
age the bitter interparty wrangling reflected in tense executive- 
congressional relations while also managing leadership 
changes in the major parties and confronting continuing seri- 
ous socioeconomic challenges. 

* * * 

An excellent one-volume historical overview in English is 
Frank Moya Pons's The Dominican Republic: A National History. 
Also useful are the chapters by Frank Moya Pons and H. Hoe- 
tink found in The Cambridge History of Latin America (in volumes 
2, 5, and 7, including their bibliographical essays). On the 
nineteenth century, see also H. Hoetink, The Dominican People 
1859-1900: Notes for a Historical Sociology; Sumner Welles, 
Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 1844-1924; and Eme- 
lio Betances, State and Society in the Dominican Republic. Bruce J. 
Calder's The Impact of Intervention is an excellent study of the 
United States occupation and its effects. On Trujillo, Robert 
Crassweller's Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator is 
highly recommended. Howard Wiarda has written extensively 
on the Dominican Republic; his most detailed work is a three- 
volume study, Dictatorship, Development and Disintegration: Politics 
and Social Changes in the Dominican Republic. Rosario Espinal has 
published many valuable articles, including "An Interpretation 
of the Democratic Transition in the Dominican Republic." 
Recent analyses of Dominican politics include those by Jan 
Knippers Black, The Dominican Republic, James Ferguson, The 
Dominican Republic: Beyond the Lighthouse; and Jonathan Hartlyn, 
The Struggle for Democratic Politics in the Dominican Republic. (For 
further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



53 



Chapter 2. Dominican Republic: 
The Society and Its Environment 




A bohfo, or rural hut 



DOMINICAN SOCIETY OF THE late 1990s reflects the coun- 
try's Spanish-African-Caribbean heritage. It manifests signifi- 
cant divisions along the lines of race and class. A small fraction 
of the populace controls great wealth, while the vast majority 
struggles to get by. The small emerging middle class works both 
to maintain and to extend its political and economic gains. 
Generally speaking, Dominican society offers relatively few ave- 
nues of advancement; most of those available allow families of 
modest means only to enhance slightly or consolidate their 
standing. 

The majority of the population is mulatto, the offspring of 
Africans and Europeans. The indigenous Amerindian popula- 
tion had been virtually eliminated within half a century of ini- 
tial contact. Immigrants — European, Middle Eastern, Asian, 
and Caribbean — arrived with each cycle of economic growth. 
In general, skin color determines placement in the social hier- 
archy: lighter skin is associated with higher social and eco- 
nomic status. European immigrants and their offspring find 
more ready acceptance at the upper reaches of society than do 
darker-skinned Dominicans. 

The decades following the end of the regime of Rafael 
Leonidas Trujillo Molina (1930-61) have been a time of exten- 
sive changes as large-scale rural-urban and international migra- 
tion have blurred the gulf between city and countryside. 
Traditional attitudes persist: peasants continue to regard urban 
dwellers with suspicion, and people in cities continue to think 
of rural Dominicans as unsophisticated and naive. Nonethe- 
less, most families include several members who have migrated 
to the republic's larger cities or to the United States. Migration 
serves to relieve some of the pressures of population growth. 
Moreover, cash remittances from abroad permit families of 
moderate means to acquire assets and maintain a standard of 
living far beyond what they might otherwise enjoy. 

The alternatives available to poorer Dominicans are far 
more limited. Legal emigration requires assets beyond the 
reach of most, although some risk the water passage to Puerto 
Rico. Many rural dwellers migrate instead to one of the repub- 
lic's cities. These newcomers, however, enjoy financial 
resources and training far inferior to those prevailing among 
families of moderate means. For the vast majority of the repub- 



57 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

lie's population, the twin constraints of limited land and lim- 
ited employment opportunities define the daily struggle for 
existence. 

In the midst of far-reaching changes, the republic continues 
to be a profoundly family oriented society. Dominicans of every 
social stratum rely on family, kin, and neighbors for social iden- 
tity and interpersonal relations of trust and confidence, partic- 
ularly in the processes of migration and urbanization. At the 
same time, these processes often cause the family to disinte- 
grate. 

Geography 

The Dominican Republic is located on the island of Hispani- 
ola (La Isla Espanola) , which it shares with Haiti to the west. 
The 388-kilometer border between the two was established in a 
series of treaties, the most recent of which was the 1936 Proto- 
col of Revision of the Frontier Treaty (Tratado Fronterizo) of 
1929. The country is shaped in the form of an irregular trian- 
gle. The short side of the triangle is 388 kilometers long, while 
the two long sides form 1,575 kilometers of coastline along the 
Atlantic Ocean, Caribbean Sea, and Mona Passage. The total 
area of the country is 48,442 square kilometers. Although the 
Dominican Republic boasts the highest elevations in the Antil- 
les, it also has a saltwater lake below sea level (see fig. 1). 

Natural Regions 

The mountains and valleys of the Dominican Republic 
divide the country into three regions: the northern region, 
central region, and southwestern region. The northern region 
borders the Atlantic Ocean and consists of the Atlantic coastal 
plain, Cordillera Septentrional (Northern Range), Valle del 
Cibao (Cibao Valley), and Samana Peninsula. The Atlantic 
coastal plain is a narrow strip that extends from the northwest- 
ern coast at Monte Cristi to Nagua, north of the Samana Penin- 
sula. The Cordillera Septentrional is south of and runs parallel 
to the coastal plain. Its highest peaks rise to an elevation of 
more than 1,000 meters. The Valle del Cibao lies south of the 
Cordillera Septentrional. It extends 240 kilometers from the 
northwest coast to the Bahia de Samana (Samana Bay) in the 
east and ranges in width from fifteen to forty-five kilometers. 
To the west of the ridge lies the Valle de Santiago, and to the 
east is the Valle de la Vega Real. The Samana Peninsula is an 



58 



Dominican Republic: The Society and Its Environment 

eastward extension of the northern region, separated from the 
Cordillera Septentrional by an area of swampy lowlands. The 
peninsula is mountainous, with its highest elevations reaching 
600 meters. 

The central region is dominated by the Cordillera Central 
(Central Range); it runs eastward from the Haitian border and 
turns southward at the Valle de Constanza to end in the Carib- 
bean Sea. This southward branch is known as the Sierra de 
Ocoa. The Cordillera Central is 2,000 meters high near the 
Haitian border and reaches an elevation of 3,087 meters at 
Pico Duarte, the highest point in the country. An eastern 
branch of the Cordillera Central extends through the Sierra de 
Yamasa to the Cordillera Oriental (Eastern Range). The main 
peaks of these two mountain groups are not higher than 880 
meters. The Cordillera Oriental also is known as the Sierra de 
Seibo. 

Another significant feature of the central region is the Carib- 
bean coastal plain, which lies south of the foothills of the Sierra 
de Yamasa and the Cordillera Oriental. It extends 240 kilome- 
ters from the mouth of the Ocoa River to the extreme eastern 
end of the island. The Caribbean coastal plain is ten to forty 
kilometers wide and consists of a series of limestone terraces 
that gradually rise to an elevation of 100 to 120 meters at the 
northern edge of the coastal plains at the foothills of the Cor- 
dillera Oriental. Finally, the central region includes the Valle 
de San Juan in the western part of the country; the valley 
extends 100 kilometers from the Haitian border to Bafria de 
Ocoa. 

The southwestern region lies south of the Valle de San Juan. 
It encompasses the Sierra de Neiba, which extends 100 kilome- 
ters from the Haitian border to the Yaque del Sur River. The 
main peaks are roughly 2,000 meters high, while other peaks 
range from 1,000 to 1,500 meters. On the eastern side of the 
Yaque del Sur lies the Sierra de Martin Garcia, which extends 
twenty-five kilometers from the river to the Llanura de Azua 
(Plain of Azua) . 

The Hoya de Enriquillo, a structural basin that lies south of 
the Sierra de Neiba, is also within the southwestern region. 
The basin extends ninety-five kilometers from the Haitian bor- 
der to the Bahia de Neiba and twenty kilometers from the 
Sierra de Neiba to the Sierra de Baoruco. The Sierra de 
Baoruco extends seventy kilometers from the Haitian border to 
the Caribbean Sea. Its three major peaks surpass 2,000 meters 



59 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

in height. The Procurrente de Barahona (Cape of Barahona) 
extends southward from the Sierra de Baoruco and consists of 
a series of terraces. 

Drainage 

The Dominican Republic has seven major drainage basins. 
Five of these rise in the Cordillera Central and a sixth in the 
Sierra de Yamasa. The seventh drainage system flows into the 
Lago Enriquillo (Lake Enriquillo) from the Sierra de Neiba to 
the north and the Sierra de Baoruco to the south. In general, 
other rivers are either short or intermittent. 

The Yaque del Norte is the most significant river in the coun- 
try. Some 296 kilometers long and with a basin area of 7,044 
square kilometers, it rises near Pico Duarte at an elevation of 
2,580 meters in the Cordillera Central. It empties into Bahia de 
Monte Cristi on the northwest coast where it forms a delta. The 
Yaque del Sur is the most important river on the southern 
coast. It rises to an elevation of 2,707 meters in the southern 
slopes of the Cordillera Central. Its upper course through the 
mountains comprises 75 percent of its total length of some 183 
kilometers. The basin area is 4,972 square kilometers. The river 
forms a delta near its mouth in the Bahia de Neiba. 

The Lago Enriquillo, the largest lake in the Antilles, lies in 
the western part of the Hoya de Enriquillo. Its drainage basin 
includes ten minor river systems and covers an area of more 
than 3,000 square kilometers. The northern rivers of the sys- 
tem are perennial and rise in the Sierra de Neiba, while the 
southern rivers rise in the Sierra de Baoruco and are intermit- 
tent, flowing only after heavy rainfall. The Lago Enriquillo 
itself varies from 200 to 265 square kilometers. Its water level 
oscillates because of the high evaporation rate, yet on the aver- 
age it is forty meters below sea level. The water in the lake is 
saline. 

Climate 

The Dominican Republic has primarily a tropical climate, 
with more diurnal and local than seasonal variations in temper- 
ature, and with seasonal variability in the abundance of rainfall. 
The average annual temperature is 25°C, ranging from 18°C at 
an elevation of more than 1,200 meters to 28°C at an elevation 
of ten meters. Highs of 40°C are common in protected valleys, 
as are lows of 0°C in mountainous areas. In general, August is 
the hottest month and January and February, the coldest. 



60 



Dominican Republic: The Society and Its Environment 

Seasons, however, vary more as a function of rainfall than of 
temperature. Along the northern coast, the rainy season lasts 
from November through January. In the rest of the country, it 
runs from May through November, with May being the wettest 
month. The dry season lasts from November through April, 
with March being the driest month. The average annual rain- 
fall for the country as a whole is 150 centimeters. Rainfall var- 
ies, however, from region to region, from thirty-five 
centimeters in the Valle de Neiba to 274 centimeters in the 
Cordillera Oriental. In general, the western part of the coun- 
try, including the interior valleys, receives the least rain. 

Tropical cyclones — such as tropical depressions, tropical 
storms, and hurricanes — occur on the average once every two 
years in the Dominican Republic. More than 65 percent of the 
storms strike the southern part of the country, especially along 
the Hoya de Enriquillo. The season for cyclones lasts from the 
beginning of June to the end of November; some cyclones 
occur in May and December, but most occur in September and 
October. Hurricanes usually occur from August through Octo- 
ber. They may produce winds greater than 200 kilometers per 
hour and rainfall greater than fifty centimeters in a twenty-four- 
hour period. 

Population 

Size and Growth 

The country's total population in 1993, according to the 
census of that year, totaled slightly more than 7 million; its pop- 
ulation for 1997 has been estimated to be slightly above 8 mil- 
lion. Growth has been high since official census-taking began 
in 1920. The average growth rate peaked during the 1950s at 
3.6 percent per year. Since then the rate has been declining: 
during the 1960s, the population grew at 2.9 percent annually; 
during the 1970s, at 2.3 percent; during the 1980s, at 2.0 per- 
cent; and during the 1990s, at 1.6 percent (see fig. 3). 

The total fertility rate, although still relatively high, declined 
substantially in the 1970s and then slowly in the 1980s and early 
1990s: from 3.7 children per woman of child-bearing age in 
1985 to 3.2 in 1990, 2.8 in 1992, and 2.7 in 1995. Official esti- 
mates indicate that half of all married women use contracep- 
tives — the rate was reportedly 58 percent in 1984 in 
comparison to 32 percent in 1975. However, the Dominican 
Republic's existing population growth rate and field studies 



61 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 




Source: Based on information from Dominican Republic, Oficina Nacional de 

Estadistica, La Republica Dominicana en Cifras, 1997, Santo Domingo, 1998, 
52-55. 

Figure 3. Dominican Republic: Population Distribution by Age and 
Sex, 1993 Census 

seem to belie this figure. A scholarly study in the 1990s indi- 
cates, for example, that whereas the use of contraceptive pills 
ranged from 5 to 9 percent for the 1975 to 1986 period, perma- 
nent sterilization has become the most popular birth control 
method among Dominican women. Their recourse to it rose 
from 8 to 33 percent during the above period. 

Despite the opposition of the Roman Catholic Church, the 
government began supporting family planning in 1967 with 
financing from the United States Agency for International 
Development. The family planning program expanded rapidly, 
from eight clinics concentrated in the cities and larger towns to 
more than 500 clinics — some in small towns and rural areas — 
by the late 1980s. Both the Secretariat of State for Public 
Health and Social Welfare (Secretaria de Estado de Salud 
Publica y Asistencia Social — SESPAS) and the National Council 
on Population and Family (Consejo Nacional de Poblacion y 



62 



Dominican Republic: The Society and Its Environment 

Familia — Conapofa) offer family planning services. By the 
1980s, both organizations were trying to make their programs 
more responsive to the needs of rural families. In the 1980s, 
the groups focused on population reduction along with mater- 
nal and child health. The focus shifted in the 1990s to achiev- 
ing a balance among population level, economic development, 
and progress toward social well-being. 

Birth control encounters strong resistance from both sexes, 
especially in the countryside and the smaller cities. Although 
women use a variety of substances believed to be contraceptives 
or abortifacients, there is considerable misinformation about 
family planning. Many men believe birth control threatens 
their masculinity; some women think various contraceptive 
methods cause sickness. Dominican migrants who travel 
abroad are more aware of the available options, and some 
women migrants use modern contraceptives. 

Population Distribution 

With regard to demographic distribution, the traditional 
(nonadministrative) subregions of the country include Valde- 
sia and Yuma in the southeast, Enriquillo and Del Valle in the 
southwest, and the Central, Eastern, and Western Cibao in the 
north. The subregion of densest settlement is Valdesia on the 
southern coast, which contains the nation's capital and, accord- 
ing to the 1993 census, 41 percent of the population. Roughly 
one-third (30 percent in 1993) of all Dominicans live in the 
National District, the area surrounding the national capital of 
Santo Domingo. The other major area of settlement is the Cen- 
tral Cibao, which accounted for 23 percent of total population 
in 1993 (see table 2, Appendix). 

Administrations have attempted to control population 
growth and distribution since the 1950s. The Trujillo regime 
fostered agricultural colonies scattered throughout the coun- 
tryside and strung along the western frontier with Haiti. Some 
were coupled with irrigation projects. In the late 1970s, some 
new joint projects with Haiti were approved by President Silves- 
tre Antonio Guzman Fernandez (1978-82). 

Beginning in the late 1970s, the government also set up 
industrial free zones around the country. Although the desire 
to increase employment was the government's primary motiva- 
tion, the establishment of free zones also had as a secondary 
goal the dispersal of industrialization, and thus migration, away 
from Santo Domingo (see Manufacturing, ch. 3). Intercensal 

63 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

growth rates on the subregional and provincial levels reflect 
these trends. Puerto Plata grew at more than twice the rate of 
the nation as a whole in the 1970s. This trend continued in the 
1980s and early 1990s as a result of the rapidly developing and 
expanding tourist industry along the north coast. The south- 
east, especially the National District, has expanded much faster 
than most of the country, as has La Romana, both largely on 
account of the increased number of industrial free zones. 

Migration 

The Dominican Republic is a country of migrants. Surveys in 
the mid-1970s found that nearly two-thirds of city dwellers and 
half of those in the countryside had migrated at least once. 
According to the 1981 census, nearly one-quarter of the popu- 
lation was living in a province other than that in which they 
were born. A decade later, according to the 1993 census, the 
figure had increased to one-third of the population. Rural 
areas in general, especially in the Central Cibao, have experi- 
enced significant levels of out-migration. The movement of 
peasants and the landless into the republic's growing cities has 
accounted for the lion's share of migration, however. Indeed, 
Dominicans have even coined a word, campuno, to describe the 
rural-urban campesino migrant. In the 1970s, the industrial 
free zones, particularly in La Romana and San Pedro de 
Macons, attracted many migrants in search of employment. 
According to the 1981 census, the principal destinations for 
migrants were the National District followed by the provinces 
of La Romana, Independencia, and San Pedro de Macons (see 
fig. 2). In the National District, 46 percent of the inhabitants 
were migrants. The main destination for migrants in the 1980s, 
according to the 1993 Dominican census, continued to be the 
National District but was followed this time by the provinces of 
Valverde and San Cristobal and then La Romana and San 
Pedro de Macoris. This census indicated the increasing urban- 
ization of the country as well as the apparent continuing mag- 
net effect of the industrial zones, which in 1997 numbered 
thirty-five and employed 182,000 Dominicans. 

In the 1990s, women predominated in both rural-urban and 
urban-rural migration (55 to 60 percent of the workers in the 
industrial free zones were women, representing what two 
Dominican analysts call the "feminization" of labor, especially 
in Santo Domingo). Men, however, are more likely than 
women to move from city to city or from one rural area to 



64 



Dominican Republic: The Society and Its Environment 

another. According to the 1993 census, in rural areas men out- 
number women until the twenty to twenty-four-year age-group, 
when women become more numerous; in the forty-five to fifty- 
year age-group, men once again become and remain in the 
majority. The figures reflect the fact that men in the twenty-five 
to forty-four-year age-group leave for the cities or for the 
United States. Many return two decades later. On the other 
hand, in the urban areas from their teens on women outnum- 
ber men. 

In general, migrants earn more than non-migrants and suf- 
fer lower rates of unemployment, although underemployment 
is pervasive. Urban-rural migrants have the highest incomes. 
This category, however, consists of a select group of educated 
and skilled workers, mostly government officials, teachers, and 
the like moving from a city to assume specific jobs in rural 
areas. They receive higher wages as a recompense for the lack 
of urban amenities in villages. 

Migrants speak of the migration chain ( cadena) tying them 
to other migrants and their home communities. Kin serve as 
the links in the chain. They care for family, lands, and busi- 
nesses left behind, or, if they have migrated earlier, assist the 
new arrivals with employment and housing. The actual degree 
of support families can or are willing to give a migrant varies 
widely, however. 

The process of rural-urban migration typically involves a 
series of steps. The migrant gradually abandons agriculture 
and seeks more nonagricultural sources of income. Migrants 
rarely arrive in the largest, fastest-growing cities "green" from 
the countryside. They acquire training and experience in inter- 
mediate-sized cities and temporary nonfarm jobs en route. 

International migration plays a significant role in the liveli- 
hood of many Dominicans. Anywhere from 10 to 12 percent of 
the total population are residing abroad. Estimates of those liv- 
ing and working in the United States in the 1990s range from 
300,000 to as high as 800,000. Roughly 200,000 more are esti- 
mated to be in San Juan, Puerto Rico, many of them presum- 
ably waiting to get to the United States mainland. One 
Dominican official reported the estimated number in the late 
1990s to be 700,000, which includes 75,000 illegals. In the mid- 
1980s, the United States admitted from 23,000 to 26,000 
Dominicans annually; by 1990 the number had increased to 
42,195 and by 1993 to almost 46,000. (The United States cen- 
sus of 1990 reported that there were 511,297 Dominicans living 



65 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

as permanent residents. After the Dominican constitution was 
amended in 1994 to allow dual citizenship, there was a Domini- 
can rush to naturalize.) Most emigrants go to New York City 
(68 percent in 1990); starting in the mid-1980s their destina- 
tions also included other cities of the eastern seaboard — Bos- 
ton, Providence, and Hartford — and in the South, Miami. 

In the 1960s and early 1970s, many professionals emigrated 
because of the lack of professional opportunities, thus consti- 
tuting a brain drain, one that affected some key professions. 
Later, the majority of those emigrating were unemployed, 
unskilled, and women. A sizable minority (about one-third), 
however, emigrated not only for economic reasons but to con- 
tinue their education, especially graduate and professional, or 
to join other family members. Many planned to save their 
money and return home to start a small business. In the 1980s 
and 1990s, the emigrants' educational and skill levels have 
been changing. Whereas the majority are still unskilled, an 
increasing minority includes emigrants who are relatively more 
educated and skilled than the Dominican populace as a whole. 
Most come from cities, but the mid- to large-sized farms of the 
overpopulated Cibao also send large numbers. Working in the 
United States has become almost an expected part of the lives 
of Dominicans from families of moderate means. 

This practice linking the two countries has resulted in the 
development of what some scholars call the "dual societies" — 
Dominican and United States — and the "dual identity" of 
Dominicans. Their moving back and forth, working and saving 
in the United States, being influenced by United States values, 
produces a north-south transnationalism. Because so many 
Dominicans live and work in New York City, a special word — 
"Domyork" — was created at home to describe those returning 
to visit, open a business, or retire. 

Cash remittances from Dominicans living abroad have 
become an integral part of the national economy. Emigrants' 
remittances constitute a significant percentage of the country's 
foreign exchange earnings. Remittances are used to finance 
businesses, purchase land, and bolster a family's standard of liv- 
ing. Most emigrants see sending money as an obligation. 
Al though some refuse to provide assistance, they come under 
severe criticism from both fellow emigrants and those who 
remain behind. The extent to which an emigrant's earnings are 
committed to family and kin is sometimes striking. Anthropolo- 
gist Patricia Pessar has described a Dominican man in New 



66 




View of theDuarte Highway north of Santo Domingo 
Courtesy Inter-American Development Bank 



York who earned less than US$500 per month. He sent US$150 
of this to his wife and children and another US$100 to his par- 
ents and unmarried siblings. In 1990 remittances accounted 
for 40 percent of Dominican family income, and 88 percent of 
these remittances came from New York state. 

Money from abroad has had a multiplier effect; it has 
spawned a veritable construction boom in emigrants' home- 
towns and neighborhoods beginning in the mid-1970s and con- 
tinuing since that time. Some of the returning "Domyorks" who 
survived and profited from drug trafficking have brought 
about a major change in traditional Dominican society with 
their Hollywood homes, expensive cars, noisy bars, and discos. 
San Francisco de Macoris is the main city that has been so 
transformed. The increasing emigrant investments in housing 
and in tourism also have challenged the traditional elite's 
monopoly control. Additionally, emigrants contribute signifi- 
cant sums to the church back home. Many parish priests make 
annual fund-raising trips to New York to seek donations for 
local parish needs. 

The impact of emigration is widely felt, which is illustrated 
by the experience of two Dominican villages, two decades 
apart, whose emigrants went to New York City and Boston. In 

67 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

the earlier case, in one Cibao village 85 percent of the house- 
holds had at least one member living in New York in the mid- 
1970s. In the later case, a village in the southern province of 
Peravia, more than 65 percent of the 445 households had rela- 
tives in the Boston metropolitan area in the mid-1990s. Where 
emigration is common, it alters a community's age pyramid: 
eighteen to forty-five-year-olds (especially males) are essentially 
missing. Emigration also eliminates many of the natural 
choices for leadership roles in the home community. Addition- 
ally, anthropologist Pessar noted in a recent study the negative 
impact of departures upon rural society. Emigration, for exam- 
ple, has led to a shift from share-cropping to cattle grazing, 
resulting in the fragmentation of the rural economy. Although 
those left behind often feel isolated from their neighbors and 
are adrift, especially those who have left farming for cattle graz- 
ing, there is a constant exchange of news and information, and 
the maintenance of social contact between the remaining vil- 
lagers and their emigrant relatives. The latter's remittances 
economically sustain or improve the welfare of the former. 

Urbanization 

For most of its history, the Dominican Republic was over- 
whelmingly rural; in 1920 more than 80 percent of its populace 
lived in the countryside, and by 1950 more than 75 percent still 
did. Substantial urban expansion began in the 1950s and 
gained tremendous momentum in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. 
Urban growth rates far outdistanced those of the country as a 
whole. The urban population expanded at 6.1 percent annu- 
ally during the 1950s, 5.7 percent during the 1960s to 1970s, 
4.7 percent through the 1980s, and 3.3 percent from 1990 to 
1995 (rural population has decreased 0.3 percent since 1990). 

In the early decades of the twentieth century, the country 
was not only largely rural, but the urban scene itself was domi- 
nated by smaller cities and provincial capitals. In 1920 nearly 
80 percent of all city dwellers lived in cities with fewer than 
20,000 inhabitants. Santo Domingo, with barely more than 
30,000 residents, accounted for only 20 percent of those in cit- 
ies. By contrast, in 1981 Santo Domingo alone accounted for 
nearly half of all city dwellers; it had more than double the 
total population of all cities of more than 20,000 inhabitants. 
Cities with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants — nearly 80 percent of 
the urban population in 1920 — constituted less than 20 per- 
cent by 1981. According to the 1993 census, the Dominican 



68 



Dominican Republic: The Society and Its Environment 

Republic was 56 percent urban, and Santo Domingo had 40 
percent of the urban population. The United Nations Demo- 
graphic Yearbook, 1996 estimated the country to be almost 62 
percent urban in 1995. 

Santo Domingo approximately doubled its population every 
decade between 1920 and 1970. Its massive physical expansion, 
however, dates from the 1950s. The growth in industry and 
urban construction, coupled with Trujillo's expropriations of 
rural land, fueled rural-urban migration and the city's growth. 
In 1993 the city had slightly more than 2 million inhabitants. 
The republic's second and third largest cities, Santiago de los 
Caballeros and La Romana, also experienced significant 
expansion in the 1960s and 1970s. Santiago, the center of tradi- 
tional Hispanic culture, drew migrants from the heavily popu- 
lated Cibao. La Romana, in the southeast, grew as a center of 
employment in the sugar industry as well as a tourism center; it 
was also the site of the country's first industrial free zone (see 
Manufacturing, ch. 3). The two cities continued to grow 
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s while the sugar industry 
declined — replaced by expanding industrial free zones and 
tourism in La Romana. In 1993 the population of Santiago de 
los Caballeros stood at 488,291 and that of La Romana at 
141,570. 

Population growth and rural-urban migration have strained 
cities' capacity to provide housing and amenities. Nevertheless, 
in 1981 nearly 80 percent of city dwellings had access to pota- 
ble water; 90 percent had limited sewage disposal; and roughly 
90 percent had electricity. These percentages subsequently 
declined because the provision of such services did not keep 
up with the general increase in population as well as with the 
continued rural-urban migration. For example, a Pan Ameri- 
can Health Organization (PAHO) report estimated that in 
1993 the potable water supply reached 65 percent of the popu- 
lation: 80 percent were in urban areas and 46 percent were in 
rural areas (only 25 percent of rural communities had drinking 
water services). Sewage disposal services covered only 16 per- 
cent of the entire population, and 28 percent of the urban pop- 
ulation had apartment or house connections. (According to 
the 1993 Dominican census, 214,354 of the country's 1,629,616 
dwellings lacked sanitary services.) Finally, the PAHO report 
indicated that 81 percent of the dwellings had electricity. 

By the mid-1980s, there was an estimated housing deficit of 
some 400,000 units; by 1990 estimates, 600,000 dwellings were 



69 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



uninhabitable, 800,000 needed repairs, and only 500,000 were 
considered adequate. The need is greatest in the National Dis- 
trict. Squatter settlements have grown in response to the scar- 
city of low-cost urban housing. In Santo Domingo these 
settlements are concentrated along the Ozama River and on 
the city's periphery. When Joaquin Balaguer Ricardo returned 
to the presidency in 1986, 3,000 squatters were forced from the 
construction site of the lighthouse along the Ozama River. 
They were moved to the side of the construction site where a 
slum area developed. A high wall was built to keep the area 
from being seen. 

Public housing initiatives date from the late 1950s, when 
Trujillo built some housing for government employees of mod- 
erate means. Through the 1980s, a number of different govern- 
mental agencies played a role. Often motivated to create jobs 
during economic crises, the Technical Secretariat of the Presi- 
dency has designed a variety of projects in Santo Domingo. The 
Aid and Housing Institute and the National Housing Institute 
bear primary responsibility for the financing and construction 
of housing. In general, public efforts have been hampered by 
extreme decentralization in planning coupled with equally 
extreme concentration in decision-making. The primary bene- 
ficiaries of public projects are usually lower-income groups, 
although not the poorest urban dwellers. Projects have tar- 
geted those making at least the minimum wage, namely the 
lower-middle sector or the more stable segments of the work- 
ing class. 

Racial and Ethnic Groups 

Ethnic Heritage 

The island's indigenous inhabitants were mainly the Taino 
Indians, an Arawak-speaking group, and a small settlement of 
Carib Indians around the Bahia de Samana. These Indians, 
estimated to number perhaps 1 million at the time of their ini- 
tial contact with Europeans, for the most part had been killed 
or died by the 1550s as a result of harsh Spanish treatment. The 
Tainos were especially ill-treated. 

The importation of African slaves began in 1503. By the 
nineteenth century, the population was roughly 150,000: 
40,000 were of Spanish descent, 40,000 were black slaves, and 
the remainder were either freed blacks or mulattoes. In the 
mid-1990s, approximately 10 percent of the population was 



70 



Dominican Republic: The Society and Its Environment 

considered white and 15 percent black; the remainder were 
mulattoes — 75 percent (the percentages are often debated). 
Since then the percentage of whites has been slowly decreasing 
and that of mulattoes increasing; the black percentage has 
remained about the same, with Haitian immigration being a 
factor. The figures about the ethnic ratio and its changing com- 
position are a sensitive Dominican issue because many elite 
and upper-class whites are anti-African (blacks and mulattoes) 
and seek to claim a higher, constant "white" figure. Many 
mulattoes, however, claim a larger percentage for themselves at 
the same time that many others have difficulty acknowledging 
their African roots. 

Contemporary Dominican society and culture are primarily 
Spanish in origin. At the same time, much of popular culture 
reflects many African influences. Taino influence is limited to 
cultigens, such as maize or corn, and a few vocabulary words, 
such as huracdn (hurricane) and hamaca (hammock). The Afri- 
can influence in society was officially suppressed and ignored 
by the Trujillo regime (1930-61) and then by Balaguer until 
the 1980s. However, certain religious brotherhoods with signifi- 
cant black membership have incorporated some Afro-Ameri- 
can elements. Observers also have noted the presence of 
African influence in popular dance and music (see Culture, 
this ch.). 

There has long been a preference in Dominican society for 
light skin, straight hair, and "white" racial features. Blackness in 
itself, however, does not necessarily restrict a person to a lower 
status position. Upward mobility is possible for the dark- 
skinned person who manages to acquire education or wealth. 
During the era of Trujillo, joining the military became a major 
means of upward mobility, especially for dark and light-skinned 
Dominicans — the white elite would not permit its sons to join). 
Social characteristics focusing on family background, educa- 
tion, and economic standing are, in fact, more prominent 
means of identifying and classifying individuals. Darker- 
skinned persons are concentrated in the east, the south, and 
the far west near the Haitian border. The population of the 
Cibao, especially in the countryside, consists mainly of whites 
or mulattoes. 

Dominicans traditionally prefer to think of themselves as 
descendants of the island's Indians and the Spanish, ignoring 
their African heritage. Thus, phenotypical African characteris- 
tics, such as dark skin pigmentation, are disparaged. Trujillo, a 

71 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

light-skinned mulatto who claimed that he was "white" (French 
and Spanish), instituted as official policy that Dominicans were 
racially white, culturally Spanish, and religiously Roman Catho- 
lic. Balaguer continued this policy until the 1980s when he 
openly recognized African cultural and social influences. He 
made the change because, first, he followed two opposition 
party governments, those of presidents Guzman (1978-82) and 
Jorge Blanco (1982-86), who had officially recognized the 
country's African roots. Second, he was appealing for votes as 
he prepared for his reelection campaign in 1986. Because of 
Trujillo's and then Balaguer's racial conditioning, emigrants 
and visitors to the United States are often shocked to discover 
that they are viewed as "black." However, they and many back 
home welcomed the civil rights and black pride movements in 
North America in the 1960s and 1970s. Those returning 
brought a new level of racial consciousness to the republic 
because they had experienced both racial prejudice and the 
black pride movement. The returning emigrants who brought 
back Afro hairstyles and a variety of other "Afro-North Ameri- 
canisms" received mixed reactions from their fellow Domini- 
cans, however. 

Modern Immigration 

Although almost all immigrants assimilate to Dominican 
society (often with surprising speed and thoroughness), immi- 
gration has had a pervasive influence on the ethnic and racial 
configuration of the country. Within a generation or two, most 
immigrants with the exception of Haitians are considered 
Dominican even though the family may continue to maintain 
contact with relatives in the country of origin. Both the elite 
and the middle segments of society have recruited new mem- 
bers with each economic expansion. The main impetus to 
immigration was the rise of sugar production in the late nine- 
teenth and early twentieth centuries. Some groups have had 
earlier antecedents, whereas others arrived as late as the 1970s, 
1980s, and 1990s — Haitians and Chinese from Taiwan contin- 
ued to enter in the late 1990s. 

Nineteenth-century immigrants came from a number of 
sources. North American freedmen, principally Methodists, 
came in response to an offer of free land made during the 
period of Haitian domination (1822-44). Roughly 5,000 to 
10,000 immigrated; most, however, were city dwellers and 
quickly returned to the United States. A few small settlements 



Dominican Republic: The Society and Its Environment 

remained around Santiago, Puerto Plata, and Samana. They 
eventually assimilated, although English is still widely used in 
the region of Samana. Sephardic Jews arrived from Curacao in 
the late eighteenth century and in greater numbers following 
Dominican independence from Haiti in 1844. They assimilated 
rapidly; both their economic assets and their white ancestry 
made them desirable additions from the point of view of both 
the elite and the criollos. Canary Islanders arrived during the 
late colonial period as well, in response to the improved 
Dominican economic conditions in the 1880s. Spaniards set- 
tled in the country during the period of renewed Spanish occu- 
pation (1861-65); a number of Spanish soldiers remained in 
the Dominican Republic after the War of Restoration. Ger- 
mans also established themselves in the republic, principally in 
Puerto Plata. Some arrived before independence, but they 
mainly came after the Spanish occupation; they were involved 
primarily in the tobacco trade. 

The expansion of the sugar industry in the late nineteenth 
century drew immigrants from every social stratum. Cubans 
and Puerto Ricans, who began arriving in the 1870s, aided in 
the evolution of the sugar industry as well as the country's intel- 
lectual development. In addition, the sugar industry attracted 
significant numbers of laborers from the British, Dutch, and 
Danish islands of the Caribbean. These immigrants also 
worked in railroad construction and on the docks. Initial reac- 
tion to their presence was negative, but their educational back- 
ground (which was superior to that of most of the rural 
populace), their ability to speak English (which gave them an 
advantage in dealing with North American plantation owners) , 
and their industriousness eventually won them a measure of 
acceptance. They founded Protestant churches, Masonic 
lodges, mutual aid societies, and a variety of other cultural 
organizations. Their descendants have enjoyed a considerable 
measure of upward mobility through education and religion. 
They are well represented in the technical trades (especially 
those associated with the sugar industry) and on professional 
baseball teams. 

Arabs — Lebanese and lesser numbers of Palestinians and 
Syrians — first arrived in the late nineteenth century and pros- 
pered. Their assimilation was slower, however, and many con- 
tinued for a long time to maintain contacts with relatives in the 
Middle East. Italians, as well as some South American immi- 
grants, also arrived during this period and assimilated rapidly. 



73 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

A few Chinese came from the other Caribbean islands and 
established a reputation for diligence and industriousness. 
More followed with the United States occupation of the island 
(1916-24). They began as cooks and domestic servants; a num- 
ber of their descendants are restaurateurs and hotel owners. 

The most recent trickle of immigrants entered the country 
from the 1930s onward. Many founded agricultural colonies 
that suffered a high rate of attrition. Trujillo, who favored 
European "whites," admitted German Jews and Spanish civil 
war refugees (both in the 1930s) , Japanese (post World War II) , 
and Hungarians and Spaniards (both in the 1950s). More Chi- 
nese came from Taiwan and Hong Kong in the 1970s; by the 
1980s, they were the second fastest growing immigrant group — 
Haitians being the first. Many had sufficient capital to set up 
manufacturing firms in the country's industrial free zones. In 
the 1990s, Chinese from Taiwan and Hong Kong continued to 
come to Haiti, along with some Japanese, Spaniards, and Vene- 
zuelans. 

Haitians 

Modern Haitian immigration to the Dominican Republic 
dates from the late nineteenth century, when increasing North 
American capital raised sugar production. Dominicans have 
never welcomed these immigrants, first, because of the legacy 
of the oppressive Haitian occupation and the Dominican strug- 
gle for independence and, second, because of Trujillo's and 
then Balaguer's views of Haitians and their anti-Haiti policies. 
The Haitian presence resulted from economic necessity born 
of the reluctance of Dominicans to perform the menial task of 
cane-cutting. The 1920 census listed slightly under 28,000 Hai- 
tian nationals in the Dominican Republic. Successive govern- 
ments attempted to control the numbers of Haitians entering 
the country; the border was periodically closed in the 1910s 
and 1920s. But by 1935 the number had increased to more 
than 50,000. Trujillo ordered a general roundup of Haitians 
along the border in 1937, during which an estimated 5,000 to 
12,000 Haitians were killed (see The Trujillo Era, ch. 1) . 

Since the 1960s, a series of bilateral agreements has regu- 
lated legal Haitian immigration. In 1966 Balaguer contracted 
with the Haitian government for 10,000 to 20,000 temporary 
Haitian workers annually for the sugarcane harvest. When this 
agreement expired in the early 1980s, there was a great labor 
shortage on the Dominican State Sugar Council (Consejo 



74 



Dominican Republic: The Society and Its Environment 

Estatal del Azucar — CEA) plantations. In response, the Domin- 
ican army rounded up Haitians in the country and forcibly 
took them to the CEA estates. The exploitation of the Haitian 
cane cutters included their being forced to live in filthy hovels, 
called bateyes. In 1983 the International Labour Organisation 
issued a critical report about the situation, which was followed 
by similar reports by human rights groups in 1989 and 1990. 
Balaguer's response after his 1990 reelection was the deporta- 
tion of 50,000 Haitian illegals. Shortly before the May 1996 
election, Balaguer ordered another roundup and deportation 
of Haitians, this time to play the racial and nationalist card 
against "black" Francisco Peha Gomez, the candidate of the 
Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario 
Dominicano — PRD) (see Political Parties, ch. 4). 

There is debate about the number of Haitians present in the 
Dominican Republic as well as the number who have entered 
legally or illegally because the estimates are often subject to 
political considerations. For example, at times the Balaguer 
government has claimed that as many as 75,000 to 100,000 Hai- 
tians have entered illegally. The 1960 census enumerated 
slightly under 30,000 Haitians living in the Dominican Repub- 
lic. According to an unofficial Dominican census of 1991, the 
number of Haitian immigrants increased from around 97,000 
in 1970 to 245,000 in 1991, with the majority still living in 
bateyes. Two well-known United States analysts have estimated 
that the number of Dominico-Haitians, or Dominicans of Hai- 
tian ancestry (they were not included in the 1991 figure of 
245,000), increased by 100,000 between 1970 and 1991. The 
analysts also estimated that 500,000 Haitians and Dominico- 
Haitians were living in the Dominican Republic in 1995. 

During the 1970s and 1980s, some Haitians rose to high 
positions in sugar production and in other areas of the econ- 
omy. Although Haitians continue to account for the vast major- 
ity of cane cutters, roughly half of all labor recruiters and field 
inspectors also are Haitians. Haitians also work harvesting cof- 
fee, rice, and cocoa and in construction in Santo Domingo. By 
1980 nearly 30 percent of the paid laborers in the coffee har- 
vest were Haitian; in the border region, the proportion rose to 
80 percent. A reasonably skilled coffee picker can nearly dou- 
ble the earnings of the average cane cutter. Overall, however, 
Haitians' earnings still lag; their wages average less than 60 per- 
cent of those of Dominicans. 

75 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

The number of Haitian workers employed results from the 
shortage of Dominican workers and from the refusal of many 
Dominicans to do certain work or to work in certain places. For 
example, Dominicans look down on cutting sugarcane, work 
they view as fit only for Haitians, nor do they want to work near 
the border with Haiti. The large demand for Haitians as cane 
cutters declined rapidly in the 1980s, however, as the Domini- 
can Republic shifted to tourism and the industrial free zones as 
major earners of foreign exchange. Haitians were mainly 
excluded from these areas but continued to work in construc- 
tion, including the building of tourist complexes. When Bal- 
aguer returned to office in 1986, he initiated a public works 
program, which provided employment to a number of Hai- 
tians. The number of Haitians in the Dominican Republic was 
affected in 1990, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 1999 by deportation. 

Urban Society 
The Elite 

The last 200 years have transformed the composition and 
configuration of the country's elite. Nonetheless, in the late 
1990s the Dominican Republic remains a country where a rela- 
tively small number of families control great wealth while the 
majority of the population live in poverty. The middle stratum 
struggles, at its lower end, to maintain economic standing and 
expand its political participation and, at its upper reaches, to 
gain greater social acceptance and economic prosperity. His- 
panic-Mediterranean ideals about the proper mode of life and 
livelihood continue to be significant. The primary social divi- 
sion is between two polar groups: the elite ( la gente buena or la 
gente culta) and the masses. 

The first half of the nineteenth century saw the elimination 
of many of the noteworthy families of the colonial era. During 
the period of Haitian domination, many prominent landown- 
ers liquidated their holdings and left. The War of Restoration 
against Spain also brought about changes, permitting lower- 
class persons who had enjoyed military success some social and 
economic upward mobility. The rise of sugarcane was another 
factor of change. The booming industry attracted immigrants 
of European extraction who assimilated rapidly. Poorer elite 
families saw a chance to improve their financial status through 
marriage to recently arrived and financially successful immi- 
grants. Even well-to-do families recognized the advantages of 



76 



Dominican Republic: The Society and Its Environment 

wedding their lineage and lands to the monied merchant- 
immigrant clans. Although the Chinese were generally 
excluded from this process of assimilation, and the Arabs 
encountered resistance, almost everyone else found ready 
acceptance. 

This pattern has repeated itself over the years. Each political 
or economic wave has brought new families into the elite as it 
imperiled the economic standing of others. By the 1990s, this 
privileged segment of society was no longer monolithic. The 
interests of the older elite families, whose wealth is based 
mostly on land (and whose prosperity diminished during the 
Trujillo years), do not always match those of families who 
amassed their fortunes under Trujillo, or of those whose 
money came from the expansion in industry during the 1960s 
and 1970s, or from the shift away from sugar and to the indus- 
trial free zones and tourism in the 1980s and 1990s. The 1965 
civil war further polarized and fragmented many segments of 
the middle and upper classes (see Democratic Struggles and 
Failures, ch. 1). These developments have resulted in a new 
Dominican elite, whose wealth comes from banking, property, 
light industry, the professions, and tourism, one which co-exists 
with the earlier elites — the small traditional landed gentry, the 
business and commercial group that came to the fore in the 
late 1900s, and the wealthy group that worked with Trujillo. 

Although rural elite families are relatively monolithic, in 
Santo Domingo and especially in Santiago there is a further 
distinction between families of the first and second rank (gente 
de primera and gente de segunda) . Those of the first rank can 
claim to be a part of the 100 families referred to locally as the 
tutumpote (totem pole, a term implying family worship and 
excessive concern with ancestry). Those of the second rank 
have less illustrious antecedents; they include the descendants 
of successful immigrants and the nouveaux riches who have 
managed to intermarry with more established families. 

Family loyalties are paramount, and the family represents 
the primary source of social identity. Elite families rely on an 
extensive network of kin to maintain their assets. In difficult 
times, the family offers a haven; as the situation improves, it 
provides the vehicle whereby one obtains political position and 
economic assets. Siblings, uncles, aunts, cousins, and in-laws 
comprise the pool from which one selects trusted business 
partners and loyal political allies. This process of networking 
pervades every level of society. The elite, however, profit to a 



77 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

much greater degree from kinship-based networking than do 
members of the lower classes. 

The number of potential kin grows as an individual's net 
worth increases. The successful are obliged as a matter of 
course to bestow favors on a widely extended group of kin and 
colleagues. Individual success in the political arena carries 
along a host of hangers-on whose fortunes rise and fall with 
those of their patron. The well-to-do try to limit the demands 
of less illustrious kin and to obtain alliances with families of 
equal or greater status. These ties permit the extended family 
to diversify its social and economic capital. 

The Middle Sector 

The emerging influential middle sector, which includes the 
three components of upper-middle, middle-middle, and lower- 
middle class, represents roughly 25 to 35 percent of the popu- 
lation in the late 1990s. It is concentrated in the ranks of sala- 
ried professionals in government and the private sector. 
Members of the middle sector have almost no independent 
sources of wealth and so are responsive to changes in the buy- 
ing power of wages and contractions in employment that 
accompany economic cycles. The middle level follows the 
racial stratification of the society as a whole: generally lighter- 
skinned as one proceeds up the social scale. As a group, the 
middle sector differs in lifestyle, marital stability, and occupa- 
tion from the poor urban masses. Members firmly adhere to 
the Hispanic ideals of leisure and lifestyle espoused by the elite 
and consider themselves, at least in spirit, a part of la gente 
buena. As with the elite, economic expansion based on the 
growth of sugar production in the late nineteenth century 
broadened the middle reaches of the social ladder as well. 
Those of this new middle segment, however, are limited in 
their upward mobility by dark skin and/or limited finances. 
They are a diverse group that includes small shopowners, 
teachers, clerical employees, and professionals. They lack a 
class identity based on any sense of common social or eco- 
nomic interests. Moreover, any sense of mutual interest is 
undermined by the pervasiveness of the patron-client system. 
Individuals improve their status by linking up with a more priv- 
ileged protector, not by joint political action for a shared goal. 

The life strategy of middle-class families is similar to that of 
the elite. Their goals are to diversify their economic assets and 
to extend their network of political and social influence. As 



78 



Dominican Republic: The Society and Its Environment 

with the elite, the middle-level family solidifies its position 
through patronage. An influential family can offer jobs to loyal 
followers and supporters. People expect that those with power 
will use it for their own ends and to advance their own and 
their family's interests. Ties to government are particularly 
important, because the government is the source of many cov- 
eted jobs (see Interest Groups and Social Actors, ch. 4). 

The Urban Poor 

The limited availability of adequately paid and steady 
employment continues to define life for most urban Domini- 
cans. The proportion of poor people has increased for the 
whole country but mainly for the urban poor, 64 percent of the 
population in the mid-1990s. This proportion increased from 
47 percent in 1984 to 57 percent in 1989; the percentage of 
indigents increased from 16 to 30 percent for the same period; 
and by 1991, 70 percent of the population had fallen below the 
poverty line. In 1990, 39 percent of the population was living in 
the most impoverished areas of the country — in twenty-two of 
the thirty provinces. Unemployment in the 1980s and 1990s 
ranged between 25 and 30 percent of the economically active 
population. In addition, more than 40 percent of the work- 
force is considered underemployed. In Santo Domingo and 
Santiago, the two largest cities, roughly 48 percent of the self- 
employed, more than 50 percent of those paid piece rate, and 
85 percent of temporary workers are underemployed. Under 
such conditions, those workers having regular employment 
constitute a relatively privileged segment of the urban popu- 
lace. 

Rural-urban migration has made the situation of the urban 
poor even more desperate because of competition for shelter 
and jobs. For the new arrivals, however, the chances of earning 
a living are slightly better in cities than in rural areas, although 
the advantages of an urban job must be weighed against the 
higher cost of food. Although landless or nearly landless agri- 
cultural laborers might find it difficult to work even a garden 
plot, the rural family can generally get by on its own food pro- 
duction. For the urban poor, however, the struggle to eat is 
relentless. 

Under conditions of chronically high unemployment, low 
wages, and, until recently, a restrictive labor code, workers 
enjoy little power or leverage. Protective labor laws are limited 
in their coverage to workers in private companies with more 



79 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

than ten employees. Organized labor made significant gains in 
the early 1960s during the short-lived Juan Bosch Gaviho gov- 
ernment (1962) and until the 1965 civil war. However, these 
gains were erased and severe restrictions were imposed upon 
workers when Balaguer took office in 1966. These restrictions 
and a frozen minimum wage — it was raised only once — were 
maintained by Balaguer until his electoral defeat in 1978. Once 
the PRD returned to office in 1978 under Silvestre Antonio 
Guzman Fernandez, labor conditions improved. For example, 
one of his first acts was to double the long-frozen minimum 
wage. However, despite the pro-labor position of both PRD 
presidents, Guzman and Salvador Jorge Blanco (1982-86), the 
serious economic situation and the restrictive labor code kept 
organized labor ineffective and weak. For example, by the mid- 
1980s a scant 12 percent of the labor force was unionized, and 
no more than 15 percent were union affiliated in the mid- 
1990s (see Labor, ch. 3). 

When Balaguer returned to power in 1986, he kept orga- 
nized labor fragmented by enforcing the restrictions of the 
labor code and by fostering the formation of rival unions. Until 
the 1990s, the legal code prohibited nearly half of all workers 
(public employees and utility workers) from strikes and job 
actions. Nonetheless, the economic crises of the 1980s resulted 
in mobilizations and strikes against the Balaguer government, 
and a Popular Movement was formed. However, the urban 
poor, like workers in general, could not sustain an organized 
opposition because of Balaguer's willingness to use force 
against strikers, his massive public works projects, and a lack of 
effective leadership. The strikes, the growing activism of work- 
ers, Balaguer's interest in running for reelection in 1990, the 
formation in 1991 of the United Confederation of Workers, 
and pressure from the United States in the form of threatened 
trade sanctions, all led to a revision of the 1951 Labor Code. 
The new code, enacted in 1992, expanded the rights of workers 
to organize and established new courts for resolving labor dis- 
putes. Although many labor unions had been recognized 
between 1991 and 1993, fifty-five were recognized in the year 
after the new code's enactment. Union activity had been 
banned in the industrial free zones, but in 1994 the first union 
contract was signed. 

Another factor affecting the life of the urban poor related to 
the role of women. A survey of urban households in the mid- 
1970s revealed that roughly one-quarter were headed by 



80 



Dominican Republic: The Society and Its Environment 

women. This figure has changed little in two decades, but it 
needs to be qualified because the women heading households 
in 1998 tended to be older — middle-aged and up. This change 
resulted from large numbers of younger women finding jobs in 
the industrial free zones. The change has occurred mainly in 
cities where these zones are located, namely, La Romana, San 
Francisco de Macoris, Puerto Plata, and Santo Domingo. Even 
in woman-headed families with a male breadwinner, a woman 
is frequently the more consistent income earner among poorer 
city dwellers. Women's economic activities are diverse, even if 
poorly remunerated. Women take in washing and ironing and 
do domestic work. The more prosperous sew. Some buy cheap 
or used items and raffle them off. A few who can muster the 
necessary capital run stalls selling groceries, cigarettes, and 
candy, but their trade is minimal. In smaller towns, women also 
perform a variety of agricultural processing tasks: grinding cof- 
fee, husking garlic, winnowing beans, and washing pig intes- 
tines. 

Like more well-to-do city families, the poor try wherever pos- 
sible to maintain ties with their kin in the countryside. Aid and 
assistance flow both ways. Farmers with relatives in the city stay 
with them on trips to town and repay this hospitality with pro- 
duce from their fields. New rural-urban migrants are assisted 
by kin who have already made the transition. The poor are 
handicapped in these exchanges because they typically have 
fewer kin in a position to help. Nonetheless, the obligation to 
help is deeply felt. Women who migrate to cities return to their 
families in the countryside as economic conditions and family 
needs dictate. 

The small urban neighborhood functions as the center of 
social life. Most sharing, mutual aid, and cooperative activity 
take place within the confines of a narrow circle of neighbors 
and kin. Most Dominicans share a belief that neighbors should 
assist each other in times of need. 

Rural Society 

Family and Social Relationships 

Most small rural neighborhoods and villages were settled 
originally by one or two families. Extensive ties of kinship, 
intermarriage, and compadrazgo (coparenthood) developed 
among the descendants of the original settlers (see Family and 
Kin, this ch.). Most villagers marry their near neighbors. First 



81 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

cousins frequently marry, despite the formal legal prohibitions 
against this practice. The social life of the countryside likewise 
focuses on near neighbors, who are frequently direct blood 
relations. The bonds of trust and cooperation among these rel- 
atives form at an early age. Children wander at will among the 
households of extended kin. Peasants distrust those from 
beyond their own neighborhoods, and they are therefore leery 
of economic relations with outsiders. The development of com- 
munity-wide activities and organizations has been handicapped 
by this widespread distrust. People commonly assume deceit in 
others in the absence of strong, incontrovertible proof to the 
contrary. 

Until the latter twentieth century, most joint activities were 
kin-based: a few related extended families joined together for 
whatever needed attention. The junta was the traditional coop- 
erative work group. Friends, neighbors, and relatives gathered 
at a farmer's house for a day's work. There was no strict 
accounting of days given and received. As wage labor became 
more common, the junta gave way to smaller work groups, or it 
fell into disuse. 

In small towns, social life focuses on the central park, or the 
plaza; in rural neighborhoods, most social interaction among 
non-kin takes place in the stores, bars, and pool rooms where 
men gather to gossip. Six-day workweeks leave little time for 
recreation or socializing. Many farm families come to town on 
Sundays to shop and to attend mass. The women and children 
generally return home earlier than the men to prepare Sunday 
dinner; the men stay to visit, or to enjoy an afternoon cockfight 
or an important baseball or volleyball game. 

Land and Poverty 

Landholding is both concentrated among large holders and 
fragmented at the lower end of the socioeconomic scale. All 
but the largest producers face some constraints in terms of 
land and money. Two surveys conducted in the 1980s indicated 
the related problems of land and poverty. The first survey, the 
agricultural census of 1981, reported that 2 percent of land- 
owners controlled 55 percent of the cultivable land while 82 
percent of farmers owned only 12 percent. The second, a 
national survey taken in 1985, found extensive rural poverty. 
More than 40 percent of the households surveyed owned no 
land; another 25 percent had less than half a hectare. (In 1990 
there were an estimated 450,000 farms, of which approximately 



82 



Rural family in Hato-Nuevo Magueyal, southwest of Santo Domingo 
Courtesy Inter-American Development Bank 

55 percent were less than one hectare in size.) Roughly 70 per- 
cent of all families relied on wage labor. Their poverty wors- 
ened in the early 1990s because the demand for such labor was 
down about 50 percent. 

Land reform legislation has had little overall impact on land- 
holding both because the reforms contained few provisions for 
land redistribution and because they have been poorly 
enforced. The Dominican Agrarian Institute (Instituto Agrario 
Dominican o — IAD) was created in 1962 to oversee land redis- 
tribution, which began with land accumulated by Trujillo and 
acquired by the state after his death. Little land was distributed 
to families during Balaguer's first term (1966-70). Instead, 
large tracts were turned over to a number of large estates for 
cattle-raising. Distribution to families was speeded up in the 
1970s. By the early 1980s, irrigated rice farms, which had been 
left intact and farmed collectively, were slated for division into 
small, privately owned plots. However, by 1980 the IAD had dis- 
tributed state land to only some 67,000 families — less than 15 
percent of the rural population. 

Land distribution was not actively pursued by either Guzman 
or Jorge Blanco, mainly because of the serious economic situa- 
tion. Jorge Blanco announced a land resettlement program in 



83 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

which 8,000 families were to be resettled the first year with 
increasing numbers to follow each year thereafter. However, he 
postponed this program as a part of his austerity measures. 

When Balaguer returned to the presidency in 1986, he 
resumed a practice that he had engaged in while president in 
the 1970s. Namely, he devoted several weekends a year to visit- 
ing poor, rural areas and handing out land titles and distribut- 
ing government-subsidized food to poor families — all with 
considerable publicity. Although little land was distributed (the 
records are incomplete), this practice, one also used as a cam- 
paign device, contributed to Balaguer's retaining the rural 
vote. Balaguer continued this activity in the 1990s while he was 
president and while he was campaigning for reelection in 1990 
and 1994. 

Population growth over the past century has almost elimi- 
nated the land reserves. Parents usually give children plots of 
land as they reach maturity so that they can marry and begin 
their own families. Over the generations, the process has led to 
extreme land fragmentation. Contemporary practices have 
sought to counteract such fragmentation by educating chil- 
dren, setting them up in business, or bankrolling their emigra- 
tion. Such steps limit the number of heirs competing for the 
family holdings and assure that the next generation will be able 
to maintain its standard of living. One or two siblings (usually 
the oldest and the youngest) remain with the parents and 
inherit the farm. In other situations, siblings and their spouses 
stay on the parental lands; each couple farms its own plot of 
land, but they pool their labor for many agricultural and 
domestic tasks. 

Emigration serves as a safety valve (see Migration, this ch.). 
Emigrants' remittances represent an essential component in 
many household budgets. These timely infusions of cash per- 
mit medium-sized landholders to meet expenses during the 
months before harvest; they also allow families to purchase 
more land. In communities with a history of fifteen to twenty 
years of high levels of emigration, the infusion of cash has had 
an inflationary impact on the local land market. For those rely- 
ing on wage labor (daily or periodic cash payment) to earn a 
living, the impact is more ambiguous. In some communities, 
the increase in emigration means more casual work is available 
as more family members emigrate. In other instances, emi- 
grants' families have switched to livestock raising to limit labor 
requirements or have hired an overseer to handle the agricul- 



84 



Dominican Republic: The Society and Its Environment 

tural work. Both these practices limit the overall demand for 
casual labor. 

The vast majority (84 percent) of farm women contribute to 
the family's earnings. Women devise means of earning income 
that mesh with their domestic tasks: they cultivate garden plots, 
raise small livestock, and/or help tend the family's fields. In 
addition, many rural women work at diverse cottage industries 
and vending. They sell everything from lottery tickets to home- 
made sweets. In the late 1990s, approximately 20 percent of 
rural households were headed by women. 

Because rural areas provide few services, working women 
have to add physically demanding and time-consuming domes- 
tic tasks to their work day. Single women are further handi- 
capped by the traditional exclusion of women from 
mechanized or skilled agricultural work. Women work during 
the labor-intensive phases of harvesting and in processing 
crops like cotton, coffee, tobacco, and tomatoes. They usually 
earn piece rate rather than a daily wage, and their earnings lag 
behind those of male agricultural laborers. 

Sugar Plantations 

Most sugar mills and cane fields are concentrated in the 
southeast coastal plains. Four large groups, one government 
and three privately owned, own 75 percent of the land. They 
are the State Sugar Council (Consejo Estatal del Azucar — 
CEA) , the Central Romana (formerly owned by Gulf and West- 
ern), Casa Vicini (a family operation), and the Florida-based 
Fanjul group (which bought out Gulf and Western in 1985). 
The government created the CEA in 1966, largely from lands 
and facilities formerly held by the Trujillo family. 

In the mid-1980s, there were roughly 4,500 colonos (see Glos- 
sary), who owned some 62,500 hectares. By the late 1980s, the 
number had increased to 8,000 colonos owning 85,000 hectares, 
which was 12 percent of the land in sugar production. These 
small to mid-sized landholders are independent growers who 
sell their harvested cane to the sugar mills. Although the 
colonos level of prosperity varies significantly, some are prosper- 
ous enough to hire laborers to cut their cane and to buy cane 
from smaller producers. Their actual number fluctuates widely 
in response to the market for cane. There were only 3,200 in 
1970; the number more than doubled by 1980, then declined 
by mid-decade but increased in the late 1980s. A slow decline 
in the number of colonos has occurred in the 1990s. 



85 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Some colon os are descendants of former small mill owners 
driven out of business during the expansion of sugar produc- 
tion in the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries. The 
parents or grandparents of others were either subsistence farm- 
ers who had switched to cane cultivation in response to rising 
demand for sugar or successful field workers. Like almost all 
Dominican farmers, colonos face land fragmentation that 
increases progressively with each generation. 

Sugar mills remain a major source of work for rural Domini- 
cans, although direct employment peaked at a high of roughlv 
100.000 workers in the early 1970s. By the mid-1980s, the mills 
employed approximately 65.000 workers: bv 1990 the number 
was around 55.000. The number has been declining since, how- 
ever, primarily because of the sharp drop in the United States 
sugar quota and growing inefficiency in the state sugar sector 
as well as the government's increasing reliance on the indus- 
trial free zones and the tourist industry. The sugar industry has 
generated considerable indirect employment as well; some 
observers have estimated that as much as 30 percent of the 
population is directly or indirectly affected bv sugar produc- 
tion (see Cash Crops, ch. 3). In the 1990s this figure decreased 
to about 20 percent. The 40.000 to 50.000 cane cutters consti- 
tute the bulk of the work force. Most are immigrant Haitians or 
their descendants (see Haitians, this ch.). In the highly strati- 
fied work force in the sugar industry, clear divisions exist 
among cane cutters, more skilled workers (largely Domini- 
cans), clerical staff, and managers. Workers' settlements 
(bateyes) dot the mill and the surrounding fields; thev usually 
include stores, schools, and a number of other facilities. 

Mixed Farming 

Landholding is less concentrated in the north and west; 
mixed crop and livestock raising dominate agricultural produc- 
tion. Much production is geared to subsistence, but growers 
also produce a number of cash crops such as cocoa, tobacco, 
coffee, and vegetables. The twin constraints of land and money 
affect the various strata of rural society differently depending 
on the precise configuration of resources a family can com- 
mand. But hardship is widespread. 

Those without land are the most hard pressed. Agricultural 
laborers rarelv enjov opportunities for permanent employ- 
ment. Most work onlv sporadically throughout the year. During 
periods of high demand for labor, contractors form semiper- 



86 



Farmer preparing jute he has grown 
Courtesy Inter-American Development Bank 

manent work groups and contract their services out to farmers. 
As with much of social life, the individual stands a better 
chance if he can couch his request for work in terms of a per- 
sonal link of kinship with the prospective employer. 

Families that depend on wage labor have very limited 
resources at their disposal. Their diet lacks greens and protein; 
eggs and meat are luxury items. Such fare as boiled plantains, 
noodles, and broth often substitute for the staple beans and 
rice. Keeping children in school is difficult because their labor 
is needed to supplement the family's earnings. 

Those with small plots of land also face very severe con- 
straints. Although this group has enough land to meet some of 
the family's subsistence needs and even sell crops occasionally, 
they also need to resort to wage labor to make ends meet. Like 
the wage laborer, the smallholder has trouble leaving children 
in school. Moreover, children's prospects are extremely lim- 
ited. Their parents can neither give them land nor educate 
them. The daily need for food also limits farmers' ability to 
work their own land. The land- and cash-poor face a double 
dilemma: they cannot work their lands effectively because to 
do so would mean foregoing wage labor needed to feed their 
families. A variety of sharecropping arrangements supplement 



87 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

wage labor for those smallholders able to muster some cash or 
credit. Such arrangements, however, are of no use to the land- 
less; only those who have land or money to finance a crop enter 
into these schemes. Smallholders and the landless live 
enmeshed in a web of dependent relationships: they depend 
on their neighbors and kin for help and assistance, on store 
owners for credit, and on larger landholders for employment. 

Families with mid-sized holdings face slightly different prob- 
lems. They often have enough land and financial resources to 
meet most of their families' food needs and earn cash from the 
sale of crops or livestock. They usually do not need to work for 
hire and sometimes can hire laborers themselves. They usually 
eat better than smallholders, and their children stay in school 
longer. But although mid-sized landholders earn more, they 
also have greater needs for cash during the year, particularly if 
they hire laborers before the harvest. 

Even relatively large holders face seasonal shortages of cash. 
Their production costs — especially for hired labor — are typi- 
cally higher than the costs faced by smaller landowners. Never- 
theless, their standard of living is notably higher than that of 
those with less land. They generally eat better and can afford 
meat or fish more frequently. Although their holdings support 
them adequately, subdivision among the family's offspring typi- 
cally leaves no heir with more than a hectare or two. Faced with 
this prospect, these farmers often encourage their children to 
pursue nonagricultural careers and help support them finan- 
cially during their student years. 

Almost all farmers depend to varying degrees on credit from 
local storekeepers. The landless and land poor need credit sim- 
ply to feed their families. Mid-sized landholders use it to tide 
them over the lean months before harvest. Prevailing interest 
rates vary considerably, but the poorest farmers — those who 
cannot offer a harvest as collateral and who usually need short- 
term credit — generally pay the highest rates. 

Farmers often depend on storekeepers to market their crops 
because they are usually unable to accumulate sufficient pro- 
duce to make direct marketing a viable option. Most farmers 
commit their crops to their merchant-creditor long before har- 
vest. Although store owners cannot legally require that some- 
one who owes them money sell his or her crops to them, the 
possibility of being denied necessary credit at a time of future 
need acts as a powerful incentive for the farm family to do so. 



88 



Fishing cooperative, San Pedro de Macoris 
Courtesy Inter-American Development Bank 

The cycle of debt, repayment, and renewed debt is constant for 
most Dominican farmers. 

Traditionally, the local storekeeper aids farmers in ways 
beyond the extension of credit. The storekeeper often estab- 
lishes a paternalistic relationship with customers; farmers con- 
sult the storekeeper on matters ranging from land purchases to 
conflicts with neighbors. Such patronage carries a heavy price 
tag, however; farmers find it difficult to haggle about terms 
with a storekeeper who is also a friend or relative. Anthropolo- 
gist Patricia Pessar recently pointed out, however, that this type 
of personal relationship has changed because of the shift from 
sharecropping to cattle raising. Because cattle raising requires 
far fewer workers per hectare, many of the sharecroppers 
became unemployed and left in search of jobs. Cattle raising is 
also much less seasonal than farming. These factors have 
greatly reduced dependence upon the storekeeper. For those 
needing it, however, credit, is expensive. Studies of coffee grow- 
ers in the mid-1970s found that the cost of credit could easily 
take one-third to one-half of a mid-sized landholder's profits. 
This economic situation continued in the 1990s. 

Consumer and savings and loan cooperatives sometimes 
offer the farmer an alternative to dealing with the local store- 



89 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

keeper, thus expanding the options of some rural families. The 
most successful cooperatives draw their membership from 
groups of kin and neighbors already linked by ties of trust. 
Although cooperatives may provide a solution for farmers 
vexed by the problem of cash shortfalls, they have not amelio- 
rated appreciably the plight of the poorest rural dwellers. 
Cooperative loans are predicated on a family's ability to pay, 
which effectively excludes the landless and land poor. 

Family and Kin 

The family is the fundamental social unit. It provides a bul- 
wark in the midst of political upheavals and economic rever- 
sals. People emphasize the trust, assistance, and solidarity kin 
owe one another. Family loyalty is an ingrained and unques- 
tioned virtue; from early childhood, individuals learn that rela- 
tives are to be trusted and relied on, while those outside the 
family are, implicitly at least, suspect. In all areas of life and at 
every level of society, a person looks to family and kin for both 
social identity and succor. 

Formal organizations succeed best where they are able to 
mesh with pre-existing ties of kinship. Distrust of those beyond 
the extended kin or neighborhood group hampers efforts to 
run community-wide activities or to establish organizations. 

The history and pattern of settlement of the countryside 
have facilitated strong ties among related families. Many valleys 
and municipalities were settled by a few related families some 
five to eight generations ago. This core of extensively related 
families remains pivotal despite large-scale migration and 
urbanization. If anything, the ties among kin extend more 
widely in contemporary society because modern transport and 
communication allow families to maintain ties over long dis- 
tances and during lengthy absences. 

In general, the extent to which families interact and with 
whom they interact depends on their degree of prosperity. 
Families with relatively equal resources share and cooperate. 
Where there is marked disparity in families' wealth, the more 
prosperous branches try to limit the demands made by the 
poorer ones. On the one hand, generosity is held in high 
esteem and failure to care for kin in need is disparaged; but on 
the other, families wish to help their immediate relatives and 
give favors to those who can reciprocate. 

A needy relation may receive the loan of a piece of land, 
some wage labor, or occasional gifts of food. Another type of 



90 



Dominican Republic: The Society and Its Environment 

assistance is a form of adoption by which poorer families give a 
child to more affluent relatives to raise. The adopting family is 
expected to care for the child and see that he or she receives a 
proper upbringing. The children are frequently little better 
than unpaid domestic help. Implicit in the arrangement is the 
understanding that the child's biological family also will receive 
assistance from the adopting family. 

Kinship serves as a metaphor for relations of trust in gen- 
eral. Where a kin tie is lacking or where individuals wish to 
reinforce one, they will often establish a relationship of com- 
padrazgo (coparenthood) . Those so linked are compadres 
(coparents or godparents). In common with much of Latin 
America, strong emotional bonds link compadres. Compadres use 
the formal usted instead of tu in addressing one another, even if 
they are kinsmen. Sexual relations between compadres are 
regarded as incestuous. Compadres are commonly chosen at 
baptism and marriage, but the relationship extends to the two 
sets of parents. The tie between the two sets of parents should 
be strong and enduring. Any breach of trust merits the stron- 
gest community censure. 

There are two accepted forms of marriage: religious and 
civil. Both serial monogamy and polygamous free unions are 
socially accepted, however. Annulment is difficult to obtain 
through the Roman Catholic Church; this fact, in addition to 
the expense involved, has made couples reluctant to undertake 
a religious marriage. Civil marriage is relatively common. 
Divorce in this case is relatively easy and uncomplicated. Mar- 
riage forms also reflect the individual's life cycle. Most opt for 
free unions when they are younger, then settle into more for- 
mal marriages as they grow older and enjoy more economic 
security. Class also plays a role: religious marriage is favored by 
the middle and upper class and thus indicates higher socioeco- 
nomic status. The ideal marriage involves a formal engagement 
and religious wedding followed by an elaborate fiesta. 

No shame accrues to the man who fathers many children 
and maintains several women as mistresses. Public disapproval 
follows only if the man fails to assume the role of "head of the 
family" and to support his children. When a free union dis- 
solves, a woman typically receives only the house she and her 
mate have inhabited. The children receive support only if they 
have been legally recognized by their father. 

Families are usually more stable in the countryside. Because 
the partners usually reside in the midst of their kin, a man can- 



91 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

not desert his wife without disrupting his work relations with 
her family. A woman enjoys greater leverage when she can relv 
on her family to assist if a union fails or when she owns her own 
land and thus has a measure of financial independence. 

In keeping with the doctrine of machismo, males usually 
play a dominant role within the family and receive the defer- 
ence due the head of the household. There is wide variation in 
practice, however. In cases where a man is absent, has limited 
economic assets, or is simply unassertive, a woman assumes the 
role of head of the family. 

Sex role differentiation begins early: boys are allowed to run 
about naked, while girls are much more carefully groomed and 
dressed. Bands of boys play unwatched; girls are carefully chap- 
eroned. Girls are expected to be quiet and helpful; bovs enjov 
much greater freedom and are given considerable latitude in 
their behavior. Boys and men are expected to have premarital 
and extramarital sexual adventures. Men expect, however, that 
their brides will be virgins. Parents go to considerable lengths 
to shelter their daughters in order to protect their chances of 
making a favorable marriage. 

Parent-child relationships differ markedly depending on the 
sex of the parent. Mothers openly display affection for their 
children; the mother-child tie is almost inviolate. Informal 
polls of money changers and studies have indicated that remit- 
tances sent from the United States for Mothers' Day exceed 
those sent at Christmas. Father-child relationships cover a 
broader spectrum. The father is an authority figure to be 
obeyed and respected, and he is more removed from daily fam- 
ily affairs than mothers. This pattern of sex roles is usuallv 
altered if one parent emigrates to the United States. When 
women are left at home, they typically take over many of the 
affairs customarily reserved for men. When women emigrate, 
they often become the main breadwinner and manager of the 
budget because they are often more employable than their hus- 
bands. Their success undermines the traditional father-hus- 
band role. 

Religion 

Around 80 percent of Dominicans are professed Roman 
Catholics. In the late 1990s, the Church organization included 
two archdioceses, nine dioceses, and 320 parishes. During this 
same period, there were 644 priests and 1,470 nuns in the 
Roman Catholic Church, more than 70 percent of whom 



92 



Dominican Republic: The Society and Its Environment 

belonged to religious orders. These figures yield a ratio of 
nominal Roman Catholics to priests of almost 11,000 to one. 
Among Latin American countries, only Cuba, Honduras, and 
El Salvador have higher ratios. 

Roman Catholicism is the official religion of the Dominican 
Republic, established by a concordat with the Vatican. For most 
of the populace, however, religious practice is limited and for- 
malistic. Few actually attend mass regularly. Moreover, popular 
beliefs and practices are often at odds with orthodox dogma. 
Nevertheless, the saints play an important role in traditional 
popular religious practice; people approach God through the 
intermediation of priests, local curanderos (curers), and the 
saints. 

Foreigners, mainly from Spain, predominate among the 
clergy. The clergy themselves are divided between the tradi- 
tional, conservative hierarchy and more liberal parish priests. 
At the parish level, some priests engage in community develop- 
ment projects and efforts to form comunidades de base (grass- 
roots Christian communities) designed to help people 
organize and work together more effectively. 

Trujillo sought and gained the support of the Roman Catho- 
lic Church, at least of the conservative hierarchy, during most 
of his regime. In exchange for this support, indicated by 
Church officials' regular presence and involvement in all offi- 
cial state ceremonies, he provided generous subsidies and gave 
the Church a free hand in religious and educational matters. 
This close relationship changed, however, when a pastoral let- 
ter protested the mass arrests of government opponents in 
1960. This action so incensed Trujillo that he ordered a cam- 
paign of harassment against the Church. Only the dictator's 
assassination prevented his planned imprisonment of the coun- 
try's bishops. 

The Church has gradually become more socially involved. 
During the 1965 civil war, for example, the papal nuncio 
attempted to administer humanitarian aid. The bishops also 
issued various statements throughout the 1970s and 1980s call- 
ing for respect for human rights and an improved standard of 
living for the majority. In the 1970s, Bishop Juan Antonio 
Flores of La Vega campaigned for indemnification for peasants 
displaced by the expansion of the Pueblo Viejo mine. Later, 
Bishops Juan F. Pepen and Hugo Polanco Brito, who had 
helped found and served as the first rector of the Pontifical 
Catholic University Mother and Teacher in the 1960s, sup- 



93 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

ported the efforts of peasants and sugar colonos to organize. 
Their actions reflected the Church's becoming involved in 
human rights issues in the 1980s, especially issues involving the 
poor and the treatment of Haitians. Some of the Church hier- 
archy also supported attempts to end corruption in govern- 
ment, and the Church endorsed the move for free elections in 
the 1990s. 

In addition to Roman Catholics, the Dominican Republic 
has Protestants and practitioners of voodoo. Protestants first 
came as immigrants from North America in the 1820s. West 
Indian laborers added to their numbers in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. By the 1920s, the various Protes- 
tant groups had organized nationally and established links with 
North American evangelical groups. The main evangelical 
groups include the Seventh Day Adventists, the Dominican 
Evangelical Church, and the Assemblies of God. Protestant 
groups expanded, mainly in the rural areas, during the 1960s 
and 1970s; pentecostals made considerable inroads in some 
regions. The growth of the pentecostal movement during the 
1980s was such that it became a major topic at the Fourth Gen- 
eral Conference of Latin American Bishops attended by Pope 
John Paul II, held in October 1992, following the V Centenario 
(500th anniversary) celebration in Santo Domingo of Colum- 
bus's first trip to the Americas. In the late 1990s, the evangeli- 
cals constitute 15 percent of the Protestant groups. With minor 
exceptions, relations between Protestants and the majority 
Roman Catholics are cordial. 

Most Haitian immigrants and their descendants adhere to 
voodoo but have practiced it quietly because the government 
and the general population regard the folk religion as pagan 
and African. In Haiti voodoo encompasses a well-defined sys- 
tem of theology and ceremonialism (see Voodoo, ch. 7). 

Culture 

Literature 

The Dominican Republic's literary history has had an 
impact on the country's culture. Balaguer considered Father 
Bartolome de las Casas (1474—1566), protector of the Indians 
and author of The Devastation of the Indies, to have been the first 
Dominican historian. As such he made the first contribution to 
Dominican literature. However, most accounts would place the 
first Dominican literary work much later with the publication 



94 



Dominican Republic: The Society and Its Environment 

in 1882, almost forty years after independence, of a famous 
Dominican novel. The novel, Enriquillo: Leyenda historica domini- 
cana by Manuel de Jesus Galvan, concerns a Taino cacique 
(chieftain), Enriquillo, who led a successful rebellion against 
the Spanish. (Today one can see the monument to this "First 
Hero of America" located in the center of the main crossroad 
leading to Lago Enriquillo.) Enriquillo stresses the oldest and 
first of the three racial-social themes of Dominican literature — 
that of nativism or Indianism ( indigenismo) ; it exaggerates the 
Taino contributions to Dominican culture and ignores those 
that are African. The second theme is hispanidad, the Roman 
Catholic and "white" cultural legacy of mother country Spain; 
from this perspective, non-Catholic and "black" Haitians are 
viewed as inferior to Dominicans. The third theme is the out- 
turn criolla, or mixed common culture, between Spanish and 
Africans. 

The first theme long remained in literature and served as a 
means of ignoring the African roots of Dominicans. A strain of 
it continues today in the reluctance of many Dominican mulat- 
toes to admit their African heritage; instead, they claim Indian 
heritage. The second theme, hispanidad, was maintained by the 
intellectual elite both before and during the rule of Trujillo, 
who made it governmental policy, and was continued by Bal- 
aguer until the 1990s. Advocates of hispanidad maintained that 
the Dominican heritage was entirely Spanish and suppressed 
writing by non-white Dominicans and literature that dealt 
favorably with non-white characters, especially Haitians. Bal- 
aguer's book, Historia de la literatura dominicana, includes a 
selection of writers who stressed the Spanish heritage. Trujillo's 
regime made Haitians and Haiti the antithesis of hispanidad — 
namely, African and uncivilized. Balaguer presented these 
views in a 1947 book, which appeared in English in 1949 as 
Dominican Reality: Biographical Sketch of a Country and a Regime. 
(The 1983 Spanish edition had Haiti in the subtitle.) During 
the Trujillo era, Juan Bosch Gaviho, a political opponent, nov- 
elist, and later president, and Pedro Mir, who became the 
National Poet, went into exile. Bosch became the leading 
Dominican short story writer and wrote favorably about blacks. 

The third theme came to the fore after Trujillo's 1961 assas- 
sination and lasted until Balaguer was elected president in 
1966. Before Bosch was overthrown as president in 1963, he 
welcomed public recognition of Dominicans' African roots and 
gave governmental support to Creole culture. The 1965 civil 



95 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

war and United States intervention produced an upsurge in 
nationalism and pride that spawned two literary movements 
made up of young writers. Not only did these writers reject his- 
panidad in favor of la cultura criolla, but their concern about 
Dominican culture and identity caused them to oppose United 
States cultural influences, which they called "northamerican- 
ization." 

Historical Monuments and Architecture 

Once Balaguer was inaugurated in 1966, he reimposed the 
official policy of hispanidad. His stress on hispanidad took the 
form of a program to restore historical monuments such as 
those of colonial Santo Domingo and build new monuments to 
glorify the Spanish legacy. This program culminated in the 
inauguration of the Columbus Lighthouse (Faro Colon) in 
time for the celebration in Santo Domingo of the 500th anni- 
versary (V Centenario) of the discovery of America in October 
1992. This restoration and building program — it was also a 
public works program to reduce unemployment — began in the 
1970s and was continued when Balaguer returned to office in 
1986. The restoration of colonial Santo Domingo and the con- 
struction of the Plaza de la Cultura were completed in the 
1970s. 

While Balaguer was out of office, the two opposition party 
governments of Silvestre Antonio Guzman Fernandez (1978- 
82) and Salvador Jorge Blanco (1982-86) supported the accep- 
tance of Creole culture. When Balaguer returned to office in 
1986, his government accepted officially the cultura criolla, 
which would now co-exist with hispanidad. The government ini- 
tiated a new annual Festival of Culture, which combined state- 
supported festivals of popular culture — Creole folk dances and 
music, and revival of the Carnival — with "high culture" hispa- 
nidad. Balaguer also speeded up the completion of the Colum- 
bus Lighthouse for the October 1992 anniversary celebration. 

Popular Culture: Dance, Music, and Baseball 

In addition to the more formal cultural elements of litera- 
ture and monuments, the Dominican people enjoy various 
aspects of popular culture, such as dance, music, and baseball. 
The merengue, the most popular Dominican national dance, 
dates from independence and is based on African-Haitian 
sources; its roots had made it unacceptable to the Spanish elite. 
It was popularized in the post-Trujillo period by Johnny Ven- 



96 



Dominican Republic: The Society and Its Environment 

tura. The leading musical group in the Dominican Republic in 
the late 1990s, the 4.40 of Juan Luis Guerra, draws upon the 
African roots of Dominican culture and music. 

In his 1997 book, Quisqueya la Bella: The Dominican Republic in 
Historical and Cultural Perspective, Alan Cambeira includes base- 
ball, in addition to dance and music, as an integral part of the 
popular culture. The Dominicans, who are extremely proud of 
their skilled baseball players, learned the game from the 
marines during the United States occupation (1916-24). The 
United States major leagues began recruiting Dominican play- 
ers in the 1950s. In the 1990s, more players are recruited from 
the Dominican Republic than from any other Latin American 
country. One of them, Sammy Sosa of the Chicago Cubs, 
became a national hero during his fall 1998 homerun battle 
with Mark McGwire of the St. Louis Cardinals. For a poor 
Dominican young man, baseball serves the same function that 
basketball serves for poor African-American youth — it is a pos- 
sible path to fame and fortune. 

It could be argued that a special Creole culture has emerged 
from the "dual societies," operating in the Dominican Republic 
in the 1990s (see Modern Migration, this ch.). The common 
practice of Dominicans living and working in the United States, 
moving back and forth, and then often returning to the 
Dominican Republic to live has resulted in the development of 
a transnational Creole culture that is an amalgam of Anglo- 
Saxon, Spanish, and African practices and values. The current 
Dominican president, Leonel Fernandez Reyna (1996-2000), 
represents and personifies this Creole culture. He lived for ten 
years as a member of the Dominican immigrant community in 
New York City, attended elementary and secondary school 
there, is fluent in English, and, as a mulatto, is proud of his 
African heritage. 

Education 

Primary and Secondary 

Formal education includes primary, secondary, and higher 
education levels. The six-year primary cycle is compulsory. 
Three years of preschool are offered in a few areas, but not on 
a compulsory basis. There are several types of secondary 
school; most students (90 percent) attend the six-year liceo, 
which awards the bachillerato certificate upon completion and is 
geared toward university admission. Other secondary programs 



97 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

include teacher training schools, polytechnics, and vocational 
schools. All primary and secondary schools are under the for- 
mal jurisdiction of the Secretariat of State for Education and 
Culture (Secretana de Estado de Educacion y Cultura — SEEC) . 
In 1984 there were an estimated 5,684 primary schools and 
1,664 secondary schools; by 1993 the former had increased to 
6,207 and the latter had risen to 4,606. 

Despite the compulsory nature of primary education, only 
17 percent of rural schools offer all six grades. This fact 
explains to some degree the low levels of secondary enroll- 
ment. For those who do go on to the secondary level, academic 
standards are low, the drop-out rate reportedly high; all but the 
poorest students must buy their textbooks — another disincen- 
tive to enrollment for many. 

The government decreed major curriculum reforms at the 
primary and secondary levels in the 1970s in an effort to ren- 
der schooling more relevant to students' lives and needs. 
Expanded vocational training in rural schools was called for as 
part of the reforms. Few changes had been fully implemented 
even by the mid-1990s, however. The realization that these 
reforms had been limited led in 1997 to the announcement of 
a ten-year Plan for Educational Reform, which was approved by 
and under the auspices of the Presidential Commission for 
State Reform and Modernization. 

Primary-school teachers are trained in six specialized sec- 
ondary schools and secondary-school teachers at the universi- 
ties. In 1973 an agreement for improving teacher training was 
signed by three universities — the Autonomous University of 
Santo Domingo (Universidad Autonoma de Santo Domingo — 
UASD), the Pedro Henriquez Ureha National University (Uni- 
versidad Nacional Pedro Henriquez Ureha- — UNPHU), and 
the Pontifical Catholic University Mother and Teacher (Pontifi- 
cia Universidad Catolica Madre y Maestra — UCMM) — and the 
SEEC. However, although in 1982 roughly half of all teachers 
lacked the required academic background, there has been only 
modest improvement since then. A chronic shortage of teach- 
ers is attributable to low pay (especially in rural areas), the rela- 
tively low status of teaching as a career, and an apparent 
reluctance among men to enter the profession. 

Education expanded at every level in the post-Trujillo era. 
Enrollment as a proportion of the primary school-aged popula- 
tion grew by more than 20 percent between the mid-1960s and 
the mid-1980s and that of the secondary school-aged popula- 



98 



Dominican Republic: The Society and Its Environment 

tion nearly quadrupled. By the mid-1980s, the eligible urban 
primary school population was almost fully enrolled; 78 per- 
cent attended public schools. Only 45 percent of those of sec- 
ondary school age were enrolled, however. According to the 
Dominican census of 1993, 1,602,219 students were attending 
primary school and 379,096 attending secondary school; 
87,636 were attending preschool (see table 3, Appendix). 
These attendance figures for primary and secondary school 
amounted to 78 percent of those eligible — 81 percent in the 
former, a lower percentage than in the 1980s, and 24 percent 
in the latter. 

Problems have accompanied educational expansion. Teach- 
ing materials and well-maintained facilities are lacking at every 
level. Salaries and operational expenses take up most of the 
education budget, leaving little surplus for additional invest- 
ment and growth. Various recent estimates about the extent of 
literacy appear to be unduly high. For example, the 1993 
Dominican census reported a national rate of 79 percent (85 
percent urban and 72 percent rural) . However, expanded edu- 
cational programs and facilities continue to have a backlog of 
illiterates. Although there are programs in adult literacy, in 
1981 fully one-third of the population more than twenty-five 
years of age had never attended school; in some rural areas the 
proportion rose to half of the population. 

University 

Dominican higher education has enjoyed spectacular 
growth. At Trujillo's death in 1961, the Dominican Republic 
had only one university, the Autonomous University of Santo 
Domingo (UASD), with roughly 3,500 students. This fact 
explains why for decades thousands of Dominicans went 
abroad to earn their graduate and professional degrees in 
Europe and the United States. The practice of going abroad 
for graduate work continued through the 1980s, but decreased 
in the 1990s. Since the end of the 1965 civil war, the number of 
universities in the Dominican Republic has increased dramati- 
cally, going from three universities in the 1960s, to seven in the 
1970s, to eighteen in the 1980s, and to twenty-seven by 1997. By 
the late 1990s, a network of reputable universities had been 
established, with the private Pontifical Catholic University 
Mother and Teacher (UCMM) at its apex. Higher education 
enrollment totaled 176,000 students in 1997. 



99 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

In the 1970s and 1980s, the United States Agency for Inter- 
national Development (USAID) and the Ford Foundation con- 
tributed to improving the quality of university education by 
providing funds and grants for developing programs as well as 
for faculty study in the United States. Legislation also created 
the National Council of Higher Education (Consejo Nacional 
de Education Superior — Cones) in 1983 to deal with issues sur- 
rounding accreditation, the awarding of degrees, and coordi- 
nation of programs on a national level. 

The sole public institution of higher education in the 
Dominican Republic is the UASD, which traces its lineage 
directly to the Universitas Santi Dominici, established in 1538, 
and was formerly known as the Universidad de Santo Dom- 
ingo. Although the university's administration is autonomous, 
the government provides all of its funding. This enables the 
UASD to offer courses free of charge to all enrolled students. 
The student body grew to more than 100,000 in the late 1980s. 
However, its Santo Domingo enrollments began to decline in 
the early 1990s. During this period, the UASD's four regional 
university centers — El Norte, El Sur, El Este, and El Oeste — and 
other universities, six new ones and two older ones, the Pedro 
Henriquez Ureha National University (UNPHU) and UCMM, 
expanded and offered needed courses of instruction. 

The leading private institutions in the Dominican Republic 
are the UCMM, based on the United States model, established 
in Santiago in 1962 (it had three regional centers in the 1990s) 
and administered by the Roman Catholic Church, and the 
UNPHU, established in Santo Domingo in 1967. Four other 
private universities were established in the 1970s, eleven in the 
1980s, and six in the 1990s. In the early 1980s, the UCMM had 
a student body of approximately 5,000, while the UNPHU 
enrolled approximately 10,000. By 1997 UCCM enrollment 
had reached 9,438 as a result of many student scholarships and 
its moderate tuition, whereas UNPHU enrollment had 
declined to 6,044 because of a combination of factors: high 
tuition, few scholarships, and a politically conservative reputa- 
tion. 

Enrollment in elementary and secondary private schools 
also expanded during the post-Trujillo era. Private schools, 
most of them operated by the Roman Catholic Church, enjoy a 
reputation for academic superiority over public schools. By the 
1970s, they had become the preferred educational option for 
children of the urban middle class, the alternative being study 



100 



Student in a computer class 
Courtesy Inter-American Development Bank 

abroad. In the mid-1990s, the Church operated sixty-seven kin- 
dergartens (with 10,189 pupils), 203 primary schools (85,011 
students), and 112 secondary schools (64,804 students). The 
number of students attending Church-operated higher insti- 
tutes and universities totaled slightly more than 16,000. 

The Dominican government's expenditures for public edu- 
cation in general and at different levels have tended to be low 
and inconsistent. Not only were expenditures low in the 1960s 
and 1970s, but Balaguer drastically reduced government funds 
to the UASD because many of its students and faculty members 
actively opposed his government. At the same time, he was gen- 
erous with funds to the private UCMM. In the 1980s, the pro- 
portion of the government's budget devoted to education 
declined; it fell from 13.3 percent in 1983 to 6.7 percent in 
1988. The budgetary proportion for education was increased 
in the 1990s — from 8.9 percent in 1992 to 13 percent in 1995. 

Health and Social Security 
Health 

According to the Public Health Code, the Secretariat of 



101 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

State for Health and Social Welfare (Secretaria de Estado de 
Salud Publica y Asistencia Social — SESPAS) is in charge of 
health services and is responsible for applying the Code. SES- 
PAS has a regionally based, three-tiered organization for pro- 
viding health care, health promotion, and preventive health 
services to the whole population. The three tiers are central, 
regional, and provincial, with the Secretariat's programs orga- 
nized at and directed from the central and regional levels. 
There are eight regional offices that direct the services and 
oversee the health areas at the provincial level. The health 
areas have rural clinics while most provincial capitals have a 
hospital. Health services offered by SESPAS in theory cover 
about 80 percent of the population; in reality, in the late 1990s 
barely 40 percent were covered. The Dominican Social Security 
Institute (Instituto Dominicano de Seguro Social — IDSS) cov- 
ers another 6.5 percent (or 15 percent of the economically 
active population), and the medical facilities of the Social Secu- 
rity Institute of the Armed Forces and National Police reach 
another 3 to 4 percent. The responsibility for workers' health, 
particularly workplace accidents and occupational diseases, is 
also shared with the secretariats for labor, education, agricul- 
ture, and public works. In the late 1990s, however, 22 percent 
of the population received no health care. 

Both personnel and facilities, in the public as well as in the 
private sector, are concentrated in the National District and 
urban areas. This situation has continued since the 1970s when 
there were roughly 3,700 inhabitants per physician nationally. 
However, the figure ranged from about 1,650 inhabitants per 
physician in the National District to roughly 5,000 per physi- 
cian in the southeast and the south-central provinces. By 1997 
the number of health personnel included 17,460 physicians 
and 1,898 dentists; there are no details on the geographic dis- 
tribution of these personnel (see table 4, Appendix). However, 
it was also the case that in 1997 more than half of the national 
total of 15,236 hospital beds were in the National District and 
the central Cibao. 

SESPAS began a major effort to improve rural health care in 
the mid-1970s. By the mid-1980s, the government had set up 
more than 5,000 rural health clinics, health subcenters, and 
satellite clinics. Doctors doing their required year of social ser- 
vice as well as a variety of locally hired and trained auxiliary 
personnel staff the facilities. Critics charge that lack of coordi- 
nation and inadequate management hamper the program's 



102 



Dominican Republic: The Society and Its Environment 

effectiveness, however. Preventive services offered through 
local health workers (who are often poorly trained in disease 
prevention and basic sanitation) are not coordinated with cura- 
tive services. In addition, absenteeism is high, and supplies are 
lacking. 

SESPAS responded to these criticisms and problems in 1997 
when it announced as its highest priority the reversal of the 
long-standing shortfall in health and social spending. SESPAS 
declared that its primary goal would be the reduction of infant 
and maternal mortality, mainly by strengthening health ser- 
vices at the provincial level. 

In 1990 SESPAS employed 3,598 physicians and 6,868 
nurses; by 1994 those numbers had increased to 5,626 and 
8,600, respectively. Reflecting a 47 percent increase since 1986, 
the Secretariat in 1992 operated 723 health care establish- 
ments — 81 percent were rural clinics and dispensaries and 11 
percent were health centers and local hospitals. In 1992 IDSS 
operated one maternity hospital, twenty polyclinics, and 161 
outpatient clinics, mostly rural. The private sector operated 
420 health care establishments in 1990. By 1996 the number of 
health care facilities in the country had risen to 1,334, with 730 
of them coming under SESPAS, 184 under IDSS, and 417 
under the private sector. In 1997 the government opened the 
Health Plaza in Santo Domingo, a modern, high-tech health 
complex. It has 430 beds, a diagnostic center, and hospitals for 
child and maternal care, geriatrics, and trauma treatment. The 
proper place of the health complex in the national health sys- 
tem is being debated. 

The Roman Catholic Church plays an important role in the 
health and welfare field. In 1993 (the latest year for which fig- 
ures are available) it operated twenty-nine hospitals, 155 dis- 
pensaries, twenty-three orphanages, twenty-five homes for the 
aged, twenty-one nurseries, and scores of other welfare facili- 
ties. 

In terms of overall national health statistics, life expectancy 
at birth was seventy-one years for the 1990-95 period, sixty-nine 
years for males and seventy-three for females. The general mor- 
tality rate has gradually declined, falling to 5.5 percent per 
1,000 population for the 1990-95 period. It is expected to 
decline to 5.2 percent per 1,000 population for 1995-2000. 
The infant mortality rate has steadily declined since 1985. The 
rate for the 1990-95 period was forty-two per 1,000 live births. 
The main causes of death in the population as a whole con- 



103 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

tinue to be cardiovascular and pulmonary circulatory diseases 
(see table 5, Appendix). The Pan American Health Organiza- 
tion (PAHO) reported a new leading cause of death for 1994, 
namely, such external causes as accidental injuries and vio- 
lence, particularly among males. Enteritis, diarrheal diseases, 
and protein energy malnutrition are the major causes of death 
in those under the age of four. Maternal mortality stood at 4.8 
deaths per 10,000 live births in 1986 and 4.5 in 1990. A PAHO 
study reported, however, that the registered rate of 4.5 in 1990 
and slightly over three in 1994 was greatly "under registered." 
As a result, the real maternal mortality rate might have been as 
high as twenty per 10,000 live births over the 1983-94 period. 
The main causes are toxemia (25 to 30 percent), hemorrhages, 
and sepsis associated with birth or abortion. Roughly 60 per- 
cent of births, mainly those in urban areas, are attended by 
medical personnel; midwives are still relied upon in many rural 
regions. 

The UNAIDS/WHO Working Group on acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome (AIDS) estimated that in late 1999, the 
Dominican Republic had some 130,000 persons living with 
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) /AIDS. Of these, about 
67,200 were adult males (ages fifteen through forty-nine), 
62,800 adult females (same ages), and 3,800 children (through 
age fourteen). The total estimated deaths of adults and chil- 
dren from AIDS in 1999 was 4,900. 

Some of the above figures and health institutions are the 
result of a major project launched in 1993 to modernize and 
reform the health sector. The project came in response to the 
critical report of President Balaguer's 1991 National Health 
Commission. A number of commissions and organizations 
have been created to implement the project. In 1995 a new 
National Health Commission was created by presidential 
decree to draft reform and modernization proposals. The 
Commission on Health of the Chamber of Deputies drafted a 
general law on health; the Senate opposed it, and it was not 
passed. Also in 1995, a National Food and Nutrition Plan was 
approved; its implementation was delegated to the Secretariat 
of Agriculture. Two other high level commissions were 
appointed: the Presidential Commission for State Reform and 
Modernization in 1996 and the Executive Commission on 
Health Reform, which is directly under the presidency, in 1997. 



104 



Dominican Republic: The Society and Its Environment 
Social Security 

The Dominican Social Security Institute (IDSS) , an autono- 
mous organization, is responsible for social security coverage, 
which includes old-age pensions, disability pensions, survivors' 
and maternity benefits, and compensation for work injuries. 
General tax revenues supplement employer and employee con- 
tributions. Wage earners, government employees (under spe- 
cial provisions) , and domestic and agricultural workers are 
eligible, although the benefits that most domestic and farm 
workers receive are quite limited. Permanent workers whose 
salaries exceed 122 Dominican Republic pesos (RD$ — for 
value of the peso, see Glossary) per week and the self-employed 
are excluded. No unemployment benefits are provided. In 
1994, 6.5 percent of the general population and 15.4 percent 
of the economically active population, or approximately 22 
percent of wage earners, were enrolled. Most of those enrolled 
were in manufacturing, commerce, and construction. The 
social welfare of workers in the hotel and restaurant sector is 
provided by the Hotel Social Fund, a nonprofit public organi- 
zation. Pensions and social services, including medical care, 
are covered by funds contributed by the government, employ- 
ers, and workers. The Aid and Housing Institute also provides 
social services such as housing construction, medical care, and 
pensions to civil servants and military personnel below a cer- 
tain salary level. Affiliation is compulsory for these two groups. 

Although the level of government services exceeds that of 
the republic's impoverished neighbor, Haiti, limited resources, 
inefficiency, and a lagging economy until the late 1990s, have 
limited the overall impact of these programs. In 1985, 8.8 per- 
cent of the national budget supported health services, and an 
additional 6.9 percent funded social security and welfare pro- 
grams. As a proportion of overall spending, the percentage 
rose to 9.5 in 1990, but declined to 7.8 percent for 1991-92 and 
remained at that level through 1995. More specifically, total 
spending by SESPAS declined as follows: from 86 percent to 65 
percent between the periods 1979-82 to 1987-90, and to 55.5 
percent in 1991. However, the Office of the President, in order 
partly to compensate for the decline, increased its share in 
health spending from 1.8 percent to 18 percent and then to 
38.4 percent, respectively, during the same years. In 1991 total 
direct spending per doctor visit, bed, and hospital discharge 
was 60 to 70 percent lower than in 1980. In 1995 the combined 
national and local governments' public health expenditure was 



105 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

28.6 percent of their combined budgets, which amounted to 
US$29 per capita. The public-private composition of national 
health expenditures in the Dominican Republic in 1995 was 38 
percent and 62 percent, respectively. 

Despite the various long-overdue and promising develop- 
ments, there is little prospect for major improvement in the 
quality of life for most Dominicans for many years to come. 
Nonetheless, President Fernandez has committed his adminis- 
tration to the improvement of social welfare — education, 
health, and social security. But whether improvements are 
implemented depends upon the economic situation and lead- 
ership by top government officials. 

* * * 

A wealth of information exists on rural life and the changing 
rural-urban context in the Dominican Republic. Jan Knippers 
Black's The Dominican Republic: Politics and Development in an 
Unsovereign State, James Ferguson's Dominican Republic: Beyond 
the Lighthouse, Glenn Hendricks's The Dominican Diaspora, Patri- 
cia R. Pessar's works, Kenneth Sharpe's Peasant Politics, and 
Howard J. Wiarda and Michael J. Kryzanek's The Dominican 
Republic: A Caribbean Crucible, all give a sense of the constraints 
with which most Dominicans must deal. Jan Black's book, H. 
Hoetink's The Dominican People, 185 9-1 900, and Frank Moya 
Pons's The Dominican Republic: A National History provide valu- 
able background reading. 

G. Pope Atkins and Larman C. Wilson's The Dominican Repub- 
lic and the United States: From Imperialism to Transnationalism, 
Alan Cambeira's Quisqueya la Bella: The Dominican Republic in 
Historical and Cultural Perspective, and Hoetink's book cover the 
society and race and culture. Americas Watch reports, Fergu- 
son's book, and Sherri Grasmuck's "Migration Within the 
Periphery: Haitian Labor in the Dominican Sugar and Coffee 
Industries" detail the situation of Haitians in the Republic. 
Emigration and immigration are discussed in Jose del Castillo 
and Martin F. Murphy's "Migration, National Identity, and Cul- 
tural Policy in the Dominican Republic," Sherri Grasmuck and 
Patricia R. Pessar's Between Two Islands: Dominican International 
Migration, Silvio Torres-Saillant and Ramona Hernandez's The 
Dominican Americans: The New Americans, and Michael J. Kryza- 
nek and Howard J. Wiarda's The Politics of External Influence in 
the Dominican Republic. Belkis Mones and Lydia Grant's "Agri- 



106 



Dominican Republic: The Society and Its Environment 

cultural Development, the Economic Crisis and Rural Women 
in the Dominican Republic" and Pessar's chapter, "Dominican 
Transnational Migration: Uneven Benefits Back Home and the 
Contingency of Return" in Emelio Betances and Hobart A. 
Spalding, Jr., editors, The Dominican Republic Today explain the 
ways in which rural women earn a living. Excellent surveys of 
the health and welfare situation are found in "Dominican 
Republic" in the Pan American Health Organization's Health 
Conditions in the Americas, 2, and Health in the Americas, 2. (For 
further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



107 



The Plaza del Mercado, Puerta Plata, ca. 1873 



LONG DEPENDENT ON SUGAR, the Dominican Republic 
diversified its economy beginning in the late 1960s to include 
mining, assembly manufacturing, and tourism. In 1996 the 
country's gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary) was 
approximately US$5.8 billion, or roughly US$716 per capita. A 
lower-middle-income country by World Bank (see Glossary) 
standards, the Dominican Republic depends on imported oil 
and, despite diversification, retained some vulnerability to 
price fluctuations in the world sugar market. Although poverty 
continued to be acute for many rural citizens in the 1990s, the 
economy had progressed significantly since the 1960s. 

In the diversification process away from sugar, by 1980 the 
Dominican mining industry had become a major foreign 
exchange earner; exports of gold, silver, ferronickel, and baux- 
ite constituted 38 percent of the country's total foreign sales. In 
the 1980s, the assembly manufacturing industry, centered in 
industrial free zones (see Glossary), began to dominate indus- 
trial activity. During this decade, the number of people 
employed in assembly manufacturing rose from 16,000 to 
nearly 100,000, and that sector's share of exports jumped from 
1 1 percent to more than 33 percent. More recently, in the first 
half of 1998, free-zone exports increased 19 percent over the 
first half of 1997, from US$541 million to US$644 million. 
Tourism experienced a similarly dramatic expansion during 
the 1980s, when the number of hotel rooms quadrupled. Reve- 
nues from tourism surpassed sugar earnings for the first time 
in 1984. By 1995 tourism was the country's largest earner of for- 
eign exchange, bringing in more than US$1.55 billion. The 
industry directly employed 44,000 persons and indirectly 
another 110,000. 

In a 1997 review of the Dominican Republic's economic 
developments and policies, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF — see Glossary) pronounced the country's economic per- 
formance in 1996 "broadly satisfactory." Over the longer 
period of 1990-95, the government was given credit for 
"strengthening the public finances, tightening credit and wage 
policies, and implementing structural reforms." Inflation 
plunged from 80 percent in 1990 to 9 percent in 1995. The 
external public debt as a share of GDP was more than halved 
(to 33 percent) during the same period. After dropping by 



111 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

about 6 percent in 1990, GDP rose on average by 4.25 percent a 
year in the period 1991-95, led by strong growth in the free 
trade zone manufacturing, construction, and tourism sectors. 
The unemployment rate declined from approximately 20 per- 
cent in 1991-93 to about 16 percent in 1995. Nevertheless, 
whereas the Dominican Republic had made great strides since 
the dictatorial rule of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina (1930- 
61), the nation's political economy continued to be strongly 
influenced by patronage, graft, and a lingering lack of political 
will to confront the traditional institutions that continued to 
restrain economic performance. 

A Developing Economy 

Originally inhabited by Taino Indians, the island was settled 
by a Spanish expedition led by Christopher Columbus in 1492. 
Spanish mercantilists largely abandoned the island by the 
1520s in favor of the gold and silver fortunes of Mexico and 
Peru. The remaining Spanish settlers briefly established an 
economic structure of Indian labor tied to land under the sys- 
tems of repartimiento (grants of land and Indian labor) and 
encomienda (grants of Indian labor in return for tribute to the 
crown) . The rapid decline of the Indian population ended the 
encomienda system by the mid-1 500s, when the Taino Indians 
were nearing extinction and were being replaced by imported 
African slaves. 

As economic activity became more sluggish in Eastern His- 
paniola (the approximate site of the present-day Dominican 
Republic) , Spanish control weakened and French buccaneers 
increasingly played a role not only in Western Hispaniola but 
also in the eastern part of the island. The French assumed con- 
trol of the western third of the island in 1697 under the Treaty 
of Ryswick, establishing Saint-Domingue (modern-day Haiti) 
(see French Colony of Saint-Domingue, 1697-1803, ch. 1). 
Whereas Haiti developed into a productive agricultural center 
on the basis of black slave labor, in the eastern part of the 
island, cattle ranching was common. Farming, however, was 
limited to comparatively small crops of sugar, coffee, and 
cocoa. 

The Spanish side of Hispaniola slowly developed a planta- 
tion economy during the nineteenth century, much later than 
the rest of the West Indies. For much of the century, political 
unrest disrupted normal economic activity and hindered devel- 
opment. Corrupt and inefficient government, by occupying 



112 



Dominican Republic: The Economy 



Haitian forces and by self-serving caudillos after the Dominican 
Republic achieved its independence in 1844, served mainly to 
increase the country's foreign debt (see Ambivalent Sover- 
eignty, Caudillo Rule, and Political Instability, ch. 1). After fail- 
ing to achieve independence from Spain in the Ten Years' War 
(1868-78), Cuban planters fled their homeland and settled in 
Hispaniola's fertile Cibao region, where they grew tobacco and 
later cocoa. 

Plummeting tobacco prices in the late nineteenth century 
prompted United States companies to invest heavily in a bur- 
geoning sugar industry, which would dominate the Dominican 
Republic's economy for most of the twentieth century. The 
influence of the United States was rising so rapidly that in 1904 
it had established a receivership over Dominican customs to 
administer the repayment of the country's commercial debt to 
foreign holders of Dominican bonds. 

Continuing economic difficulties and ongoing internal dis- 
orders, combined with the Dominican government's inability 
to maintain order and United States anxiety over Europe's 
(especially Germany's) spreading influence in the republic, led 
to United States occupation in 1916 and the establishment of a 
military government (see From the United States Occupation 
(1916-24) to the Emergence of Trujillo (1930), ch. 1). Even 
after the marines departed in 1924, United States economic 
advisers remained to manage customs revenues until 1941. 
Although security interests were the primary reason for the 
occupation, the United States did benefit commercially. 
Dominican tobacco, sugar, and cocoa, previously exported to 
French, German, and British markets, were shipped instead to 
the United States. The powerful United States sugar companies 
came to dominate the banking and transportation sectors. 
They also benefited from the partition of former communal 
lands, which allowed the companies to augment their holdings. 
However, although the occupation was resented politically by 
Dominicans, the Dominican economy also reaped some bene- 
fits: the United States presence helped stabilize the country's 
finances and greatly improved its infrastructure, constructing 
roads, sanitation systems, ports, and schools. 

Another significant outcome of the United States occupa- 
tion was the creation of a Dominican army, the commander of 
which, Rafael Trujillo, took power over the nation in 1930 and 
maintained absolute dictatorial control until his assassination 
in 1961 (see The Trujillo Era, 1930-61, ch. 1). Trujillo's agree- 



113 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

ment ending the United States customs receivership allowed 
him to assume the title of "Restorer of Financial Indepen- 
dence." High prices for Dominican produce during World War 
II (1941-45) enabled him to liquidate the country's outstand- 
ing debt in 1947. At the same time, he introduced a national 
currency, the Dominican Republic peso (RD$ — for value, see 
Glossary) . 

Although Trujillo initiated substantial industrialization and 
public works projects, his interest in promoting economic 
development was largely for his own and his supporters' bene- 
fit. Corruption and blackmail helped him amass an enormous 
fortune and made him the country's largest landowner. His pri- 
mary means of self-enrichment was the national sugar industry, 
which he rapidly expanded in the 1950s, despite a depressed 
international market. At the time of his death in 1961, Trujillo 
and his coterie reportedly controlled 60 percent of the total 
sugar, cement, tobacco, and shipping industries and owned 
more than 600,000 hectares of improved land. In the process 
of consolidating his enormous wealth, Trujillo looted the 
national treasury and built a personal fiefdom similar to those 
of the Somoza and the Duvalier families in Nicaragua and 
Haiti, respectively. 

The Dominican economy's GDP experienced growth under 
Trujillo at the rate of about 6.5 percent a year from 1950 to 
1958 but dropped to 0.3 percent from 1959 to 1961. However, 
the unequal distribution of that growth impoverished rural 
Dominicans. The period between Trujillo's assassination in 
1961 and the 1965 civil war was both politically and economi- 
cally chaotic, prompting simultaneous capital flight and 
increased demands for spending on social programs. Cash 
infusions (mostly from the United States) and loans helped to 
sustain the economy. During the first three presidencies of 
Joaquin Balaguer Ricardo (1966-78), the country experienced 
a period of sustained growth characterized by economic diver- 
sification and a more equitable distribution of benefits among 
Dominicans. During its peak growth period, from 1966 to 1976, 
the economy expanded at an annual rate of nearly 8 percent, 
one of the highest growth rates in the world at the time. But in 
1979 two hurricanes killed more than 1,000 Dominicans and 
caused an estimated US$1 billion in damage, and by the early 
1980s, rising oil prices and a forty-year low in sugar prices had 
stifled the local economy. The average rate of economic growth 
dropped to almost 1 percent a year. 



114 



Dominican Republic: The Economy 



The unstable economic situation compelled the administra- 
tion of Salvador Jorge Blanco (1982-86) to enter into a series 
of negotiations with the IMF and to begin restructuring gov- 
ernment economic policies. In 1983 the government signed a 
three-year Extended Fund Facility that called for lower fiscal 
deficits, tighter credit policies, and other austerity measures. 
This program paved the way for the first in a series of resched- 
uling agreements with foreign creditors. Although the resched- 
ulings slowed the pace of repayments, the higher consumer 
prices that resulted from the agreements sparked food riots in 
April 1984. The government subsequently suspended the 1983 
agreements. 

In April 1985, however, the Jorge Blanco administration 
signed a new one-year IMF Standby Agreement that included 
more austerity measures and the floating of the Dominican 
Republic peso in relation to the United States dollar. The one- 
year loan also enabled the government to reschedule commer- 
cial bank and Paris Club (see Glossary) debts. However, repay- 
ments were abruptly suspended in 1986 because they were 
considered too high. The ensuing civil disorders and serious 
differences over the pace of reforms sealed the end of the 
agreement prematurely, and the electorate ousted the Jorge 
Blanco administration in favor of former president Balaguer, 
who evoked memories of the economic growth of the 1970s 
and was determined not to seek help from the IMF. 

The Balaguer approach was to refuse to negotiate with the 
IMF in order to avoid the austere economic conditions its 
agreements usually entailed. Instead, Balaguer tried to revive 
the economy by initiating a large public works construction 
program during his 1986-90 tenure. The economy expanded 
rapidly in 1987, but then contracted sharply in 1988 — mainly as 
a result of the government's spending patterns. High inflation 
and currency devaluation, coupled with serious problems with 
such basic services as transportation, electricity, and water, crip- 
pled Balaguer's reform program. His expansionary fiscal poli- 
cies also fueled unprecedented inflation, causing prices to rise 
60 percent in 1988 alone, which took a severe toll on the 
poorer segments of the population. His continued devaluation 
of the peso may have benefited the country's burgeoning 
export sector and tourist trade — but at the expense of disad- 
vantaged Dominicans earning fixed salaries. By the late 1980s, 
the external debt — US$4 billion — was almost double what it 
had been in 1980. Finally, the government's payment problems 



115 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

and its inability to meet its foreign debt commitments left it no 
choice but to turn again to the IMF in 1990. 

High levels of inflation, increasing debt, and persistent defi- 
cits masked several positive trends during the 1980s, however. 
The most positive development was the country's rapid diversi- 
fication away from its dependence on sugar. New jobs in assem- 
bly manufacturing offset many of the local jobs in the cane 
fields. Employment in assembly operations grew from 16,000 in 
1980 to nearly 100,000 by 1989. These figures represented the 
world's fastest growth in free-zone employment during the 
1980s. By 1987 the value of assembly exports surpassed that of 
traditional agricultural exports. The Dominican Republic also 
enjoyed the Caribbean's fastest growth in tourism during the 
1980s. Moreover, although the mining industry suffered from 
low prices and labor disputes, it contributed a significant per- 
centage of foreign exchange as well. The agricultural sector 
also diversified to a limited degree, with a new emphasis on the 
export of nontraditional items such as tropical fruits (particu- 
larly pineapple), citrus, and ornamental plants to the United 
States under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI — see Glos- 
sary) . 

Economic Policies 

The severe imbalances in public finances and the fluctua- 
tions of deteriorating budget deficits that characterized the 
1980s spilled over into the early 1990s. Problems related to ser- 
vicing the debt also continued, forcing the government to fol- 
low a policy of on-again, off-again recourse to IMF inter- 
ference. Although the required austerity measures usually 
caused public discontent and, in some cases, civil disturbances, 
President Balaguer, who had refused to negotiate with the IMF, 
changed course in 1990 and announced at the beginning of his 
sixth term that he was doubling basic food and fuel prices to 
meet the conditions for resumed IMF assistance. The following 
year witnessed further anti-inflationary measures, including 
the freezing of public-sector pay. The government also stopped 
its practice of printing money to pay for public spending, and 
the money supply contracted. The ensuing deep recession 
caused inflation to drop significantly and the exchange rate to 
stabilize. These developments in turn prompted the IMF in 
September 1991 to approve an eighteen-month standby 
arrangement, followed by an RD$31.8 million (about US$4.4 
million) loan. Soon the economy registered a 3 percent 



116 



Dominican Republic: The Economy 



increase in GDP and in 1993 an inflation rate of 5 percent; 
these figures contrasted with a 5 percent decrease in GDP and 
consumer price inflation of 100 percent in the late 1980s. 

A reversal of policy seemed inevitable, however. Just prior to 
the 1994 election, the traditional upsurge in public-sector pay 
and government spending on public works programs reap- 
peared, and Balaguer's extravagant capital projects began to 
deplete government revenues. The Central Bank of the 
Dominican Republic (Banco Central de la Republica Domini- 
cana — BCRD) tried to remedy the deteriorating situation by 
requiring the government to pay the surcharge on fuel sales 
directly to the Central Bank to finance mounting foreign debt 
payments. With the 1996 presidential elections around the cor- 
ner, however, the government totally ignored this requirement. 
The only way to maintain a modest fiscal surplus was to allow 
several state-owned public enterprises to delay their payments. 

This heavy economic burden was passed on to the incoming 
president, Leonel Fernandez Reyna. The new president 
pledged, upon his election in 1996, to observe tight fiscal poli- 
cies and initiate a wide-ranging modernization program, 
including privatization of public enterprises. One of his first 
steps was to mount a campaign against tax evasion, which 
proved to be quite successful: budgetary income in 1997 was 31 
percent higher than in 1996. Perhaps his immediate focus on 
taxes resulted from the common practice of tax evasion by 
wealthier Dominicans. Moreover, many businesses illegally 
received tax-exempt status because of political contacts while 
other qualified firms did not. 

Fernandez also reinstated payments of the fuel surcharge to 
the Central Bank, even though they put a strain on funds. The 
resumption of transfer payments to financially devastated state 
corporations, however, was a much larger drain on finances. 
The Fernandez government inherited a huge domestic debt on 
several of these companies, especially the sugar and electricity 
enterprises. Restructuring these enterprises required the pas- 
sage of a law permitting the capitalization (i.e., partial privati- 
zation) of public corporations, which was signed in June 1997 
after a long struggle between the president and Congress. 

Electricity distribution operations of the Dominican Electric- 
ity Corporation (Corporacion Dominicana de Electricidad — 
CDE), as well as other divisions of the company, were sched- 
uled for public auction by late 1998. That date was postponed 
indefinitely as a result of damage to the electricity network by 



117 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



Hurricane Georges. However, in September 1998, the Domini- 
can government and a consortium of three British and United 
States firms signed an agreement to construct three 100-mega- 
watt combined-cycle generators. The generators, to be built by 
Germany's Siemens and financed by the World Bank and the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), are to come on 
stream in early 2000. 

The sugar parastatal corporation known as the State Sugar 
Council (Consejo Estatal del Azucar — CEA) is to follow a dif- 
ferent path from that of the electricity company. The Commis- 
sion for the Reform of Public Enterprise announced in July 
1998 that it had decided against partial privatization. Instead it 
recommended the introduction of private participation 
through long-term leases. An investment bank is to advise on 
the process, which is to be implemented in 1999. A group of 
milling, paints, oils, and insurance enterprises is also on the 
privatization list. Other economic reforms contemplated by the 
government include the liberalization of business legislation, 
aid for small enterprises, and the promotion of investment in 
tourism, telecommunications, mining, and the free zones. A 
new foreign investment law promulgated in September 1997 
allows non-Dominican concerns to invest in all sectors, with the 
exception of those related to national security. It also provides 
for full repatriation of capital and profits. An older foreign 
investment law (August 1996) also encourages manufacturing 
in the tax-free zones by exempting foreign investors from 
import duty on inputs and by simplifying registration proce- 
dures and offering tax exemption for up to twenty years. 

Fiscal Policy 

Another significant reform under consideration by the 
Dominican Congress in the late 1990s was that of imposing 
restrictions on the executive's discretionary use of public 
finances. Meanwhile, a role would be established for the pri- 
vate sector in providing for social security and strengthening 
the Central Bank's autonomy and supervision of all banking 
procedures. Overseeing the country's financial system has 
always been the function of the Monetary Board of the BCRD. 
The BCRD controls the money supply, allocates credit and for- 
eign exchange, seeks to restrain inflation, manages the 
national debt, and performs currency-typical central bank 
functions. 



118 



Dominican Republic: The Economy 



The Dominican Republic peso (RD$) has been issued by the 
BCRD since 1948 and was officially on par with the United 
States dollar for decades. The peso underwent a slow process 
of devaluation on the black market from 1963 until the govern- 
ment enacted a series of devaluations during the 1980s. A 1978 
Dominican law had actually required that the peso equal the 
dollar in value, but as economic conditions worsened, authori- 
ties abandoned this policy. The most important change in 
Dominican exchange policy came in 1985: the Jorge Blanco 
government, acting in accordance with the terms of an IMF sta- 
bilization program, floated the national currency in relation to 
the dollar, thereby temporarily wiping out the previously exten- 
sive black market. The floating peso fell to a level of US$1 = 
RD$3.12, an official devaluation of more than 300 percent that 
proved to be a major shock to the economy. Preferential 
exchange rates, however, remained in force for oil imports and 
parastatal transactions. The devaluation caused higher domes- 
tic prices and burdened many poor citizens, while it improved 
the country's export sector through newly competitive prices. 
Rising inflation, balance-of-payments deficits, and foreign debt 
compelled further devaluations after 1985. The peso stabilized 
somewhat at US$1 = RD$6.35 by 1989, after bottoming out at 
nearly US$1 = RD$8 in mid-1988. As a result of these fluctua- 
tions, the Monetary Board experimented during the 1980s with 
a multitier fixed exchange rate, a floating exchange rate, and 
other systems. By 1988 it had settled on a fixed rate subject to 
change based on the country's export competitiveness and 
domestic inflation. An important provision of the exchange- 
rate policy of 1988 prohibited currency transactions at the 
country's exchange banks and channeled all foreign currency 
transactions into the commercial banks under BCRD supervi- 
sion. 

In February 1991, a new dual exchange-rate system autho- 
rized the BCRD to set the rate for official transactions and com- 
mercial banks to conduct operations at a free-market rate. Four 
years later, the two systems were unified, with the exception of 
such government transactions as debt servicing and importing 
fuels. The rates for these transactions were unified in 1997 on a 
free-market basis and at an initial rate of US$1 = RD$14. A gap 
between the two currencies, however, forced an adjustment in 
the official rate to US$1 - RD$14.2. After Hurricane Georges, 
the official rate dropped further to US$1 = RD$15.46; the com- 
mercial rate was US$1 = RD$16 in late November 1999. 



119 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Without changing the BCRD's basic functions as the coun- 
try's central bank, a banking reform law in 1992 reduced the 
number of financial institutions. Instead, the law created 
"multi-banks," which would specialize in offering a complete 
range of services. The consolidation was effected by merging 
commercial and development banks with mortgage or savings 
banks. In the late 1990s, the Dominican Republic had fifteen 
commercial banks, of which one, the Banco de Reservas, was 
state-owned, and five were foreign-owned: the United States 
Chase Manhattan Bank and Citibank, Canada's Bank of Nova 
Scotia, and Spain's Banco Espahol de Credito and Banco 
Santander. The foreign investment law, which was passed in 
September 1997, opens up the banking sector to other poten- 
tial foreign participants, although it stipulates that insurance 
agencies remain under majority Dominican ownership. In 
addition, seven development banks provide loans for housing, 
agriculture, and other investments. 

Government Role 

The role of the BCRD (an entity under the President's con- 
trol) in managing the country's domestic monetary policy and 
dealing with pressures on the exchange rate is only one aspect 
of the government's traditional tight grip on the economy. Its 
interventionist approach is also evident in its repeated efforts 
to restrain inflation. But the disruptive nature and abrupt 
changes in governmental economic policy have contributed to 
sharp fluctuations in the inflation rate. To cite one example: 
lax fiscal and monetary policies caused inflation to rise from an 
average of approximately 6 percent in 1983 to 38 percent by 
1985 to an average of 59.5 percent in 1990. An abrupt tighten- 
ing of monetary policy resulted in a sharp inflation rate drop to 
4.5 percent in 1992, but accelerated spending prior to presi- 
dential elections caused the rate to rise to 12.5 percent in 1995. 
That rise was brought down to 5.4 percent a year later, however, 
when the BCRD introduced tight monetary restraints. Rising 
food prices in 1997 again reversed the trend, raising the rate to 
almost 10 percent and leading to street demonstrations and to 
the imposition of government price controls. The business sec- 
tor immediately accused the government of taking this restric- 
tive measure strictly for political reasons related to elections. In 
imposing these controls on such basic goods as rice, milk, 
chicken, and cement, however, the administration has acknowl- 



120 



Dominican Republic: The Economy 



edged that it lacks the means to enforce them and has sug- 
gested that they be used only as a reference point for prices. 

The Dominican government's approach of imposing restric- 
tive monetary measures dates back to the 1970s and 1980s, 
reflecting its concern over the rising cost of basic consumer 
goods. Many prices were set by the government's National 
Price Stabilization Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estabiliza- 
cion de Precios — Inespre). Despite Inespre's efforts, food 
prices rose faster than all other prices during the 1980s. Ine- 
spre's pricing policies responded more to political concerns 
than to economic realities. Prices of basic foodstuffs were main- 
tained at unrealistically low levels, in part because urban vio- 
lence often resulted from efforts to bring these prices more in 
line with the free market. Keeping urban consumer prices low 
necessitated the purchase of staple crops from Dominican 
farmers at less than fair value, a practice that depressed the 
income and the living standard of rural Dominicans. 

Privatization 

In the late 1990s, the government showed no evidence of 
relaxing its rigid hold on the country's economy. Although in 
March 1998 it had initiated the qualification process for firms 
interested in bidding for the distribution and marketing opera- 
tions of the state-owned electricity enterprise, strong opposi- 
tion in some government circles together with the impact of 
Hurricane Georges have slowed the process. Similarly, plans to 
privatize the generating operations of the CDE have been con- 
tradicted by the administration's decision in late 1997 to pur- 
chase new electric generators. Further proof that the 
government was extending the same approach to other public 
enterprises came in 1997, when it imported 600 buses for a new 
state corporation assigned to provide public transportation in 
the Santo Domingo area. The state sugar company, CEA, is also 
on the privatization list, but parcels of its land have been dis- 
tributed, at questionably low prices in some cases, as part of the 
government's agrarian reform program. All these actions cast 
doubts on the administration's commitment to the concept of 
privatization. They may also reflect a strong difference of views 
within the administration, with some members — including the 
new director of the CDE, named in 1998 — favoring the 
strengthening of state-owned enterprises rather than their 
privatization or capitalization. 



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Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Labor 

The structure of the Dominican labor force began to change 
significantly during the post-Trujillo era as agriculture's share 
of output diminished. In 1950 agriculture had employed 73 
percent of the country's labor, but by the end of the 1980s it 
accounted for as little as 35 percent. In mid-1996 the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimated that agriculture, 
forestry, and fishing employed only 20 percent of the labor 
force. Industry and services had incorporated approximately 
20 percent and 45 percent, respectively, of displaced agricul- 
tural labor (see table 6, Appendix). As a consequence of gaps 
in the labor statistics, official estimates of the female segment 
of the economically active population varied widely, from 15 to 
30 percent of the labor force. Whatever the total figures, the 
role of women, particularly in the urban economy, was growing 
by the late 1980s. Seventy percent of the employees in free- 
trade zones (FTZs) were women; as greater numbers of FTZs 
opened in the late 1980s, the rate of employment for females 
more than doubled the rate of employment for males. This 
shift represented a major transformation in the labor force; 
previously, the percentage of women in the Dominican work 
force had been lower than that for any other Latin American 
country. Men continued to dominate agricultural jobs, but 
these were among the lowest paid jobs in the country. The 
highest salaries were earned in mining, private utilities, finan- 
cial services, and commerce. The distribution of income 
among workers was highly skewed; the top 10 percent earned 
39 percent of national income, while the bottom 50 percent 
earned only 19 percent. 

Income distribution continued to be skewed in the 1990s, 
with the top 20 percent of the population earning 60 percent 
of the country's total income in 1994, and the bottom 20 per- 
cent earning only 4.5 percent. A 1992 World Bank report classi- 
fied 4.6 million Dominicans as poor, with 2.8 million living in 
extreme poverty. About 10 to 15 percent of the total workforce, 
estimated at 2.84 million in 1994, are union members. Official 
statistics put the average unemployment rate at 15.6 percent 
for the 1994-95 period, compared with 20.7 percent for the 
1992-93 period. Approximately 15 percent of the economically 
active population are engaged in agriculture; 23 percent in 
industry; 27 percent in tourism, trade, and finance; and 35 per- 
cent in other services and government employ. Although the 
administration of President Fernandez is committed in princi- 



122 



Dominican Republic: The Economy 



pie to reducing the level of public-sector overstaffing, it 
allowed government personnel recruitment to increase 6.4 per- 
cent in the first half of 1998. Moreover, the government has 
expressed reluctance to undertake public-sector layoffs despite 
a favorable economy. 

In the 1980s, the most controversial labor law was the one 
governing the national minimum wage. Although the Congress 
increased minimum wages on several occasions during the 
decade, unusually high inflation, which reduced the real wages 
of workers, usually outpaced these increases. General strikes or 
other confrontations between labor and government fre- 
quently resulted. Government officials were reluctant to grant 
frequent raises in the minimum wage, in part, because they felt 
the need to keep Dominican wages competitive with those of 
other developing countries. Dominican wages did indeed 
remain lower than those in other Caribbean Basin countries, 
with the exception of impoverished Haiti. 

A new labor code promulgated in May 1992, however, pro- 
vided for increasing a variety of employee benefits. The mini- 
mum wage was raised twice in the next two years by a total of 20 
percent, substantially more than the rate of inflation or devalu- 
ation. Public- and private-sector minimum wages were also 
increased by approximately 20 percent in 1997, resulting in a 
considerable rise in the Dominican Republic's labor costs. 

Although labor unions appeared only after the Trujillo era 
and only in the form of poorly financed and politically divided 
peasant-based movements, the Dominican constitution pro- 
vides for the freedom to organize labor unions and for the 
right of workers to strike (as well as for private-sector employers 
to lock out workers) . All workers, except military and police 
personnel, are free to organize, and workers in all sectors exer- 
cise this right. Organized labor, however, represents no more 
than 15 percent of the work force and is divided among three 
major confederations, four minor confederations, and several 
independent unions. The government respects association 
rights and places no obstacles to union registration, affiliation, 
or the ability to engage in legal strikes. 

Requirements for calling a strike include the support of an 
absolute majority of the workers of the company, a prior 
attempt to resolve the conflict through arbitration, written 
notification to the Secretariat of State for Labor, and a ten-day 
waiting period following notification before proceeding with a 
strike. The Labor Code specifies the steps legally required to 



123 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

establish a union. It calls for automatic recognition of a union 
if the government has not acted on its application within a spe- 
cific time. In practice, the government has readily facilitated 
recognition of labor organizations. Unions can and do freely 
affiliate regionally and internationally, and they are indepen- 
dent of the government and political parties. 

Collective bargaining is provided for by law and may be exer- 
cised in firms in which a union has gained the support of an 
absolute majority of the workers, but only a minority of compa- 
nies have collective bargaining pacts. The Labor Code stipu- 
lates that workers cannot be dismissed because of their trade 
union membership or activities. In 1997 there were some sev- 
enty unions in the thirty-six established FTZs, which included 
288 United States-owned or affiliated companies and employed 
approximately 172,000 workers, mostly women. The majority of 
these unions are affiliated with the National Federation of Free 
Trade Zone Workers, but many of them exist only on paper. 
And some FTZ companies, whose working conditions are gen- 
erally better than others in the country, have a history of dis- 
charging workers who attempt to organize unions. The State 
Sugar Council (CEA), on the other hand, employs workers 
from more than 100 unions while it discourages additional 
organizing efforts. Dominican workers predominate in most of 
the unions, but two unions are Haitian-dominated. 

The matter of Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic 
has been a contentious one. Since the early twentieth century, 
the Dominican Republic has received both temporary and per- 
manent Haitian migrants. Several hundred thousand Haitians 
were believed to reside in the Dominican Republic in the late 
1990s, representing workers in the country both legally and 
illegally. As the result of several agreements between the 
Dominican and Haitian governments, numerous cane cutters 
were brought in legally. However, most were paid miserably low 
wages and experienced very poor living conditions. Many of 
the legal and illegal Haitian workers lived in camps on the sug- 
arcane plantations. Because of disturbances that arose at a 
sugar plantation in 1985 in which several Haitians were killed, 
the government discontinued the official contracting of Hai- 
tian cane cutters. Reportedly, however, numerous Haitians in 
the Dominican Republic illegally (primarily because Domini- 
can salaries and living conditions generally were better than 
those in Haiti) were picked up by the government and obliged 
to work in the cane fields or be forcibly repatriated. Haitians 



124 



Dominican Republic: The Economy 



also worked as labor recruiters and field inspectors in the cane 
fields as well as laborers harvesting coffee, rice, and cocoa and 
as construction workers in Santo Domingo. 

Although the law prohibits forced or compulsory labor, 
forced overtime in factories continues to be a problem. 
Employers, particularly in FTZs, sometimes lock the exit doors 
at the normal closing time to prevent workers from leaving. 
Other employers fail to inform new hires that overtime is 
optional. And there have been reports of some employees 
being fired for refusing to work overtime. 

The Labor Code prohibits employment of children under 
fourteen years of age and places restrictions on the employ- 
ment of children under the age of sixteen. These restrictions 
include a limitation of no more than six hours of daily work, no 
employment in dangerous occupations or establishments serv- 
ing alcohol, as well as limitations on nighttime work. Domini- 
can law requires six years of formal education. High levels of 
unemployment and lack of a social safety net, however, create 
pressures on families to allow children to earn supplemental 
income. Tens of thousands of children work selling newspa- 
pers, shining shoes, or washing cars, often during school hours. 

The Labor Code authorizes a National Salary Committee to 
set minimum wage levels; the Congress may also enact mini- 
mum wage legislation. The minimum wage equals approxi- 
mately US$75 per month. Although this amount covers only a 
fraction of the living costs of a family in Santo Domingo, many 
workers make only the minimum wage. For example, 60 per- 
cent of government employees earn only minimum wage. The 
Labor Code establishes a standard work period of eight hours a 
day and forty-four hours per week. It also stipulates that all 
workers are entitled to thirty-six hours of uninterrupted rest 
each week, and to a 35 percent differential for work above 
forty-four hours up to sixty-eight hours per week and double 
time for any hours above sixty-eight hours per week. The 
degree to which Labor Code provisions are enforced is uncer- 
tain. 

The Dominican Social Security Institute (Instituto Domini- 
cano del Seguro Social — IDSS) sets workplace safety and health 
conditions. However, the existing social security system does 
not apply to all workers and is underfunded. In addition, both 
the IDSS and the Secretariat of State for Labor have a limited 
number of inspectors appointed through political patronage 
charged with enforcing standards. In practice, for example, 



125 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

workers cannot remove themselves from hazardous workplace 
situations without jeopardizing continued employment. Condi- 
tions for agricultural workers are generally much worse, espe- 
cially in the sugar industry. On many sugar plantations, cane 
cutters are paid by the weight of cane cut rather than by hours 
worked. Many cane cutters earn the equivalent of approxi- 
mately US$3.70 per day. Many villages in which workers, often 
Haitians, gather for mutual support have high rates of disease 
and lack schools, medical facilities, running water, and sewer- 
age systems. 

Agriculture 

The backbone of the Dominican economy for centuries, 
agriculture declined in significance during the 1970s and 
1980s, as manufacturing, mining, and tourism began to play 
more important roles in the country's development. During 
the 1960s, the agricultural sector employed close to 60 percent 
of the labor force, contributed 25 percent of GDP, and pro- 
vided between 80 and 90 percent of exports. By 1988, however, 
agriculture employed only 35 percent of the labor force, 
accounted for 15 percent of GDP, and generated approxi- 
mately 50 percent of all exports. In 1992 the sector's share of 
exports dropped to 43 percent and employed only 28 percent 
of the total workforce. By the end of 1995, the agricultural sec- 
tor's contribution to GDP stood at 12.7 percent, and it 
employed approximately 12.9 percent of the labor force. The 
declining importance of sugar, the principal source of eco- 
nomic activity for nearly a century, was even more dramatic. 
Sugar's share of total exports fell from 63 percent in 1975 to 
less than 20 percent by the late 1980s. Sugar exports in 1995 
were 75 percent lower than in 1981, and the severe drought of 
1997 also lowered production. 

The transformation in agriculture paralleled the country's 
demographic trends. In 1960, some 70 percent of the country's 
population was rural; that figure was reduced to 30 percent in 
the 1990s. Government policies accelerated urbanization 
through development strategies that favored urban industries 
over agriculture in terms of access to capital, tariff and tax 
exemptions, and pricing policies. As a consequence, the pro- 
duction of major food crops either stagnated or declined in 
per capita terms from the mid-1970s to the late 1990s. How- 
ever, production of some major export products, coffee and 
cocoa, grew by some 9 percent in the latter 1990s. 



126 



Picking cotton 
Courtesy Inter-American 
Development Bank 




Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 
Land Policies 

The uneven distribution of arable land continued to be a 
fundamental obstacle to the economic development of the 
Dominican Republic in the 1990s. Despite active attempts to 
reform land tenure patterns, the basic dichotomy of latifundio 
(see Glossary) and minifundio (see Glossary) continues to be 
the predominant feature of rural life. According to the 1981 
agricultural census, 2 percent of the nation's farms occupied 55 
percent of total farmland. By contrast, landholdings averaging 
less than twenty hectares, which represented 82 percent of all 
farms (314,665 units), covered only 12 percent of the land 
under cultivation. Land distribution on both extremes was 
notably worse. Some 161 farms, 0.1 percent of all farms, occu- 
pied 23 percent of all productive land, whereas tens of thou- 
sands of peasants possessed only a few tareas (the tarea, the 
most common measurement of land on the island, equaled 
one-sixteenth of a hectare) . 

The government is the largest landholder. The state-owned 
largest sugar producer, CEA, established in 1966 to manage the 
sugar operations acquired from the Trujillo family, and the 
Dominican Agrarian Institute (Instituto Agrario Dominicano — 
IAD), the national land reform agency, control the overwhelm- 
ing share of public-sector land, most of which was derived from 
Trujillo's estate. The two major privately owned sugar produc- 
ers, Central Romana and Casa Vicini, along with several large 
cattle ranches, represent the largest private landholdings. 

The concentration of land ownership in the Dominican 
Republic, although it can trace its roots back to Christopher 
Columbus's parceling of land, resulted principally from the 
"latifundization" of land with the advent of commercial sugar- 
cane production in the late nineteenth century. The concen- 
tration of arable land ownership increased after 1948, when 
Trujillo intensified his involvement in the sugar industry. In a 
little over a decade, Trujillo doubled the amount of land dedi- 
cated to sugarcane. The dictator and his cronies seized as 
much as 60 percent of the nation's arable land through coloni- 
zation schemes, the physical eviction of peasants from their 
land, and the purchase of land through spurious means. In the 
aftermath of Trujillo's assassination in 1961, the government 
expropriated his family's landholdings by means of Decree 
6988, thus setting the stage for contemporary land policy. 

In 1962 the post-Trujillo Council of State created the IAD to 
centralize agrarian reform and land policy, charging the orga- 



128 



Dominican Republic: The Economy 



nization with redistributing the ruler's former holdings to peas- 
ants. Agrarian reform was hindered by the country's stormy 
political transitions in the 1960s, but it was strengthened in 
1972 by legislation that authorized the government to expro- 
priate unused farms in excess of 31.4 hectares under certain 
conditions. Despite the broad mandate for land reform, a 
cause strongly advocated by the Balaguer administration in the 
late 1980s, the IAD has made disappointing progress since 
1962, according to its critics. Figures vary considerably as to the 
number of hectares actually distributed (reportedly, some 
409,000 hectares by late 1987), with the greatest progress on 
redistribution occurring during the early years. Since 1988 
land redistribution has been minimal. 

The IAD distributed parcels of land to individuals, coopera- 
tives, and settlements (asentamientos). A range of support ser- 
vices, including land-clearing, road construction, irrigation, 
agricultural extension services, and credit, were also provided 
in principle. However, peasants criticized the IAD's sluggish 
performance in transferring land titles, its distribution of 
mainly marginal agricultural land, and the generally inade- 
quate level of support services caused by lack of funding and 
ineffectual management of the IAD. For example, only 38 per- 
cent of IAD land was actually devoted to the cultivation of 
crops in the late 1980s; 9 percent was devoted to livestock and 
53 percent to forestry or other uses. 

After decades of wrangling, the Dominican Republic com- 
pleted the 1980s with the issue of land largely unresolved from 
the perspectives of both peasants and commercial farmers. 
This failure was most evident in data demonstrating an ongo- 
ing pattern of skewed land ownership. Frequent spontaneous 
land seizures and invasions by peasants of underused land 
throughout the 1980s epitomized rural frustrations. On one 
end of the economic spectrum, numerous rural associations, 
disconcerted by the pace and the quality of land reform, partic- 
ipated in land seizures, demanding "land for those who work 
it." On the other end of the spectrum, agribusiness complained 
of the government's inconsistent policies with regard to the 
expropriation of land. Some analysts viewed such inconsisten- 
cies as a deterrent to new investment in diversified agriculture 
and therefore as counterproductive to the republic's efforts 
through the encouragement of tourism and the development 
of mineral resources to diversify its economy away from sugar. 



129 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

The agricultural sector continued to be depressed well into 
the 1990s, with a growth of just over 3 percent in 1997-98 (as 
against 9 percent the previous year). Government policies, 
especially those relating to agrarian reform, remained incoher- 
ent, with informal land occupations occurring more frequently 
toward the end of the decade. Years of high interest rates 
remained a serious impediment to investment, making it 
almost impossible to purchase replacements for antiquated 
equipment. The government's decision to import large quanti- 
ties of major staple items at low prices in response to the 1997 
drought caused setbacks to domestic agriculture, especially 
because no thought was given to helping domestic producers. 
Dairy farming was hit particularly hard by another government 
decision — to sell imported powdered milk at subsidized prices. 
The decision resulted in several bankruptcies in the dairy 
industry. 

Hurricane Georges, which hit the Dominican Republic on 
September 22, 1998, had a devastating impact on the agricul- 
tural sector. The hurricane destroyed 80 percent of the banana 
crop and producers of sugarcane, cocoa, coffee, and citrus also 
experienced significant losses. In addition, the poultry industry 
was hard hit. Substantial imports of food were required for the 
remainder of 1998. 

Land Use 

About 57 percent of the Dominican Republic's total terri- 
tory, some 27,452 square kilometers out of 48,442 square kilo- 
meters, was devoted to agriculture-related activities, including 
pasture land, in the late 1990s. In 1998 forest and woodland 
areas occupied some 6,000 square kilometers, representing 
about 12 percent of the total land area. Because of environ- 
mental concerns over deforestation, access to the main forest 
reserves is limited. The government also has created thirteen 
national parks and nine areas of special scientific interest. 
Although deforestation is steadily reducing this area, most of 
the soil is well-suited for cultivation, and the climate ranges 
from temperate to tropical. The coastal plains of the south and 
the east are the main sugar-producing areas. The valley of 
Cibao in the north and the Vega Real region northeast of Santo 
Domingo are the richest and most productive agricultural 
lands. These regions are endowed with a fair share of water 
from streams and rivers; however, the country's irrigation sys- 
tem barely covered 15 percent of the arable land, or about 



130 



Dominican Republic: The Economy 



139,000 hectares, in the late 1980s. By 1991 with the construc- 
tion of several dams the irrigated area was estimated at 225,000 
hectares. 

Cash Crops 

Despite ongoing diversification efforts since the late 1980s, 
the Dominican Republic in the late 1990s continues to be a 
major world producer of sugarcane. The sugar industry has an 
impact on all sectors of the economy and epitomizes the 
nation's vulnerability to outside forces. Fluctuating world 
prices, adjustments to United States sugar quotas, and the 
actions of United States sugar companies (such as Gulf and 
Western Corporation's sale of all its Dominican holdings in 
1985) all could determine the pace of economic development 
for decades. 

Columbus introduced sugarcane to Hispaniola, but sugar 
plantations did not flourish in the Dominican Republic until 
the 1870s, much later than on most Caribbean islands. Invest- 
ment by United States sugar companies, such as the United 
States South Porto Rico Company and the Cuban-Dominican 
Sugar Company, rapidly transformed the Dominican economy. 
These companies had established themselves by the 1890s, and 
between 1896 and 1905 sugar output tripled. During the 
United States occupation (1916-24), the sugar industry 
expanded further, acquiring control of major banking and 
transportation enterprises. 

Beginning in 1948, Trujillo constructed a string of sugar 
mills, many of which he owned personally. The elimination of 
United States sugar quotas for Cuba after the Cuban revolution 
of 1959 further enhanced the economic role of sugar because 
the Dominican Republic assumed Cuba's former status as the 
main supplier under the quota system. 

Heavy reliance on sugar has created a number of economic 
difficulties. The harvest of sugarcane, the zafra, is arduous, 
labor-intensive, and seasonal, and it leaves many unemployed 
during the tiempo muerto, or dead season. Haitian laborers have 
harvested most of the Dominican cane crop since the late nine- 
teenth century, by agreement between Hispaniola's two govern- 
ments. Although Haitian cane cutters live under conditions of 
near slavery, two factors continue to draw them across the bor- 
der: depressed economic conditions in Haiti and the reluc- 
tance of Dominicans to perform the backbreaking, poorly 
regarded work of cane cutting. 



131 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

After the death of Trujillo, Dominican policy makers faced 
the sensitive issue of how best to manage the dictator's eco- 
nomic policy, which by stressing a one-crop economy repre- 
sented more of a drain on national finances than a catalyst to 
development. These contradictions played themselves out 
within the CEA, an entrenched, politicized, and inefficient par- 
as tatal. 

The role of sugar changed markedly in the 1980s as external 
conditions forced the national economy to diversify. Sugar 
prices had reached unprecedented highs in 1975 and again in 
1979. The international recession of the early 1980s, however, 
pushed prices to their lowest level in forty years. Lower world 
prices hurt the Dominican economy, but the reduction of sales 
to the United States market, as a result of quota reductions that 
began in 1981, was even more costly because of the preferential 
price the United States paid under the quota system. The inter- 
national market continued to be unpromising in the late 
1990s. The market was glutted by overproduction, caused prin- 
cipally by European beet growers; major soft-drink manufactur- 
ers also began to turn to high-fructose corn sweeteners and 
away from cane sugar. 

In the late 1980s, the CEA controlled 60 percent of the 
nation's sugar output through the ownership of 75 percent of 
the country's major sugar mills. These mills included the larg- 
est and best equipped, the Haina mill. The CEA also owned 
233,000 hectares of land. However, the state-owned enterprise 
was operating at a loss and became so heavily indebted that it 
began selling off land for industrial free zones and tourism 
development projects. Its output fell below the production rate 
of the two major privately owned companies, Casa Vicini and 
the Central Romana Corporation. 

The CEA's production has continued to decline steadily in 
the 1990s, dropping from 311,000 tons in 1993 to 271,533 tons 
in 1994 to 224,448 tons in 1995, to an all-time low of 196,826 
tons in 1996. The long-term declining productivity of the CEA, 
which was scheduled for privatization in 1999, was compen- 
sated for by privately owned mills. For example, Central 
Romana reported record production of 370,000 tons in 1993 
and 344,700 tons in 1996 (only figures available). The coun- 
try's total sugar output in 1997, for example, was sufficient to 
enable it to meet its United States preferential import quota 
(see table 7, Appendix). This quota system, of which the 
Dominican Republic is the largest beneficiary, provides a pref- 



132 



Dominican Republic: The Economy 



erential market for more than half of Dominican sugar exports 
and creates a cushion against slumps in world sugar prices. 

Coffee, the second leading cash crop, continues to be sub- 
ject to varying market conditions in the 1990s. Introduced as 
early as 1715, coffee continues to be a leading crop among 
small hillside farmers. In 1993 the area of coffee production 
was estimated at 85,000 hectares, whereas in the late 1980s it 
had covered 152,000 hectares over various mountain ranges. 
Coffee farming, like sugar growing, is seasonal and entails a 
labor-intensive harvest involving as many as 250,000 workers, 
some of whom are Haitians. The preponderance of small hold- 
ings among Dominican coffee farmers, however, has caused 
the coffee industry to be inefficient, and yields fall far below 
the island's potential. Production of coffee fluctuates with 
world prices. The trend in the 1990s was one of declining 
prices. As a result, low prices on the world market dramatically 
reduced production from 1.2 million sixty-kilogram bags in 
1987-88 to less than half that amount — 545,000 bags — in 
1993-94. Export earnings for the latter period amounted only 
to US$28 million, whereas the earnings for the 1994 calendar 
year reached US$62.7 million, the highest figure since 1989. 
Exports reached the US$81 million mark in 1995 but fell back 
to US$65 million in 1996, mainly because of lower interna- 
tional prices. 

Another factor that has influenced production is vulnerabil- 
ity of the coffee bushes to the hurricanes that periodically rav- 
age the island, such as Hurricane Georges in September 1998. 
Furthermore, the Dominican coffee industry faces interna- 
tional problems that result mainly from the failure of the Inter- 
national Coffee Organization (ICO) to agree on quotas 
through its International Coffee Agreement (ICA). Although 
Dominicans consume much of their own coffee, they have 
increasingly been forced to find new foreign markets because 
of the ICO's difficulties. As is true of many Dominican com- 
modities, middlemen often smuggle coffee into Haiti for re- 
export overseas. 

Cocoa constitutes another principal cash crop, occasionally 
surpassing coffee as a source of export revenue. The Domini- 
can cocoa industry emerged in the 1880s as a competing peas- 
ant crop, when tobacco underwent a steep price decline. 
Although overshadowed by sugar, cocoa agriculture enjoyed 
slow, but steady, growth until a period of rapid expansion in the 
1970s. In response to higher world prices, the area covered 



133 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

with cacao trees rose from 65,000 hectares in 1971 to 117,000 
hectares by 1980. Small farmers cultivate the most cocoa, pro- 
ducing some 40,000 tons of cocoa on approximately 134,000 
hectares in 1987. This crop was enough to make the Domini- 
can Republic the largest producer of cocoa in the Caribbean. 

Cocoa production declined in the early 1990s, reaching 
49,000 tons in 1991, but it recovered to a peak of approxi- 
mately 67,000 tons in 1996. However, the crop was a casualty of 
the 1997 drought, which resulted in a loss of more than 17.5 
percent. The 1987 level of US$66 million in exports also was 
reduced to a low point of US$35 million in 1991 before recov- 
ering to US$60 million in 1995. Higher cocoa prices on inter- 
national markets raised export earnings to US$65 million in 
1996. 

Tobacco enjoyed a renaissance in the 1960s, with the intro- 
duction of new varieties and an increase in prices. Sales reve- 
nues peaked in 1978, but they declined considerably in the 
1980s and 1990s because of lower prices, disease, and inade- 
quate marketing. Black tobacco of the "dark air-cured and sun- 
cured" variety is manufactured into cigars for export. Numer- 
ous companies participate in the export of black tobacco. A 
growing number of cigar companies operate out of the coun- 
try's burgeoning free zones. 

Declining prices and structural changes in the international 
market for the Dominican Republic's traditional cash crops of 
sugar, coffee, cocoa, and tobacco forced the government to 
consider opportunities for nontraditional agricultural exports 
during the 1980s and 1990s. This new emphasis on nontradi- 
tional exports coincided with the implementation of the Carib- 
bean Basin Initiative (CBI), which afforded the country 
reduced-tariff access to the United States market. The main 
categories of nontraditional exports promoted by the govern- 
ment included ornamental plants, winter vegetables (vegeta- 
bles not grown in the United States during winter months), 
citrus, tropical fruits, spices, nuts, and certain types of produce 
popular among the growing Hispanic and Caribbean popula- 
tions in the United States. However, new investments in agri- 
business during the 1980s and 1990s were less successful than 
anticipated, particularly in comparison to the dramatic success 
of assembly manufacturing and tourism. Nonetheless, officials 
apparently succeeded in broadening the options of farmers 
and investors from a few crops to a diverse range of products. 
The government spearheaded agricultural diversification 



134 




135 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

through an export promotion agency, the Dominican Center 
for the Promotion of Exports (Centro Dominicano de Pro- 
mocion de Exportaciones — Cedopex), and through coopera- 
tion with a nongovernmental organization, the Joint 
Agricultural Consultative Committee, which promotes agribusi- 
ness investment in the republic. By the 1990s, some success had 
been achieved with citrus and pineapples, but quicker growth 
in nontraditional agricultural exports was hindered by the slow 
pace of the CEA's diversification program, which had sched- 
uled portions of the fertile sugar plains for conversion to non- 
traditional crop production. 

As part of the national dish of rice and beans, rice was a 
major Dominican food crop in the late 1980s and 1990s. Rice 
production expanded significantly in the post-Trujillo era, and 
by late 1979 the country had achieved self-sufficiency for the 
first time. Rice production, however, waned in the 1980s and 
1990s, forcing renewed imports. 

The annual harvest of paddy rice reached 566,000 tons in 
1992 but fell to 533,000 tons in 1994. Declines in production 
were related to a series of economic factors. Rice subsidies to 
the urban poor, who had less than two kilograms of rice a week 
as part of Inespre's food basket, or canasta popular, were gener- 
ally at odds with the goal of increased output. Apart from such 
subsidies, the cost of rice was more than twice that on the world 
market. The government's land reform measures also may have 
had a negative impact on rice yields; IAD's rice holdings, which 
accounted for 40 percent of the nation's rice, were noticeably 
less productive than private rice holdings. In the late 1980s, the 
government continued to involve itself extensively in the indus- 
try by supplying irrigation systems to more than 50 percent of 
rice farmers as well as technical support through the Rice 
Research Center in Juma, near Bonao. The government also 
moved to increase the efficiency of local distribution in 1987; it 
transferred rice marketing operations from Inespre to the Agri- 
cultural Bank of the Dominican Republic (Banco Agricola de 
la Republica Dominicana — Bagricola) and then to the private 
sector. 

The other principal grains and cereals consumed in the 
Dominican Republic include corn, sorghum, and imported 
wheat. Corn, native to the island, performed better than many 
food crops in the 1980s and 1990s because of the robust growth 
of the poultry industry, which used 95 percent of the corn crop 
as animal feed. The strong demand for feed notwithstanding, 



136 



Dominican Republic: The Economy 



Inespre's low prices for corn and other distortions in the local 
market caused by donated food from foreign sources 
decreased incentives for farmers and reduced output during 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. The cultivation of sorghum, a 
drought-resistant crop also used as a feed, expanded rapidly in 
the 1980s because of sorghum's suitability as a rotation crop on 
winter vegetable farms and as a new crop on newly idle cane 
fields. 

Wheat is another increasingly important cereal because 
Dominicans are consuming ever-greater quantities of the com- 
modity, donated primarily by the United States and France. 
The government is reluctant to interfere with Dominicans' 
preference for the heavily subsidized wheat over local cereals 
for fear of violent protests by poorer consumers. 

Other major crops include starchy staples such as plantains 
and an assortment of tubers. Because of their abundance, 
sweet taste, and low cost, Dominicans consume large quantities 
of plantains, usually fried. Beans, a dietary staple and the chief 
source of protein for many Dominicans, are grown throughout 
the countryside. 

Dominicans also grow cash crops that include an assortment 
of fruits and vegetables. In recent years, farmers, encouraged 
by the CEA, have diversified into such new crops as bananas, 
tomatoes, flowers, pineapples, and oranges. Citrus production 
became a growth industry in the late 1990s when it expanded 
its marketing to Europe and North America; its sales had been 
limited to the Caribbean market in the early 1990s. Similarly, 
banana production for export, which started only in 1990, 
totaled more than 104,160 tons in 1994 and shot up to 361,000 
tons in 1996. Exports of fresh pineapple amounted to 65,000 
tons in 1993, earning approximately US$13 million. The Euro- 
pean Union, which had allotted the Dominican Republic a 
quota of 55,000 tons for 1995, almost doubled that amount in 
1996. 

Livestock 

The raising of livestock, the basis of the economy during 
colonial times, continued to be a common practice in the 
1990s, despite the country's warm climate and hilly interior. 
The predominant livestock on the island are beef and dairy cat- 
tle, chickens, and pigs. The country is essentially self-sufficient 
in its production of basic meat. Cattle-raising was still the pri- 
mary livestock activity in the mid-1990s, and the Dominican 



137 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

stock contained 2.4 million head of cattle, up from 2 million 
head in the late 1980s. The great majority of the cattle were 
beef cattle, raised on medium-to-large ranches in the east. 

The country also contains an undetermined, but dwindling, 
number of dairy cows. The decline in numbers of dairy cows 
because of large-scale slaughter of breeding cattle resulted 
from years of low government prices for milk. Implemented in 
an effort to keep consumer milk prices low, this policy had the 
unintended effect of dramatically increased milk imports. 

The poultry industry, in contrast to the dairy industry, 
enjoyed strong growth in the 1980s. In the mid-1990s, the 
country had some 33 million chickens. A few large producers 
supplied the nation with 90,000 tons of broilers a year and with 
hundreds of millions of eggs. The pork industry had also 
rebounded by the mid-1980s, after suffering the virtual eradica- 
tion of its stock from 1978 to 1982 because of an epidemic of 
African swine fever. Afterward, the Dominican Republic estab- 
lished an increasingly modern and well-organized pork indus- 
try. 

By the mid-1990s, the number of pigs was estimated at 
850,000. However, an attack of cholera in the late 1990s 
affected the national pig stock. In addition, Dominican live- 
stock in the mid-1990s included some 574,000 goats. Livestock 
accounted for 5.2 percent of GDP in 1996, compared with 4.9 
percent in 1991. 

Forestry and Fishing 

Pine, hardwood, and other tree cover, once ample, covered 
only 15 percent of the land by the beginning of the 1990s. To 
offset losses caused by the indiscriminate felling of trees and 
the prevalence of slash-and-burn agriculture, the government 
outlawed commercial tree cutting in 1967. Since then, limited 
development of commercial plantation forestry has occurred, 
but the nation continues to import more than US$30 million 
in wood products each year. Although not so drastic as in Haiti, 
deforestation and the erosion that it causes pose serious envi- 
ronmental concerns for the country's watersheds into the 
1990s and beyond (see Land Use, this ch.). The limited 
amount of land occupied by forest and woodland (0.6 million 
hectares) continued to be steadily reduced in the late 1990s. 

The fishing industry continued to be underdeveloped into 
the 1990s. It consists of only small coastal fishermen using 
small boats lacking refrigeration, who barely exploit the 1,400 



138 



Dominican Republic: The Economy 



kilometers of coastline. Fish production contributes little to the 
country's GDP (0.4 percent in 1994). In the late 1990s, the 
catch averaged about 22,000 tons per year. 

Industry 

Manufacturing 

This sector consists of traditional or domestic manufacturing 
as well as assembly operations in free zones. One of the most 
important factors in accelerating the industrialization and 
diversification of the Dominican Republic's economy in the 
1990s, manufacturing contributed 18.3 percent of GDP in 
1998. 

Traditional Manufacturing 

During the Trujillo era, manufacturing grew more slowly 
than in other Latin American and Caribbean countries because 
of the dictatorship's disproportionate emphasis on sugar pro- 
duction. After the Balaguer government introduced the Indus- 
trial Incentive Law (Law 299) in 1968, domestic manufacturers 
for the first time received substantial tariff protection from for- 
eign competition. Although these incentives stimulated an 
array of domestic industries, created jobs, and helped diversify 
the country's industrial base, Dominican industries tended to 
be heavily dependent on foreign input and proved to be ineffi- 
cient and unable to compete internationally. In 1990 the gov- 
ernment decided to drastically reduce the rates of import 
tariffs; all incentives provided for in Law 299 were eliminated 
in 1992. High interest rates caused the performance of the 
domestic industry subsector to contract in 1994 and 1995 so 
that it was growing at rates substantially below the national 
average of manufacturing. Consequently, the GDP share of 
domestic manufacturing, including sugar processing, declined 
from 16.6 percent in 1992 to 13.4 percent in 1997. 

A reversal of the decline occurred, however, in 1998, mainly 
because the pressures of external competition, especially from 
Mexico, encouraged investment in modernizing plants. The 
manufacturing industry experienced a strong growth of 7.4 
percent in the first half of 1998 in spite of a 13 percent drop in 
sugar production caused by the 1997 drought. The subsector of 
domestic manufacturing, which includes mostly consumer 
goods, food, and cigar production, grew by 10.1 percent in the 
first half of 1998. The growth may have resulted partially from a 



139 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

dramatic increase in the demand for Dominican cigars; the 
Dominican Republic is the leading supplier to the United 
States, where cigar smoking was on the rise in the late 1990s. 

Free-Zone Manufacturing 

No economic process was more dynamic in the Dominican 
Republic during the 1980s than the rapid growth of free zones. 
Although the government established the legal framework for 
free zones in 1955, it was not until 1969 that the Gulf and West- 
ern Corporation opened the country's first such zone in La 
Romana. Free-zone development, which had progressed mod- 
estly in the 1970s, accelerated rapidly during the 1980s as a 
result of domestic incentives, such as Free-Zone Law 145 of 
1983 and the United States CBI of 1984. Free-Zone Law 145, a 
special provision of the Industrial Incentive Law, offered liberal 
incentives for free-zone investment, including total exemption 
from import duties, income taxes, and other taxes for up to 
twenty years. By the close of the 1980s, the results of free-zone 
development were dramatically clear. From 1985 to 1989, the 
number of free zones had more than doubled, from six to fif- 
teen; employment had jumped from 36,000 to nearly 100,000. 
The number of companies operating in free zones had 
increased from 146 to more than 220. 

The trend was similar in the 1990s. Industrial free zones 
numbered thirty-three by the end of 1995 and employed 
approximately 165,000 workers in 469 companies. Those num- 
bers remained at the same level at the end of 1996, but the 
number of firms operating in free zones stood at 434. The drop 
was attributed to keen competition from Mexico over United 
States markets. However, more than sixty applications for the 
establishment of new free-zone companies were approved in 
1997. Although free-zone manufacturing contributes little to 
the country's GDP (3.4 percent in 1996 and 3.5 percent in 
1997), it employs a significant portion of the industrial labor 
force (165,000 and 172,000 out of some 500,000 in 1996 and 

1997, respectively). Moreover, free-zone manufacturing has 
been the major element in the growth of manufacturing since 
the last half of 1997 and grew by 8.3 percent in the first half of 

1998. These factors may explain the creation within the Secre- 
tariat of State for Industry and Commerce of a special office for 
the development of free zones, the National Council for Free 
Zones (Consejo Nacional de Zonas Francas — CNZF). Also, 
free-zone exports generate badly needed foreign exchange: 



140 



Worker in textile mill 
Courtesy Inter-American 
Development Bank 




US$2 billion in 1996 and US$3.8 billion in 1997— almost 75 
percent of the island's total export earnings. 

The Dominican Republic's free zones vary widely in terms of 
size, ownership, production methods, and location. The size of 
free zones ranges from only a few hectares to more than 100 
hectares, with most located in the south and southeast. At least 
70 percent of the free-zone companies produce garments, 
while others produce footwear, leather goods, electrical and 
electronic items, and cigars. 

Mining 

The mining industry enjoyed extraordinary growth in the 
1970s, when the country's major ferronickel and dore (gold and 
silver nugget) operations were inaugurated. The contribution 
of mining to GDP rose from 1.5 percent in 1970 to 5.3 percent 
by 1980, where it remained until the late 1980s. Although the 
mining sector employed only about 1 percent of the labor 
force throughout this period, it became a major foreign- 
exchange earner in the 1980s. 

Gold and silver dore, which occur naturally in the Dominican 
Republic, played a critical role in the rapid emergence of min- 



141 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

ing. Although the Spanish mined gold on the island as early as 
the 1520s, gold production in the Dominican Republic was 
insignificant until 1975, when the private firm Rosario Domini- 
cano opened the Pueblo Viejo mine, the largest open-pit gold 
mine in the Western Hemisphere, on the north side of the 
island. In October 1979, the Dominican government, the 
owner of 46 percent of the shares of Rosario Dominicano, pur- 
chased the remaining equity from Rosario Resources, a New 
York-based company, thereby creating the largest Dominican- 
owned company in the country. Rosario's huge mining infra- 
structure, with an annual capacity of 1.7 million troy ounces of 
gold and silver, impelled by rapidly increasing international 
prices for gold, had nearly succeeded in pushing dore past sugar 
as the country's leading source of export revenue by 1980. 
From 1975 to 1980, gold and silver skyrocketed from percent 
of exports to 27 percent. Declining prices for gold and silver 
during the 1980s, however, curtailed the extraordinary growth 
trend of the 1970s. 

Production from the Rosario Pueblo Viejo gold and silver 
mine declined further as reserves in the oxide zone were being 
depleted. In 1992 gold production was down to 72,000 troy 
ounces (from a high of 412,990 troy ounces in 1981). The com- 
pany suspended mining in March 1993, laying off 70 percent of 
its 1,300 employees. The average cost of production of gold in 
1991 and 1992 was US$535 per ounce, compared with a selling 
price of US$352. Revenue from gold and silver exports, which 
had peaked at US$259.9 million in 1980, continued to 
decline — except for a brief recovery in 1987 — until it reached a 
low of US$4.1 million in 1993. At that time, heavy losses caused 
by low export prices forced the company to suspend produc- 
tion for months. When Rosario suspended operations, it was in 
debt for more than US$90 million. However, the mine 
reopened in mid-1994 after renovation work financed by a for- 
eign bank loan of US$20 million was completed. The reopen- 
ing brought the year's exports up to US$19 million and 
increased them to US$44 million in 1995. Although gold and 
silver production in 1996 exceeded 117,625 troy ounces and 
547,220 troy ounces, respectively, increasing export earnings to 
US$49 million, Rosario operations remained unprofitable (see 
table 8, Appendix). As of the late 1990s, the company contin- 
ued to seek more foreign investment to allow mining in the 
lower sulfide zone. 



142 



Dominican Republic: The Economy 



Nickel is another Dominican export that contributed to the 
mining prosperity of the 1970s. From 1918 to 1956, the United 
States Geological Survey performed a series of mineral studies 
in the country. These studies encouraged the Canadian firm 
Falconbridge of Toronto to undertake its own nickel testing 
starting at the end of that period. Falconbridge successfully 
opened a pilot nickel plant in 1968, and by 1972 the company 
had begun full-scale ferronickel mining in the town of Bonao. 
In the late 1980s, the Bonao ferronickel mine was the second 
largest in the world. Buoyed by high international prices, 
nickel exports rose from 11 percent of total exports in 1975 to 
14 percent by 1979. Although nickel exports, as a percentage 
of total exports, continued to climb in the 1980s, reaching 16 
percent by 1987, lower world prices for nickel and a lengthy 
dispute between the government and Falconbridge over tax 
payments hampered output throughout the decade. 

Nonetheless, nickel remains one of the Dominican Repub- 
lic's main traditional exports, generating between US$220 mil- 
lion and US$240 million a year in the late 1990s. Low export 
prices, however, compelled Falconbridge Dominicana, which is 
majority-owned by the Toronto company, to suspend produc- 
tion for three months in 1993, reducing output to approxi- 
mately 13,445 tons in that year. Production rose steadily 
thereafter, reaching 33,000 tons in 1997. Falconbridge Domini- 
cana experienced difficulties that resulted in a 6.8 percent fall 
in nickel output in 1998 and caused the company to suspend 
operations during the last three months of 1998 because of low 
international prices. The firm indicated, however, that it would 
use the time to revamp and upgrade plant facilities. The combi- 
nation of gold, silver, and nickel has made the Dominican 
Republic's mining sector the largest export earner, with the 
exception of the free zones, since the 1980s. 

Construction 

The construction industry had a major effect on the econ- 
omy during the 1970s and the 1980s because government- 
funded public works provided thousands of jobs and improved 
the physical infrastructure. Construction activity boomed in 
the early 1970s, increasing at a rate of 16 percent annually from 
1970 to 1975, faster than any other sector during that period, 
with the exception of mining. Public-works projects such as 
dams, roads, bridges, hospitals, low-income housing, and 
schools transformed the national infrastructure during the 



143 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

1970s. The sector's rapid growth continued in the 1980s, but it 
was very uneven because of fluctuations in annual government 
spending. Private-sector construction, particularly of free-zone 
facilities and hotels, also boosted industry performance. 

Construction firms, like many other Dominican businesses, 
rely heavily on personal contacts. For example, in the late 
1980s the government awarded only about 15 percent of its 
construction contracts through a competitive bidding process. 
Government authorities, up to and including the president, 
negotiated or offered the remaining contracts as if they were 
personal spoils. The Balaguer administration's emphasis on 
construction in the late 1980s focused primarily on renovations 
in Santo Domingo. Projects included the construction of muse- 
ums, a lighthouse, and a new suburb, all in preparation for 
1992's observance of the 500th anniversary of Columbus's 
arrival in the New World. 

The construction sector is generally self-sufficient; less than 
33 percent of all construction material is imported. Domesti- 
cally produced items include tiles, cables, gravel, sand, clay, 
piping, metals, paint, and cement. The rapid expansion of 
activity during the 1980s caused a serious shortage of cement 
that slowed the progress of some projects. The Dominican gov- 
ernment built cement factories in Santiago and San Pedro de 
Macoris in 1977, in joint ventures with private investors, to 
complement its major plant in Santo Domingo. The new capac- 
ity quickly became insufficient, and the country was forced to 
begin importing cement by the mid-1980s. By the late 1980s, 
cement factories were operating at full capacity, a rarity among 
developing countries such as the Dominican Republic. The 
construction sector is a major employer of unskilled labor. 

Although the construction sector's growth in the first half of 
the 1980s was uneven, it registered an impressive average 
annual growth of 18 percent in the last three years of the 
decade. The earlier growth spurt was the result of a rise in tour- 
ist-related projects, but the industry's stronger showing in 1989 
was the result of an extensive public works program involving 
construction of public housing, a hydroelectric project, and an 
aqueduct for Santo Domingo. After contracting by 6.9 percent 
in 1990 and by 12.5 percent in 1991, the construction sector 
grew by 24.4 percent in 1992. The industry's growth rate fluctu- 
ations were determined by such factors as how much public 
spending was being devoted to infrastructure or how many 
rooms were being added by the tourism sector. Construction 



144 



Dominican Republic: The Economy 



growth dropped back to 10.1 percent in 1993, 6.6 percent in 
1994, and 5.7 percent in 1995 before jumping to 13 percent in 
1996 and 17.1 percent in 1997, accounting for 10 percent of 
GDP in contrast to nearly 9 percent of GDP in 1987. The 
upswing resulted mainly from a sharp increase in spending on 
public works (about 3 percent of GDP), road construction, and 
large investments in the energy sector. In 1998 construction 
growth slowed from 10.9 percent in the first quarter to 6.2 per- 
cent for the first half as a whole. The boom in private construc- 
tion during the third quarter of 1998 slowed as a result of a 
decrease in private investment and because of the high interest 
rates set in 1997 to support the peso. The drop is reflected in a 
26.6 percent decrease in new construction permits. 

Energy 

An oil-importing country, the Dominican Republic has been 
impeded in its development efforts by the cost and scarcity of 
energy, especially when its import bill for petroleum multiplied 
tenfold in absolute terms during the 1970s. Although oil prices 
eased during the 1980s, the island faced a new energy crisis as a 
result of a critical shortage of electrical-generating capacity. 
Inadequate supplies of electricity resulted by the late 1980s in 
frequent power outages, frustrated consumers, and disrupted 
production activities. 

The country's aggregate consumption of energy is low, even 
by Latin American standards. However, the Dominican Repub- 
lic's narrow domestic energy resource base satisfies barely half 
the nation's energy demand, and the country continues to 
depend on imported crude oil and related petroleum prod- 
ucts. The potential supply of hydropower, the most promising 
resource, is estimated at 1,800 megawatts (MW), but less than a 
quarter of that amount was being tapped in the late 1990s. 
Wood and charcoal use is constrained by the small size of the 
country's remaining forests. Biomass, mostly bagasse from sug- 
arcane residue, is getting more use but has limited potential as 
a fuel. 

The country's energy problems continued well into the 
1990s. The electricity-generating operations of the Dominican 
Electricity Corporation (Corporacion Dominicana de Electri- 
cidad — CDE) were severely deficient during most of the period 
from 1990 to 1996. Production fell to about one-half of peak 
demand in 1990 and 1991. By mid-1996, output was below 800 
MW, compared with a peak demand of 1,200 MW. The prob- 



145 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

lem was attributed to the frequent withdrawal from service for 
repair of antiquated generating units. Low hydroelectric pro- 
duction was also caused by an inefficient distribution system 
that resulted in one-half of the electricity produced being lost 
in transmission or through illegal connections. The CDE's 
losses were running at RD$200 million (some US$25.4 million) 
a month in 1996, and total debt had risen to RD$1,800 million 
(some US$138.5 million) by the end of the year. 

Although power cuts and shortages continued into the mid- 
1990s, an electricity overhaul program financed by a US$148 
million loan from the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) and a US$105 million loan from the World Bank gener- 
ated enough electricity to meet a demand for 1,250 MW by 
1997. Privately operated power stations, including the 185-MW 
Smith-Enron station in Puerto Plata and the 220-MW Destec 
gas turbine at Los Minas, accounted for approximately half of 
total power generation. 

Legislation was introduced in 1997 to privatize the CDE, and 
by mid-1998 the state-owned enterprise's generating and distri- 
bution operations were being restructured (see Economic Poli- 
cies, this ch.). Transmission systems are to remain in public 
ownership, however. After years of neglect resulting from the 
lack of public investment by previous administrations, the 
CDE's installed capacity was estimated at 1,600 MW in late 
1997. However, it was operating at a maximum capacity of 
1,450 MW, 380 MW of which was hydroelectric. Private genera- 
tors, which supply the CDE, have an estimated capacity of 600- 
700 MW. 

The Dominican Republic has been developing its hydroelec- 
tric capacity, but imported oil continues to account for 85 per- 
cent of its energy sources. Oil imports amount to about 
100,000 barrels a day, accounting for 20 percent of total import 
spending in 1997. Mexico and Venezuela have been the island 
country's traditional suppliers under the San Jose agreement, 
which allows 20 percent of the cost to be converted into soft 
loans. Both countries agreed in 1997 to more than triple their 
deliveries to the Dominican Republic — from 14,500 barrels a 
day to 45,000 barrels a day. 

Services 
Transportation 

The Dominican Republic's relatively advanced transporta- 
tion infrastructure, which had experienced sustained expan- 



146 



The Tavera Dam 
Courtesy Inter-American Development Bank 

sion since the 1950s, has been growing at a much faster rate 
since the late 1980s because of the booming tourist industry 
(see fig. 4) . Roads are the most common medium of travel, and 
the national road network, which in the late 1990s totals more 
than 17,200 kilometers, is considered extensive by Caribbean 
standards. However, most roadways are narrow and flood easily. 
Moreover, 80 percent of all feeder roads had completely deteri- 
orated by the mid-1980s because of lack of funding for badly 
needed maintenance and repair work. In the mid-1980s, 
steadily worsening road conditions prompted the World Bank 
and the Inter-American Development Bank to finance a pro- 
gram to develop better maintenance systems. However, Domin- 
ican road conditions remained poor well into the early 1990s. 
It was not until the late 1990s that a major road construction 
program was undertaken to develop intercity routes and urban 
projects in Santo Domingo. More than 470,700 vehicles were in 
use in 1997, including some 266,100 private cars and 133,610 
trucks — compared with 405,000 in 1996 and about 242,000 in 
1991. 

In 1997 the Dominican Republic boasted a 1,600-kilometer 
railroad system, one of the longest in the Caribbean, compared 
with 325 kilometers in the mid-1980s. Although the CEA owns 
a substantial portion of the country's railroad system, several 



147 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

private rail companies serve the sugar industry, the largest of 
which is the Central Romana. 

Of the fourteen seaports in the Dominican Republic, only 
five are considered major ports. Santo Domingo is the largest, 
handling about 80 percent of imports. The other three on the 
south coast are Haina, Boca Chica, and San Pedro de Macoris; 
the fifth major port is Puerto Plata on the north coast. In 1992 
the country had a merchant fleet of 12,000 gross registered 
tons. Containerized shipping is widely used, mainly originating 
in Miami and New York. Port facilities were expanded and a 
new breakwater was opened in 1997 at Haina, which handles 
about 65 percent of maritime cargo traffic. An enlarged cruise- 
liner berth at Santo Domingo has made it one of the region's 
major berths for cruise ships. In 1998 the government granted 
a concession to a joint-venture company to build an even larger 
port to be used by the free-zone enterprises. 

The Dominican Republic has five international airports: 
Santo Domingo, Puerto Plata, Punta Cana, La Romana, and 
Barahona. A sixth airport was under construction at Samana in 
1998. Puerto Plata and Punta Cana are the main airports for 
charter flights; Las Americas in Santo Domingo is the airport 
for scheduled flights. The government announced in Septem- 
ber 1998 that for the first time it would grant concessions to 
upgrade and operate the international airports at Santo Dom- 
ingo, Puerto Plata, Barahona, and Samana. Thereby it hoped 
to reduce maintenance costs by RD$230 million annually and 
also shift much of the needed investment to private firms. The 
government intends to draft similar plans for the country's 
ports. Passenger arrivals on scheduled flights exceeded 1.45 
million in 1995, compared with 632,000 on charter flights. 
American Airlines is the dominant carrier, with a market share 
of more than 50 percent on routes to many United States cities, 
but mostly Miami and New York. 

Communications 

One of the most modern and dynamic sectors of the Domin- 
ican economy is the telecommunications industry, which sur- 
passes its counterparts in most Latin American and Caribbean 
nations in terms of technology. Telecommunications services, 
however, tend to be concentrated in urban areas. The govern- 
ment opened the telecommunications sector to competition in 
1990. Since then it has become the fastest-growing element in 



148 



Dominican Republic: The Economy 



the economy, doubling its share of GDP to 4.6 percent. In the 
first half of 1998, the industry grew by 20.8 percent. 

The most impressive and technologically advanced compo- 
nent of the nation's telecommunications network is its tele- 
phone system. The Dominican Telephone Company (Com- 
pariia Dominicana de Telefonos — Codetel), a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the United States company GTE, operates 
approximately 90 percent of the 250,000-unit national tele- 
phone system under the regulatory authority of the General 
Directorate for Telecommunications of the Secretariat of State 
for Public Works and Communications. Some of the advanced 
features of the system include direct domestic and interna- 
tional dialing, toll-free access to the United States through 
"800" numbers, incoming toll-free service or WATS, high-speed 
data transmission capabilities, fiber-optic cables, digital switch- 
ing, and a full range of services usually available to consumers 
in the United States. In 1987 the Dominican Republic became 
the second Latin American country to boast cellular mobile 
telephones; it was the only developing country in the hemi- 
sphere to offer this service to the public on a national basis. 
Codetel and other companies also offer telex, electronic mail, 
telenet, and facsimile services to the public. A member of the 
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization 
(Intelsat) , the Dominican Republic possesses a satellite earth 
station, a submarine cable to the United States Virgin Islands, 
and microwave stations. In 1989 a fiber-optic cable to Puerto 
Rico was completed to expedite sophisticated data transmission 
to the United States. 

Codetel invested about US$500 million in the first half of 
the 1990s to upgrade its systems; by the late 1990s, it had more 
than 3,000 international and 500,000 domestic lines in use not 
only in Santo Domingo but across much of the country. Code- 
tel accounted for almost 95 percent of the market. Codetel also 
signed an agreement in late 1997 with Northern Telecom of 
Canada for further modernization of its systems. Its most 
aggressive competition for the Dominican market by the close 
of the 1990s was expected to come from a United States com- 
pany, Tricom, which is 40 percent owned by Motorola and 
which has embarked on a five-year US$200-million expansion 
plan. 

Tourism 

The Dominican tourist industry grew tremendously during 
the 1970s and the 1980s and continued to do so in the 1990s — 



149 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



International 
boundary 




Figure 4. Dominican Republic: Transportation System, 1999 

thanks to the passage in 1971 of the Tourist Incentive Law, 
which provided investors in tourism a ten-year tax holiday and 
an exemption from tariffs on imports not available locally. In 
1979 the director of tourism was elevated to cabinet level, a fur- 
ther indication of official interest in and commitment to pro- 
moting the industry's growth. Besides its 1,400-kilometer 
coastline, one-third of which consists of beaches, the island also 
offers numerous appeals to tourists. Such attractions include 
the republic's inexpensive tourist accommodations and liberal 
divorce laws. 

The number of tourists visiting the Dominican Republic 
almost tripled in ten years, increasing from 278,000 in 1975 to 
792,000 in 1985. By 1987 the number of vacationers surpassed 
1 million for the first time, and by 1997 the Dominican Repub- 
lic was the second largest earner of tourism dollars in the Car- 
ibbean, behind Mexico. The country's foreign-exchange 



150 



Dominican Republic: The Economy 



earnings from tourism also multiplied dramatically, increasing 
from US$430 million in 1986 to US$2.1 billion in 1997. 

The tourist industry employed approximately 44,000 hotel 
workers in 1995; an additional 110,000 were indirectly 
employed by the sector. The rapid growth of tourism also had 
an impact on other industries, such as construction, transporta- 
tion, and commerce as well as hotels, bars, and restaurants. 
The number of stopover tourists increased dramatically from 
some 850,000 in 1986 to 1,766,800 in 1994 to 1,930,000 in 1996 
to 2,211,000 in 1997 (see table 9, Appendix). Most growth 
came from Europe, which provided about 58 percent of stop- 
over tourists in 1997, compared with 9 percent from Canada 
and 23 percent from the United States. Each year during the 
1980s, the United States had accounted for more than 50 per- 
cent of visitors. Stopover tourists usually stay at large hotels 
owned or managed by international chains from Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the United States, and Spain. The latter country 
accounts for 37 percent of Dominican hotel beds. The total 
number of hotel rooms available in the country was close to 
40,000 in 1998, with approximately 13,000 in Puerto Plata, the 
island's leading resort on the north coast. Other resorts fre- 
quented by foreign tourists include Bavaro, El Cortecito, 
Higiiey, and Punta Cana on the east coast. 

Fortunately, the damage from Hurricane Georges in Sep- 
tember 1998 affected only 5 percent of hotel rooms; the institu- 
tions affected were expected to be back in operation by 
December 1998. Although the number of visiting tourists con- 
tinues to rise — by 15.3 percent in the first half of 1998 — they 
are staying for shorter periods. This fact, combined with the 
construction of more hotel rooms, has led to lower hotel occu- 
pancy rates. 

Foreign Economic Relations 

Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments 

Trade deficits continued to plague the Dominican Republic 
during the 1990s. The Dominican trade deficit exceeded 
US$2.7 billion in 1997 (see table 10, Appendix). The latest fig- 
ures available (preliminary figures) from the Central Bank 
(BCRD) indicate that the trade deficit in the first half of 1998 
was US$945 million. The sharp decline in world commodity 
prices triggered by the Asian currency crisis of 1997 undoubt- 
edly had a strong negative impact on the Dominican Republic's 



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Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

trade deficit. Exports of one of the country's major earners of 
foreign exchange, nickel, suffered a price drop of 27 percent 
in the first half of 1998. As a result, nickel exports fell 38.4 per- 
cent in 1998. Exports of coffee were adversely affected by a 10 
percent decline in international prices. However, the price 
decline was offset by a 46.1 percent increase in production, 
which enabled coffee exports to equal their 1997 value. The 
1997-98 coffee crop was one of the best in fifteen years, bring- 
ing in US$81 million from exports. Tobacco exports decreased 
27.4 percent during 1998. The value of cocoa exports, however, 
increased by 46.1 percent as a result of world price rises and a 
greater volume of exports. The export of sugar and sugar prod- 
ucts in 1998 decreased 29.6 percent as a result primarily of a 
24.0 percent cut in the Dominican international sugar quota. 
Exports of other lesser or nontraditional products increased 
7.2 percent in spite of a 20.3 percent decrease in fourth quar- 
ter production resulting from the damaging effects of Hurri- 
cane Georges. Thus, the overall decrease in value of national 
exports in 1998 was 12.7 percent that of 1997. 

Perhaps the silver lining in the Asian crisis was the deep 
plunge in oil prices since 1997, which reduced the Dominican 
Republic's fuel bill by approximately 20 percent to US$336 mil- 
lion in the first half of 1998. Total domestic imports in 1998 
amounted to US$7.6 billion, of which capital goods rose by 
51.3 percent, and consumer goods increased by 19.3 percent. 
The 15 percent increase in the value of imports over 1997 is 
attributable in part to the effects of Hurricane Georges. Free- 
zone exports increased 14.0 percent, earning 18.6 percent 
more in 1998 than in 1997, largely the outcome of new enter- 
prises opened in 1998. These factors kept the trade deficit from 
worsening. 

In a measure designed to facilitate trade and improve its bal- 
ance of payments, in August 1997, the Dominican Republic 
signed a trade agreement with the Caribbean Community and 
Common Market (Caricom — see Glossary). This agreement 
resembles the free-trade accord signed with the Central Ameri- 
can Common Market (CACM) in April 1997 and is subject to a 
successful conclusion of negotiations over exemptions and lib- 
eralization of capital and labor flows between the Dominican 
Republic and Caricom. The two agreements aim at establishing 
the Dominican Republic as a bridge for promoting trade links 
between the Caribbean and Central America. In the late 1990s, 
for example, Haiti bought more than 75 percent of Dominican 



152 



Unloading lumber, port of Haina 
Courtesy Inter-American Development Bank 

exports to the Caribbean. The agreements would also put the 
Dominican Republic in a favorable position to benefit from 
foreign investment generated by the special agreements that 
the CACM and Caricom maintain with the United States and 
the European Union (EU). 

In September 1998, Hurricane Georges cut a devastating 
path across the Dominican Republic, leaving about 300 per- 
sons dead, hundreds of thousands of homeless, and economic 
damage estimated at US$1.3 billion (8 percent of GDP). It 
severely damaged farming and livestock production, with total 
losses estimated at US$400 million during 1998-99. It also 
affected tourism and such key exports as sugar, coffee, cocoa, 
tobacco, and fruit. The government's preliminary damage 
assessments put the cost of repairs to basic public-sector infra- 
structure and low-income housing at more than US$400 mil- 
lion (2.5 percent of GDP). 

A month later, the IMF approved the government's request 
for financial assistance equivalent to one-fourth of the Domini- 
can Republic's special drawing rights (SDRs — see Glossary) 
quota, approximately US$56 million. The support of the 
Dominican government's economic adjustment program and 



153 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

associated rehabilitation efforts is part of the IMF policy on 
emergency assistance related to natural disasters. 

In their request for IMF assistance, the Dominican Secretary 
of State for Finance and the Governor of the Central Bank said 
their country's adjustment policies would press ahead with a 
structural reform agenda including trade liberalization, reduc- 
tion of inflation, pension reform, and legislation regarding tax 
and tariff reform. Also included was the conclusion of free- 
trade agreements with Central American and Caribbean coun- 
tries. The officials warned that the most significant effect on 
the balance of payments would come from a surge in imports 
related to the reconstruction effort, estimated at a total of 
US$700 million through 1999. They promised not to introduce 
or intensify existing trade restrictions for balance of payments 
purposes. Instead, they would seek to defray construction costs 
by such additional measures as cutting salaries of public-sector 
employees by 5 to 10 percent, increasing selective consumption 
taxes, and requesting extensions of payment periods from 
bilateral creditors. 

Foreign Assistance 

The Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, 
and the European Union are the major multilateral aid donors 
to the Dominican Republic. In spite of its contentious relation- 
ship with the island nation, the IMF also has been a significant 
contributor. The EU has been involved only since 1990, when 
the Dominican Republic acceded to the Lome Convention (see 
Glossary), making it eligible for EU assistance. The first proto- 
col of 1990-95 allotted it RDS 1,256 million, and the second 
protocol (1995-2000) increased its allocation to RD$ 1,565 mil- 
lion. 

The United States and Japan are the largest bilateral donors. 
Other important donors include Italy, Germany, and Canada. 
The level of United States assistance, which dates back to the 
early 1960s, has tended to fluctuate widely in response to eco- 
nomic and political trends. It reached US$99.7 million in 1966, 
one of the highest levels in the region, in the aftermath of the 
United States occupation (see table 11, Appendix). Aid levels 
dropped considerably in the 1970s, however, averaging only 
US$18.13 million a year from 1970 through 1979. The United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) aug- 
mented its program in the country during the 1980s until its 



154 



Dominican Republic: The Economy 



assistance level averaged US$81 million a year for the decade 
from 1980 through 1989. 

The 1990s brought a significant shift of emphasis in USAID's 
program priorities and strategic plans. USAID's heavy emphasis 
on development assistance in the 1980s gradually but consis- 
tently decreased over the years, dropping from a high of 
US$34.6 million in 1980 to US$18 million in 1990 to US$11 
million in 1997. For a number of years, development assistance 
was reinforced by substantial Economic Support Funds (ESF) 
and Public Law-480 (PL-480 — see Glossary) food aid pro- 
grams. It appeared that USAID concern over the Dominican 
Republic's overwhelming incidence of poverty, continuing lack 
of economic opportunity, and social injustice led the agency to 
reallocate its reduced funding toward support for social-sector 
activities. Health and education programs, for example, 
accounted for 67 percent of its 1996 resources. 

In outlining its five-year strategic plan for 1997-2000, USAID 
makes the point that "after years of keeping its distance from 
the government and implementing activities primarily through 
local NGOs (nongovernmental organizations)," one aim of its 
latest plan is to strengthen cooperative relations with the gov- 
ernment in order to address long-neglected social sectors and 
deal with poverty issues. The country's rampant poverty (the 
poorest 50 percent of the population receives less than 20 per- 
cent of total income, while the richest 10 percent receives 42 
percent) is caused and exacerbated by poor governance, social 
injustice, and extremely low social spending. Dominican public 
social investment is much lower than world and Latin Ameri- 
can averages. USAID success in working directly with NGOs 
seems to have encouraged other donors to turn to the same 
organizations to help fill gaps in public services such as health, 
family planning, and acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS) prevention. USAID's renewed cooperative relationship 
with such government agencies as the Secretariat of State for 
Public Health and Social Welfare and the Technical Secretariat 
of the Presidency and its Planning Office should strengthen its 
posture as a catalyst vis-a-vis other donors and result in better 
coordination. 

Outlook 

The disturbing aspect of the Dominican Republic's economy 
is that although its positive growth rate, especially in the 1990s 
after the sharp deterioration of the 1970s and 1980s, seems to 



155 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

be impressive, the economy leaves an observer with an uncom- 
fortable feeling about how uneven it is. When various sectors 
are viewed separately, several appear to be doing very well. 
Tourism comes to mind immediately, not only because of its 
spectacular growth but also because of its positive impact on 
other industries such as construction and commerce. Free- 
trade zones and telecommunications are other examples of 
Dominican success. The aggregate of the separate compo- 
nents, however, seems to be unrelated to a central theme and 
fails to add to a cohesive whole. Perhaps other economic sec- 
tors are hobbled by a corrupt political structure, an unjust 
social system, outmoded institutions, flawed policies, ineffi- 
cient state enterprises, or a much more basic societal malady 
such as poverty. 

The Foundation for Economics and Development (Fon- 
dacion Economia y Desarrollo — FED) , a nonprofit, private eco- 
nomic research institute, estimates that about 21 percent of 
Dominicans live in poverty, surviving on less than US$1 a day. 
More than 20 percent of the island's families lack the income 
required to meet standard nutritional requirements. Approxi- 
mately 65 percent of the population in rural areas lacks access 
to potable water and about 25 percent lacks electricity. Health, 
water supply, sanitation, education, and housing deficiencies 
affect a significant proportion of the population, with the 
result that the Dominican Republic trails all its neighbors in 
the region, with the exception of Haiti and Guyana. Histori- 
cally, the level of social spending has been one of the lowest in 
the hemisphere, and successive administrations have cut back 
appropriations to the poorest elements of the population. 
Flawed economic policies such as protectionism and state 
monopolies that unfairly raise the price of basic commodities 
have also added disproportionately to the burden of the poor. 
It is estimated that the poor spend up to 45 percent of their 
income on protected food commodities such as rice, which 
costs at least twice as much as the price on world markets. 

The Dominican Republic lacks a focal point that would coor- 
dinate development projects among all parties concerned — 
government, foreign donors, and private organizations 
(including businesses). The country's leadership — executive, 
congressional, or judiciary — needs to commit to the imple- 
mentation of social programs. That the largest aid donor had 
to "keep its distance from the government" for years speaks vol- 
umes about the government's withdrawal and lack of serious 



156 



Dominican Republic: The Economy 



commitment. That USAID was able to implement 85 percent of 
its program through private organizations is a healthy sign, 
especially about private initiative, but it does not compensate 
for full-fledged governmental participation. The lack of gov- 
ernment participation should not be seen as an excuse for the 
complete dependence on the government as the engine of eco- 
nomic development, as occurred in the past. The government, 
however, must strengthen the agencies responsible for design- 
ing reform measures and delivering services to the people. 
Congress must be included in the process as well because after 
years of being largely ignored, it has become a vocal player in 
the country's budget and reform programs (see The Legisla- 
ture, ch. 4). The judiciary also must become involved if only 
because it has been a key constraint to implementation of 
much-needed reform. Continued participation by private orga- 
nizations and businesses will, of course, always be needed. Only 
the combination of all these ingredients will enable the Domin- 
ican Republic to effect a more equitable public resource alloca- 
tion and increase funding for badly needed social programs. 

* * * 

The USAID mission in Santo Domingo is a good source of 
information on the general condition of the economy of the 
Dominican Republic. USAID reports on various aspects of the 
international community's development efforts in the Domini- 
can Republic also are useful, although they tend to emphasize 
areas in which the mission is involved. USAID also credits many 
private voluntary organizations operating in the Dominican 
Republic and with which it cooperates closely. Another good 
source is the Foreign Commercial Service of the United States 
Department of Commerce, which prepares the Country Com- 
mercial Guide for each nation. 

The Dominican Republic's Banco Central de la Republica 
Dominicana and, only since the late 1990s, the Secretariat of 
State for Tourism, as well as the IMF and the World Bank, are 
useful sources of statistical data. Those interested in following 
the Dominican Republic's economic development on a regular 
basis should consult the Economist Intelligence Unit's annual 
and quarterly reports. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



157 



Chapter 4. Dominican Republic: 
Government and Politics 



View of the Alcazar de Colon, the home of Spanish governor Diego Columbus 



THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IN the late 1990s could be con- 
sidered a political democracy, albeit one that remained fragile 
and uninstitutionalized. This chapter focuses on contemporary 
issues and patterns in the country's government and politics. It 
briefly reviews the emergence of democratic politics in the 
country, examines the country's system of government and 
political institutions, analyzes the major political and socioeco- 
nomic actors, and discusses major issues in foreign relations. 

Three major themes are underscored. First, the discussion 
notes that various historical, socioeconomic, and international 
factors have been unfavorable to the development of democ- 
racy in the country, although dramatic changes have taken 
place over the past several decades. Second, this historical 
experience is crucial to understanding how the country's sys- 
tem of government comprises both formal rules (such as the 
constitution and elections) and informal norms often at vari- 
ance with the formal rules. The formal rules have frequently 
been ignored, manipulated, or changed by political actors as 
part of the struggle for power. Informal norms regarding both 
the use of the state for personal power and accumulation of 
wealth and the invocation of formal rules have often been 
more important. Following Max Weber, we may say that these 
norms reflect patrimonial politics, where a ruler governs a 
country as if it were simply an extension of his household, thus 
blurring public purposes and private interests. Typically, this 
type of ruler seeks to reduce the autonomy of his followers 
through complex ties of dependence and loyalty commonly 
involving patronage and clientelist ties. The third theme is 
that, as a consequence, the struggle for political democracy in 
the country has been a struggle not only for greater respect for 
civil liberties and political rights of the population as a whole, 
but also for the construction of a more coherent and account- 
able set of state and political institutions, with greater respect 
for a democratic rule of law. 

Historical Legacies of Authoritarian Rule 

The Dominican Republic has had a tragic history particu- 
larly inimical to the development of democratic politics. This 
fact is evident in the country's Spanish colonial experience, 



161 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

which was followed in the nineteenth century by foreign inva- 
sion and occupation by neighboring Haiti, a brief reoccupation 
by Spain, numerous civil wars, and economic ruin. These fac- 
tors inhibited the possibility of national integration or the con- 
struction of a viable central state. As a result, the country 
experienced considerable political instability even as all early 
efforts to extend liberal rule in the country failed. According 
to Dominican historian Mu-Kien Sang, between 1840 and 1900 
the Dominican Republic had fifty-six governments, of which 
only four comprised administrations that were able to com- 
plete their constitutional period; furthermore, seventeen indi- 
viduals governed for less than a year, and 271 rebellions or 
armed uprisings occurred. The country ended the nineteenth 
century with the increasingly despotic seventeen-year rule of 
Ulises Heureaux (1882-99); his assassination, in turn, led to a 
renewed period of tremendous upheaval, aggravating the 
country's debt problems. Into the twentieth century, the coun- 
try was marked by a weak church, insecure economic elites, 
and the absence of an effective national military institution, as 
well as by high levels of poverty and low levels of social or polit- 
ical organization. 

The turn of the century was also marked by increasing 
dependence on the United States, which ultimately led to the 
United States occupation of 1916-24. This occupation in turn, 
through its establishment of a constabulary force with Rafael 
Trujillo Molina at its head and its improvements in the coun- 
try's transportation and communications infrastructure, 
helped set the stage for the rise and the consolidation in power 
of Trujillo in 1930 (see The Trujillo Era, 1930-61, ch. 1). 
Trujillo governed the country from 1930 to 1961; during that 
time, he built a state and constructed a nation, although his 
methods were brutal and his discourse racist. Under Trujillo, 
there was seemingly complete respect for the forms of democ- 
racy. The country had a congress, a judiciary, regular elections, 
and the formal passage of laws, but these institutions were a 
meaningless charade carefully manipulated by Trujillo. His 
massive economic holdings, which became state patrimony 
upon his death, evolved into major economic liabilities for the 
country. In addition, Trujillo's political style of centralization 
of power, cynical manipulation of individuals, and constitu- 
tional hypocrisy had a profoundly negative impact on the coun- 
try's political culture. 



162 



Dominican Republic: Government and Politics 

A successful transition to democracy following the death of 
Trujillo in 1961 faced numerous obstacles given the extent and 
nature of Trujillo's domination of the island republic. The mil- 
itary was essentially Trujillo's personal instrument, no indepen- 
dent societal organizations existed (with the partial exception 
of the Roman Catholic Church), and no political opposition 
was countenanced. Furthermore, the country was relatively 
poor, rural, and isolated. Yet, in part because of the involve- 
ment of the United States, democracy advanced further in the 
nation at this time than might have been expected based on 
the country's history and the legacies of the Trujillo era. In the 
period before and after Trujillo's assassination, the United 
States once again became deeply enmeshed in Dominican 
internal affairs, motivated both by anticommunist objectives 
(which remained central) and a desire to promote democracy. 
An initial result was a surprisingly successful democratic elec- 
tion in 1962, with the victory of Juan Bosch Gaviho and his 
Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario 
Dominicano — PRD). However, Bosch was overthrown after 
only seven months in office by a coalition of conservative social 
and political forces and the military; because of Cold War fears 
about communism and concerns about the nature of Bosch's 
leadership (including the belief that Bosch himself was not suf- 
ficiently anticommunist) , the United States did not forthrightly 
defend his government. 

Following Bosch's overthrow, the country entered a deeply 
tumultuous period, marked in 1965 by a brief civil war and 
United States intervention that originated in an exaggerated 
fear of a "second Cuba" in the Western Hemisphere. The 
United States arranged the formation of a provisional govern- 
ment and the holding of elections in 1966. These elections 
were won by Joaquin Balaguer Ricardo, a prominent figure 
from the Trujillo era, and his Reformist Party (Partido Reform- 
ista — PR). Balaguer handily defeated a dejected Bosch, who 
ran a desultory campaign. Balaguer was to become the domi- 
nant figure of Dominican politics for the next three decades, 
serving as president from 1966 to 1978 and again from 1986 to 
1996. 

Under Balaguer, patrimonial politics emerged once more, 
although Balaguer never sought or achieved the degree of per- 
sonal control that Trujillo had attained. Balaguer was an astute 
politician with an astounding drive for power. He was willing to 
be ruthless if necessary, but not over-eager to employ repres- 



163 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

sion and violence. He emphasized themes of order and stabil- 
ity, and he continued to link Dominican nationalism to what he 
viewed as its Hispanic, Roman Catholic essence and to anti-Hai- 
tian themes. He was both a realist about power politics and a 
conservative nationalist; he recognized the overwhelming real- 
ity of the United States presence, but retained a certain disdain 
for that country and its leaders. Although he was willing to take 
United States aid, Balaguer had conservative instincts and a 
nationalist interpretation of Dominican history that led him 
generally to be, like Trujillo, a fiscal conservative. 

During the period from 1966 to 1978, Balaguer governed in 
an authoritarian fashion. In both 1970 and 1974, in the face of 
open military harassment, most opposition forces opted to 
abstain from participation in elections. In 1973 Bosch — skepti- 
cal about liberal democracy and critical of the United States — 
left the PRD to found the more radical cadre-oriented Party of 
Dominican Liberation (Partido de la Liberacion Domini- 
cana — PLD). In 1976, however, in the face of growing United 
States pressure, mounting economic problems, and increasing 
domestic discontent, Balaguer began a process of political lib- 
eralization. Meanwhile, the PRD sought to moderate its image 
within the country, build support across all social sectors, and 
strengthen its international ties. All this set the stage for Ba- 
laguer's electoral defeat in 1978 and a transition to democracy. 

The Contemporary Struggle for Democracy 

The Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) came into office 
in 1978 as a party committed to strengthening democracy and 
fostering reform. However, the party's eight years in office were 
ultimately to be a disappointment. The PRD's most significant 
achievement was that one major threat to democracy, that of 
military incursion into politics, receded considerably, begin- 
ning in 1978 when President Silvestre Antonio Guzman 
Fernandez forcibly removed high military officers favorable to 
Balaguer. Even when Balaguer returned to power in 1986, the 
military never regained the level of importance or of influence 
it had had during his first twelve years in office. 

In other respects, however, PRD administrations were not as 
successful. The Guzman administration (1978-82) was limited 
in its reform agenda because it faced a Senate controlled by 
Balaguer's party and then experienced growing intraparty 
rivalry in the PRD. Initial hopes that the administration of Sal- 
vador Jorge Blanco (1982-86) could be an important example 



164 



President Joaquin Balaguer visits military installations. 

Courtesy United States Department of Defense 

of a less personalist, more institutional, reformist presidency 
fell short as well under the impact of the country's economic 
crisis. The situation was a result of the world oil crisis, execu- 
tive-congressional deadlock now driven by intraparty factional- 
ism, and the reassertion of patrimonialism from the 
presidency. 

By the end of Jorge Blanco's term, the PRD was a factional- 
ized organization that had been forced to oversee a brutal eco- 
nomic adjustment and that was facing widespread accusations 
of corruption and mismanagement. Although civil liberties 
had generally been respected, there were no significant 
advances in democratic institutionalization or participation 
nor were there reforms of a social or economic nature during 
the PRD years. Rather than leaving a legacy of lasting political 
and economic changes implemented by a social-democratic 
party, the PRD rule had continued patronage politics. Jorge 
Blanco's government faced wrenching economic problems, 
and its attempt to stabilize the economy involved extensive 
negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF — see 
Glossary) and other international creditors. The situation led 
to bitter party wrangling and the eventual division of the PRD. 



165 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Economic decline and divisions within the PRD paved the 
way for the unexpected presidential comeback of Joaquin Ba- 
laguer in 1986. A loyal electorate, especially older, less edu- 
cated, rural, and female voters, and splits within and between 
the opposition parties permitted Balaguer to win the 1986 elec- 
tions. Aided, it was charged, by electoral fraud, Balaguer was 
able to eke out narrow victories in 1990 and 1994 as well. 

The 1990 elections were marred by irregularities and 
charges of fraud, as the eighty-three-year-old incumbent Ba- 
laguer edged out his eighty-year-old opponent, Juan Bosch, by 
a mere 24,470 votes. With the PRD still recovering from its fac- 
tional strife, Jose Francisco Peha Gomez came in a surprisingly 
strong third place. The 1994 elections were even more crisis- 
ridden than those of 1990 because of an extremely tense and 
bitter campaign between Balaguer and Peria Gomez. When 
thousands of voters were prevented from voting because their 
names did not appear on electoral rolls, domestic protest and 
international pressure led to a drawn-out crisis. Between 1994 
and 1996, the political efforts of opposition parties, Dominican 
civil society (including substantial elements of the business 
community), and the international community (the United 
States in particular) focused on how to secure the holding of 
fair elections in 1996 and how to block any effort by Balaguer 
to extend his term in office, either unconstitutionally or by 
modifying the constitution. The crisis was finally resolved when 
Balaguer agreed to reduce his term to two years and accept a 
number of constitutional reforms, including a prohibition on 
immediate presidential reelection. As a consequence, the 
eighty-eight-year-old Balaguer finally left the presidency in 
1996, handing power over to the PLD's Leonel Fernandez 
Reyna, whom Balaguer had tacitly supported and then openly 
endorsed (age and illness had led to Bosch's retirement in 
1994). 

The 1996 elections proceeded according to strict guidelines. 
In 1996, unlike the previous two elections, presidential reelec- 
tion was not an issue, and the Central Electoral Board was 
staffed by professional nonpartisans. Furthermore, in addition 
to the oversight provided by several high-profile missions of 
international observers, civil society mobilized far more exten- 
sively in support of free and fair elections than it had done in 
the past. 

The 1996 elections were held under new rules requiring a 
second-round election if no candidate received more than 50 



166 



Dominican Republic: Government and Politics 

percent of the votes in the first round. With a renewed PRD 
under his tight leadership, Peha Gomez performed well. How- 
ever, he only gained 45.9 percent of the vote. He was followed 
by Leonel Fernandez of the PLD with 38.9 percent, and Jacinto 
Peynado of the Reformist Social Christian Party (Partido 
Reformista Social Cristiano — PRSC) with 15 percent. Balaguer 
did not endorse his party's candidate (indeed, he did not even 
vote in the first round) , instead providing his implicit support 
to Fernandez during the first round. For the second round, 
Balaguer and the PRSC officially endorsed the candidacy of 
Leonel Fernandez in a "Patriotic Pact" calling for the preserva- 
tion of national sovereignty and Dominicanness, against the 
candidacy of Peha Gomez. Fernandez defeated Peha Gomez in 
the second round. 

Fernandez obtained the presidency, but his party had a very 
small representation in Congress as a result of its poor perfor- 
mance in the 1994 elections. The new electoral calendar estab- 
lished by the 1994 reform meant that congressional elections 
would now be held at the midpoint of the presidential term. 
And, soon after Fernandez's electoral victory, the PRSC negoti- 
ated a pact with the PRD to secure leadership positions in Con- 
gress. 

Without congressional support, the Fernandez administra- 
tion has faced serious difficulties in obtaining the passage of a 
number of desired reforms, although some progress has been 
made on a number of important fronts. The legislative attempt 
to reform the economy in late 1996 failed when Congress 
refused to agree on a set of policy proposals to liberalize the 
economy, including lower tariffs and a higher value-added tax. 
Congressional deadlock prevented an agreement over the 
national budget for 1997, which led President Fernandez to 
withdraw the budget bill from Congress and use the 1996 bud- 
get agreement to apply in 1997, as stipulated by the constitu- 
tion when no agreement is reached between the executive and 
the legislative branches over revenues and expenditures. 

Yet, Fernandez has governed in a more democratic and insti- 
tutional fashion than Balaguer, without renouncing the use of 
patronage or clientelist mechanisms. Some important legisla- 
tive measures also have been approved to which he can point. 
Furthermore, the country has been able to maintain high rates 
of economic growth with moderate inflation, and the state has 
modestly expanded its investments in education, health, and 
housing. 



167 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

With regard to greater respect for democratic institutions, 
several important successes occurred during Fernandez's first 
three years in office. One has to do with improvements in the 
judicial branch. A crucial step was the appointment of a new 
Supreme Court composed of distinguished jurists in a much 
more open process through a Council of the Magistrature 
established by the constitutional reform of 1994. This Supreme 
Court has sought to review and improve the qualifications of 
judges throughout the country. In August 1998, Congress also 
approved a law establishing a judicial career service; the imple- 
mentation of such a career service is expected to further pro- 
fessionalize and improve the judiciary. Another success was the 
fact that the congressional and municipal elections held on 
May 16, 1998, were viewed as free and fair, although the results 
were disappointing for Fernandez. The death of PRD leader 
Peha Gomez a week before the elections probably helped the 
PRD win by an even wider margin than expected; with 51.4 per- 
cent of the vote, the PRD gained twenty-four of thirty Senate 
seats, and eighty-three of 149 Chamber of Deputies' seats. The 
PLD won 30.4 percent of the vote, winning only four Senate 
seats and forty-nine Chamber seats (sufficient to permit it to 
uphold a presidential veto). The PRSC, in turn, continued its 
decline, winning only 16.8 percent of the vote, and electing two 
senators and seventeen representatives. 

As a result of the election, President Fernandez was com- 
pleting his term with continued strong opposition in Congress. 
In the course of 1999, both the PRD and the PLD were able to 
choose presidential candidates without causing party splits, 
even as the PRSC remained beholden to its now nonagenarian 
leader, Joaquin Balaguer. As of November 1999, the May 2000 
presidential elections appeared to be polarized between 
Hipolito Mejia, the candidate of the PRD, and Danilo Medina, 
the candidate of the PLD. As neither appeared able to attain a 
majority in the first round, both were courting Balaguer and 
the PRSC for potential support in the second round. Thus, the 
state of the country's political parties (especially the PRSC) and 
the party system remained in flux as the country prepared for 
the challenges of the next century. 

System of Government 

Especially in the period since 1978, the Dominican Republic 
has had important experiences with democratic politics. At the 
same time, democracy has been marred by the weakness of 



168 



Dominican Republic: Government and Politics 

institutions and formal rules, including flawed and sometimes 
fraudulent elections. Democratization also has been hindered 
by the lack of sustained progress in strengthening a more dem- 
ocratic and plural civil society, democratizing political institu- 
tions, and making state institutions more coherent and more 
accountable. 

To understand the system of government in the Dominican 
Republic, as well as some of the major challenges political 
democracy confronts, it is crucial to understand the formal 
rules as defined by the constitution and electoral and other key 
laws. It is equally important to understand the informal norms, 
legacies of patrimonial politics, and strong-man rule under 
which politics has operated. Laws and legal procedures have 
often been ignored, manipulated, or changed in the pursuit of 
power and of policy, including in negotiations to facilitate 
political transitions or to control the military. 

This tension between the formal rules and the informal 
norms of politics was especially evident during the presidential 
periods of Balaguer, even when he governed in a somewhat 
more democratic fashion during the 1986-96 period. Over 
time, there has been a growing demand from the institutional 
voices of business and from elements of civil society, particu- 
larly those representing middle-sector groups, for a change in 
this political style. Such elements seek a greater respect for 
institutionality and the rule of law, both within the state and 
within political parties. Dominican business people and civil 
society in general have increasingly recognized that effective 
citizenship requires reductions in severe poverty and marked 
inequality as well as improvements in education and health. 

Yet, for various reasons, movement away from the informal 
norms of patrimonial, clientelist politics has been difficult, and 
much remains to be done. Even presidents who may not have 
entered office intending to foster these norms have often 
employed or succumbed to them. Many politicians across all 
the major parties have continued to pursue political office as 
much for personal or narrow parochial gain as for the pursuit 
of ideological or policy goals. Given high levels of poverty, weak 
societal organizations, and the country's historical patterns, 
many of the politicians' followers expect them to satisfy 
demands in a personalist, clientelist fashion, rather than in an 
institutional, impersonal one. Even as business organizations 
encourage reform and many companies largely respect the 
rules, other firms have grown accustomed to operating in an 



169 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

informal environment and deriving profit from it. And, many 
groups in civil society have also responded more to clientelist 
modes of politics than to more participatory, democratic ones. 

The Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine 

Liberal ideas did not penetrate deeply into the country in 
the nineteenth century. Constitutions and formal legal institu- 
tions were often either ignored or given ex post facto rational- 
izations; such documents and institutions kept liberal doctrines 
alive but at the cost of hypocrisy and cynicism. The Dominican 
Republic appears to fit the general pattern in Latin America in 
that the number of constitutions correlates inversely with a 
country's democratic experience. Having had practically no 
democratic history until well into the second half of the twenti- 
eth century, the country has, nevertheless, experienced a sub- 
stantial number of new constitutions and other modifications. 
As was the case in other authoritarian countries, in the Domin- 
ican Republic the adoption of a new constitution, especially in 
the late nineteenth century, often reflected an authoritarian 
leader's effort to legitimize or extend his rule. This pattern was 
to continue well into the twentieth century. However, at times, 
as elsewhere on the continent, new constitutions in the Domin- 
ican Republic also were generated during democratic "turning 
points," although these tended to be short-lived. Thus, for 
nearly all of Dominican history, unconstitutional regimes have 
used constitutionalism to augment their claims to legitimacy 
rather than employing them to establish general "rules of the 
game" to which they or other major power holders in the soci- 
ety would commit themselves. At the same time, reformers and 
democratic leaders sought to generate liberal constitutional 
texts and to live by them. 

The country's first constitution in 1844 was a remarkably lib- 
eral document. It was influenced directly by the Haitian consti- 
tution of 1843 and indirectly by the United States Constitution 
of 1789, the liberal 1812 Cadiz Constitution of Spain, and the 
French constitutions of 1799 and 1804. Because of these influ- 
ences, the 1844 constitution called for presidentialism, separa- 
tion of powers, and extensive "checks and balances." But its 
liberal nature was to be short-lived. General Pedro Santana, 
claiming that the legislative restrictions on the executive were 
excessive in a period of war, forced the Constitutional Assembly 
to add an article granting the president extraordinary powers. 
Also, although the constitution did not permit immediate pres- 



170 



Dominican Republic: Government and Politics 



idential reelection, the Assembly elected Santana to two con- 
secutive terms. These actions initiated a pattern in which a 
strong executive imposed constitutional hypocrisy; careful 
attention to form went hand in hand with violation of the sub- 
stance of democratic process and rights. 

Genuine efforts to put in place more liberal constitutions 
that restricted centralized, authoritarian power continued, 
however. Thus, an even more liberal constitution was prepared 
in 1854. It, too, was almost immediately modified to vitiate it of 
an effective legislative check on executive authority: all control 
over the armed forces was placed directly in the hands of the 
president. Later in 1854, an essentially authoritarian constitu- 
tional text was enacted because Santana, eager to ensure him- 
self even more constitutional authority, successfully pressured 
the Congress for the change. The change reduced Congress 
from two chambers to a single, seven-member Senate that was 
to meet only three months a year; moreover, the president 
could suspend civil and political rights if deemed necessary. 
Meanwhile, the country soon descended into a lengthy civil 
war in which figures from the Cibao region emerged victorious. 
In 1858 in Moca, an even more liberal and democratic constitu- 
tional text was enacted, although, as in 1854, it was never 
implemented. For the first time in the country's history, how- 
ever, the constitution called for direct elections for major 
elected posts; it also prohibited presidential reelection, decen- 
tralized authority, and prohibited the death penalty for politi- 
cal crimes. 

From the enactment of a Dominican constitution in 1865, 
following the forced departure of the Spanish, until the United 
States military entered the country in 1916, sixteen additional 
constitutional changes took place. Most of these were associ- 
ated with a change in leadership or with an effort by a leader to 
provide a legal cover for the extension of his term in office. Yet, 
they also represented a struggle between the two different con- 
stitutional traditions represented by the constitutions of 1854 
and 1858. Thus, when Buenaventura Baez Mendez and the Red 
Party (Partido Rojo) took power in 1865, they forced the Con- 
gress to enact a more authoritarian text, in imitation of that of 
1854; when Baez was overthrown a year later, a more liberal 
text was decreed. In turn, when Baez resumed the presidency 
in 1868, a constitutional shift again occurred. Constitutional 
changes occurred each year from 1874 to 1879 reflecting the 
revolts and changes in government that took place. The pat- 



171 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

tern continued in the next decade, when the leader of the Blue 
Party (Partido Azul), Gregorio Luperon, called for a National 
Convention to enact a new liberal constitution. The new consti- 
tution was enacted in 1880. This text, in turn, was reformed 
three more times before the end of the century (in 1881, 1887, 
and 1897). In 1907 and 1908, political changes were once again 
associated with constitutional modifications. By 1880, however, 
the liberal constitutional doctrine, although not the practice, 
had emerged triumphant. 

Constitutional manipulation and hypocrisy continued in the 
twentieth century, particularly during Trujillo's period in 
power, when seven constitutional reforms occurred. There was 
formal obedience to constitutional and electoral requirements, 
although neither Congress nor the courts were autonomous, 
the population had no basic rights, and election results were 
carefully orchestrated. For example, in response to interna- 
tional pressure for democratization following the end of World 
War II, Trujillo permitted two regime-sponsored opposition 
parties to run in the 1947 elections; each officially received a 
similar vote of just under 4 percent of the total, which was care- 
fully distributed so that each could win exactly one deputy seat. 

In 1963, following his decisive victory in the presidential 
elections and his comfortable majority in Congress, Bosch 
decided to proceed with a significant revision of the country's 
constitution. The new constitution was promulgated in May 
1963. In many ways, the constitution, which included prohibi- 
tion of presidential reelection, was a model democratic text. 
However, it drew sharp attacks from conservative and business 
forces because it curtailed some of the traditional rights of the 
church and foresaw the possibility of expropriation of property 
and control of foreign investment. One of the first actions by 
the military that overthrew Bosch was to declare the new consti- 
tution "nonexistent." In turn, over the next several years Bosch 
sought to "return to constitutional power without elections," 
ultimately setting the stage for the 1965 conflict between "con- 
stitutionalist" and "loyalist" forces that led to the United States 
intervention. 

Following his inauguration as president, Balaguer pro- 
ceeded to enact a new constitution through Congress. The 
November 1966 constitution (with important modifications 
made in 1994) is the text under which the country's democracy 
currently operates. The new text enhanced presidential powers 
and permitted unlimited presidential reelection (until 1994), 



172 



Dominican Republic: Government and Politics 

while removing material objectionable to church and business 
interests. 

The Executive 

Within the Dominican Republic, the 1966 constitution is 
widely viewed as giving the president extraordinary powers (see 
fig. 5). Although the formal powers of the president are fairly 
extensive, in fact they are more limited than in several other 
Latin American countries, given the absence of extensive 
decree powers, constitutional budgetary powers, a partial veto, 
and the ability to force referenda. 

The president has often been perceived as having near-dicta- 
torial powers because of the willingness of some incumbents, 
particularly Balaguer, to abuse the powers of their office in the 
absence of effective checks from the legislature or the judi- 
ciary. In doing so, such incumbents built upon historical pat- 
terns of patrimonialism and strong-man rule that had gained a 
degree of support in society. Thus, Balaguer and, to a much 
lesser extent, other presidents during this period assumed vast 
informal (and sometimes unconstitutional) powers to create 
taxes, set budgets by decree, spend money, and ignore numer- 
ous laws. In contrast, when presidents have sought to govern in 
a fashion that is more democratic and more respectful of the 
other branches of government, such as is largely the case with 
Leonel Fernandez Reyna, who has governed with only minority 
support in Congress and with a more independent judiciary, 
their power has appeared more limited and constrained. 

The constitution vests executive power in a president who is 
elected by direct popular vote and whose term of office is four 
years. Until 1994 nothing in the constitution prohibited a pres- 
ident from seeking reelection. Balaguer was reelected in 1970 
and in 1974; following defeats in 1978 and 1982, he was elected 
again to the presidency in 1986. He was reelected in 1990 and 
again in 1994. Well-documented allegations of fraud, however, 
led to international pressure and an internal political crisis that 
was finally resolved by negotiation and constitutional reform: 
Balaguer's presidential term was shortened to two years, and 
the constitution was amended to prohibit immediate presiden- 
tial reelection. The 1994 reform also introduced a mandatory 
second round among the top two vote getters in presidential 
elections if no candidate received a majority of the votes cast in 
the first round. 



173 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 





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174 



Dominican Republic: Government and Politics 

The constitution requires that presidential candidates be 
Dominican citizens by birth or origin, at least thirty years old, 
and in possession of all political and civil rights. A candidate 
cannot have been a member of the military or the police for at 
least one year prior to election. Vice presidential candidates 
must meet the same qualifications. The vice president may 
assume the office of president when the chief executive is ill, 
outside the country, or otherwise unable to perform the duties 
of the office. If the president dies or becomes permanently 
unable to carry out the functions of the office, the vice presi- 
dent serves until the next scheduled election. If the vice presi- 
dent is also unable to fill the office, the president of the 
Supreme Court serves temporarily. Within fifteen days, the 
president of the Supreme Court must convene the National 
Assembly (which consists of both houses of the Congress), 
which must then select a substitute to fill out the term. 

The Dominican constitution takes twenty-seven paragraphs 
in Article 55 to spell out the president's extensive powers. 
Among the most important are those that grant the president 
authority over almost all appointments and removals of public 
officials and that empower him to promulgate the laws passed 
by Congress; to engage in diplomatic relations; to command, 
deploy, and make appointments in the armed forces; and to 
extend pardons. The president also has the right to declare a 
state of siege or a state of national emergency when Congress is 
not in session, and to assume special emergency powers against 
unions and strikes in the face of threats to public order or state 
security. Historically, the exercise of these emergency powers 
usually has been the prelude to dictatorship. The few limita- 
tions the constitution places on presidential authority focus pri- 
marily on the requirement that the president obtain 
congressional consent to certain appointments, treaty negotia- 
tions, and the exercise of emergency powers. In recent years, 
perhaps the most important constraint on the executive has 
been the constitutional provision that certain contracts, includ- 
ing foreign assistance loans from international financial institu- 
tions, require congressional approval. 

The constitution of 1966 provides for cabinet secretaries of 
state and subcabinet secretaries of state to assist in public 
administration. These officials must be Dominican citizens, at 
least twenty-five years of age, with full civil and political rights. 
The powers of these officials are determined by law and are not 
set forth in the constitution. However, the president is constitu- 



175 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

tionally responsible for the actions of such officials. Secretaries 
of state serve at the president's discretion, can be removed by 
the president, and function both as administrators of their sec- 
retariats and as agents of presidential authority. 

The extent to which presidents have sought to employ the 
cabinet as a functioning executive body to organize and imple- 
ment policy has varied considerably. Balaguer rotated individu- 
als in and out of such cabinet positions with great frequency 
and sometimes appointed people with little relevant back- 
ground; he also granted the rank of secretary of state to large 
numbers of individuals other than cabinet ministers. Thus, 
alongside the formal bureaucratic structure of the state and 
cabinet with its constant rotation of office-holders, there were 
the informal cliques of Balaguer's true confidants. The govern- 
ments of the PRD and of the PLD differed from this pattern, 
while still retaining a high degree of personalism, and, in the 
case of Silvestre Antonio Guzman Fernandez, nepotism. 

The Legislature 

The 1966 constitution confers all legislative powers on the 
Congress of the Republic, which consists of a Senate and a 
Chamber of Deputies. The election of senators and deputies is 
by direct vote every four years. Until 1994 congressional terms 
were coterminous with presidential terms. This fact greatly 
increased the possibility that the president's party would enjoy 
a majority in the legislature, particularly in the Senate. As a 
consequence of the 1994 constitutional reform that called for 
new presidential elections — but not congressional or local 
ones — in 1996, the electoral calendar now separates presiden- 
tial elections by two years from elections for congressional and 
local-level positions. This nonconcurrent timing decreases the 
likelihood that a president will have majority support in Con- 
gress. Under Balaguer the possession of such majorities, at least 
in the Senate, permitted not only the use but also the abuse of 
presidential power. However, as a result of the 1994 reform, the 
country faces the opposing risk of potential deadlock and 
ungovernability because of executive-legislative confrontation 
between a minority administration and a Congress dominated 
by opposition parties. 

One senator is elected from each of the country's provinces 
and from the National District (Santo Domingo); in 1998 the 
Dominican Senate had thirty members (see fig. 2). This elec- 
toral rule provides for significant rural overrepresentation in 



176 



Dominican Republic: Government and Politics 

the Senate. Deputies also represent provinces, but their seats 
are appointed on the basis of population. According to the 
constitution, there should be one deputy for each 50,000 
inhabitants in a province, with no fewer than two per province; 
in reality, adjustments based on census figures have often been 
delayed. Nevertheless, the more populous provinces and the 
National District do have larger delegations. In 1998 there 
were 149 representatives in the Chamber of Deputies, forty- 
four of whom came from the National District of Santo Dom- 
ingo. An electoral law approved in 1997 (Law 275-97) calls for 
the creation of single-member electoral districts in the larger 
provinces of between 25,001 and 50,000 inhabitants, beginning 
with the elections of 2002. 

Deputies and senators must be Dominican citizens, at least 
twenty-five years old, with full civil and political rights. They 
must be natives or residents for at least five years of the prov- 
ince they wish to represent. Naturalized citizens are eligible to 
run for Congress if they have been Dominican citizens for ten 
years. Senators and deputies are not allowed to hold another 
public office concurrently. 

The Senate and Chamber of Deputies may meet together as 
the National Assembly on certain specific occasions cited by 
the constitution — for example, when both the president and 
vice president are unable to complete their terms of office and 
a successor must be designated, or in order to amend the con- 
stitution itself. By a three-fourths vote, the Chamber of Depu- 
ties may bring accusations against public officials before the 
Senate, but it has no other exclusive powers. In contrast, the 
Senate has several exclusive powers. These currently include: 
choosing the president and members of the Central Electoral 
Board, electing the members of the Controller's Office, 
approving diplomatic appointments made by the president, 
and hearing cases of public misconduct brought before it by 
the Chamber of Deputies, with removal possible with a three- 
fourths vote. As a result of the 1994 constitutional reform, the 
Senate lost an important prerogative it previously had had, the 
appointment of judges to the Supreme Court (see The Judi- 
ciary, this ch.). 

The Congress has broad powers to levy taxes, change the 
country's political subdivisions, declare a state of emergency, 
regulate immigration, approve or reject extraordinary expen- 
ditures requested by the executive, legislate on all matters con- 
cerning the public debt, examine annually all the acts of the 



177 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

executive, interrogate members of the cabinet, and legislate on 
all matters not within the constitutional mandate of other 
branches of government or contrary to the constitution. By a 
two-thirds vote of the full membership in each chamber, the 
Congress can also override a presidential veto of a law previ- 
ously approved by simple majority. 

Historically, the Dominican Congress has been a weak, sub- 
missive branch. Its facilities, staffing, offices, and library have 
been woefully inadequate; in addition, the Court of Accounts, 
which examines the country's finances and reports to the Con- 
gress, has not provided complete or timely information. In the 
past several years, some modest steps toward improvement 
have been taken. Because the selection of candidates to the 
party lists has been determined by party leaders, legislators 
have tended to be more responsive to these leaders than to vot- 
ers. Turnover has been extremely high: from 1970 to 1998, 
only 18 percent of incumbent senators and only 17 percent of 
incumbent deputies were reelected to a subsequent term. The 
turnover has further encouraged legislative weakness and exec- 
utive predominance. Many legislators have seen their position 
in Congress as temporarily providing them with an opportunity 
to focus on issues of personal and parochial gain, rather than 
on broader ideological or policy issues. The high turnover has 
also tended to discourage emphasis on building up the institu- 
tion of the Congress itself. Finally, because the judicial branch 
until very recently has also tended to be extremely submissive 
to the executive branch, there has been little the legislature 
could actually do to prevent abuse of power by the president. 
This was especially the case with Balaguer, who governed the 
country with considerable discretion and little effective con- 
gressional oversight. 

Congress showed more independence during the PRE) gov- 
ernments of Antonio Guzman and Salvador Jorge Blanco 
between 1978 and 1986, and again under the PLD government 
of Leonel Fernandez (1996-2000). In addition, during his 
1986-96 period in office, Balaguer was more limited in his abil- 
ity to ignore or sidestep Congress than he had been during the 
1966-78 period when he had comfortable majorities in both 
chambers. Even the earlier Balaguer administrations occasion- 
ally confronted an obstructionist Congress, however. Indeed, 
the major power of Congress has been to obstruct and to 
delay — whether in the pursuit of personal or parochial gain, 
responding to the wishes of interest groups or other societal 



178 



Dominican Republic: Government and Politics 



allies, or as a result of genuine policy or ideological differences. 
The PRD governments were especially frustrated by factions 
within their own parties, although they also faced opposition 
from the PRSC and PLD representatives. President Fernandez, 
in turn, has been confronted particularly with opposition from 
the PRD, especially after it gained congressional seats in the 
1998 election. 

The Judiciary 

Judicial power is exercised by the Supreme Court of Justice 
and by other courts created by the constitution and by law. The 
country has general courts, which consider civil, criminal, com- 
mercial, and labor issues (except for labor matters in the major 
urban areas of Santo Domingo, Santiago, San Francisco de 
Macoris, and San Pedro de Macons) , and certain specialized 
courts, namely land courts, labor courts (in the country's four 
major urban areas), tax courts, and new children's courts that 
were mandated by a 1994 law. The country also has other 
courts or offices with judicial functions, which do not form a 
part of the judicial branch. These include the Police Tribunal, 
the Military Tribunal, and the Central Electoral Board, which 
administers elections and is the unappealable arbiter of all dis- 
putes related to elections, with complaints being heard in the 
first instance by municipal electoral boards. 

Under the Supreme Court there are nine Courts of Appeals, 
which hear appeals of decisions from Courts of First Instance. 
There are eighty-three of these Courts of First Instance, which, 
unlike the Supreme Court or the Appeals Courts, are presided 
over by only one judge. There are also 214justices of the peace, 
who hear cases of small claims or minor crimes. In addition, 
there are also four Labor Courts of Appeal, and single Courts 
of Appeal for tax and for land issues; under these are the 
respective specialized courts of first instance. 

Centralized and hierarchical, the Dominican legal system is 
patterned after the French system; its basic codes for criminal 
and civil procedure date back to 1884. The legal system has 
employed a code-law legal system rather than a common law 
system such as the one used in the United States. Detailed and 
comprehensive, the codes leave little room for United States- 
style judicial activism or citation of precedent. Legal reasoning 
is deductive (from the codes) , rather than inductive or based 
on past cases. 



179 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Until a 1994 constitutional reform enacted substantial 
changes to the 1966 constitution, the judiciary was particularly 
dependent upon the other branches of government. Prior to 
the reform, judges were chosen by the Senate, not by the presi- 
dent, ostensibly to limit executive power. The Senate also 
selected judges for the lower courts. Because judges were not 
named for any specific term of office, the result was a highlv 
politicized process of nomination and rotation in office. Fur- 
thermore, the president could name all public emplovees in 
the judicial branch, as well as temporarily name judges if vacan- 
cies occurred. Other problems cited as affecting the judiciary 
have included low pay, poor working conditions, staff short- 
ages, and allegations of corruption and influence-peddling. 

The 1994 constitutional reform was intended to enhance the 
independence and autonomy of the judiciary. It called for the 
establishment of a Council of the Magistrature (Consejo de la 
Magistratura) whose sole purpose is to name the judges of the 
Supreme Court. The Council consists of the president, the 
president of the Senate, a senator chosen by the Senate from a 
political party different from the president of the Senate, the 
president of the Chamber of Deputies, a representative chosen 
by the Chamber from a party different from the president of 
the Chamber, the president of the Supreme Court, and 
another judge from the Supreme Court, chosen bv the Court. 
The reform gave the Supreme Court the power to select judges 
for all the courts under it, as well as to name administrative per- 
sonnel for the judicial branch. Furthermore, it called for the 
establishment of a judicial career (judicial civil service), and 
for life tenure forjudges in the context of this judicial civil ser- 
vice. And, it enabled the president, the president of the Senate 
or the Chamber, or any interested partv to appeal to the 
Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of a law. After 
the new court was installed, it held public hearings to evaluate 
all sitting judges and replaced about two-thirds of them. 

Requirements for appointment as a Supreme Court justice 
and other powers of the Court remain as established bv the 
1966 constitution. Supreme Court justices must be Dominican 
citizens by birth or origin, at least thirty-five years old, with full 
political and civil rights. They are required to have a law degree 
and to have practiced law or held judicial office for at least 
twelve years. These requirements become progressively less 
strict for lower-court justices. The Supreme Court has the 
exclusive power to assume jurisdiction in matters affecting the 



180 



Dominican Republic: Government and Politics 

president and other high officials, act as a court of cassation, 
serve as a court of last instance in matters forwarded from 
appellate courts, exercise final disciplinary action over other 
members of the judiciary, and transfer justices from one juris- 
diction to another. 

Implementation of the 1994 constitutional reforms has been 
slow but significant. The Council of the Magistrature was 
formed in late 1996, and in August 1997 new members of the 
Supreme Court were named. This new Supreme Court is 
widely viewed as professional and nonpartisan, and for the first 
time in the country's history, business, professional, and mid- 
dle-sector groups from civil society played an active role in the 
nomination and screening process. Critical judicial reforms 
have also made gradual progress. The Supreme Court evalu- 
ated and replaced many of the country's judges, leading to 
improvements in the system's efficiency and effectiveness. A 
law establishing a judicial career service was promulgated in 
August 1998, and in August 1999 a National School for the 
Judiciary was established to improve the training and the qual- 
ity of the country's judges. With these changes, the quality of 
the country's judiciary and the historical subservience of the 
courts to the government in power appears to be changing 
slowly. 

Public Administration 

Historically, the Dominican Republic has been marked by a 
public administration dominated by patronage and clientelist 
relations, with nepotism, corruption, and inefficiency as com- 
mon features. Although initial civil service legislation was 
passed under the United States military occupation of 1916- 
24, and changed several times thereafter, the legislation was 
never truly implemented. Indeed, the legislation was actually 
abolished in 1951 by President Trujillo. Under Trujillo, the 
state was largely an instrument for the benefit of the dictator; 
this meant there was little localized or decentralized corrup- 
tion not countenanced by Trujillo or his closest cronies. 

Following the fall of Trujillo, no ruler retained as full a per- 
sonalist control over the state and its personnel as he had expe- 
rienced. Balaguer (1966-78; 1986-96) came closest, especially 
in his first twelve years in office. Under Balaguer 's administra- 
tion, the executive centralized expenditures and power 
through contracts and patronage networks, and widely ignored 
administrative regulations and bureaucratic norms. Although 



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Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

the governments of Guzman (1978-82) and Jorge Blanco 
(1982-86) did not attain as extreme a level of centralization, 
their administrations were marked by clientelist favoritism, 
nepotism, and corruption. Fernandez's government has sought 
to initiate significant state reforms, while not totally ignoring 
clientelist uses of the state; one of its first measures was to 
increase the salary offered for high posts in government from 
the extremely low levels to which they had fallen under Bal- 
aguer. 

In addition to receiving low salaries, Dominican public offi- 
cials historically had little protection in their jobs. A civil ser- 
vice law was approved in 1991 and finally implemented by the 
executive in 1994. However, at that time only an extremely lim- 
ited number of employees, primarily those working in fields 
related to insurance and banking services, were allowed to seek 
incorporation into the civil service. Under the Fernandez 
administration, the civil service was expanded to include 
employees in several secretariats of state, including the Techni- 
cal Secretariat of the Presidency, Labor, Foreign Affairs, and 
the Attorney General's office. Indeed, without further restruc- 
turing that set guidelines for determining professionalism, 
qualifications, and salary rates in other areas of the public sec- 
tor, such a law could conceivably complicate public-sector effi- 
ciency rather than improve it. 

From the cabinet level to the lowest ranks, traditionally 
almost all civil servants have been appointed, served, and could 
be removed largely at the will of the president. The result was a 
patronage-dominated system in which public-sector jobs were 
given out in return for loyalty and service. Hence merit, 
achievement, and competence were not always the main crite- 
ria guiding government appointments. The public bureaucracy 
was often characterized by incompetence even at the highest 
levels. Nepotism and corruption — a favor in return for a favor, 
the granting of special governmental privileges to favored per- 
sons, private enrichment stemming from public service, out- 
right bribery — were also widespread. Those who tried to be 
honest were scorned and considered foolish by their col- 
leagues. Indeed, for some, government service was thought of 
not so much as an honored career but as a brief opportunity to 
indulge oneself at the public trough. The frequent failure of 
government programs could often be attributed directly to the 
corruption and incompetence of the bureaucracy. And, just as 
the use and abuse of state funds were common at election time, 



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Dominican Republic: Government and Politics 

a public-sector worker was often expected to do political work 
for his or her patron. 

The abuse of the public sector and of public administration 
was particularly evident during Balaguer's governments. 
Although he insisted that corruption stopped "at the door of 
his office," he openly acknowledged the legitimacy of what he 
politely termed "commissions," allowing his family members to 
accept ostensible donations and gifts by favored contractors. 
Balaguer rarely called cabinet meetings, although he named 
dozens of people as secretaries of state without portfolio. 
Around election time, in particular, he openly countenanced 
corruption and the abuse of state resources. Balaguer's policy 
of rotating individuals in and out of government positions 
extended to the appointment of governors of the Central 
Bank; indeed, in a sample of fifty-eight countries over the past 
several decades, the Dominican Republic had the second low- 
est average tenure, around twenty-one months, for a Central 
Bank governor (only Argentina was lower). The PRD adminis- 
trations, particularly that of Jorge Blanco, were not free of 
these problems, although they tended to be more rational in 
their naming of cabinet officials. 

Under President Fernandez, until August 1999 there were 
fifteen secretaries of state: an administrative secretary of state 
for the presidency, a technical secretary of state for the presi- 
dency, and twelve additional secretaries of state administering 
various secretariats. In August 1999, Congress approved the 
establishment of a new secretary of state for women. In addi- 
tion, as of year-end 1999, the Central Bank governor named by 
Balaguer in 1994 had retained his position. 

In addition to the cabinet secretaries of state, in 1999 the 
country had some two dozen autonomous and semiautono- 
mous agencies. The autonomous and semiautonomous agen- 
cies were established in the early 1960s to administer new 
public programs as well as the vast properties and enterprises 
inherited by the state after the death of Trujillo. These agen- 
cies administer an array of programs and enterprises, ranging 
from farm loans to cooperatives to vast sugar lands. The largest 
of these is the State Sugar Council (Consejo Estatal del Azu- 
car — CEA), which at one time had 85,000 employees, making it 
the largest employer in the country and its most important 
exporter. Among the others are the Dominican State Enter- 
prises Corporation (Corporacion Dominicana de Empresas 
Estatales — Corde), in which twenty-three state-owned enter- 



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Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

prises that had belonged to Trujillo were consolidated, and the 
Dominican Electricity Corporation (Corporation Dominicana 
de Electricidad — CDE) (see Industry, ch. 3). 

These agencies traditionally have been dominated by 
patronage considerations, plagued by corruption and ineffi- 
ciency, and sometimes plundered for electoral purposes. By the 
end of Balaguer's last term in office in 1996, even enterprises 
that once had been profitable were plagued with deficits. The 
government was being forced to subsidize the CEA, which had 
once provided the government with a steady stream of reve- 
nue. In addition, the CDE confronted a situation in which 
more than half of the electricity that it sold was either lost in 
transmission or distribution or not paid for, even as the coun- 
try was plagued with frequent outages. 

Under President Fernandez, some steps toward rationaliza- 
tion of some public enterprises and the privatization of others 
were initiated during his first three years in office, following 
passage of the Public Enterprise Reform Law of 1997. However, 
in the face of protests from nationalists and workers at the 
firms, as well as resistance from opposition parties that feared 
the administration might use funds received from privatization 
for partisan political purposes, the government was proceeding 
slowly. By the end of 1999, steps had been taken to privatize the 
distribution of energy; to further privatize some of the produc- 
tion of electricity; to allow private investments in some CEA 
lands, with the expectation that many of the state's sugar mills 
would be leased to the private sector; and to permit greater pri- 
vate-sector involvement in areas such as the management of 
the country's seaports and airports. 

Local Government 

The Dominican system of local government, like the Domin- 
ican legal system, has been based on the French system of top- 
down rule and strong central authority. In late 1999, the coun- 
try was divided into twenty-nine provinces plus the National 
District (Santo Domingo). The provinces in turn were subdi- 
vided into a total of 108 municipalities. Each province is admin- 
istered by a civil governor appointed by the president. A 
governor must be a Dominican citizen, at least twenty-five years 
old, and in full possession of civil and political rights. The pow- 
ers and duties of governors are set by law. The constitution 
establishes the structure of local government; its specific func- 
tions are enumerated in the municipal code. 



184 



Dr. Leonel Fernandez Reyna, 
President of the Dominican 
Republic, 1996-2000 
Courtesy Embassy of the 
Dominican Republic 



The municipalities and the National District are governed by 
mayors (called sindicos) and municipal councils, both popularly 
elected to four-year terms. The size of the council depends on 
the size of the municipality, but each is required to have at least 
five members. The qualifications of local officials as well as the 
powers and duties of mayors and councils are set by law. Natu- 
ralized citizens can hold municipal office provided they have 
lived in the community at least ten years. 

Neither provinces nor municipalities have any significant 
independent power to levy taxes. As a result, historically few 
services have been initiated at the local level. There are no 
local police departments, only a single national force. Policy 
and programs relating to education, social services, roads, elec- 
tricity, and public works likewise are administered at the 
national level, rather than at the provincial or municipal level. 
Local government, therefore, has been weak and ineffective, 
not only because it has lacked taxing authority, but also 
because in the Dominican system the central government sets 
almost all policy. 

Starting in the early 1960s, the Bosch government made var- 
ious efforts to strengthen Dominican local government. A new 
Dominican Municipal League came into existence in 1962, and 



185 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

efforts were made to develop community spirit, local initiative, 
and self-help projects. These projects were not wholly success- 
ful, in large part because of the traditional arrangement under 
which almost all power flowed downward from the central gov- 
ernment. A small step was taken with the passage of a law in 
1983 that mandated that a percentage of the country's taxes be 
distributed to municipalities. Enforcement of the law, particu- 
larly under President Balaguer, was uneven, however. 

In the 1990s, as a consequence of the focus of international 
aid agencies on decentralization, the emergence of groups in 
Dominican civil society pressuring for change, and the desire 
of some opposition political parties to coordinate local devel- 
opment efforts, additional pressure for change emerged. An 
important potential advance took place with the passage of a 
January 1997 law providing that 4 percent of the central gov- 
ernment's national budget be transferred to municipal govern- 
ments. The law did not clearly specify the functions or 
responsibilities of a municipality, however. 

Decentralization efforts under President Fernandez, how- 
ever, became mired in partisan politics. Following the 1998 
local elections, which led to PRD plurality victories in more 
than half of the country's municipalities, the PRD expected to 
retain control of the secretary generalship of the Dominican 
Municipal League and thus of the enhanced resources pro- 
vided for under the new law, which promised to be a key source 
of patronage. However, the PRD publicly accused the Fernan- 
dez administration of attempting to bribe electors in order to 
take control of the League by supporting a candidate from the 
PRSC. In January 1999, following several tense incidents 
between riot police and PRD party members, two parallel 
assemblies elected two different persons as secretary general to 
head the League, through which would flow approximately 
US$400 million. The candidate of the PRSC supported by the 
PLD ultimately gained control of the League offices. In Febru- 
ary 1999, President Fernandez proposed a political dialogue in 
order to resolve several critical issues including this one, others 
such as the composition of the Central Electoral Board leading 
up to the 2000 elections, and various key administrative bills 
stalemated in Congress (see Electoral System, this ch.). With 
regard to the Dominican Municipal League, an ad-hoc commit- 
tee of notables was formed to help determine how funds 
should be disbursed. 



186 



Dominican Republic: Government and Politics 

Electoral System 

Voting is free, secret, and obligatory for both men and 
women. Suffrage is available to anyone eighteen years old or 
older, or any married person regardless of age. Members of the 
police or armed forces are ineligible to vote, as are those who 
have lost their political and civil rights, for example, incarcer- 
ated criminals. Polls are open from 6 am to 6 pm on the day of 
elections, which is not a working day. The method of voting has 
frequently been changed. In the 1996 and 1998 elections, 
women have voted in the morning and men in the afternoon. 
The process was as follows: on election day voters went to their 
voting station to register; once registration closed, voting 
began. This process (known as colegios cerrados) was mandated 
by a 1994 constitutional reform, and was intended to prevent 
the possibility of double voting. And, on the basis of a 1997 law, 
for the first time in 1998, political parties received public fund- 
ing. For other provisions of the 1997 law, see below. 

Elections in the Dominican Republic historically have been 
highly problematic and crisis-ridden. Opposition parties have 
usually questioned the use and abuse of state resources by the 
governing party, and the campaign period leading up to elec- 
tion day has often been marked by widespread distrust, allega- 
tions of fraud, and violence associated with campaign events. 
In recent years, as a consequence of fraud and protest, particu- 
larly in the 1990 and 1994 elections, important modifications 
in the electoral law have been made. 

At the center of the problem with elections has been doubts 
about the objectivity, capability, and autonomy of the country's 
Central Electoral Board (Junta Central Electoral — JCE), which, 
along with its subsidiary municipal boards, is responsible for 
overseeing elections. These agencies combine administrative, 
regulatory, and judicial functions. The JCE is responsible for 
managing the voter registry list, regulating the campaign and 
administering the elections; it is also the unappealable arbiter 
of all disputes related to elections, with complaints being heard 
in the first instance by municipal electoral boards. The auton- 
omy and credibility of the JCE have been affected by a number 
of factors. Its judges are named by the Senate (or by the presi- 
dent if the Senate is not in session and does not subsequently 
act) for terms that can be coterminous with each electoral 
period; partisan political criteria often have been uppermost. 
In a number of elections, an imperfect alternative to a strong 



187 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

JCE was the use of ad-hoc mediating and support commissions 
or international observers or mediators. 

As a consequence of the 1990 electoral crisis, an electoral 
law was passed in 1992 that instituted a number of reforms. 
This law provided the JCE with greater legal budgetary inde- 
pendence. It also provided that henceforth Dominican citizens 
would receive a single card that would serve both as an identity 
card and an electoral card; prior to this law, the JCE shared 
responsibility with the executive branch for the management 
of the offices that provided the personal identification cards 
that citizens had to present along with electoral cards distrib- 
uted by the JCE in order to vote. Naturally, this enhanced fears 
by opposition parties that the emission of identity cards could 
be manipulated to favor the government party. Like much of 
the rest of the state, the JCE has also paid woefully low salaries, 
a situation that has improved somewhat since 1996. 

As a consequence of the 1992 law, building up to the 1994 
elections the JCE leadership was expanded from three to five 
judges — three chosen by the governing PRSC party and two by 
opposition parties. The JCE also issued a new national and 
electoral identity card and prepared a new electoral roll, which 
ended up being flawed and at the center of significant fraud in 
the elections carried out that year. Thus, the JCE remained an 
institutionally weak, politicized institution. 

For the 1996 elections, rather than choosing JCE judges with 
partisan criteria paramount, independent figures were named, 
who remained in place for the 1998 elections. Both these elec- 
tions were relatively trouble free. However, partisan criteria 
again played a hand when JCE judges were chosen to oversee 
the presidential election of the year 2000. In August 1998, the 
PRD-dominated Senate named all five of the JCE judges with- 
out consultation with the opposition parties. This action once 
again made the composition of the JCE an issue of serious con- 
tention among the country's major political parties. Finally, 
after extensive negotiations, in June 1999 the Senate named 
two additional JCE judges, one identified with the PLD and the 
other with the PRSC. 

The electoral law of 1997 (Law 275-97) mandated a number 
of important changes in electoral procedures. In addition to 
requiring public funding of political parties, the law instituted 
a 25 percent quota for female candidates. The requirement 
helped improve female representation in the Chamber of Dep- 
uties, which went from 8.6 percent female representation in 



188 



Dominican Republic: Government and Politics 

1994 to 16.1 percent in 1998, and in the municipal councils, 
which went from 14.7 percent female representation in 1994 to 
26.5 percent in 1998. The law also called for the creation of 
electoral subdistricts of three to four representatives each in 
large multimember provinces such as Santo Domingo and San- 
tiago, to begin in 2002. Furthermore, the 1997 law permits 
Dominicans abroad to vote in presidential elections, beginning 
in the year 2000. 

Political Parties 

For a country with relatively limited experience with political 
democracy, the Dominican Republic has a surprisingly strong 
set of political parties. However, the party system is currently in 
a state of flux as the parties confront the risks of potential frag- 
mentation over leadership succession issues. Since the 1960s, 
the country has had two important political parties: the 
Reformist Party (Partido Reformista — PR) , now the Reformist 
Social Christian Party (Partido Reformista Social Cristiano — 
PRSC) , and the Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido Rev- 
olucionario Dominicano — PRD). A third party, the Party of 
Dominican Liberation (Partido de la Liberacion Domini- 
cana — PLD), was formed in 1973 and gradually became elec- 
torally important in the course of the 1980s. In addition to 
these three parties, numerous other minor parties have occa- 
sionally garnered support. 

Prior to the Trujillo period (1930-61), parties were weakly 
organized, had insubstantial leadership, were neither very 
ideological nor programmatic, and were generally based on 
personalist followings rather than concrete programs. Trujillo 
organized the Dominican Party (Partido Dominicano) to pro- 
vide himself with support, even though elections were fraudu- 
lent. Following Trujillo's assassination and the forced exile of 
his brothers and then of Balaguer, the party was officially 
banned. 

When Balaguer returned from exile to campaign for the 
presidency in 1966, he recaptured central elements of the con- 
servative constituency that had formed the bulwark of Trujillo's 
support among rural, less-educated, older, and female voters. 
He further sustained their loyalty and support by employing 
the power of the presidency and state resources on their 
behalf. During the 1966-78 period when he was president, sev- 
eral high-level military figures also played a prominent role in 
the party. Moreover, military pressure eased Balaguer's reelec- 



189 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

tion in 1970 and 1974; nearly all of the opposition ultimately 
refrained from participating. Balaguer also consistently 
retained the support of the conservative Roman Catholic hier- 
archy within the country. The PR was Balaguer's personal 
machine, largely ignored when he was in office, except at elec- 
tion time. As such, it lacked a clear-cut program or coherent 
ideology, although Balaguer continued to reiterate themes of 
order, nationalism, religiosity, and anti-Haitianism. 

In 1986 Balaguer supported the merging of his party with 
existing minor Christian Democratic parties, opening the way 
for the integration of his newly named PRSC (the former PR 
party) into the Christian Democratic Union. As with the much 
longer lasting and more deeply rooted link between the PRD 
and the Socialist International, this association brought the 
PRSC international visibility, financial and technical assistance, 
and the promise, never realized, of an ideological basis for the 
party. Although the merger did assist Balaguer in his electoral 
comeback that year, from 1978 to 1994, electoral support for 
the PR (or PRSC since 1986) oscillated fairly narrowly between 
around 35 percent and 42 percent of the vote. The party won 
elections for the most part because of divisions in the opposi- 
tion and some use of fraud. 

Throughout his political career, Balaguer has consistently 
retained absolute control over the PRSC, forcing out or weak- 
ening potential adversaries within the party. In 1996, when he 
was constitutionally barred from running for the presidency 
again, he refused to campaign for or ultimately vote for his own 
party's candidate in the first round of the presidential ballot; 
instead, he first quietly supported Leonel Fernandez of the 
PLD, and then openly endorsed him for the second-round bal- 
lot. In 1996 support for the party dropped precipitously to only 
15 percent in the first-round presidential election, and it has 
remained at that low level. Although Balaguer turned ninety- 
two in 1999, he retains control of the PRSC. There are serious 
questions about the future of the party once Balaguer dies. 

Another major party is the PRD, which was founded in 1939 
by exiles from the Trujillo dictatorship, including Juan Bosch. 
It functioned as an exile organization for twenty-two years 
before returning to the Dominican Republic in 1961 after 
Trujillo's assassination. The PRD was able to win an impressive 
victory in the 1962 elections, through extensive organizational 
work and a campaign that focused on helping the poor. This 
electoral victory led to the ephemeral government of Juan 



190 



Dominican Republic: Government and Politics 

Bosch, which was overthrown after only seven months in office. 
Yet, the PRD as a strong party was ultimately forged through 
this initial victory and overthrow, and the further heroics of 
civil war, foreign intervention, and subsequent repression 
under Balaguer. The struggle for democracy during the 1970s 
under these conditions and the hard bureaucratic work associ- 
ated with it helped to build a strong organization led by Jose 
Francisco Peha Gomez, who often served as the party's secre- 
tary general. The party continued to prosper in spite of Bosch's 
departure in 1973 in order to create a new party. Bosch, who 
had become radicalized as a consequence of the 1965 United 
States intervention, was promoting the notion of "dictatorship 
with popular support." 

Following Bosch's departure, the PRD pursued a three- 
pronged strategy to assume power in 1978. It continued its 
extensive organizational work, particularly in the country's 
major urban areas where the bulk of its supporters were found. 
The party also moderated its nationalist, statist, and reformist 
program and purposely named a very moderate figure, 
Guzman, as its presidential candidate. In addition, it assidu- 
ously strengthened its international contacts, both with the 
Socialist International and with liberal politicians in the United 
States. As a consequence, when the Dominican military sought 
to block the vote count and prevent a PRD victory in 1978, the 
party was able to draw upon support from the United States 
and other international allies, as well as from a variety of 
domestic groups and to secure the presidency. In 1982, with 
Jorge Blanco as its presidential candidate, the PRD was once 
again able to win the country's national elections. 

The eight-year period during which the PRD held the presi- 
dency turned out to be an acute disappointment for the coun- 
try and for the party, however. The party was forced to oversee 
a difficult period of economic stabilization as a result of the 
debt crisis. At the same time, each of the presidencies became 
marked by bitter intraparty division as the party increasingly 
lost its ideological moorings and its factions fought for power 
and spoils. The first term was marked by the tragic suicide of 
Guzman near the end of his term. Guzman had bitterly 
opposed Jorge Blanco's nomination as the party's candidate for 
president, and as he became increasingly isolated within the 
party, he feared retribution and corruption charges against 
family members by the incoming administration. The term pre- 
sided over by Jorge Blanco saw an increase in levels of corrup- 



191 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

tion, clientelist practices, and infighting by PRD leaders. 
Combined with the country's economic decline, these practices 
helped lead to the electoral comeback of Balaguer in 1986. 
The prosecution and conviction of Jorge Blanco on corruption 
charges by Balaguer (a case still under appeal as of year-end 
1999), further weakened the party. Factional divisions finally 
led to a formal party split in the period leading up to the 1990 
elections. Pena Gomez retained the party name and symbols, 
while the party's 1986 candidate, Jacobo Majluta Azar, formed 
the Independent Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario 
Independiente — PRI). The latter party received only 7.0 per- 
cent of the vote in the 1990 elections and subsequently 
declined further. 

During the 1990s, Pena Gomez gradually supplanted formal 
notions of internal party democracy and assumed the role of 
uncontested leader within the PRD. He failed to attain the 
presidency, however. In 1994 it is likely that fraud robbed him 
of the margin of victory. In 1996 the introduction of a second- 
round presidential election — held because no party had 
received a majority in the first round — and an effective alliance 
between the PLD and the PRSC in the second round prevented 
him from winning. Pena Gomez's death just a week before the 
1998 congressional and local elections helped the PRD to gain 
51.4 percent of the vote, which translated into twenty-four of 
the country's thirty Senate seats and eighty-three representa- 
tives in the Chamber of Deputies. The party also won majorities 
in many municipalities. The PRD then successfully limited fac- 
tional infighting and maintained organizational coherence 
while selecting its presidential nominee for the May 2000 elec- 
tions, something it had not been able to do leading up to the 
elections of 1986 and 1990. Hipolito Mejia handily won a presi- 
dential primary the party held in June 1999, and successfully 
incorporated the two major losing candidates, Rafael Subervi 
and Hatuey DeCamps, into high-level positions within the 
party. 

Remarkably, Juan Bosch is the founder of two of the coun- 
try's three major parties. In 1973 he left the PRD to found the 
PLD, positioning it as a more radical, cadre-oriented, ideologi- 
cally coherent, and organizationally solid party. Its major initial 
strength was among educated, nationalist, radicalized urban 
middle-sector and labor groups. Gradually, as the country's 
economic situation declined during the 1980s and the PRD was 
weakened by internecine struggles, Bosch and the PLD reen- 



192 



Dominican Republic: Government and Politics 

tered the electoral arena. From a mere 1.1 percent of the vote 
in 1978, the PLD's support grew to 9.9 percent in 1982 and 
18.4 percent in 1986. In 1990 a much more moderate PLD 
campaigned on promises of honesty, efficient government, and 
gradual reform. It gained 33.9 percent of the vote, losing the 
presidency to Balaguer by a very slim margin, which many 
Dominicans are convinced was the result of fraud. Although 
the PLD continued to retain a more complex organizational 
structure and a greater respect for internal party norms than 
did Balaguer's PRSC, Bosch remained its unquestioned leader; 
individuals perceived as potential threats were occasionally 
forced out of the party. 

During the 1990s, the PLD continued to moderate its ideo- 
logical position. Retaining a modest nationalism and focus on 
good governance, as well as a strong organizational structure, 
the party sought to reach out more effectively to broader sec- 
tors of Dominican society. In 1994 an aging and ailing Bosch 
was able to capture only 13.1 percent of the vote. As a result of 
the agreement following that election, Balaguer's term was 
shortened by two years, and he agreed not to seek reelection. 
Because of his age and poor health, Bosch agreed to step down 
as leader and presidential candidate for the PLD and endorsed 
the party's nominee, Leonel Fernandez. With Fernandez's vic- 
tory in the 1996 presidential elections, the PLD reached the 
country's highest office; ironically, however, the once radical 
party did so by defeating the PRD through a coalition with the 
conservative Balaguer. The PLD, however, has been stymied by 
its lack of support in Congress. In the 1998 elections, it 
received 30.4 percent of the vote, slightly increasing its pres- 
ence in Congress, especially in the Chamber of Deputies where 
it was able to elect forty-nine representatives, just enough to 
uphold a presidential veto. Nevertheless, President Fernandez 
has remained a generally popular figure. And, his favored can- 
didate within the PLD, his close adviser and Secretary of the 
Presidency Danilo Medina, won the party's nomination 
through a closed party primary in June 1999 to be the PLD can- 
didate for the May 2000 elections. The major future challenges 
for the PLD are consolidating its support among the parts of 
the electorate it won over from the PRSC and winning over 
new voters, while preventing factional strife and division. 

In addition to these major parties, the PRSC, the PLD, and 
the PRD, the Dominican Republic has had multiple minor par- 
ties. Some of these have been little more than personalist vehi- 



193 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

cles that have permitted their leaders to maintain a certain 
presence in the national arena, sometimes by establishing alli- 
ances with one of the major parties. Others have been created 
by leaders who have lost factional struggles within one of the 
major parties. Extreme-left and communist parties have never 
had much of a popular following in the country, and they have 
often been consumed by internecine conflicts and by bitter 
attacks against the PRD and then the PLD. Following the end 
of the Cold War, these parties declined even further as elec- 
toral vehicles, when some of their leaders joined the PRD or 
the PLD, and others focused more of their attention on social 
movements. 

As the Dominican Republic enters the new century, each of 
its major parties confronts challenges that could lead to signifi- 
cant changes in the party system. And, as elsewhere on the con- 
tinent and, indeed, in the world, political parties in the country 
confront high levels of skepticism within an electorate that 
often perceives them as inefficient, self-serving organizations 
rather than as effective means of representing their interests. 
The PRD remains the party with the strongest membership and 
following, but it knows it risks a repeat of factional division or 
loss of support because of poor performance in government. 
The PRSC has experienced sharply declining electoral support 
as its aging leader was forced from the presidency, yet Balaguer 
retains a firm grip on the party. It is unlikely that any other 
leader will be able to retain the loyalty of this electorate to the 
degree that Balaguer did, and the fate of the party is very much 
in question once he dies. Meanwhile, as its relatively lackluster 
performance in the 1998 congressional elections indicates, the 
PLD has not yet consolidated support among the voters who 
gave it a presidential victory in 1996. 

Interest Groups and Social Actors 

In the Dominican Republic, numerous factors have militated 
against the establishment and maintenance of a dynamic civil 
society characterized by a multiplicity of interest groups and 
associations. Historically, the most important factors that 
explain this lack include poverty and low rates of education, 
high levels of inequality, repressive governments such as that of 
Trujillo (1930-61), which quashed any independent organiza- 
tions, and the reliance of political actors on clientelism and 
patronage. Since 1961, and especially since the early 1980s, 
socioeconomic changes and international influences have had 



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Dominican Republic: Government and Politics 

contradictory consequences regarding the development of civil 
society. Urbanization, education, economic growth, the growth 
of middle-sector groups, some return migration, and support 
from international aid and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) have all helped the development of civil society. At the 
same time, economic crisis and wrenching economic changes 
have helped weaken labor and popular-sector organizations, 
and large-scale migration has also involved a significant "brain 
drain" of many talented Dominicans. 

Overall, this sector remains quite weak, with business and 
middle-sector groups overrepresented. Yet, during the past sev- 
eral decades, more interest groups and a more self-consciously 
identified civil society have emerged. This civil society has 
played an important role in seeking to strengthen Dominican 
democracy, both in terms of political rights and a greater 
respect for institutionality and the rule of law. Its influence has 
been apparent in efforts to generate national agendas for 
reform and in more specific areas such as electoral reform 
(including the pursuit of gender equality through measures 
such as quotas for women on electoral lists) , electoral observa- 
tion, and judicial reform. At the same time, the role of two tra- 
ditionally powerful actors, the Roman Catholic Church and the 
armed forces, has also evolved during the past several decades. 
The church has moderated its position and seen some of its 
influence wane in the face of the growth of Protestantism and 
secularization, and the role of the military in domestic affairs 
has declined although institutionalized, democratic, civilian 
control over the military yet remains to be achieved. 

Economic Elites 

The Dominican Republic's economy has undergone a major 
transformation, especially in the period since the mid-1980s. 
Until the 1970s, the country's economy was fundamentally 
based on the export of selected agricultural crops such as 
sugar, tobacco, coffee, and cocoa, and of minerals such as fer- 
ronickel. A set of industrialists who produced goods for a 
heavily protected domestic market also existed. However, dur- 
ing the 1980s, as sugar exports declined drastically, dramatic 
growth occurred in light industry for export in free-trade zones 
and in tourism. As a consequence, the once important Associa- 
tion of Landowners and Agriculturists (Asociacion de 
Hacendados y Agricultores) was gradually overshadowed in 
importance by associations related to industry, finance, real 



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Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



estate, telecommunications, tourism, and free-trade zones; 
importers and commercial interests continued to retain power- 
ful organizations, however. Behind the array of seemingly for- 
mal organizational structures lies the reality that many sectors 
of the economy are dominated by a few large firms that often 
form part of family conglomerates that sometimes have com- 
plex histories of collaboration and rivalry. 

Efforts to construct a powerful, united umbrella organiza- 
tion of private-sector interests has had mixed results. The clos- 
est approximation is the National Council of Private Enterprise 
(Consejo Nacional de la Empresa Privada — Conep), which, 
however, has seen defections during the 1990s as a result of ten- 
sions over the nature and pace of the opening up of the econ- 
omy. Such tensions have divided local industrialists from 
importers. 

Middle Class 

By the 1990s, Dominican society no longer consisted of a 
small landed elite at the top and a huge mass of peasants at the 
bottom, with almost no one in between. In large part as a result 
of the economic development and modernization that had 
occurred since the end of the Great Depression, a sizable, het- 
erogenous middle class had emerged that comprised 30 to 35 
percent of the population (see Urban Society, ch. 2). 

The middle class consists of shopkeepers, government offi- 
cials, clerks, military personnel, white-collar workers of all 
kinds, teachers, professionals, and the better-paid members of 
the working class. Most of the middle class resides in Santo 
Domingo, but secondary cities like Santiago, Barahona, Monte 
Cristi, La Romana, San Francisco de Macoris, and San Pedro 
de Macoris have also developed sizable middle-class popula- 
tions. 

The middle class has come to predominate within the coun- 
try's major political institutions: the Roman Catholic Church, 
the military officer corps, government service, political parties, 
interest groups, and even trade union leadership. It also has 
provided important leadership for civil society organizations 
committed to good governance and clean government, and 
has supported women's and environmental issues and commu- 
nity development. Yet, many in the middle class remain quite 
conservative, reflecting the fact that this social group has often 
been divided on social and political issues. Generally, its mem- 
bers advocate peace, order, stability, and economic progress, 



196 



Dominican Republic: Government and Politics 

although increasingly many also want democracy and respect 
for institutions and the rule of law. 

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, many middle-class ele- 
ments supported Balaguer because he was thought to stand for 
those things they wanted; later, chafing under Balaguer's per- 
sonalism and economic decline, they supported the PRD gov- 
ernments of Guzman and Jorge Blanco. As a result of the 
failure of these governments to reform conditions in the coun- 
try, which led thousands in the middle class to migrate, they 
turned away from the PRD, toward either the PRSC or the 
PLD. Partly, their turn from the PRD came because many held 
anti-Haitian sentiments and thus did not wish to support the 
PRD's Peha Gomez. In 1996 many supported the PLD. 

Trade Unions and Popular Organizations 

Organized labor in the Dominican Republic has always been 
weak (see Labor, ch. 3). Labor was repressed under Trujillo, 
who passed very restrictive legislation in 1951; labor also expe- 
rienced severe restrictions under Balaguer in the 1966-78 
period. Although a labor code passed in May 1992 established 
new rights for workers and unions, organized labor remains 
weak and politically divided in three larger and several smaller 
labor confederations that represent 12 percent of the work 
force. Even following passage of the 1992 labor code, many 
employers replace workers who try to organize. They can do so 
because the country has high rates of unemployment and 
underemployment and a surplus of unskilled labor. The prac- 
tice of replacing workers is especially prevalent in the country's 
export-oriented free-trade zones, where unionization and col- 
lective bargaining are largely absent. Some of the strongest 
unions are found among middle-sector professionals employed 
by the public sector, such as medical personnel and teachers; 
such professionals often obtain salary increases only after 
threatened or actual work stoppages. 

Trade union organizations have often been closely allied 
with individual political parties; in recent years, however, iden- 
tification of the major confederations with individual political 
parties has declined. Rivalry across trade union federations has 
often been intense, and most of the union organizations have 
suffered from weak funding and limited staff. In recent years, 
support from international labor federations and NGOs has 
supplemented more modest domestic revenue sources. Some- 
times employers have engaged in what could be described as 



197 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

union-breaking activities, including the summoning of police 
to put down union activities. These and other conditions have 
both weakened and politicized the labor movement. Because 
collective bargaining is limited to only a few of the larger firms, 
political action, such as street demonstrations, marches to the 
National Palace, and general strikes, is a widely used tactic. 
These tactics are meant to put pressure on the government to 
side with the workers in labor disputes. 

During the 1980s, a number of important urban, neighbor- 
hood-based protest organizations emerged. Their emergence 
was facilitated by greater democratic freedoms under PRD gov- 
ernments, and sometimes by the assistance of local church and 
other activists as well as by international aid. The activism of 
these groups was enhanced by the country's growing economic 
crisis. Typically, they focused on local-level demands such as sal- 
ary increases, price reductions for basic products, and improve- 
ments in public transportation, water, and electricity services. 
Despite various efforts by the organizations during the 1980s 
and 1990s to move toward more effective, centralized, unified 
action, such efforts largely failed. Tensions within the organiza- 
tions and between them and the already divided labor move- 
ment were also sometimes exploited by the government, 
particularly under Balaguer, who was a master at employing 
patronage and clientelism to coopt leaders and divide and 
weaken popular movements. 

Similarly, independent peasant groups have been limited, 
weak, and often politically fragmented. Balaguer excelled at 
such political fragmentation. He retained loyal support among 
many in the rural sector through his appeals for a conservative, 
Roman Catholic nationalism and for order and stability. He 
also occasionally distributed land titles and other personalist 
benefits, even as the urban bias of many government policies 
led to massive rural to urban migration as well as emigration 
overseas. Furthermore, trade union and peasant organizations 
have rarely succeeded in forming a workable joint organization 
composed of Dominicans and Haitian migrants. Indeed, dur- 
ing 1999, the Dominican government took steps to try to limit 
the influx of Haitians and to repatriate some it considered to 
be in the country illegally. The increased presence of Haitians, 
in part because of the deteriorating situation in that country, 
once again became a sensitive issue domestically. 



198 



Dominican Republic: Government and Politics 

Mass Media 

Starting in the early 1960s, the Dominican Republic experi- 
enced a communications revolution. The spread of radio, tele- 
vision, and newspapers awakened the previously isolated 
countryside, stimulated rapid urbanization, and led to the 
political mobilization of millions of persons who had never par- 
ticipated in politics before. In addition, since Trujillo's death in 
1961, the Dominican media have been among the freest in 
Latin America. 

In the 1990s, Dominicans have access to a multiplicity of 
radio and television stations domestically, including several 
that are state-owned and managed; many Dominicans also have 
access to major United States, Spanish, and Latin American 
networks through various satellite cable companies. All radio 
and television stations are government-licensed, a situation 
that has sometimes led to charges of undue pressure and 
manipulation. Furthermore, at election time, the state-owned 
media have usually been blatantly partisan in favor of the 
incumbent administration's candidates. As ownership of televi- 
sion units has grown, television has become the major medium 
through which the public receives its news. Those who cannot 
afford a set of their own often watch at neighbors' houses or in 
public places such as bars or shops. 

The country's major newspaper is the Listin Diario, founded 
in 1889 and revived in 1964. Santo Domingo boasts a number 
of other significant dailies as well, including Hoy, El Siglo, El Ca- 
ribe, El National, and Ultima Hora. These newspapers circulate 
nationally, although other cities also have smaller papers. Own- 
ership of newspapers tends to be concentrated in family-held 
conglomerates, which sometimes use their control of the press 
to advance the interests of their firms or to attack those of their 
rivals. Journalists are not always well paid and sometimes accept 
additional remuneration from government offices, political 
parties, or firms. Not surprisingly, objectivity in reporting some- 
times suffers. At the same time, investigative reporting of 
alleged corruption, abuse, and negligence by government and 
by private-sector firms, previously almost unknown, has gained 
impetus over the past decade in these daily newspapers and 
also in the weekly newsmagazine, Rumbo. 

Roman Catholic Church 

The Dominican Republic remains about 80 percent Roman 



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Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Catholic despite major gains by Protestant groups, especially 
evangelical, charismatic, and spiritualist sects (see Religion, ch. 
2). The Dominican Roman Catholic Church historically has 
been conservative and traditionalist, generally supporting the 
status quo and the existing power structure. But the Roman 
Catholic Church also has been weak institutionally, with few 
priests (fewer than 200 in the entire country) , little land, few 
educational or social institutions, and little influence over the 
daily lives of most Dominicans. 

Since the 1960s, the Roman Catholic Church has ceased to 
identify wholly with the status quo. Rather, it has tended to 
advocate moderate change. It has organized mainstream Cath- 
olic political parties, trade unions, student groups, peasant 
leagues, and businessmen's associations. 

Liberation theology has made few inroads in the Dominican 
Republic. A few priests espouse liberationist ideas, but they are 
not considered to be in the mainstream of the clergy. Nor have 
there been calls by church officials for an alliance with Marxist 
groups, let alone calls for guerrilla struggles or other militant 
action against the system. During the 1980s and 1990s, the 
church often played a mediating role in political and social 
conflicts, particularly through Monsignor Agripino Nunez Co- 
llado, rector of the Pontifical Catholic University Mother and 
Teacher. 

As the Dominican Republic has modernized and secular- 
ized, the church has lost some of its influence. The country 
legalized divorce in 1963 and instituted government-sponsored 
family planning in 1967, two measures that the church had 
opposed. The church seldom has succeeded in mobilizing vot- 
ers in support of its favored programs. With only some 10 per- 
cent of the population engaged as active, practicing Catholics, 
and with Protestant groups continuing to grow rapidly, church 
influence has continued to decline during the 1990s. While 
Balaguer was in office, there was a particularly strong link 
between his government and the conservative cardinal and 
Archbishop of Santo Domingo Nicolas de Jesus Lopez 
Rodriguez. However, increasingly the importance of Protestant 
voices within organized religion is recognized, and secular 
influences in culture and education continue to grow. 

Armed Forces 

One of the most significant changes in the Dominican 
Republic during the past several decades has been the lessen- 



200 



Dominican Republic: Government and Politics 



ing of the threat of military incursion into politics. Trujillo 
assumed power in 1930 as head of the country's military; dur- 
ing the thirty-one years he controlled the country, he vastly 
expanded the budget of the armed forces, while manipulating 
the military to his advantage. Following his assassination, the 
military retained considerable influence, and during the 1960s 
became deeply enmeshed in civil-military plots. Under the Ba- 
laguer presidency during the 1966-78 period, the military 
remained a powerful support group of the government and 
occasionally a potential threat to Balaguer. Numerous generals 
were forced to resign under PRE) governments (1978-86), how- 
ever. 

In the 1990s, as a result of the successive changes, the 
Dominican military combined patrimonial elements, partisan 
balance, and financial constraints. The military was not the 
professional, partially insulated, democratically controlled 
armed forces that reformers had sought to develop. Different 
administrations also carried out their relations with the mili- 
tary ignoring established legal norms. The PRD administra- 
tions managed to weaken the institution of the military and to 
promote individuals loyal to the president to high posts. Fol- 
lowing this pattern, Balaguer brought back to active service 
officers who had been loyal to him. However, during the ten 
years of his presidency (1986-96), the armed forces increas- 
ingly became a weak, underpaid, top-heavy, and largely unpro- 
fessional institution. 

The first dramatic change to the military came on the day of 
Guzman's inauguration in 1978 when he forced the resignation 
of several generals who could have proved a threat to his 
regime (see The PRD in Power and Balaguer, Again, ch. 1). 
During the next two years, more than thirty generals either 
were retired, demoted, or sent abroad. In addition to taking 
additional steps to remove the military from partisan politics, 
Guzman also instituted a more concerted policy of rotating 
officers to break up regional pockets of civilian-military alli- 
ances that had become established under Balaguer. Guzman 
earned the trust of the remaining military both through his 
conservative views and anticommunist policies and his endorse- 
ment of Balaguer's last-minute generous salary increases for 
the military, as well as additional modest budget increases. By 
the end of his administration, Guzman could number several 
military among his closest and most loyal associates. 



201 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Jorge Blanco (1982-86) transformed the armed forces even 
more, while also establishing close relations with certain top 
officers. He weakened the military structure by accelerating a 
pattern of massive retirements, typically after first rapidly pro- 
moting officers. To outside observers, the logic was not always 
clear because some of those retired appeared to be profes- 
sional, well-trained individuals; the United States, for example, 
complained that its military training funds were being wasted 
as careers were cut short. In addition to further limiting the 
ability of the military to participate in politics, Jorge Blanco's 
actions constrained the maneuvering room of any incoming 
administration regarding promotions. The result was a military 
force that was institutionally weak and no longer a direct politi- 
cal threat. And, as all the major political parties moderated 
their policy positions, the support for military intervention 
declined throughout all groups in society. 

In the same way, however, that Balaguer's maneuvers in 1978 
largely did not prevent Guzman from taking steps against cer- 
tain officers, so Jorge Blanco's actions ultimately did not limit 
Balaguer's options in 1986. Balaguer, also, had little interest in 
unduly strengthening the military. By the time he returned to 
power in 1986, he was prepared to accept his inability to retain 
power either by overt military pressure or through a coup, 
given United States pressure and the extent of organized 
domestic opposition. What Balaguer wanted was a military that 
was loyal to him. Thus, when he resumed the presidency in 
1986 and in subsequent years, he simply brought a number of 
officers who had been close to him back into active service. 
Because many of these previously retired officers continued to 
age while ostensibly on active duty, Balaguer's strategy became 
known as abuelismo (from the word for "grandfather"). 
Although recalling previously retired officers was in open viola- 
tion of the Organic Law of the Armed Forces, as many of 
Guzman's actions had been, no effective judicial challenge 
could be mounted given Balaguer's sway over the judiciary and 
possible alternative interpretations of presidential constitu- 
tional powers. 

During the 1986-96 period, the military receded further as 
important political, strategic, or economic players, especially in 
contrast to the role they had played during Balaguer's first 
twelve years in power. The contexts were substantially different. 
In 1966 Balaguer took office shortly after a civil war that had 
provoked serious intramilitary rifts and left a legacy of polariza- 



202 



Dominican Republic: Government and Politics 



tion and continued commitment to violence among some. In 
1986 there were no active political forces committed to the use 
of violence. As in his first period as president, Balaguer sought 
to place officers he trusted in key places, occasionally rotating 
them to keep them off balance. However, far more than in the 
1960s and 1970s, he now made a mockery of any sense of mili- 
tary professionalism or career path. Balaguer also permitted 
the budget to decline; paid the military appallingly low salaries, 
thus inviting corruption; allowed the armed forces to become 
one of the most top heavy on the continent; and made generals 
out of individuals such as his personal chauffeur. 

The decline in military professionalism continued to deteri- 
orate the longer Balaguer remained in office. Not surprisingly, 
given the low salaries and lack of official functions for many 
officers, corruption was alleged to be rampant. For example, 
because of their presence along the Haitian border, the 
Dominican military played an important role in acquiring Hai- 
tian labor for state sugar mills, for which bribery was often 
involved, and also in "facilitating" contraband trade between 
the two countries (especially during the period of the interna- 
tional embargo of Haiti in 1993 and 1994). 

Balaguer's policies helped provoke unhappiness within the 
ranks of the military, especially among frustrated individuals in 
the lower ranks who perceived their chance of advancement as 
blocked by individuals who had been brought back from retire- 
ment and remained in place. Although some military might 
have been willing to support Balaguer by force of arms if called 
to do so, during the 1990s it appears that the Dominican 
armed forces were becoming increasingly divided in their polit- 
ical loyalties. In both the 1994 and 1996 elections, all the major 
presidential candidates and parties possessed the support of at 
least some military officers. Opposition parties did not com- 
plain of centralized military harassment against them, 
although evidence of local-level military bias was present. 

In sum, as a result of the actions of the PRD and the more 
cautious and cynical steps subsequently by Balaguer, the 
Dominican armed forces were largely not a political threat to 
democracy. Yet, occasionally, firm action was still required by 
the president: soon after assuming the presidency in August 
1996, President Fernandez was forced to dismiss the head of 
the air force, General Juan Bautista Rojas Tabar, when the gen- 
eral challenged the president's political authority. President 
Fernandez has been seeking to improve the degree of profes- 



203 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

sionalism of the armed forces. Yet, the military institution (or 
parts of it) remains a potential instrument of the president in 
power because it has not yet developed into a professional, 
well-organized semiautonomous but democratically account- 
able state institution. Furthermore, in the absence of a profes- 
sional, apolitical ethos, it is also possible for politically 
ambitious individuals within the military to rise through the 
ranks and represent a potential threat to civilian authority. 

Foreign Relations 

The Dominican Republic is a relatively small and weak coun- 
try, heavily dependent on the outside world economically and 
strategically, and located in the center of what was an impor- 
tant area for Cold War conflict in the world — the volatile Carib- 
bean. Because of these factors, various outside actors have long 
exercised a significant degree of influence in the island 
nation's internal politics. 

In the early nineteenth century, the principal outside actors 
were Spain, France, and Britain; toward the end of the century, 
Germany and the United States had also become involved in 
Dominican affairs. The United States has remained a central 
actor in Dominican affairs ever since. Because the Dominican 
Republic shares the island of Hispaniola with Haiti, and 
because Haiti represented a constant threat to the Dominican 
Republic both before and after the Haitian occupation of 
1822-44, Haiti also has exerted significant influence (see The 
Struggle for Formal Sovereignty and Ambivalent Sovereignty, 
Caudillo Rule, and Political Instability, ch. 1). In recent years, 
the economic importance of Europe has grown for the coun- 
try, particularly because of increased European aid flows and 
the large number of Europeans who vacation in the country. 

Various transnational actors have played a significant role in 
Dominican politics. These include private economic actors 
such as multinational corporations, and financial institutions 
such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank (see 
Glossary) , and the Inter-American Development Bank. They 
also include other international political or state actors such as 
the Socialist International (the international grouping of social 
democratic parties, which was highly involved in Dominican 
affairs during the 1970s and 1980s), the international Christian 
Democratic Union, the Vatican, and European assistance orga- 
nized through the Lome Convention (see Glossary). In recent 
years, they have included NGOs, principally from Europe and 



204 



Dominican Republic: Government and Politics 

from the United States, including such organizations as the 
American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organi- 
zations (AFL-CIO) and Human Rights Watch, which played an 
important role in applying pressure for passage of the 1992 
Labor Code in the Dominican Republic. In addition, overseas 
Dominicans must now be considered as important actors 
within the Dominican Republic because their remittances are a 
crucial source of foreign exchange and because Dominican 
political parties avidly seek their funding. The Dominican 
diaspora has also recently been given the right to vote in 
Dominican presidential elections, even as the diaspora also is 
beginning to have more of a presence in local politics in New 
York City and elsewhere where its numbers are concentrated. 

With regard to relations between the United States and the 
Dominican Republic, in the past issues that were central 
focused primarily on security concerns, protection of United 
States private economic actors, and expectations of political 
solidarity. Such issues are being increasingly superseded by new 
issues related to market-oriented reforms, democracy and 
human rights, drug trafficking, and migration. From the per- 
spective of the Dominican Republic, Dominican policy makers 
worry that the country is marginal to the concerns of United 
States policy makers; they also are concerned about unilateral- 
ism and potential pressure by the United States, no longer 
because of anticommunism, but as a consequence of issues 
such as narcotics, democracy, and human rights. Finally, the 
Fernandez government is putting forth efforts to enhance 
hemispheric cooperation around such issues as trade and 
respect for democracy. 

As a small, economically vulnerable country, the Dominican 
Republic has continually been forced to adapt to sudden 
changes in the world economy. Globalization has had contra- 
dictory effects on the country. On the one hand, it has gener- 
ated sometimes wrenching economic changes, weakening 
previously strong popular-sector organizations and stimulating 
further inequality, at least in the short term. The dramatic shift 
away from sugar exports toward tourism and free-trade zones is 
one example, as is the significant increase in emigration that 
was spurred in the 1980s and continues to this day. On the 
other hand, globalization has deepened the country's links to 
the outside world, providing external support for organizations 
committed to building or strengthening democratic account- 
ability within the country. This effect has been seen in the 



205 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

international support for electoral observers and for NGOs in 
areas such as labor, women's rights, and environmental issues. 

The country's major trade relations are with the United 
States, its primary partner, and with Japan, Venezuela, Mexico, 
and the European Union. In addition to sustaining diplomatic 
relations with these countries, the Dominican Republic main- 
tains embassies throughout the Western Hemisphere and in 
selected other countries, including the Republic of China (Tai- 
wan) and Israel. 

The Dominican Republic is a signatory to the Charter of the 
Organization of American States (OAS), the Inter-American 
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty), the Pact of 
Bogota, and all major inter-American conventions. Historically, 
its ties to and involvement in the OAS were stronger than its 
relations with the United Nations (UN) , although under Presi- 
dent Fernandez this is changing. 

The Dominican Republic is a member of the UN and its Eco- 
nomic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cul- 
tural Organization (UNESCO), the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO), 
and the International Court of Justice. It subscribes to the IMF, 
the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation (IFC — 
see Glossary), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 
the International Development Association (IDA — see Glos- 
sary), and the International Telecommunications Satellite 
Organization (Intelsat) . It is also a participant in the Interna- 
tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Universal Postal 
Union (UPU), and the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU), and is a member of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). 

The Dominican Republic faces significant foreign policy 
challenges. Under President Balaguer, the country had a low 
international profile and increasingly tense relations with the 
United States. Because of his age and his health, President Ba- 
laguer traveled abroad very little. A conservative nationalist, 
President Balaguer accepted the fact that the Dominican 
Republic was in the sphere of influence of the United States, 
yet he also resented its presence and its influence. Relations 
became especially tense around questions of democratic elec- 
tions and also with regard to Haiti, particularly when the 
United States was seeking to force the Haitian military to leave 



206 



Dominican Republic: Government and Politics 

in order for the deposed Jean-Bertrand Aristide to return to 
office. 

The country's international profile and its relations with the 
United States have changed considerably since President 
Fernandez assumed office in August 1996. In his first two years 
in office, President Fernandez has made foreign policy and 
international relations an important priority. He has worked to 
strengthen the country's Secretariat of State for Foreign Rela- 
tions and its diplomatic capabilities in terms of personnel and 
equipment. He has reached out to the country's Caribbean and 
Central American neighbors, seeking to have the Dominican 
Republic serve as a bridge between the two areas. He has rees- 
tablished diplomatic relations with Cuba. He has also worked 
with his Caribbean and Central American neighbors to find 
common ground on issues that affect their relations with each 
other and with the United States, such as drug trafficking, eco- 
nomic integration, improved access to United States markets, 
and the treatment of their emigrants in the United States, 
including concerns about the forced repatriation of convicted 
criminals to their country of origin. 

The growing international profile of President Fernandez 
and of the Dominican Republic is demonstrated by the fact 
that the country now presides over the African, Caribbean, and 
Pacific group of nations (under the Lome Convention that 
obtains aid for these countries from the European Union). 
Furthermore, the second summit meeting of heads of state of 
these nations was held in Santo Domingo in November 1999. 
In addition, the Dominican Republic presented the requests of 
this group to the meeting of the World Trade Organization in 
Seattle, which began in late November 1999. 

One of the most challenging relationships has been with 
Haiti. Although in general President Fernandez has sought to 
improve relations with Haiti, he has also responded to domes- 
tic fears and pressures revolving around the growing presence 
of Haitian migrants in the country. As Haiti's economic situa- 
tion has continued to deteriorate and Haitians have found it 
increasingly difficult to migrate to the United States, they 
increasingly attempt to enter the Dominican Republic. Large- 
scale deportations of Haitians during 1998 and 1999 met with 
protests; many deportees complained that they were not 
allowed to demonstrate that they were legally resident in the 
Dominican Republic and criticized their treatment while being 
transported out of the country. 



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Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Beginning with President Fernandez, awareness has grown 
in the Dominican Republic that maintaining an informed role 
in world affairs is crucial to helping the country confront the 
challenges it faces in an increasingly globalized world. The 
Dominican Republic's global outlook is facilitated by the extent 
of contact that broader elements of the Dominican population 
have with that world through family members who have emi- 
grated abroad, tourism, the media, and travel. 

* * * 

Many useful books are available on the government and pol- 
itics of the Dominican Republic. On the formative Trujillo era, 
see Jesus Galindez's The Era of Trujillo, the excellent biography 
by Robert Crassweller entitled Trujillo, and Howard J. Wiarda's 
Dictatorship and Development: The Methods of Control in Trujillo' s 
Dominican Republic. Post-Trujillo developments are treated in 
detail in John Bartlow Martin's Overtaken by Events, and Howard 
J. Wiarda's three-volume Dictatorship, Development, and Disinte- 
gration: Politics and Social Change in the Dominican Republic. The 
1965 revolution and intervention are well covered in Piero 
Gleijeses's The Dominican Crisis, Dan Kurzman's Santo Domingo: 
Revolt of the Damned, Abraham Lowenthal's The Dominican Inter- 
vention, and Jerome Slater's Intervention and Negotiation: The 
United States and the Dominican Republic. 

For the Balaguer era of the 1960s and 1970s, see G. Pope 
Atkins's Arms and Politics in the Dominican Republic, Ian Bell's The 
Dominican Republic, Rosario Espinal's "An Interpretation of the 
Democratic Transition in the Dominican Republic," and 
Howard J. Wiarda and Michael J. Kryzanek's The Dominican 
Republic: A Caribbean Crucible. More recent developments are 
analyzed in Jan Knippers Black's The Dominican Republic: Politics 
and Development in an Unsovereign State, James Ferguson's The 
Dominican Republic: Beyond the Lighthouse, a special issue of the 
North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) Report 
on the Americas entitled "The Dominican Republic After the 
Caudillos," Jonathan Hartlyn's The Struggle for Democratic Politics 
in the Dominican Republic, and Rosario Espinal and Jonathan 
Hartlyn's "The Dominican Republic: The Long and Difficult 
Struggle for Democracy." (For further information and com- 
plete citations, see Bibliography.) 



208 



Chapter 5. Dominican Republic: 
National Security 




The Torre del Homenaje, Santo Domingo 



BY TRADITION, THE DOMINICAN Republic's armed forces 
have been active in the competition for national political 
power and have often functioned as a praetorian guard for the 
government holding power. The turbulent period of the early 
1960s led to three coups against the civilian government by the 
military leadership. Violence between reformist and conserva- 
tive military elements brought the country close to civil war in 
1965, and intervention by the United States was required to 
restore order. However, it appeared that during the 1970s and 
the 1980s, successive governments were able to reduce the mil- 
itary's former role in national political life as self-appointed 
final arbiter of public policy. 

By the late 1980s, the stature of the armed forces had been 
reduced to that of an important interest group competing with 
other such groups for power and influence within the nation's 
increasingly pluralistic political system. It would be premature, 
however, to conclude that the goal of developing an institution- 
alized and apolitical military establishment had been com- 
pletely realized by 1999. Individual military officers continued 
to exert considerable political influence, and armed forces 
units continued to be employed overtly during political cam- 
paigns. Nevertheless, the military's explicit support of civilian 
governments during the 1980s, and particularly of Joaquin Ba- 
laguer Ricardo, who served as president between 1986 and 
1996, suggested that the armed forces had accepted the princi- 
ple of civilian control. The military leadership benefited finan- 
cially during Balaguer's rule, but could not act independently 
of the president. Balaguer's successor, Leonel Fernandez 
Reyna, began his term by dismissing or retiring many generals 
in what was seen as part of an effort to restore higher standards 
to a military institution whose standards had slackened under 
Balaguer. 

The armed forces have as their primary mission the defense 
of the nation's territorial integrity. However, as of 1999, the 
country faced no credible external threat, and the military 
served more as an internal security force, working with the 
National Police and the narcotics police to maintain domestic 
order, to combat the increasingly serious problem of narcotics 
trafficking, and to control contraband and illegal immigration 
from Haiti. 



211 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Although the Dominican Republic no longer faces a domes- 
tic insurgency threat, popular economic discontent has 
resulted in frequent protests and strikes that occasionally have 
become violent, resulting in injuries and some deaths. Soldiers 
are routinely assigned to help the police and have sometimes 
been accused of excessive force in clashes with demonstrators. 
Most of these disturbances are rooted in despair over the con- 
stant deterioration of living conditions for ordinary citizens as 
well as a decline in the level and quality of public services. 

The country's security forces often have been called upon to 
prevent violence and disturbances in connection with political 
campaigns and elections by measures that included detentions 
of antigovernment figures. In 1996, however, presidential 
power was transferred peacefully and smoothly after elections 
described as the cleanest in the country's history. 

Defense budgets since the early 1980s have shown little 
change except for measurable increases between 1993 and 
1996. Weapons replacement and modernization have been 
almost abandoned as spending constraints preclude outlays 
much beyond pay and benefits. As a consequence, the readi- 
ness of the armed forces to deal with any threat from abroad is 
severely limited. They are capable of carrying out most internal 
security functions, but lack the resources to adequately patrol 
the country's borders against the flow of illicit drugs. 

The armed forces in 1999 consisted of about 24,300 active- 
duty personnel. The army has seven brigades, most organized 
along constabulary or tactical infantry lines. The air force oper- 
ates three flying squadrons, only one of which is armed, and 
the navy maintains twelve armed patrol vessels. The Dominican 
military is second in size to Cuba's military in the Caribbean. 

The National Police, the National Department of Investiga- 
tions, and the National Drug Control Directorate also share 
responsibility for security matters. The latter two groups, which 
draw personnel from both the military and the police, report 
directly to the president. 

The criminal justice system comes under the jurisdiction of 
the national government. The system, according to its critics, 
has many shortcomings, including interference by political 
authorities, judicial corruption, maladministration of the 
courts, and scandalously poor prison conditions. Much police 
misconduct goes unpunished. In addition, the Dominican 
Republic has become a primary way station in the transport of 
narcotics between Colombia and the United States. Dominican 



212 



Dominican Republic: National Security 



nationals are leading figures in drug distribution and delivery 
in New York and throughout the northeastern United States. 
Rarely do narcotics-related crimes result in prison sentences in 
the Dominican Republic. 

The presidential administration that took office in 1996 had 
drug corruption and judicial and prison reform on its agenda. 
Measures have been introduced to make the criminal justice 
system more humane and effective and independent of poli- 
tics. As the head of a minority party, the president nevertheless 
faces an uphill battle in cleansing the bureaucracy, the military, 
and justice and law enforcement agencies of the influence of 
the well-entrenched drug interests. 

History and Development of the Armed Forces 

Spanish colonial militias were the first organized military 
forces in what is now the Dominican Republic. These forces 
maintained law and order over the entire island of Hispaniola, 
which from 1496 was ruled from Santo Domingo, the center of 
Spanish colonial administration in the New World (see The 
First Colony, ch. 1). By the mid-1500s, when Spain's interests 
shifted to the richer colonies of Mexico and Peru, the Domini- 
can colony had a well-established hierarchical social system that 
was based on authoritarian rule by a small white elite. The col- 
ony also included a large black slave population (see Ethnic 
Heritage, ch. 2). 

The shift in Spain's colonial interests and the consequent 
withdrawal of most of Spain's military from the Dominican col- 
ony was followed by a long period of economic and political 
decay, during which domestic order deteriorated. The colony 
was threatened by pirates along the coast as well as by periodic 
encroachment by the forces of France and England, which 
were competing with each other and with Spain for territory 
and power in the New World. 

As a result of this competition, Spain was forced in 1697 to 
cede the western third of Hispaniola to France. Nevertheless, 
border disputes continued, and by 1797 France had prevailed 
on Spain to cede the rest of the island. 

Before French rule became established in the Dominican 
colony, however, a slave revolt broke out in the western portion 
of the island, which came to be known as Haiti. In what proved 
to be the first in a series of Haitian incursions into Dominican 
territory, the rebellious Haitians invaded the poor and less 
populous eastern side of the island in 1801. Haitian forces were 



213 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

repelled, but the rebellion within Haiti continued, and the 
French were forced to withdraw from the island by 1804. In 
1809, helped by Britain, Spain regained control of the Domini- 
can portion of the island. Spain ruled only until 1821, however, 
when the Dominican colonists revolted. Independence lasted 
just a few weeks before Haiti invaded in 1822. The Dominicans 
were not able to expel the Haitian forces until 1844 (see The 
Struggle for Formal Sovereignty, ch. 1). 

The long-delayed achievement of independence did not 
bring peace to the new Dominican Republic, nor did it 
improve public order. Political power was extremely decentral- 
ized, and competition among factions of the landowning white 
elite produced a level of national disunity that had disastrous 
effects on public safety. Although the central government had 
established a national army, this force essentially consisted of a 
small group of officers who were interested chiefly in personal 
enrichment and whose duties were largely ceremonial. The 
national army was far outnumbered by armed militias that were 
organized and maintained by local caudillos, who had set 
themselves up as provincial governors. Using these militias, the 
caudillos waged bloody civil wars as they contended for 
regional and national power. National political life was charac- 
terized by repeated coups and military uprisings against which- 
ever caudillo — usually self-promoted to general-officer status — 
had gathered enough power to seize the presidency. 

The continuous civil war, political upheaval, and misrule 
that characterized the republic's early years were punctuated by 
repeated Haitian attempts to invade. During such periods of 
danger, forces larger than the small national army were needed 
to defend the country. These forces, hastily raised and poorly 
equipped, were essentially conglomerations of regional militias 
that had been filled out by poor farmers or landless plantation 
workers who had been pressed into service. Once the threat 
had subsided and Haitian forces had been repelled, the militias 
would return to advancing the cause of particular regional 
leaders. The impressed troops would return home, where some 
would contribute to the general state of disorder by taking up 
banditry. 

During its first thirty years of independence, the Dominican 
Republic was run directly, or indirectly, by General Pedro San- 
tana Familias and General Buenaventura Baez Mendez, whose 
bitter rivalry was played out in civil wars that resulted in alter- 
nating Santana and Baez regimes (see Ambivalent Sovereignty, 



214 



Dominican troops participating in a parade 
Courtesy Embassy of the Dominican Republic, Washington 

Caudillo Rule, and Political Instability, ch. 1). Each of the two 
generals used his position to enrich himself, his relatives, and 
his followers at public expense. To deal with the national bank- 
ruptcy caused by civil war, corruption, and mismanagement, 
San tana called on Spain in 1861 to restore colonial rule. The 
Dominicans soon had enough of Spanish control, and in 1865 
Spain was again forced out. As a result of army restructuring 
after the restoration, existing military tendencies in Dominican 
society became more pronounced. 

General Ulises Heureaux became president in 1882. During 
his brutal, dictatorial rule, factionalism was repressed, and the 
nation enjoyed relative internal peace. The army emerged as a 
standing organization for the first time, based on a system of 
conscription that affected mainly peasants. The number of 
officers increased sharply, and military expenditures domi- 
nated the state budget. By 1897 Heureaux was able to boast of a 
disciplined army with 14,000 Remington rifles and six artillery 
batteries. With the country's newly built rail lines and a modest 
navy, the force had considerable mobility. 

After Heureaux was assassinated in 1899, political factions 
again contested for power and for access to the national trea- 
sury. By 1904 the economy was in shambles, and foreign gov- 



215 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

ernments were threatening to use force to collect defaulted 
loans. Citing the need to avert European intervention, the 
United States assumed control of Dominican customs receipts 
in 1905. Amid continuing disorder, a force of 750 United States 
Marines landed in 1912, and in 1916 they were authorized by 
President Woodrow Wilson to take full control of the Domini- 
can government (see From the United States Occupation 
(1916-24) to the Emergence of Trujillo (1930), ch. 1). 

The marines disbanded the regional militias and ruled the 
nation directly for eight years, acting as police in cities and in 
rural areas. As part of its effort to build effective institutions of 
government in the Dominican Republic, the United States 
formed a new Dominican Constabulary Guard of about 2,000 
officers and men to replace the old national army. Up to this 
time, both the civilian and the military elites had been drawn 
from the same wealthy landowning class. Intense resentment 
among the elites against the United States presence, however, 
made it impossible to find recruits for the new constabulary 
among the landowning class. The ranks became filled by the 
lower strata of Dominican society and, as a result, the new force 
had neither ties nor debts to the traditional elite. The most 
notable representative of the new military leadership was 
Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, who entered the Dominican 
Constabulary Guard in 1919 as a second lieutenant. By curtail- 
ing the power of regional caudillos, the constabulary gave the 
country a sense of political unity and provided the structure for 
the emergence of a new elite that would eventually control 
political life. 

In 1924, after the Dominican Republic had adopted a new 
constitution and had elected a civilian president, the United 
States forces withdrew. The same year, the constabulary was 
renamed the Dominican National Police, a somewhat mislead- 
ing title for what had become more a military entity than a law 
enforcement organization. By that time, Trujillo had risen to 
the rank of major and had assumed one of the nation's two 
field commands. He had also emerged as one of the most influ- 
ential voices within the force, increasingly able to mold its 
development to suit his personal ambitions. In 1928 when the 
National Police was renamed the National Army (Ejercito 
Nacional), Trujillo became a lieutenant colonel and army chief 
of staff. In this role, Trujillo was the most powerful individual 
in the nation even before his election to the presidency in 1930 
(see The Trujillo Era, 1930-61, ch. 1) 



216 



Dominican Republic: National Security 

By the 1930s, the new Dominican military establishment had 
developed into a centrally controlled and well-disciplined force 
that was both larger and far better equipped than any previous 
Dominican army. New rifles and machine guns were pur- 
chased, and an artillery element was fashioned by combining 
Krupp 77mm guns from the old Dominican army with newer 
37mm and 77mm guns. The unified, apolitical, and profes- 
sional force that had been envisioned by the United States mili- 
tary government had not been realized, however. Instead, 
traditional Dominican patterns of military service persisted, 
including factionalism, politicization, and the perception that 
position entitled one to personal enrichment. Trujillo encour- 
aged and strengthened these patterns, and used them both to 
retain the support of the armed forces and to control them. 
Military officers became an elite class, gaining wealth, favors, 
prestige and power, and developing an esprit de corps that 
Trujillo carefully nurtured. Under these conditions, a career in 
the military came to be esteemed as an avenue of upward 
mobility. The services themselves were built up, large quantities 
of arms were imported, and a defense industry was established. 
The country was divided into three military zones, each garri- 
soned by a two-battalion brigade. 

Trujillo rationalized maintenance of a large military by cit- 
ing the purported need for vigilance against Haiti and, particu- 
larly after the Cuban Revolution of 1959, against communism. 
For the most part, however, Trujillo used the large and power- 
ful military establishment to maintain internal control over the 
nation. The army and the navy intelligence services were 
among the numerous agencies Trujillo employed to maintain 
close surveillance and rigid control over the population. In 
1957 the intelligence and secret police organizations were uni- 
fied into the State Security Secretariat. With a personnel 
strength of 5,000, this new organization was larger than either 
the regular National Police, the air force, or the navy. 

The military establishment claimed an increasingly greater 
share of the national budget. Part of the military costs were off- 
set by basing privileges granted to the United States during 
World War II. The basing agreement enabled the Dominican 
Republic to qualify for Lend-Lease aid. However, only limited 
equipment transfers took place, mostly light weapons and 
lightly armored vehicles. After the war ended, the country 
acquired larger quantities of surplus stocks, including 105mm 
howitzers, light tanks, and half-track armored personnel carri- 



217 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

ers. Sweden and Brazil became important suppliers of materiel; 
combat, training, and transport aircraft were acquired from 
Britain and the United States. 

Trujillo did not rely solely on rewards to keep control over 
the military. He maintained personal command of all aspects 
of military organization, including promotions, logistics, 
assignments, and discipline. He constantly shuffled personnel 
from assignment to assignment to prevent any potential rival 
from gaining an independent power base. Trujillo also used 
the tactic of frequent inspections, sometimes in person and 
sometimes by undercover operatives, to keep tabs on both men 
and operations. In addition, he brought many of his relatives 
and supporters into the armed forces, promoting them rapidly 
as a reward for loyalty. 

As part of his effort to maintain control over the armed 
forces, Trujillo built up the air force as a political counterbal- 
ance to the army, and he encouraged factionalism in all the ser- 
vices. A full armored battalion was formed at San Isidro Air 
Base outside Santo Domingo. This battalion, which was directly 
subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, essentially constituted 
a fourth armed force, further splintering power within the mil- 
itary. The total complement of 10,000 men was supplemented 
by a call-up of reservists after Fidel Castro Ruz established his 
communist dictatorship in Cuba in 1959. The government 
acquired many additional weapons from a variety of sources, 
notably 106mm recoilless rifles from the United States and 
AMX-13 tanks from France. The Dominican army easily 
crushed an invasion from Cuba of anti-Trujillo Dominicans in 
July 1959. 

After Trujillo was assassinated in 1961, the military, as the 
nation's most powerful and best-organized interest group, 
claimed a major role in the political competition that followed. 
It soon became clear, however, that the factionalism encour- 
aged by Trujillo prevented the military from acting as a unified 
institution. Instead, elements of the armed services allied with 
various civilian politicians. After Juan Bosch Gaviho of the cen- 
ter-left won the presidential election in 1962, portions of the 
military became alarmed over his reforms and his tolerance of 
leftists and legal communist parties. In 1963 armed forces offic- 
ers, led by Elias Wessin y Wessin (a colonel at the time), over- 
threw Bosch and replaced him with a civilian junta. Another 
faction of officers calling themselves Constitutionalists favored 
the return of Bosch. In 1965 this faction overthrew the Chilian 



218 



Dominican Republic: National Security 

junta. In the following days, civil war erupted as the armed 
forces split into warring camps. The majority within the armed 
forces united behind Wessin y Wessin (by this time a general) 
and attacked the new government with armored and air sup- 
port. The Constitutionalists armed their civilian supporters in 
order to defend the capital (see Democratic Struggles and Fail- 
ures, ch. 1). 

United States intervention in the conflict halted the fight- 
ing, but subsequent efforts to reunify the armed forces were 
only partly successful. The agreement to reintegrate those 
officers who had supported Bosch was never fully imple- 
mented, and only a few gained readmission. Politically, the out- 
look of the officer corps remained right of center after the civil 
war. 

Although the armed forces continued to be a significant fac- 
tor, their influence on national political life steadily declined. 
This decline began during the administration of Joaquin Ba- 
laguer Ricardo (1966-78; 1986-96), who made effective use of 
some of the same tactics employed by Trujillo to maintain con- 
trol over the military, including the encouragement and 
manipulation of factionalism within the officer corps and the 
frequent shuffling of top assignments. He also increased the 
number of general officers from six in 1966 to forty-eight by 
1978. At the same time, Balaguer gave senior officers a stake in 
his regime by appointing many to positions in government and 
in state-run enterprises. He also extended valuable sugar-grow- 
ing concessions for government mills. 

The process of reining in the military advanced significantly 
during the terms of Balaguer's successors, Silvestre Antonio 
Guzman Fernandez (1978-82) and Salvador Jorge Blanco 
(1982-86), each of whom made an effort to institutionalize the 
armed forces and to remove the powerful group of officers 
who had supported Trujillo and Balaguer. The partial success 
of their efforts was demonstrated in the period from 1984 to 
1985, when the armed forces leadership repeatedly and pub- 
licly supported Jorge Blanco's government in the face of social 
unrest provoked by adverse economic conditions. Although 
Jorge Blanco had not been the military's preferred candidate 
in the 1982 elections, the leadership chose to support him as 
constitutional head of state rather than to take power itself. 

Military capability in the years after the 1965 civil war 
declined to an even greater extent than did the armed forces' 
national political role. After that time, each administration 



219 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

faced increasing national economic constraints that forced 
stringent limits on defense spending. Although force levels and 
personnel budgets were generally left untouched, aging equip- 
ment was not replaced. As a result, as of 1999 equipment in all 
three services was outmoded, in short supply, and of doubtful 
operational utility. 

Role of the Military in Public Life 

The 1966 constitution describes the armed forces as "essen- 
tially obedient and apolitical and without the right to deliber- 
ate. The purpose of their creation is to defend the 
independence and integrity of the republic, to maintain public 
order, and to uphold the Constitution and the laws." By law, 
members of the armed forces are denied the right to vote and 
the right to participate in the activities of political parties and 
organized labor. 

Since the early 1960s, the political influence of the military 
has declined. And military officers have largely accepted their 
status as defenders of national sovereignty and their subservi- 
ence to the civilian government hierarchy. During Balaguer's 
first two terms (1966-78), the president reinforced his control 
by accommodating high officers, helping them to become 
landowners, merchants, and industrialists, positions they could 
not have attained had they remained in the purely military 
sphere. When Balaguer left office in 1978, the officers were 
reluctant to see power handed over to Antonio Guzman, fear- 
ing a threat to their profitable positions. Their fears were justi- 
fied. Guzman retired some forty pro-Balaguer generals and 
introduced a period of military professionalization. When Ba- 
laguer resumed power in 1986, however, the retired generals 
were reintegrated into the military and offered a financial 
stake in the regime. Although friendly to the military establish- 
ment, Balaguer's authoritarian style enabled him to keep it on 
a tight leash (see Interest Groups and Social Actors, ch. 4). 

After disputed elections marred by fraud in 1994 between 
Jose Francisco Peha Gomez of the Dominican Revolutionary 
Party (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano — PRD) and Bal- 
aguer of the Reformist Social Christian Party (Partido Reform- 
ista Social Cristiano — PRSC), the Dominican military openly 
supported the election board's declaration of Balaguer's vic- 
tory. (Balaguer had won elections in 1966, 1970, and 1974; was 
voted out of office in 1978; and was reelected in 1986 and 
1990.) An official communique warned against attempts to 



220 



President Fernandez attending the 
graduation of various infantry classes, 1997 
Courtesy Embassy of the Dominican Republic, 

Washington 



undo the decision, saying that the armed forces "would not 
omit efforts to guarantee public peace and the tranquillity and 
serenity that the Dominican family enjoys." 

A post-election agreement in 1994 limited Balaguer's term to 
two years, and lawyer Leonel Fernandez Reyna, new head of 
the PRD, won in a run-off election. Soon after taking office in 
1996, President Fernandez undertook efforts to reprofessional- 
ize the military leadership, which had become preoccupied 
with its own enrichment under Balaguer's policy of granting 
economic and commercial privileges. He retired twenty-four of 
the country's seventy generals, most of whom were considered 
allies of Balaguer. The president also replaced the head of the 
navy, the head of the air force, the head of the state intelli- 
gence service, and the commander of the second brigade. 
Admiral Ruben Paulino Alvarez continued as secretary of state 
for the armed forces. Although Fernandez faces opposition 
from pro-Balaguer factions in the officer corps, he may be able 
to count on a more liberal group of officers to support him in 
the transition to a more democratic style of government. 



221 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Missions 

No valid purpose exists for armed forces structured to 
defend the Dominican Republic's security because the country 
faces no foreseeable external military threat. The principal jus- 
tification for the military establishment is the containment of 
possible civil unrest. The military is thus largely organized as an 
internal security force. The armed forces also constitute a prin- 
cipal line of defense against international drug trafficking. 
However, in spite of help from the United States, the flow of 
narcotics has not been stemmed because of equipment and 
budget limitations as well as insufficiently motivated personnel. 

The Dominican Republic has a tradition of enmity toward 
Haiti although the military officers of the two countries have 
maintained friendly relations. On a personal level, President 
Balaguer had little incentive to enforce the United Nations 
(UN) embargo against the Haitian military regime in 1994 
because it was intended to help restore the government of Pres- 
ident Jean-Bertrand Aristide, whom Balaguer personally dis- 
liked. The unhindered movement of goods, particularly 
gasoline, across the lightly patrolled border with Haiti under- 
cut the effectiveness of the embargo. Only after coming under 
heavy international pressure did Balaguer agree to seal the bor- 
der by replacing corrupt border guards with 10,000 or more 
troops. The United States provided radios and night vision 
equipment, and a UN observer force was dispatched to help 
stiffen the Dominican effort. The Dominican army cut down 
embargo violations by day but was unable to prevent activity at 
night. It was also alleged that many of the border troops were 
less interested in interdicting gasoline than in ensuring their 
share of the bribe money changing hands. 

After the return of the Aristide government in 1994, several 
of the more notorious of the Haitian military coup leaders took 
refuge in the Dominican Republic, where their presence 
became a source of tension between the two governments. In 
1996, however, they were deported by the Dominican authori- 
ties and left for Central America. 

Dominican army troops and observation posts are thinly 
located along the length of the 388-kilometer frontier. Border 
forces are principally concerned with illegal border crossings 
and contraband, especially narcotics. Haitian military capabil- 
ity has been clearly unequal to that of Dominican forces, and 
incursions in whatever form could be handled. Any latent Hai- 
tian threat became even more improbable after the Haitian 



222 



Dominican Republic: National Security 

armed forces were abolished in 1995. The renewal of upheaval 
in Haiti would present a danger of large-scale refugee move- 
ments, however. The several hundred thousand legal and ille- 
gal Haitian immigrants who work in the nation as agricultural 
laborers are already a recurring source of tension, and the 
Dominicans would face increasing difficulty in controlling bor- 
der movement if the economic situation in Haiti caused more 
Haitians to flee conditions in their own country (see Foreign 
Relations, ch. 4). 

After Castro's assumption of power in 1959, the Dominican 
Republic saw Cuba as a potential external threat. This view, 
which was rooted in the anticommunist sentiments espoused 
by Trujillo, is still held by most military officers. It also has a 
basis in the 1959 Cuban-based invasion attempt by anti-Trujillo 
Dominicans. Cuba itself, however, has never taken overt mili- 
tary action against the nation. Critics have charged the armed 
forces with justifying attacks on leftist political groups and on 
political and labor activists by falsely accusing them of having 
ties with Cuba. 

Until the mid-1970s, the military occasionally conducted 
operations against limited insurgencies, but by the late 1970s 
the country was relatively free of insurgent groups. In 1990 
eight terrorist attacks, mainly bomb explosions, were directed 
against United States targets in the Dominican Republic. None 
of the attacks resulted in the death of a United States citizen. 
Some were linked to the United States military action against 
Panama. A group calling itself the Revolutionary Army of the 
People claimed responsibility for several of the attacks. The 
government blamed the National Union of Revolutionary Stu- 
dents and other communist organizations for attempting to 
organize a campaign of terror and subversion. 

As part of its mission to assist the police in maintaining pub- 
lic order, the military keeps watch on political groups deemed 
to be possible sources of instability, including opposition par- 
ties of the far left that have little following but operate freely. 

Interdiction of illegal immigration is another mission of the 
armed forces. The country has become an important way sta- 
tion for would-be immigrants to the United States who attempt 
to cross the 175-kilometer-wide Mona Passage to Puerto Rico. 
Refugees from many corners of the world congregate on the 
country's northern coast to make contact with boat captains. 
Local officials are often bribed to overlook the activity. 
Although the armed forces cooperate with the United States in 



223 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

intercepting the refugees, the navy's tight budget hampers its 
interdiction efforts. 

Article 93 of the constitution states that an objective of the 
armed forces is the pursuit of civic-action programs and, at the 
direction of the executive branch, participation in projects that 
promote national, social, and economic development. The 
armed forces hence conduct civic-action activities in the form 
of well-digging; road, home, and school construction; and the 
provision of sports and educational equipment to rural 
schools. The military also runs the most important vocational 
school system in the nation. Navy schools train diesel mechan- 
ics, for example, and the army is largely responsible for forest 
conservation. In addition, military medical and dental teams 
pay visits to remote areas, and the air force has transported 
medicine, doctors, and supplies to areas damaged by hurri- 
canes and other natural disasters. The navy also plays a role in 
transporting fuel oil. 

Armed Forces Organization, Training, and Equip- 
ment 

Under the constitution, the president of the republic is the 
commander in chief of the armed forces. The chain of com- 
mand extends from the president to the secretary of state for 
the armed forces and then to deputy secretaries of state for the 
army, navy, and air force (see fig. 6). The secretary and the 
three deputies are all military personnel. In the past, the secre- 
tary has usually been an army lieutenant general although an 
admiral held the post in 1998 and the incumbent in 1999 was a 
major general, Manuel de Jesus Florentine The secretary is 
appointed by the president and also serves as chief of the 
armed forces general staff. The deputies, normally holding the 
rank of major general or rear admiral, are appointed by the 
secretary with the approval of the president. 

Each deputy controls his service through a chief of staff and 
a general staff that consists of five principal sections: person- 
nel, intelligence, operations, logistics, and public affairs. In 
addition, an administrative judge advocate section for each ser- 
vice handles military legal matters. Except in emergencies, the 
chiefs of staff exercise operational control over the three ser- 
vices of the armed forces. 

The army is responsible for the nation's land territory and 
for the border with Haiti. The navy is responsible for coastal 



224 



Dominican Republic: National Security 

waters, port areas, dams, rivers, and lakes. The air force is 
responsible for the operation and security of international air- 
ports, local airports, and landing strips. 

The Secretariat of State for the Armed Forces operates sev- 
eral schools, including the three military academies. It also 
runs the General Juan Pablo Duarte Military Institute of 
Advanced Studies located in Santo Domingo, which operates a 
one-year command and staff program for senior officers and a 
six-month course of advanced strategic studies. The institute 
also offers fourteen specialized courses, including military 
intelligence, foreign languages, and military law. Another 
school at the same location, the General Directorate for Mili- 
tary Training, gives a specialized course for captains and first 
lieutenants, with a branch for noncommissioned officers. It has 
introduced courses on human rights, environmental protec- 
tion, and forestry. 

The secretariat also administers the Vocational School of the 
Armed Forces and Police, which is headquartered in Santo 
Domingo and has twenty-three branches throughout the coun- 
try. With a student body primarily composed of civilians, its 
offerings include courses in carpentry, electricity, auto 
mechanics, industrial mechanics, plumbing, and leather and 
metal working. Some courses are also taught in prisons. The 
school operates a job placement program for its graduates. 

The armed forces maintain an integrated judicial system for 
courts-martial for officers, and each branch conducts courts for 
minor offenses. All persons subject to military jurisdiction who 
commit a crime or misdemeanor while on military duty are 
accountable to military authorities. Those not on military duty 
are liable to prosecution by civilian authorities. 

Army 

As of 1999, the Dominican army had a strength of approxi- 
mately 15,000, about twice the size of the navy and air force 
combined. The army is organized into seven brigades com- 
posed of battalions that fall into one of two categories — admin- 
istrative, which perform constabulary functions, and tactical, 
which are organized as combat units. Purely tactical brigades 
are generally composed of three battalions, while administra- 
tive brigades have no fixed number of battalions and may have 
as many as five or six. 

The first brigade, headquartered in the capital, is a combat 
brigade with two battalions in the capital and one at San 



225 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 




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227 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Cristobal nearby (see fig. 7). The second brigade, with head- 
quarters in Santiago, has three administrative and two tactical 
battalions, the first in Santiago and the second, a Special Force, 
in the central mountains at Constanza. The third brigade is an 
administrative brigade at San Juan in the west. One of its battal- 
ions patrols the frontier with Haiti. The fourth brigade has its 
headquarters in Valverde. One of its two battalions patrols the 
northern part of the border with Haiti. The fifth brigade has 
headquarters at Barahona, with one tactical and two adminis- 
trative battalions scattered in the southwest. The sixth brigade 
is designated as combat support. It has five battalions — artil- 
lery, armor, medical, engineering, and transportation — and 
quartermaster services. The seventh brigade is designated as a 
training brigade. 

One independent battalion, headquartered at San Pedro de 
Macoris, has four companies stationed at provincial capitals at 
the eastern end of the island. A mixed tactical battalion of 
army, navy, and air force infantry units headquartered in Santo 
Domingo reports directly to the secretary of state for the 
armed forces. It includes a mixed Special Forces unit trained in 
antiterrorism. 

The army's principal small arm is the German G3 7.62mm 
rifle. Its armored assets include twelve French AMX-13 tanks 
and twelve American M-41A1 light tanks, all mounting 76mm 
guns. Eight Cadillac Gage V-150 Commando armored vehicles 
and twenty half-tracks serve as armored personnel carriers. 
The artillery units maintain twenty-two 105mm towed howit- 
zers and are also equipped with 81mm and 120mm mortars 
(see table 12, Appendix). Most of the foregoing weapons date 
from the post-World War II period, and their present opera- 
tional utility is considered doubtful. 

Army enlisted personnel receive basic training at the Armed 
Forces Training Center near San Isidro, ten kilometers east of 
the capital. Advanced and specialized training is also provided 
to relevant units. Officer candidates are required to be high- 
school graduates and to meet strict physical requirements. 
Officer cadets attend the four-year Military Academy at San 
Isidro. A six-month course for infantry captains and lieutenants 
is conducted to prepare young officers to function as company 
commanders. Senior officers attend the Armed Forces Staff 
College in Santo Domingo to prepare for battalion-level and 
higher commands. 



228 



Dominican Republic: National Security 

Navy 

A Dominican navy was first established in 1873, when the 
country acquired a gunboat built in Scotland. By the time the 
navy was disbanded in 1916 during the United States Marine 
occupation, the fleet had acquired only two more gunboats 
and four armed launches. Several elements of the navy were 
incorporated into the Dominican Constabulary Guard in 1917 
to function as a small coast guard. The navy remained an ele- 
ment of the National Army until 1943, when the Dominican 
National Navy was formally established as a separate service. 
During the next year, the navy began activities at the naval base 
at Las Calderas; in 1948 a separate naval school opened there. 

The navy received a number of coast guard cutters from the 
United States just before the outbreak of World War II. Three 
additional cutters were transferred after the transport Presidente 
Trujillowas sunk by a German submarine in 1942. The Domini- 
can Republic was not actively involved in the war although it 
made base facilities available to the United States. As a conse- 
quence of the purchase of numerous war-surplus vessels as part 
of a postwar expansion program, the Dominican navy became 
the most powerful in the Caribbean, with personnel number- 
ing 3,000, including one marine battalion. Naval strength had 
leveled off by the time of the 1965 civil war when naval units 
participated in the shelling of Constitutionalist positions in 
Santo Domingo. After 1965, aging vessels were not replaced, 
and the naval inventory steadily declined. 

As of 1999, the active naval complement was 3,800 officers 
and men, a reduction of 25 percent from ten years earlier. Navy 
headquarters are located at the 27 de Febrero Naval Base in 
Santo Domingo. The other principal base is at Las Calderas. 
The navy also has facilities at the ports of Barahona, Haina, La 
Romana, Monte Cristi, Pedernales, Puerto Plata, Samana, and 
San Pedro de Macoris. 

The navy chief of staff supervises the operations of the 
regional commands. The Santo Domingo Naval Zone includes 
the naval headquarters and the various naval organizations 
located in the capital. The headquarters of the Northern Naval 
Zone, at Puerto Plata, are responsible for the Atlantic coast 
from the northern border with Haiti to the Mona Passage. The 
Southern Naval Zone, headquartered at Barahona, covers the 
southwest coastal area to the Haitian border. The Eastern Naval 
Zone, with headquarters at La Romana, covers the eastern end 
of the island. 



229 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



International boundary 
National capital 
Populated place 
Brigade headquarters 
Independent battalion 
Naval base 

Naval facility or regional 
command headquarters 
Major airbase 
Other airbase 




Figure 7. Dominican Republic: Military Bases and Headquarters, 1 999 



By 1999 national economic constraints had reduced the 
Dominican fleet to twelve armed patrol vessels and thirteen 
support ships, tugboats, and sail training ships. Most of the 
armed vessels are World War-II vintage craft of United States 
origin. The largest is a 1,000-ton (fully loaded) patrol vessel of 
the Balsam class, formerly a United States Coast Guard cutter 
transferred to the Dominican Republic in 1995 for antinarcot- 
ics patrols. Only limited use has been made of the new vessel 
because of insufficient fuel supplies. The most heavily armed 
are two 855-ton corvettes sold to the Dominican Republic in 
1976. Each mounts two 76mm guns. An Admiral-class gunship 
of 905 tons, a former United States minesweeper, and a Satoy- 
omo-class vessel of 860 tons are each mounted with a single 
76mm gun. Smaller patrol craft are fitted with Bofors 40mm 




230 



Dominican Republic: National Security 

machine guns and Oerlikon 20mm machine guns (see table 
13, Appendix). The navy has at its disposal two Alouette III 
helicopters and five Cessna T-41D aircraft for inshore coastal 
reconnaissance. Naval aircraft are operated by air force liaison 
personnel. A battalion-sized naval infantry unit is headquar- 
tered at Santo Domingo. 

The Dominican Navy undertook a concerted effort in 1999, 
in cooperation with the United States Coast Guard, to inter- 
cept illegal shipments to Puerto Rico of persons, weapons, and 
drugs. In addition, the navy created a motorized company to 
interdict illegal crossings. The company consists primarily of 
fifty-five naval officers who patrol the coasts on all-terrain 
motorbikes, equipped with night vision and communications 
gear. 

Naval enlisted personnel receive instruction at the training 
center at Las Calderas. The Naval Academy at Las Calderas 
offers a four-year course to officer cadets. 

Air Force 

The air force traces its origins to 1928, when the govern- 
ment, inspired by the use of air power in World War I, autho- 
rized the creation of an aviation school. The first military 
aviation element was formed in 1932 as an arm of the National 
Army. The air force became an independent service in 1948. 
After several name changes, it has been officially designated as 
the Dominican Air Force since 1962. 

Beginning in 1942, with the grant of base facilities to the 
United States, the Dominican Republic received shipments of 
aircraft under the Lend-Lease program, mostly light trainers. 
Later, after the signing of the Rio Treaty in 1947, the United 
States provided twenty-five F-47 fighter-bombers, plus C-46 
and C-47 transports and additional trainers. Trujillo later pur- 
chased two B-17 and two B-25 bombers from commercial 
sources. In 1952 he made a large purchase of jet fighter-bomb- 
ers from Sweden and F-51Ds from the United States. By the 
mid-1950s, the air force had some 240 aircraft and some 3,500 
uniformed personnel. After Trujillo's assassination, however, 
funds were not forthcoming for the replacement of aging air- 
craft, and the air force's capabilities dwindled rapidly. 

Air force headquarters are located at San Isidro Air Base 
near Santo Domingo. Most aircraft are based at San Isidro as 
well. The second large base is La Union at Puerto Plata on the 
north coast. Smaller bases are at Barahona, La Romana, and 



231 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Pedernales, with airstrips at Constanza in the central moun- 
tainous area and Dajabon, on the Haitian border. The air force 
administers the general military medical center located in San 
Isidro. The air force also runs the nation's Civil Aeronautics 
Directorate, and air force officers oversee the operation of the 
nation's airports. 

The air force, numbering some 5,500 personnel in 1998, is 
organized into three flying squadrons. The counterinsurgency 
squadron is equipped with eight Cessna A-37B Dragonflies. 
The A-37B, developed from the T-37 jet trainer, can land on 
short, unimproved airstrips. It is armed with a machine gun 
and can carry a light load of bombs or other munitions. The 
transport squadron uses three C-47 Douglas Dakotas and one 
Commander 680, and the helicopter squadron has as its princi- 
pal units eight Bell 205s for search-and-air rescue and trans- 
port. Various small aircraft are used for liaison and training 
purposes (see table 14, Appendix). The air force carries out 
routine antidrug reconnaissance patrols, but is often grounded 
because of lack of fuel and spare parts. 

The Base Defense Command provides security for all bases 
and aircraft. It includes an airborne Special Forces unit and an 
air police unit, both of approximately battalion size, and an 
antiaircraft battalion equipped with four 20mm guns. The 
Maintenance Command is responsible for maintenance and 
repair. The Combat Support Command supplies all base ser- 
vices. Air force cadets attend the Army Military Academy at San 
Isidro for three years, then spend their fourth year at the Frank 
Feliz Miranda Aviation School, also at San Isidro. 

Manpower 

The combined strength of the three armed services in 1998 
was 24,300. This figure represents a ratio of 2.8 military person- 
nel for every 1 ,000 citizens, which conforms to the average for 
all Latin American states. The armed forces had expanded 
about 10 percent over the previous decade. 

The armed forces no longer have the strength and the mili- 
tary potential they enjoyed under Trujillo, but the military con- 
tinues to be a popular career. The constitution provides for 
compulsory military service for all males between the ages of 
eighteen and fifty-four. However, the ranks are easily filled by 
volunteers, and the military does not impose a strain on 
national manpower. Officers, noncommissioned officers 
(NCOs) , and many enlisted personnel, as well, look on the mil- 



232 



Dominican Republic: National Security 

itary as a long-term career. As a result, all three services consist 
largely of experienced and well-trained professionals. 

Entry into the officer corps is competitive, and most entrants 
are drawn from the middle and the lower-middle classes. Most 
enlisted personnel come from rural areas. The military has a 
very small number of females; most serve in positions tradition- 
ally reserved for women, such as nursing. Women first gained 
admittance to positions traditionally held only by men in 1981, 
when a few female personnel were commissioned as medical 
officers. 

Pay and conditions of service compare well with opportuni- 
ties available in civilian occupations. Larger installations main- 
tain a number of commissaries and exchanges, and each of the 
three services operates officer and enlisted clubs. Military per- 
sonnel also benefit from free medical service. Under the 
armed forces' generous retirement program, all members who 
have served thirty years are entitled to receive a pension based 
on 75 percent of their active-duty pay at the time of retirement. 
Certain officers, such as pilots and naval engineers, may apply 
for a full pension after twenty years of service. 

Defense Spending 

Estimated defense expenditures for 1998 were US$180 mil- 
lion, representing 1.1 percent of gross national product 
(GNP — see Glossary), according to the United States Central 
Intelligence Agency. The levels of spending reported by the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, pre- 
sumably calculated on a different basis, were significantly 
lower, averaging US$109 million annually for the years 1994-96 
and US$120 million in 1997. Military expenditures averaged 
about 7 percent of central government expenditures during 
the decade 1986-95 and were slightly in excess of 1 percent of 
GNP in most years of that decade. 

The level of military spending measured in Dominican cur- 
rency rose steadily during the late 1970s, remained at relatively 
constant amounts during the early 1980s, then tended to be 
somewhat higher from 1992 onward. When adjusted for infla- 
tion, however, there was no real increase in military outlays 
until 1993. The sharp decline in the value of the peso in the 
mid-1980s weakened the nation's ability to finance the arms 
imports necessary for modernization, not to mention replace- 
ments and spare parts for existing equipment. 



233 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

The problem was made even more acute by the fact that the 
military budget is preponderantly allocated to current opera- 
tions. Capital expenditures are believed to account for well 
under 10 percent of total military spending. The low propor- 
tion of the budget devoted to funding capital improvements is 
illustrated by the fact that reported arms and related imports 
during the 1986-95 period totaled only about US$40 million, 
constituting 0.35 percent of the nation's total imports. The 
United States has been the most important source of military 
equipment although, during the 1982-87 period, the nation's 
principal arms supplier was France. 

Trujillo established the nation's defense industry just after 
World War II. By the late 1950s, the Dominican Republic had 
the capacity to be nearly self-sufficient in small weapons. 
Although that capability has deteriorated, the nation still has a 
modest arms-manufacturing capacity. The arsenal at San 
Cristobal, twenty-four kilometers west of Santo Domingo, pro- 
duces small arms ammunition and can repair heavier weapons 
and vehicles. Smaller wooden-hulled craft have in the past 
been produced by domestic shipbuilders for the navy. 

Between fiscal year (FY — see Glossary) 1950 and FY 1996, 
United States grant military assistance to the Dominican 
Republic totaled US$36.5 million. No grant assistance has been 
provided in recent years except for the transfer to the Domini- 
can Republic in 1995 of a United States Coast Guard cutter to 
assist the antinarcotics effort. Training for the Dominican mili- 
tary in the United States or elsewhere in Latin America under 
the International Military Education and Training (IMET) pro- 
gram is provided at a cost of about US$35,000 annually. Financ- 
ing of Dominican purchases under the Foreign Military Sales 
Program totaled US$34.5 million between FY 1950 and FY 
1996. The Dominican Republic used this credit program for 
only US$441,000 worth of materiel in FY 1996. 

Ranks, Uniforms, and Insignia 

The rank structure of the armed forces follows traditional 
lines and largely conforms to the pattern of the United States 
services, with minor variations reflecting the disparity in force 
levels. The army has eight enlisted grades, six company and 
field-grade ranks, and three ranks for general officers (see figs. 
8 and 9). The air force has seven enlisted grades; its officer 
ranks are identical to those of the army. Naval personnel are 
separated into six enlisted grades, six ranks for officers, and 



234 



Dominican Republic: National Security 

three ranks for flag-rank officers (admirals). The highest rank 
attainable is lieutenant general (army and air force) or admiral 
in the navy (comparable to vice admiral in the United States 
Navy). 

Uniforms resemble those of United States counterparts in 
cut, design, and material. The ground forces wear olive green 
uniforms; the air force, blue; and the navy either navy blue or 
white. Enlisted personnel in all three services also have khaki 
uniforms. The three categories of uniform include full dress, 
dress, and daily. The dress uniform is worn off-duty as well as 
on semiformal occasions. The basic uniform for officers con- 
sists of a short-sleeve or long-sleeve shirt, tie, trousers, belt, and 
black shoes. The basic uniform for army and air force enlisted 
personnel is an olive green fatigue uniform with combat boots. 
Navy enlisted personnel wear denim shirts and dungarees for 
work and middy blouse and trousers when off duty. 

Army and air force company-grade officers wear one, two, or 
three silver laurel leaves as their insignia of rank. For field- 
grade officers, rank insignia consist of one to three gold stars. 
Brigadier, major, and lieutenant generals wear one, two, and 
three silver stars, respectively. Naval officer ranks are indicated 
by gold stripes worn on the lower sleeve of the uniform jacket. 
Army and air force enlisted personnel wear green chevrons on 
the upper sleeve; navy enlisted personnel wear red chevrons. 

Internal Security and Public Order 

The Dominican Republic historically has depended on the 
export of its sugar and other agricultural products. By the late 
1970s, however, markets for these crops had plummeted, and 
the consequent agricultural crisis forced thousands of farmers 
to migrate to the cities. Although some employment was cre- 
ated by setting up industrial trade zones and promoting tourist 
trade, sufficient jobs did not materialize, and workers, peas- 
ants, and even middle-income families expanded the ranks of 
the unemployed. Many of the unemployed emigrated to the 
United States, mainly during the late 1970s and the 1980s. 

The Dominican population has traditionally turned to the 
state to relieve social distress. In the past, political parties dis- 
tributed contracts and found jobs for their followers, but in the 
late 1990s the government had only a limited capacity to deal 
with the wider needs of material relief. About half the people 
live below the poverty line. Access to potable water and sewer- 
age is limited, and electric power outages are common. The 



235 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 




236 



Dominican Republic: National Security 




237 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

resulting social discontent has brought periodic outbreaks of 
turmoil and violence. In addition, grassroots groups have 
shown an increasing ability to organize major protest actions 
that can lead to conflict and threaten the internal order. 

In July 1997, a general strike was called in the northeast to 
demand infrastructure improvements that had been promised 
in the presidential campaign of the previous year. Power cuts 
resulting from delays in building new generating units were a 
particular source of resentment. The rising prices of staples 
like rice and chicken were also at issue. Hundreds of soldiers, 
as well as air force airborne units, were dispatched to reinforce 
the police. Some injuries occurred as strikers set off explosives 
and exchanged fire with police. Although the strike ended 
after its leaders had met with a team of high government offi- 
cials, the president charged that the strikes were being led by 
"remnants of the left." 

Protests continued in the fall of 1997, with numerous violent 
street demonstrations taking place in the suburbs of Santo 
Domingo. These demonstrations culminated in a national gen- 
eral strike in November 1997 to protest failure of the national 
power grid, which had led to power outages and rising prices. 
The strike was led by the Coordination of Popular, Peasant, and 
Union Organizations. The demonstrators accused the govern- 
ment of aiming for high growth rates at the expense of public 
services and controls on the prices of fuel and food staples. 
The series of local and national disturbances prompted the 
government to deploy thousands of police, reinforced by sol- 
diers, to the poor neighborhoods of the main cities, which were 
described as under a virtual state of siege. Although ten civil- 
ians and police officers had been killed during earlier clashes, 
the two-day general strike was peaceful. The security forces 
demonstrated restraint although they detained many persons 
on suspicion of vandalism and violence. In July 1998, the police 
used live fire in an attempt to disperse a demonstration, killing 
one law student. Police officers detained in the incident were 
arrested and faced trial. 

Dominican Marxist parties, illegal under Trujillo, emerged 
from the underground after his death. During the civil war, 
they supported Bosch and the Constitutionalists. Since then, 
most of these groups have operated as legal political parties. 
Although they have contested elections, they are small and 
weak and have failed to win seats in the legislature. The Domin- 
ican Communist Party, which has had a legal existence since 



238 



Dominican Republic: National Security 

1977, was one of fifty-three political organizations and trade 
unions that formed the Dominican Leftist Front in 1983 but 
which still retain their individual structures. The government 
has often detained members of organizations and populist 
groups thought to be preparing public disturbances, especially 
during election campaigns. For example, the authorities 
detained hundreds of opposition party figures, members of 
other antigovernment groups, and journalists, ostensibly to foil 
possible violence, following the disputed 1994 elections. 

The presence of Haitians living illegally in the Dominican 
Republic has been a source of recurrent disturbances. Large 
numbers of Haitians come to the country, some legally but 
most undocumented, searching for economic opportunity. 
Security forces, particularly the army, round up and repatriate 
thousands of these Haitians each year. Persons with legal resi- 
dence and those of Haitian ancestry with possible claims to 
Dominican citizenship have complained of being included in 
the expulsions without being given a chance to prove their sta- 
tus. Ill-treatment of Haitian sugarcane cutters working under 
contract has also been a source of resentment and violence. 
Forced recruitment of Haitians to work on the sugar planta- 
tions has been reported. After as many as 25,000 Haitians were 
deported in early 1997, the presidents of the two countries met 
to set up a mechanism for the repatriations to be carried out 
under humane conditions. 

National Police 

The nation's security forces consist of the National Police, 
the National Department of Investigations (Departamento 
Nacional de Investigaciones — DNI) , the National Drug Con- 
trol Directorate (Direccion Nacional de Control de Drogas — 
DNCD), and the armed forces. The National Police is under 
the secretary of state for interior and police, the military is 
under the secretary of state for the armed forces, and the DNI 
and DNCD report directly to the president. 

The country's first police organization was a municipal force 
set up in 1844 in Santo Domingo. Beginning in 1847, other 
towns formed similar organizations. Eventually, every province 
had independent police forces. The national executive branch 
had only nominal influence over these forces, which were 
largely controlled by local caudillos. The local forces were dis- 
banded in 1916 during the United States occupation; at that 
time, the United States Marines, and later members of the 



239 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Dominican Constabulary Guard, assumed police duties. The 
National Police was created in 1936. Since then, police activi- 
ties in the nation have been completely centralized, and no 
independent provincial or municipal forces have existed. 

In 1998 the National Police numbered some 15,000. The 
force's current strength reflects an enlargement by 50 percent 
in less than a decade. A further 2,000 personnel from the mili- 
tary were reportedly transferred to the police in September 
1997 to help deal with civil disturbances. The director general 
of the National Police is a police major general, who is directly 
subordinate to the secretary of state for interior and police (see 
fig. 10). The police maintain a close relationship with the 
armed forces, and, until the 1980s, the chief of the National 
Police was often a senior officer from one of the armed ser- 
vices. The director general is assisted by a deputy director gen- 
eral and directly supervises two sections: Internal Affairs and 
Planning, and Special Operations. Three other sections, 
Administration and Support, Police Operations, and Territo- 
rial Zones, are headed by the deputy director general. 

The deputy director general of police has overall responsibil- 
ity for territorial police operations. He supervises five regional 
directors, usually police brigadier generals, who are responsi- 
ble for five zones: the Northeastern Zone (headquartered at 
San Francisco de Macons), the Northern Zone (Santiago), the 
Southern Zone (Barahona), the Central Zone (San Cristobal), 
and the Eastern Zone (San Pedro de Macons). The police 
zones each cover several provinces; forces within the zones are 
broken down into provincial sections, companies, detach- 
ments, and local police posts. 

An assistant director general under the director heads the 
Special Operations Section, which is responsible for the admin- 
istration of the secret service, generally headed by a police brig- 
adier general. The secret service performs undercover 
surveillance of domestic political groups and foreigners sus- 
pected of espionage or of inciting political or economic disor- 
der. In October 1997, Special Operations took more than 500 
persons into custody because it was believed they might incite 
violence during the planned general strike. The secret service 
coordinates its efforts with the DNI, which reports to the presi- 
dent. Created in 1962, the DNI is authorized to "investigate any 
act committed by persons, groups, or associations that conflict 
with the constitution, laws, or state institutions, or that attempt 
to establish any totalitarian form of government." The DNI is 



240 



Dominican Republic: National Security 

an investigative body and, unlike the police, generally does not 
have arrest authority. The functions of the DNI are closely 
coordinated with those of the armed forces intelligence units, 
as well as with the functions of the police. The DNI is often 
commanded by a retired military general. 

Approximately half of all police personnel are stationed in 
the capital area, both because Santo Domingo is by far the 
nation's largest city and because police headquarters, as well as 
several special police units, are located there. Among the spe- 
cial units garrisoned in the capital is a paramilitary Special 
Operations battalion with some 1,000 personnel armed with 
teargas and shotguns. The unit is used for riot control in Santo 
Domingo, although elements also can be deployed rapidly to 
any section of the country. Other specialized police units 
include a special Bank Guard Corps and a Sappers Corps that 
performs firefighting and civil defense duties. 

The public image of the police has improved since the 
1970s, but excesses on the part of police personnel, including 
beatings of suspects, continue to spark controversy. The gov- 
ernment has adopted several measures to monitor police 
behavior and has taken corrective steps, but complaints about 
such abuses continue to surface (see Respect for Human 
Rights, this ch.). 

Criminal Justice System 

The Dominican criminal justice system is basically an inquisi- 
torial arrangement in which a court and its staff take general 
charge of a criminal case, and the judge gathers evidence to 
supplement that produced by the prosecution and the defense. 
Evidence is largely committed to writing, and the final stage of 
the proceedings consists of the judge's examining all the com- 
bined written material and then deciding whether he or she is 
convinced, beyond doubt, of the guilt of the accused. The 
criminal courts do not, therefore, operate under a system of 
trial by jury. 

The 1966 constitution guarantees several basic legal rights to 
all citizens. These include the rights of due process, public 
trial, and habeas corpus protection. An accused person is also 
guaranteed protection against double jeopardy and self-incrim- 
ination. A written order from a competent judicial authority is 
required if any person is to be detained more than forty-eight 
hours or if an individual's home or property is to be searched. 
Security forces have frequently violated these provisions by 



241 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



PRESIDENT 



NATIONAL 
DEPARTMENT OF 
INVESTIGATIONS 



SECRETARY OF STATE 
FOR 

INTERIOR AND POLICE 



NATIONAL 
DRUG CONTROL 
DIRECTORATE 



DIRECTOR GENERAL 
NATIONAL POLICE 



INTERNAL AFFAIRS 
AND 

PLANNING SECTION 



SPECIAL 
INVESTIGATIVE 
TEAMS 



FINANCIAL 
INVESTIGATIVE 
UNIT 



DEPUTY 
DIRECTOR GENERAL 



ADMINISTRATION AND 
SUPPORT SECTION 



PERSONNEL 

FINANCES 

COMMUNICATION 

TRANSPORTATION 

LOGISTICS 

EDUCATION AND TRAINING 



POLICE OPERATIONS 
SECTION 



DEPARTMENTS: 
ROBBERY INVESTIGATIONS 
HOMICIDE INVESTIGATIONS 
PROPERTY CRIMES 
HIGHWAY PATROL 
NARCOTICS 



ASSISTANT 
DIRECTOR GENERAL 



SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
SECTION 
(SECRET SERVICE) 



TERRITORIAL ZONES 
SECTION 



NORTHEASTERN ZONE- 
SAN FRANCISCO DE MACORIS 

NORTHERN ZONE- 
SANTIAGO 

SOUTHERN ZONE- 
BARAHONA 

CENTRAL ZONE- 
SAN CRISTOBAL 

EASTERN ZONE- 
SAN PEDRO DE MACORIS 



PROVINCIAL SECTIONS 



COMPANIES 



DETACHMENTS 

I 



LOCAL POLICE POSTS 



Figure 1 0. Dominican Republic: Organization of Internal Security 
Agencies, 1999 



242 



Dominican Republic: National Security 

detaining suspects for "investigation" or "interrogation." It has 
been customary for the police to detain both suspects and wit- 
nesses in a crime, deciding only after investigation which merit 
release and which should be held further. Since the new gov- 
ernment took office in 1996, an effort has been made to 
reduce abuses of the forty-eight-hour rule by placing lawyers 
from the prosecutor's office in police stations. 

During the closed pretrial investigative phase of the criminal 
justice process, the state does not provide counsel to indigent 
prisoners. A small public defender organization was intro- 
duced in 1998 to assist indigent defendants in the Santo Dom- 
ingo area. Other indigent cases are assigned to part-time, 
private attorneys. The courts rarely appoint defense lawyers in 
misdemeanor cases. 

Defendants awarded bail rarely face an actual trial. Those 
denied bail may serve their entire sentences while awaiting 
trial. Accordingly, the decision to grant bail often determines 
whether an accused person will ever serve a prison sentence. 

The justice system suffers seriously from chronic delays. 
Many suspects undergo a long period of pretrial detention that 
sometimes exceeds the maximum possible criminal sentence. 
In 1998 the proportion of the prison population awaiting trial 
was more than 75 percent. In the Santo Domingo National Dis- 
trict, which accounts for approximately 45 percent of all crimi- 
nal cases, the average pretrial detention declined from 13.8 
months in 1996 to 6.5 months in 1998. However, the rest of the 
country did not experience corresponding improvement. 

In addition to the Supreme Court of Justice, the constitution 
established three basic types of courts: courts of appeal, courts 
of first instance, and justice of the peace courts. There are spe- 
cial courts for labor, traffic, administrative, and land matters. 
Most misdemeanor offenses are tried by the justice of the 
peace courts, of which there is one in each municipality or 
township. The courts of first instance have original jurisdiction 
for criminal felony cases. There are twenty-nine of these, one 
for each province. Decisions may be, and regularly are, 
appealed to one of the nation's seven courts of appeal. These 
courts also have original jurisdiction over cases against judges 
of courts of first instance, government attorneys, provincial 
governors, and other specified officials. 

Military and police courts have jurisdiction over members of 
the security forces, but a military or police board frequently 
remands cases involving capital crimes to civil courts. In 1996 



243 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

police referred two cases of extrajudicial killings to civilian 
criminal courts. 

The constitution stipulates an independent judiciary, but in 
the past interference from other entities, including the execu- 
tive branch, has undermined judicial independence. The Sen- 
ate previously appointed all justices by majority vote for four- 
year terms, except members of the Supreme Court. This proce- 
dure subjected judges to undue political influence and often 
resulted in a wholesale turnover of judicial personnel when 
control of the Senate changed hands. The result was a highly 
politicized process, sometimes bringing incompetent jurists to 
the bench who could not be supervised effectively by the exec- 
utive authorities. 

Under a constitutional reform enacted in 1994, the judiciary 
was granted a fixed percentage of the national budget, thus 
weakening legislative control. A Council of the Magistrature 
was created to appoint justices of the Supreme Court (see The 
Judiciary, ch. 4). 

The constitution requires all judges to have law degrees, and 
judges at each level of the judiciary are required to have prac- 
ticed law for a specified number of years. Supreme Court jus- 
tices, for instance, must have a minimum of twelve years of 
experience, and judges of the courts of first instance must have 
two years of experience. Justices of the peace are also required 
to have a law degree; exceptions are permitted, however, in 
rural areas where it might be impossible to appoint a trained 
lawyer. 

Respect for Human Rights 

The government observes the protections guaranteed to citi- 
zens under the constitution. It grants individuals and groups of 
all political points of view the freedom to speak, respects the 
constitutional right of peaceful assembly and association, nor- 
mally grants permits for public marches and meetings, and 
imposes no restrictions on domestic or international travel. 
The government also adheres to the constitutional protections 
against invasion of the home, and conducts wire tapping and 
other forms of surveillance under provisions provided by law. 

Dominican internal security forces are generally responsive 
to the authority of the civilian executive branch, but frequent 
instances of human rights abuse have occurred. Misuse of the 
police for political motives is relatively rare, however. There are 
no political prisoners, and deliberate political murders have 



244 



Dominican Republic: National Security 

not occurred in recent years. However, the 1994 disappearance 
of university professor Narciso Gonzalez, a prominent critic of 
the government of President Balaguer, has been a source of 
discord in the country, with suspicion falling on senior military 
officers. After President Fernandez took office in 1996, he 
reopened the investigation of the case. 

In 1997 President Fernandez dismissed the heads of the 
National Police and the DNCD after both officers had been 
criticized by the attorney general for use of torture in criminal 
investigations and excessive force in attempting to control 
crime. Extrajudicial executions, described as "exchanges of 
fire," were said to have occurred. In addition, valuable assets 
seized in drug cases — cars, planes, and boats — were said to 
have disappeared. 

Numerous deaths have resulted from police use of excessive 
force on persons in custody, during civil disturbances, or in 
pursuing suspects. In 1995 eighty-five such cases were reported; 
in 1998 seventy-five extrajudicial killings were ascribed to the 
police or the DNCD, a sharp increase over the previous year. 
Police personnel involved in such incidents may be tried by 
police courts or remanded to civilian courts. During 1998 
police courts convicted and sentenced fifty members of the 
police for serious crimes. Numerous other officers were dis- 
missed and their cases remanded to the civilian court system. 
As a rule, sentences in serious cases of abuse have ranged from 
a one-month suspension to six months' incarceration. In 1997 
the narcotics police of the DNCD were accused of numerous 
cases of torture. The DNCD initially failed to cooperate with 
efforts to impose civilian supervision over the investigative pro- 
cess; the monitoring program resumed when the DNCD direc- 
tor was removed. When soldiers were transferred to the 
National Police in 1997, the human rights issue was high pro- 
file enough that the government mandated that those trans- 
ferred receive several weeks of human rights training. 

The National Police and narcotics police are reported to 
engage in the practice of rounding people up indiscriminately 
in poorer neighborhoods; most detainees are released after 
several hours. The security authorities continue to detain rela- 
tives and friends of suspected criminals to coerce a suspect into 
surrendering. Detentions of hundreds of persons occurred in 
1994 and in earlier years at election time, ostensibly to prevent 
violent demonstrations. The individuals involved were released 
within the legal forty-eight-hour period. 



245 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 
Penal System 

With a countrywide prison population of about 14,814 in 
1997, the largest penal facility is the national penitentiary, La 
Victoria, in Santo Domingo. All individuals sentenced to more 
than two years of imprisonment serve their sentences there. A 
warden is supposed to run each prison and report to the attor- 
ney general through the Directorate of Prisons. In practice, 
however, the police or military colonel assigned to each prison 
to provide security is in charge of the prison and neither the 
wardens nor the Directorate of Prisons has much power. 

The corrections system has received inadequate financing 
and suffers from unsanitary conditions and gross overcrowd- 
ing. Medical supplies and services of physicians are deficient. 
Most prisoners find it necessary to supplement the prison diet 
with food supplied by relatives or purchased. Rioting to protest 
overcrowding and food shortages is an almost annual occur- 
rence, often accompanied by loss of life. Gangs operating 
inside the prisons supply drugs and run prostitution rings. 
Prison officers reportedly engage in extortion and other forms 
of corruption. 

Under the Fernandez government, which took office in 
1996, some reforms have been instituted. The government 
instituted a census of all prisons, and the attorney general's 
office began a case-by-case review of prisoners. Minors, the 
mentally ill, and the infirm were also segregated from other 
prisoners. In addition, a renovation program has begun at La 
Victoria and several other prisons to supply improved sanita- 
tion and more comfortable quarters, medical teams have been 
sent to each prison, and telephone access and recreation pro- 
grams have been instituted. 

As of the end of 1997, the number of inmates at La Victoria 
penitentiary had been reduced to 2,100 from a peak of 3,500. 
However, as a result of a crackdown against crime, the prison's 
population had risen to 3,300 by the end of 1998. Najayo, the 
second largest prison, built in 1994 to house 700 inmates, had a 
population of 2,290. Some 300 juveniles found by investigators 
to be incarcerated in La Victoria were removed in 1997. An 
inspection by a government reform commission continued to 
find many incidents of violations in other prisons, including 
156 juveniles jailed with adults at Najayo. Females are held in 
separate prison wings under conditions that are, in general, 
superior to those found in the male wings; few abuses by guards 
have been reported. 



246 



Dominican Republic: National Security 

Narcotics Trafficking 

The Dominican Republic is a major transshipment country 
for cocaine from Colombia destined for the United States and 
Puerto Rico. The country's long, underpatrolled border with 
Haiti and its poorly paid and ill-equipped police and armed 
services make it an ideal linkage point for drug deliveries. 
Although the Dominican Republic is not a drug-producing 
country, the profits of drug trafficking support a significant 
part of the construction and business sectors, and are responsi- 
ble for much of the personal spending on luxuries. 

Dominican citizens are heavily involved in the street narcot- 
ics networks in New York and other cities of the Northeast and 
Miami. They are believed to be responsible for one-third of the 
300 tons of cocaine reaching United States markets each year 
— a share that has doubled since the early 1990s. Loads of 
drugs from Colombia are delivered by ships and planes, often 
offshore air drops for pickup by small Dominican vessels. The 
drugs are then transferred directly to Puerto Rico by specially 
designed speedy small craft and yachts, or to the mainland 
United States hidden in legitimate cargoes. Aircraft are used 
for flights to the Bahamian islands. Profits from drug transac- 
tions are sent back to the Dominican Republic by bulk transfers 
of cash concealed in commercial shipments and camouflaged 
as remittances from Dominican workers in the United States. 

The Dominican Republic has demonstrated considerable 
determination in the conduct of its counternarcotics effort. 
Senior officials engage in neither drug trafficking nor money 
laundering. The counternarcotics effort is normally in the 
hands of the DNCD and the military. Composed of more than 
800 officials from the police, the three armed services, and the 
civilian sector, the rapidly growing DNCD has done an excel- 
lent job of battling drug trafficking along the southwest and 
east coasts and in the Santo Domingo area. However, lack of 
experience among operational-level personnel and low salaries 
hamper its overall effectiveness. The DNCD is aided by Special 
Investigative Teams of the DNCD, trained and equipped by the 
United States; these teams supply valuable intelligence on 
major international narcotics operations. A Financial Investiga- 
tive Unit was formed in 1997 to uncover money laundering. 
The two other mechanisms for controlling drug trafficking are 
not as effective. Neither the police nor the military are suffi- 
ciently motivated or equipped to impose consistently effective 
controls. The army has had little success in interdicting ship- 



247 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

merits along the porous border with Haiti, across which thou- 
sands of kilograms of cocaine are smuggled annually. In 1998, 
however, a new border check station was established on the eas- 
iest route for smuggling drugs for transshipment to the United 
States, and two more stations were planned to be opened in 
1999. The navy and air force, however, lack sufficient resources 
to give full support to the DNCD, and patrol planes obtained 
from the United States can perform only limited coastal recon- 
naissance because of fuel and parts shortages. 

The United States is engaged in a program to furnish equip- 
ment and training in support of the Dominican counter narcot- 
ics effort. Under the terms of a bilateral agreement concluded 
in 1988, the United States has supplied US$4,200,000 in coun- 
ternarcotics assistance. In 1998 US$300,000 was provided, 
including support for a canine detection program and the Hai- 
tian border initiative. A United States policy of linking denial 
of visas with drug-related corruption has also proven effective 
in thwarting corruption. 

Although the DNCD is said to be relatively untainted, the 
United States Department of State reported in 1998 that cor- 
ruption continued to be widespread among lower-level law 
enforcement officials; bribery of immigration officers and air- 
line personnel by drug dealers is also common. Of 10,000 drug 
cases over a seven-year period, only 100 ended in jail sentences. 
Rumor had it that family ties between Dominican officials and 
narcotic traffickers have led to delayed arrests, early release, 
and loss of evidence to prevent conviction. 

Charges of corruption have arisen in the DNCD over the dis- 
position of confiscated assets of drug traffickers. Numerous 
incidents of torture of prisoners by the DNCD have also been 
alleged, in some cases with leaders of the DNCD present. After 
the rear admiral heading the DNCD was dismissed in 1997, a 
new agency was formed to take charge of seized assets and 
placed under the direct control of the governmental coordi- 
nating body, the National Drug Council (Consejo Nacional de 
Drogas) rather than the DNCD. 

As regards criminal cases, 1,942 Dominicans were deported 
from the United States as criminals in 1997. More than 100 
Dominican nationals wanted in the United States are believed 
to have taken refuge in their homeland. In 1998 the Domini- 
can Republic enacted legislation repealing the prohibition on 
the extradition of Dominican nationals and subsequently extra- 
dited three Dominicans, in one case for narcotics-related racke- 



248 



Dominican Republic: National Security 

teering. In 1999 the Dominican government had yet to act on a 
number of other extradition requests from the United States. 
Dominican gang members in the United States have been con- 
sidered notoriously violent, confident they could escape pun- 
ishment by fleeing to their homeland. 

Since taking office in 1996, President Fernandez has made 
strenuous efforts to reduce narcotics-related corruption 
among the judiciary and the police, military, and customs ser- 
vices. Nevertheless, his party is weak in Congress, and the polit- 
ical opposition has become increasingly dependent on funds 
from major drug dealers. Drug money infiltrates into legiti- 
mate business enterprises, casinos, banking, and the media, 
thereby turning illicit profits into legitimate assets. The influ- 
ence of the traffickers grows as more and more of the economy 
becomes dependent on them. 

Fernandez has made a promising beginning by introducing 
partial reforms to the criminal justice system and attempting to 
motivate the military and the police to join more wholeheart- 
edly in the struggle against narcotics. While improving cooper- 
ation with the United States on this issue, his political priorities 
oblige him to turn first to the reduction of social tensions 
induced by poverty and breakdowns in public services, matters 
of primary importance to the Dominican electorate. 

* * * 

No recent studies that deal comprehensively with national 
security in the Dominican Republic are available. Two works 
published in 1983-84 survey the history and development of 
the armed forces until that period. One is Adrian English's 
Armed Forces of Latin America, and the other is the section on the 
Dominican Republic in John Keegan's World Armies (second 
edition). A recent study of the institutional evolution of the 
armed forces is Las fuerzas militares en la Republica Dominicana 
desde la Primer a Republica hasta los comienzos de la Cuarta Republica 
by Jose Miguel Soto Jimenez. 

Current order of battle data are available in The Military Bal- 
ance published by the International Institute of Strategic Stud- 
ies in London and in Jane's Fighting Ships. The conduct of the 
internal security forces, the reform of the judicial system, and 
problems of human rights and public order are reviewed in 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, a report submitted 
annually by the United States Department of State to the 



249 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



United States Congress. The Department of State's International 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report provides an annual appraisal of 
the Dominican effort to curtail drug trafficking. Mention of 
other matters pertaining to the military and internal security 
can often be found in Caribbean Insight and Latin American 
Regional Reports: Caribbean and Central America Report. Both of 
these periodicals are published in London. (For further infor- 
mation and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



250 



Haiti: Country Profile 



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Country 

Formal Name: Haiti. 
Short Form: Haiti. 
Term for Citizens: Haitians. 
Capital: Port-au-Prince. 

Geography 

Size: Approximately 27,750 square kilometers. 



251 



Topography: Five mountain ranges divide country into three 
regions: northern, central, and southern. Highest peak, Morne 
de la Selle, located in south, reaches an altitude of 2,715 
meters. No navigable rivers. Largest lake is Etang Saumatre, 
brackish body in southern region. 

Climate: Tropical climate influenced by northeast trade winds. 
Wet season generally lasts from March through May, dry season 
from December through February. Rainfall irregular because 
of mountainous topography. Temperature in lowland area 
15°C to 25°C in winter, 25°C to 35°C in summer. 

Society 

Population: Estimated at 8 million in year 2000. Estimated 
growth rate 2.08 percent annually 1995-2000. 

Language: 1987 constitution recognizes both French and 
Creole as official languages. Languages linguistically distinct, 
not mutually comprehensible. Creole spoken by vast majority, 
but facility with French connotes higher social status. 

Ethnic Groups: Population almost entirely black and mulatto 
as result of historical origin as slaveholding agricultural colony. 
Economic and political elite mainly mulatto. Only ethnic 
minority "Arabs" — Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian 
immigrants — most of whom work in export-import sector. 

Education and Literacy: In academic year 1996-97, enrollment 
rate 64 percent for six- to twelve-year-olds and 15 percent for 
twelve- to eighteen-year-olds. Private schools attended by 75 
percent of school enrollment. Ninety percent of urban 
children but only 23 percent of rural children attend school. 
University of Haiti major institution of higher learning. 
National literacy estimates range from 20 to 53 percent. 

Health: Children twelve to twenty-four months old at high risk 
for malnutrition. Infant mortality high at seventy-two per 1,000 
live births in 1996, a decline since mid-1980s. Principal causes 
of death for children one to five years old diarrheal illnesses 
(37 percent), malnutrition (32 percent), and respiratory illness 
(25 percent). Common causes of adult deaths malaria, 
tuberculosis, parasitic diseases, and typhoid fever. National 
incidence of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) projected 
at 5.4 to 7.7 percent for 2000; rate of males to females with 



252 



acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) one to one. 

Religion: Roman Catholicism official religion according to 
1860 concordat with Vatican. Voodoo more widely practiced 
than Catholicism, could be considered national religion. Much 
overlap of believers, with most voodooists considering 
themselves Roman Catholics. Although church joined in 
several antivoodoo campaigns in course of Haiti's history, its 
opposition to folk religion more sporadic and ambivalent than 
that of Protestant missionaries, who condemn voodoo as 
diabolical. Rapid growth of Protestantism since 1950; some 
estimates 25 percent of population Protestant in late 1990s. 

Economy 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): From 1991 coup to 1994, real 
GDP plunged 30 percent and per capita GDP dropped from 
US$320 to US$260. In late 1990s, US$225 per capita GDP 
made Haiti poorest country in Western Hemisphere. 

Agriculture: Employed 66 percent of total workforce of almost 
3 million in 1990s and accounted for some 25 to 30 percent of 
GDP and less than 10 percent of exports. In late 1990s, 
agriculture sector produced only 20 percent of Haiti's domestic 
food requirements. Constantly deteriorating rural 
infrastructure, primitive farming techniques, migration out of 
rural areas, deforestation, and natural disasters, including 
Hurricane Georges in September 1998, have taken a toll. 

Industry: Manufacturing 14 percent of GDP in 1991, suffered 
following Jean-Bertrand Aristide's overthrow and ensuing 
embargo imposed by United Nations (UN) and Organization 
of American States (OAS) . Of 180 companies operating in four 
free zones (more than 150 of these, mostly United States- 
controlled, engaged in assembly production), 130 closed 
factories after 1991 coup. Some thirty plants reopened after 
reestablishment of constitutional government in October 1994. 
Plants generated about 60,000 jobs producing processed foods, 
electrical and electronic equipment, textiles, clothing, toys, 
sporting goods, and handicrafts. Assembly industry prospects 
hampered by underdeveloped infrastructure, illiterate 
workforce, scarce managerial personnel, and highest utility 
costs in Caribbean. Chronic political instability prompted 
many firms to relocate to more stable Caribbean areas, mostly 
to free zone in neighboring Dominican Republic. By late 



253 



1990s, Haiti's assembly sector operating at fraction of capacity. 
In mid-1999 Prime Minister Alexis decided to resume 
privatization process of various enterprises after a two-year 
hiatus. 

Currency: Gourde (G). Official exchange rate originally set at 
G5 to US$1 in 1919. Black market trading began in early 1980s 
in response to high inflation and fiscal shortfalls. Political 
crises of early 1990s, international embargo, and sharp drop in 
government revenues reduced value of gourde by about 80 
percent by 1994. Although the Central Bank pumped more 
than US$37 million into foreign exchange market in 1996, 
gourde continued to fall to G16.9 = US$1 in August 1997. In 
1999 gourde fluctuated between 17.5 and 18.3 to US$1. 

Imports: Primarily food, tobacco, chemicals, machinery, and 
transportation equipment; fell from US$449 million in 1991 to 
US$141 million in 1994. 

Exports: Mainly coffee and manufactured goods from assembly 
plants; declined from US$202 million in 1991 to US$57 million 
in 1994. 

Balance of Payments: Since mid-1960s and continuing into late 
1990s, Haiti has incurred substantial trade deficits. Deficits 
partially offset by remittances from Haitians working abroad 
and official aid. During 1992-94 international trade embargo, 
public deficit financed mainly by Central Bank credit and 
accumulation of arrears. External current account deficit, 
estimated at 19 percent of GDP in FY 1994-95, projected to 
drop gradually to 10 percent of GDP by FY 1999-2000. 

Fiscal Year (FY): October 1 through September 30. 

Fiscal Policy: Effects of gourde depreciation, together with 
rising food prices, raised inflation rate from 15.6 percent in 
December 1996 to 17.2 percent in July 1997. To protect gourde 
stability, government adopted stringent fiscal policy and 
aggressive tax collection program. New legislation broadened 
base of sales tax and unified its rates, reduced tax evasion 
among larger companies, and minimized number of tax and 
customs exemptions. 

Transportation and Communications 

Roads: Of 1999 total of 4,050 kilometers of roads, 950 
kilometers are paved, another 950 kilometers are gravel or 



254 



otherwise improved, and 2,150 kilometers are unimproved and 
almost impassable during rainy season. Two paved highways 
link northern and southern regions. 

Ports: Port-au-Prince is major port, with container facilities and 
berths for large liners. Remaining thirteen ports, largely 
provincial and small, centers of imported contraband in 1990s. 

Airports: Haiti's main international airport is located ten 
kilometers north of Port-au-Prince. Some ten other airfields 
are operational but are only grass strips. 

Railroads: One rail line, used for transporting sugarcane. No 
passenger rail service. 

Telecommunications: With a ratio of six telephones per 1 ,000 
inhabitants in 1998, Haiti ranks below some poorer African 
nations (eight telephones per 1,000 people). The 39,000 
telephone lines of the 1980s increased to 64,000 in late 1990s, 
with 80 percent concentrated in capital area, where only 25 
percent of population live. Subscribers with international 
service can dial directly to United States and Europe via 
satellite station at Sabourin. Telephone service in rural areas so 
poor that many resort to two-way radios. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Internationally monitored national election in 
November 1990 ended four years of military-dominated rule 
that followed end of Duvalier family dictatorship. Jean- 
Bertrand Aristide, elected president in a landslide, inaugurated 
to five-year term February 7, 1991. 1990 election overturned in 
September 1991 by military coup. De facto military 
government of General Raoul Cedras failed to achieve 
international recognition; ousted by UN-sanctioned 
multinational force in September 1994 with Aristide restored 
to power after three years in exile. Internationally monitored 
parliamentary and municipal elections of 1995 brought to 
office candidates affiliated with Aristide's Lavalas political 
movement. Majority had run under Lavalas Political 
Organization (Organisation Politique Lavalas — OPL) banner. 
Rene Garcia Preval, OPL's candidate, won December 1995 
presidential election, succeeding Aristide February 7, 1996. 
Prime Minister Rosny Smarth formed OPL-dominated cabinet. 
In January 1997, Aristide formed new political party, Lavalas 
Family (La Famille Lavalas — FL) , creating schism within ruling 



255 



OPL. In June 1997, Smarth resigned. In December 1998, 
deeply divided parliament confirmed Jacques Edouard Alexis 
as prime minister. In January 1999, Preval initiated rule by 
decree, dismissing parliament and appointing municipal 
officials "interim executive agents" of Ministry of Interior. In 
March, following successful negotiations between Preval and a 
coalition of political organizations that did not include FL or 
OPL, Prime Minister Alexis formed interim government and 
Preval named a Provisional Electoral Council with mandate to 
organize overdue parliamentary and municipal elections by 
late 1999. Elections held in May 2000, with Aristide's Lavalas 
Family party gaining victory. OAS Election Observation 
Mission questioned validity of Senate elections, and United 
States, Canada, and European Union threatened to withhold 
aid if results not revised. As of August 2000, Haitian 
government has refused to accept OAS recommendations. 

Politics: Tentative progress toward pluralistic democratic 
government after long history of rule by military leaders and 
dictators. Tradition of political movements or upheavals and 
strong presidency inhibit development of political parties and 
of power sharing among executive, legislature, and judiciary. 
Late 1980s Lavalas movement of Aristide promoted a 
participatory and decentralized democracy as opposed to more 
urban-centered, representative forms of democratic 
governance. Movement splintered several times since gaining 
power in 1990 elections. National political institutions and 
organizations decimated during three years of de facto military 
rule (1991-94). Political void following 1995 dismantling of 
Haitian army filled by OPL. Emergence in 1997 of Aristide's FL 
shattered OPL, creating bitter rivalry between country's two 
dominant political groups. Other political parties small and 
weak. Adherents of authoritarian rule abound, but lack stable 
institutions and popular support. Church, business, and civil 
society lack formal political institutions, but often have been 
influential political actors. Charismatic leadership, currently in 
person of Aristide, remains dominant political trait in Haiti. 

International Relations: Focused mainly on United States, 
country's leading trade partner and major source of foreign 
aid, and on neighboring Dominican Republic. Haiti's 
longstanding regional and international isolation diminished 
following greater involvement by Caribbean Community and 
Common Market (Caricom), OAS, and UN beginning with 
1990 elections and increasing following international 



256 



condemnation of 1991 military coup and subsequent multi- 
national intervention of September 1994. Argentina, Canada, 
France, and United States especially active since the coup, 
maintaining active presence through UN peacekeeping and 
police training missions between 1994 and 1999. Haiti 
recognized Cuba in 1996 and initiated exchange missions. 
Presidents Aristide and Preval decreased Haiti's isolation 
through participation in international summits. Haiti hosted 
its first OAS General Assembly in 1995. Haiti's growing overseas 
population gave country vocal presence in many North 
American and European cities. 

International Agreements and Memberships: Member of UN, 
OAS, Caribbean Community, Association of Caribbean States, 
Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, and Lome 
Convention. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Armed Forces of Haiti (Forces Armees 
d'Haiti — FAd'H) disbanded January 1995, after return of Presi- 
dent Aristide from exile. Strength of armed forces including 
police elements 8,000 before Aristide's return. 

Police: Haitian National Police (Police Nationale d'Haiti — 
PNH) with approximately 6,000 members only functioning 
security force in late 1999. 

Police Organization: Main components Administrative Police, 
Judicial Police, and Office of Inspector General. Specialized 
units include presidential and ministerial guards, crowd 
control unit, Coast Guard, and Counternarcotics Unit. Nine 
departmental directorates supervise city and rural divisions. 
UN-sponsored police trainers helped form PNH in 1995; about 
280 trainers from eleven countries as of late 1999. 

Police Equipment: Ordinary police carry sidearms. Special 
units have shotguns, semiautomatic rifles, and submachine 
guns. Some riot equipment, vans, and radio equipment. 



257 



_ International 
boundary 

_ Department 
boundary 

National capital 

Department 
capital 

Populated place 

20 40 Kilom eters 
20 40 Miles 



Port-de-Pal 



lie de la Tortue 
(Tortuga) 



Caribbean 
Sea 

Grande 

Cayemite 

o 

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Jeremie 




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- Hinche^ rK , 
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Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 




Figure 11. Haiti: Administrative Divisions, 1999 



258 



Table B. Haiti: Chronology of Important Events 

Period Description 



1492 

1492-1697 
1503 

1697 

1791-1803 

1804 January 1 

1806 
1807 
1807-18 
1807-20 

1818-43 

1843-1915 

1860 

1862 

1915-34 

1937 

1941-42 

1946-50 

1950 May 10 

1950-56 
1957-71 
1966 

1971-86 
1983 

1985-86 

1986 January 



February 7 



1986-88 



1990 December 

1991 February 7 



Columbus lands at present-day Mole Saint-Nicolas, Haiti; 
establishes first permanent Spanish New World settlement at 
site of Santo Domingo. 

Spain colonizes Hispaniola. 

Nicolas de Ovando named governor and supreme justice; 
institutes encomienda system. Importation of African slaves 
begins. 

Treaty of Ryswick: Spain cedes western part of Hispaniola, 
known as Saint-Domingue, to France following War of the 
Grand Alliance. 

Slave rebellion in Saint-Domingue leads to revolution under 
Toussaint Louverture against French expeditionary force. 

Haiti becomes independent, with Jean-Jacques Dessalines as 
president and, subsequently, emperor. 

Dessalines assassinated. 

Haiti partitioned. 

Alexandre Petion president in the south. 

Henry Christophe president and during 1811-20 king in the 
north. 

Jean-Pierre Boyer presidency; Boyer reunites Haiti 1820, 
invades and occupies Santo Domingo 1822; abolishes slavery. 

Period of political instability in Haiti. 

Concordat restores relations between the Vatican and Haiti. 
United States recognizes Haiti. 
United States marines occupy Haiti. 

Dominican military kills 5,000-12,000 Haitians along Hai- 
tian-Dominican border. 

Roman Catholic Church organizes anti-superstition cam- 
paign. 

Dumarsais Estime presidency; new 1946 constitution and 
reforms launched. 

Military coup overthrows regime of Dumarsais Estime and 
leads to period of instability. 

Paul Magloire presidency. 

Francois Duvalier presidency/dictatorship. 

Revision of concordat between the Vatican and Haiti allows 
Francois Duvalier to nationalize the Roman Catholic 
Church. 

Jean-Claude Duvalier presidency. 

Pope John Paul II visits Haiti; advocates justice, more egali- 
tarian society. 

Haitians demonstrate against Jean-Claude Duvalier. 

United States withholds recertification of Haiti for foreign 
assistance. 

Jean-Claude Duvalier leaves Haiti. 

Lieutenant General Henri Namphy heads National Council 
of Government. 1 

Free parliamentary and presidential elections. 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide assumes presidency. 



259 



Table B. ( Continued) Haiti: Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



September 25 Aristide addresses United Nations General Assembly. 

September 31 Hainan military overthrows Aristide; he leaves for Venezuela, 

later goes to United States. 

1991-94 Raoul Cedras military regime. 

1993 July 3 Aristide and Haitian armed forces commander General 

Raoul Cedras sign Governors Island Accord, providing for 
Aristide's return to power in Haiti on October 30, 1993. 

July 16 United Nations Security Council imposes worldwide oil and 

arms embargo on Haiti. 

October 1 1 Armed gangs prevent the USS Harlan County from docking 

in Port-au-Prince. 

1994 April 12 Randall Robinson, Executive Director of TransAfrica, begins 

hunger strike to protest United States policies toward Haiti. 

April 29 Ambassador Lawrence Pezzullo is dismissed as United States 

envoy to Haiti; former United States Congressman Wil-liam 
Gray III replaces him. 

May 21 United Nations levies comprehensive embargo on Haiti. 

July 31 United Nations Security Council passes resolution (S/Res/ 

940) approving United States plan to raise a multilateral 
force to remove the military junta from power in Haiti. 

September 16-18 Team consisting of former President Jimmy Carter, former 
chair of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin 
Powell, and United States Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia 
negotiates the peaceful departure from Haiti of junta lead- 
ers. 

September 19 United States forces land unopposed in Port-au-Prince. 

October 4 Haitian police chief Michel Francois leaves Haiti for the 

Dominican Republic. 

October 13 General Cedras and General Biamby leave Haiti for Panama. 

October 15 President Aristide returns to Haiti. 

October 16 United Nations lifts all sanctions on Haiti. 

1995 June 25 Contentious municipal and parliamentary elections held. 
August 13 Rerun of contended municipal and parliamentary elections. 

1996 February 7 Rene Preval assumes presidency. 



260 



Chapter 6. Haiti: Historical Setting 




Figure from a painting by Prosper Pierrelouis 



AFRICAN SLAVES IN THE French colony of Saint-Domingue 
rebelled against their French masters, defeated a powerful 
Napoleonic military force, and founded the independent 
nation of Haiti in January 1804. This overthrow of a govern- 
ment by slaves is the only such revolution in history. It also 
made Haiti the second oldest independent nation in the West- 
ern Hemisphere, after the United States. However, since this 
auspicious beginning, Haitian history has seen perennial politi- 
cal, economic, and racial problems. 

Haitian rulers have emulated the French colonial system. 
They have exploited racial, religious, and class differences, and 
retained armies and personal security forces to control the 
population and remain in power. At various times they have 
favored either blacks or light-skinned Haitians (mulattoes), 
Roman Catholics or voodooists, the elite or the masses, each at 
the expense of the other. 

As a consequence of the French colonial legacy, Haiti has 
had a history of dictatorial leaders who have defied constitu- 
tions, ruled through reliance on their military and security 
forces, and often come into power or left it through violent 
means. Of the few presidents who were popularly elected, such 
as Dumarsais Estime (1946-50), Francois Duvalier (1957-71), 
and Jean-Bertrand Aristide (1991-95), only the last named left 
office voluntarily after completing his term of office. The pop- 
ular revolt that deposed President-for-Life Jean-Claude Duva- 
lier (1971-86), the military coup that deposed President 
Aristide in 1991, and the United States/United Nations actions 
that reinstated Aristide in 1994 suggest that violence continues 
to be the usual route to change. 

Spanish Discovery and Colonization, 1492-1697 

The island of Hispaniola (La Isla Espahola), which today is 
occupied by the nations of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, 
is located about eighty kilometers from Cuba, 200 kilometers 
from Jamaica, and 1,120 kilometers from the United States. 
Haiti has an area of about 27,750 square kilometers, compara- 
ble in size to the state of Maryland. Evidence exists of human 
habitation in Haiti as early as the fourth millennium B.C. by 
people of Central American origin. The Taino emerged as an 



263 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

ethnic group in Hispaniola around A.D. 1200, and the Caribs 
arrived just before the Spanish landed at Mole Saint-Nicolas in 
1492. 

Christopher Columbus received a friendly reception from 
the Indians when he disembarked on Hispaniola in what is 
today Haiti, near Cap-Haitien. However, when Columbus 
returned on his second voyage in 1493, he found that his first 
settlement, Navidad, had been destroyed and its inhabitants 
slain. Undeterred, Columbus established a second settlement, 
Isabela, farther to the east, and continued his mission to spread 
Roman Catholicism, claim new lands for Spain, and discover 
gold. 

Hispaniola, or Santo Domingo, as it became known under 
Spanish dominion, became the first outpost of the Spanish 
Empire. When the quest for gold failed, the island became 
important as a seat of colonial administration and a starting 
point for other conquests. It was in Santo Domingo that the sys- 
tem of allotments of land (repartimiento) was introduced, 
whereby Spanish-born persons residing in the New World (pen- 
insulares) received large grants of land and the right to compel 
labor from the Indians who lived there. 

Christopher Columbus was the first administrator of Santo 
Domingo. He and his brother, Bartolome Columbus, fell out of 
favor with the settlers and the Indians as a result of their harsh 
demands and discipline. They also lost favor with the crown for 
failure to maintain control of the colony, bring gold back to 
Spain, or discover a new route to Asia. Both brothers were 
briefly held in a Spanish prison. The colony's new governor, 
Nicolas de Ovando, laid the groundwork for the island's devel- 
opment. During his tenure, the repartimiento system gave way to 
a system in which all the land was considered to be the prop- 
erty of the crown (encomienda) . This new system granted stew- 
ardship of land to the crown's agents (encomenderos) , who were 
entitled to employ (or, in practice, to enslave) Indian labor. 

The Indians were the first and greatest victims of colonial 
rule. Although the exact size of the indigenous population of 
the time is not known, contemporary observers have estimated 
it to be between several thousand and several million. By most 
accounts, however, there were between 60,000 and 600,000 
Indians on the island. Within fifty years, almost all had been 
killed outright, died as a result of overwork in the mines, or 
succumbed to diseases to which they were not immune. 



264 



Haiti: Historical Setting 



Several years before the Indians were decimated, Santo 
Domingo had lost its position as the preeminent Spanish col- 
ony in the New World. Its lack of mineral riches caused it to be 
neglected by the mother country, especially after the conquest 
of New Spain (Mexico). In 1535 Santo Domingo was incorpo- 
rated into the Viceroyalty of New Spain, which included Mex- 
ico and the Central American isthmus; its status dwindled 
further after the conquest of the rich kingdom of the Incas in 
Peru. Agriculture became the mainstay of the island's econ- 
omy, although the colony did not reach the high level of pro- 
ductivity that was subsequently to characterize it under French 
rule. 

Although Hispaniola never realized its economic potential 
under Spanish rule, it remained strategically important as a 
gateway to the Caribbean. The Caribbean provided the oppor- 
tunity for pirates from England, France, and the Netherlands 
to impede Spanish shipping, waylay galleons filled with gold, 
and establish a foothold in the hemisphere, which had been 
divided by papal decree between Spain and Portugal. This 
competition for spoils occurred throughout the Caribbean, but 
nowhere as intensively as on Hispaniola. 

England's Sir Francis Drake led one of the most famous for- 
ays against the port of Santo Domingo in 1586, just two years 
before he played a key role in the English navy's defeat of the 
Spanish Armada. Drake failed to secure the island, but his raid, 
followed by the arrival of corsairs and freebooters who estab- 
lished scattered settlements, was part of a pattern of encroach- 
ment that gradually diluted Spanish dominance. 

Beginning in the 1620s, Frenchmen, reportedly expelled by 
the Spanish from Saint Christopher (Saint Kitts), began to use 
Tortuga Island (lie de la Tortue), located off the northwest 
coast of Hispaniola, as a base to attack English and Spanish 
shipping. They came to be called buccaneers, a term derived 
from the Indian word, boucan, meaning spit, on which they 
cooked their meat. Skirmishes with Spanish and English forces 
were common. As the maintenance of the empire drained the 
energies of a declining Spain, the buccaneers' intervention 
became more effective on behalf of France. The first perma- 
nent settlement on Tortuga was established in 1659 under the 
commission of King Louis XIV of France. The subsequent 
establishment of the French West India Company to direct the 
expected commerce between the colony on Tortuga and 
France underscored the seriousness of the enterprise. 



265 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

In time, the buccaneers began to cross to the western side of 
Hispaniola to hunt for cattle and wild boar, and some settled 
there, assuming they would be safe because of the area's rela- 
tive remoteness from the Spanish capital city of Santo Dom- 
ingo. By 1670 the buccaneers had established a permanent 
settlement at Cap-Francois, now Cap-Haitien (see fig. 11). At 
that time, the western third of the island was commonly 
referred to as Saint-Domingue, the name it bore officially after 
Spain relinquished sovereignty over the area to France follow- 
ing the War of the Grand Alliance, which officially ended with 
the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697. 

French Colony of Saint-Domingue, 1697-1803 

More French citizens arrived in Saint-Domingue in the 
1720s. They hoped to get rich by farming indigo, coffee, or 
sugar and then to return to France. Many succeeded in their 
goal. By the mid-eighteenth century, this territory, largely 
neglected under Spanish rule, had become the richest and 
most coveted colony in the Western Hemisphere. Between 
1783 and 1789, agricultural production on the island almost 
doubled, creating more wealth than the rest of the West Indies 
combined, and more than the United States. Sugar was the 
principal source of its wealth. Saint-Domingue produced 40 
percent of the sugar imported by France. The colony played a 
pivotal role in the French economy, accounting for almost two- 
thirds of French commercial interests abroad and 40 percent 
of foreign trade. 

This flourishing economy was based on slavery. The first 
African slaves were brought from Portugal and Spain, but by 
1513, shipping lines had been established exclusively for slav- 
ing, and its victims were imported directly from Africa. 
Although most of the slaves came from West Africa, their ori- 
gins were diverse, representing at least thirty-eight regions in 
Africa and 100 tribes. With time, Saint-Domingue became the 
principal slave-importing island in the West Indies. According 
to historian Moreau de St. Mery, who wrote in 1797, based on 
census figures there were 452,000 slaves in Saint-Domingue in 
1789 out of a total population of 520,00 — the remainder con- 
sisted of 40,000 whites and 28,000 affranchis (free men and 
women of color) or descendants of affranchis. Between 1764 
and 1771, 10,000 to 15,000 new slaves arrived in Saint- 
Domingue annually, while countless others died at sea en 
route. Most who survived the crossing subsequently perished in 



266 



Haiti: Historical Setting 



Saint-Domingue, some because of the island's tropical heat, 
humidity, and diseases, and others as the result of brutal treat- 
ment by plantation owners. Statistics show that there was a 
complete turnover of slaves every twenty years. In 1789 two- 
thirds of all the slaves in the colony had been born in Africa. 

The colony was hierarchically structured, based on color, 
class, and wealth. At the bottom of the social ladder were the 
slaves who had just arrived in Saint-Domingue and spoke only 
African languages. As field laborers, they had the hardest work 
and were despised by everyone else. On the next rung were the 
Creole slaves, Africans whose source of pride was that they had 
been born in the New World. Above them came the mulatto 
slaves, who often worked in the plantation house and viewed 
themselves as superior to the freed black slaves because of their 
indoor work and lighter skin color. At the top were the affran- 
chis, usually mulattoes, or people of color (gens de couleur) , nei- 
ther whites nor slaves. Whites were on a separate social ladder; 
at the bottom were the shopkeepers, referred to as the small 
whites (petits blancs) . At the top were the plantation owners, 
wealthy merchants, and high officials, who were known as the 
big whites (grands blancs) . 

Social and racial dissatisfaction and tensions among plant- 
ers, free blacks, and slaves became widespread in Saint- 
Domingue in the last years of the colony. In addition, the plant- 
ers chafed at regulations imposed by the mother country. 
France appointed the colonial governors, quartered militia in 
the colony, and required that all cargo travel on French ships. 

The free blacks protested their second-class status. Begin- 
ning in the 1770s, the white colonists imposed laws that pre- 
cluded blacks from being called "mister," from wearing certain 
clothes, or from sitting wherever they liked in churches and 
theaters. The free blacks wanted equal rights with whites, and 
most of all the right to hold citizenship and to own slaves. 

The slaves on Saint-Domingue, who were badly mistreated by 
the planters, became increasingly restive, spurred on by the 
French Revolution, with its endorsement of freedom and 
equality and by campaigns by British and French anti-slavery 
organizations. Violent conflicts between white colonists and 
black slaves were common in Saint-Domingue. Bands of run- 
away slaves, known as maroons (marrons), entrenched them- 
selves in bastions in the colony's mountains and forests, from 
which they harried white-owned plantations, both to obtain 
provisions and weaponry and to avenge themselves against the 



267 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

inhabitants. As their numbers grew, these bands, sometimes 
consisting of thousands of people, began to carry out hit-and- 
run attacks throughout the colony. This guerrilla warfare, how- 
ever, lacked centralized organization and leadership. The most 
famous maroon leader was Francois Macandal, whose six-year 
rebellion (1751-57) left an estimated 6,000 dead. Reportedly a 
boko, or voodoo sorcerer, Macandal drew from African tradi- 
tions and religions to motivate his followers. Only one instance 
is known of an organized plan to free slaves during the 100 
years prior to 1791. The instigator was Macandal. His attempt 
failed before it got started, but as the number of slaves, free 
blacks, and escaped slaves increased, so, too, did the potential 
for insurrection. 

In 1790 the National Assembly in Paris required that the 
white Colonial Assembly grant suffrage to landed and tax pay- 
ing free blacks; the planters' refusal to comply led to the first 
rebellion in Saint-Domingue. A white militia, reinforced by a 
corps of black volunteers, contributed to the racial tensions by 
brutally putting down the revolt, which was led by Vincent Oge. 

Fight for Independence, 1791-1803 

The slave rebellion that finally toppled the French colony 
began with a voodoo ceremony. It was organized by Boukman, 
a maroon voodoo priest (houngan) , on August 14, 1791, at the 
Turpin plantation near Bois Cayman. Among those who partic- 
ipated in that ceremony and later became leaders of the revolu- 
tion and new nation were Toussaint Louverture (also seen as 
L'Ouverture), Georges Biassou, and Jean-Francois. 

The slave rebellion began little more than a week after the 
voodoo ceremony. The slaves slaughtered whites and torched 
property, fields, and factories in northern settlements, includ- 
ing Acul, Limbe, and Flaville. When news of the uprising 
reached Cap-Francais (formerly Cap-Francois) , whites retali- 
ated at random against non-whites. In response, they were 
attacked by thousands of blacks. The rebellion ended with an 
estimated 10,000 slaves and 1,000 whites dead, and 1,200 coffee 
estates and 200 sugar plantations ruined. 

The attack on Cap-Francais failed, but elsewhere the plant- 
ers were unable to regain control. Mulatto forces under Andre 
Rigaud, Alexandre Petion, and others, reinforced by black 
slaves, continued to clash with white militia in the west and 
south. The rebellion set in motion events that culminated in 
the Haitian Revolution. 



268 



Haiti: Historical Setting 



After the French National Assembly declared in favor of 
enfranchisement of free blacks and enforcement of equal 
rights, commissioners were dispatched to Saint-Domingue to 
implement the policy. Whites in Saint-Domingue, who had had 
little respect for royal governance in the past, now rallied 
behind the Bourbons and rejected the radical egalitarian 
notions of the French revolutionaries. A convoluted situation 
developed in different regions of the colony, which resulted in 
divisions within the white, mulatto, and black communities as 
well as among the various groups. Black slaves battled white col- 
onists while blacks who supported the French king, known as 
black royalists, fought white and mulatto French republicans, 
and still other mulattoes struggled against white troops. The 
Spanish and British took advantage of the instability, and their 
intervention became another chapter in the revolution. 

The leader of the slave rebellion in Saint-Domingue was 
Toussaint Louverture. Toussaint was born between 1743 and 
1746 on the Breda plantation in northern Saint-Domingue, 
one of a small number of slaves who were well treated and 
allowed to become literate. Toussaint served on the Breda 
plantation as a steward; when the rebellion began, he arranged 
safe conduct for his master's family out of the colony and 
joined the army. He soon emerged as the preeminent military 
strategist, reportedly in part because of his reading of works by 
Julius Caesar and others, and in part because of his innate lead- 
ership ability. 

In April 1793, Cap-Francais fell to the French republican 
forces, who were reinforced by thousands of blacks who had 
joined them against the French royalists on the promise of free- 
dom. In August Commissioner Leger-Felicite Sonthonax abol- 
ished slavery in the colony. 

Two black generals refused to commit their forces to France. 
Instead, Jean-Francois and Georges Biassou accepted commis- 
sions from Spain and, in coordination with Spanish forces, 
sought to take the north of Saint-Domingue. Toussaint joined 
the Spanish in February 1793. Commanding his own forces, he 
cut a swath through the north, swung south to Gonaives, and 
by the end of the year had taken control of north-central Saint- 
Domingue. At this point, Toussaint changed his surname to 
Louverture meaning "opening," perhaps a commentary on his 
ability to find openings on the battlefield, or an allusion to his 
role in creating an opening for slaves. 



269 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Some historians believe that Spain and Britain may have 
reached an informal arrangement to divide the French colony 
between them — with Britain taking the south and Spain the 
north. British forces landed in Jeremie and Mole Saint-Nicolas, 
besieged what is now Port-au-Prince, and took it in June 1794. 
Meanwhile, the Spanish launched an offensive from the east. 
The French forces checked Spanish progress toward Port-au- 
Prince in the south, but the Spanish pushed rapidly through 
the northern part of the country, occupying most of it by 1794. 
Spain and Britain appeared poised to seize Saint-Domingue 
but were foiled by epidemics of tropical diseases. 

Toussaint's centrally located forces became the key to vic- 
tory. After three years of service with Biassou and Jean- 
Francois, Toussaint joined forces with France on June 25, 1794, 
presumably because the French National Assembly had 
decided on February 4, 1794, to abolish slavery whereas Spain 
showed no sign of keeping its promise to end slavery in territo- 
ries it controlled, and Britain had reinstated slavery in places it 
had occupied. Toussaint took the Artibonite region following a 
number of raids against his former allies. Andre Rigaud's 
mulatto forces had some successes in the south, and the tide 
turned toward the French republicans. On July 22, 1794, a 
peace agreement was signed between the principal contenders, 
France and Spain; Britain was not involved, having no legiti- 
mate claim to Hispaniola. Although not implemented until the 
next year, the Treaty of Basel directed Spain to cede its hold- 
ings on Hispaniola to France. The Spanish forces were left 
without supplies, funding, or avenues of retreat. The armies of 
Jean-Francois and Biassou disbanded, and many of their forces 
joined Toussaint. 

In March 1796, Toussaint rescued the French commander, 
General Etienne-Maynard Laveaux, from a mulatto-led effort 
to depose him as the primary colonial authority, and the grate- 
ful Laveaux appointed Toussaint lieutenant governor of Saint- 
Dominque. Subsequent French governors made Toussaint 
commander in chief of all French forces on the island. From 
this position, Toussaint attempted to create an autonomous 
state under black rule by getting rid of the French and the 
mulattoes. He expelled Sonthonax, the French commissioner, 
and defeated Rigaud's forces in the so-called War of the Castes 
(1799-1800). 

After capturing the port of Santo Domingo in May 1800, 
Toussaint controlled all of Hispaniola. Then, he turned his 



270 



Haiti: Historical Setting 



attention to domestic issues. In 1800 the plantations were oper- 
ating at only two-thirds of their former productivity. Toussaint 
sought to maintain an export economy by putting his generals 
in charge of the plantations. He reinstated forced labor, fer- 
mage, in order to grow sugar, coffee, and other crops; made 
Roman Catholicism the official religion; and outlawed voodoo, 
the religion of most of the population. Toussaint also declared 
divorce illegal and demanded monogamy and marital fidelity 
of his subjects, although he himself kept mistresses. 

According to a constitution approved by the Colonial Assem- 
bly in 1801, Toussaint was made governor general for life and 
given the authority to choose his successor. This did not please 
slave-holding countries, such as the United States and Britain, 
and threatened French ambitions for a western empire. With 
the French victorious in Europe, on October 23, 1801, Napo- 
leon ordered his brother-in-law, General Charles Victor 
Emmanuel Leclerc, to retake the colony and restore slavery. 

A 20,000-man French-led expeditionary force, which 
included Polish, German, Dutch, and Swiss mercenaries and 
was joined by white colonists and mulatto forces under Petion 
and others, landed on the north coast of Saint-Domingue in 
January 1802. Their numbers were later doubled. Toussaint 
held out for several months, but two of his chief lieutenants, 
Jean-Jacques Dessalines and Henry Christophe, held separate 
talks with the French and went over to their side. On May 6, 
1802, Toussaint surrendered, perhaps believing that blacks 
would be allowed to retain their freedom or that tropical dis- 
eases would work their earlier magic and allow him to regain 
control. However, despite French assurances of his safety, Tous- 
saint was arrested in June 1802 and sent to the Fort de Joux 
prison in the Jura mountains of France, where he died on April 
7, 1803. 

Following Toussaint's betrayal, Dessalines, Christophe, and 
Petion regrouped to oppose Leclerc and his diseased army. 
Leclerc requested reinforcement but died of yellow fever two 
months later, in November 1802. Once his replacement, Gen- 
eral Donatien Rochambeau, arrived, fierce fighting continued 
for another year, during which 55,000 more people were killed, 
including most of the remaining whites. Many plantations and 
villages were also destroyed. By September 1803, Rochambeau 
wrote to Napoleon Bonaparte advising him that the only way 
for France to win would be to kill everyone over twelve in Saint- 
Domingue. Meanwhile, more than 20,000 of his own forces 



271 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

were dead. War had resumed in Europe, and consequently 
Rochambeau was never adequately supported. Following the 
French defeat at Vertieres, Rochambeau fled to Jamaica in 
November 1803, where he surrendered to the British, ending 
French colonial rule in Saint-Domingue. After a decade of vio- 
lence, 300 years of foreign domination had come to an end. 

Early Years of Independence, 1804-43 

On January 1, 1804, Jean-Jacques Dessalines proclaimed the 
birth of a new nation. Its name would be Haiti, taken from an 
Arawak word for "mountainous," and its flag would be red and 
blue like the French tricolor, but minus the white stripe. 

The new nation faced major challenges. Its black and 
mulatto population of 480,000 in 1789 had been reduced to 
250,000 by 1804. Its plantation-based economy was in shreds, 
and few of the 170,000 who could still do agricultural work 
wanted to return to the plantations, the symbol of slavery. Even 
if a supply of labor were found, credit would be required, and it 
would not be obtainable from the hostile, slave-owning sur- 
rounding states. The population was uneducated and largely 
unskilled, and commerce was almost nonexistent. 

Dessalines, the first leader of Haiti, was born in the north, 
on the Corers plantation, where he served as a field hand prior 
to being sold to a freeman. Both his masters were brutal, and 
Dessalines developed a hatred for whites, mulattoes, and 
authority. When the revolt began, he joined forces with Tous- 
saint Louverture, and proved to be a successful and ruthless 
leader in battle. As the leader of Haiti, Dessalines governed 
with a firm hand just as Toussaint had done and, like Toussaint, 
reimposed the plantation system and used the military to 
ensure that laborers stayed on the plantations and worked. The 
quality of life for blacks did not improve much during Dessal- 
ines's rule. His extensive use of the military set a pattern that 
lasted until the army was disbanded in 1995. 

In 1803 Dessalines became governor general for life, and, in 
1804, he crowned himself Emperor Jacques I. Dissatisfaction 
with his rule increased and became widespread. Cultured Hai- 
tians objected to his ignorance and illiteracy, the mulattoes felt 
threatened by his racism, and most Haitians objected to his cor- 
ruption and poor economic judgment. 

Dessalines was assassinated on October 17, 1806. En route to 
Port-au-Prince with a column of troops to crush a mulatto-led 
rebellion, Dessalines was ambushed, shot, and hacked to pieces 



272 



Artist's rendering of Henry Christophe's palace 
Sans Souci at Cap-Haitien 
Courtesy Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division 

by people probably hired by mulatto opponents. The perpetra- 
tors were never apprehended. His assassination contributed to 
a legacy of racial friction, and led to a popular connection 
between Dessalines and black power. It was the first in a long 
series of violent deaths of Haitian heads of state. 

Although Dessalines had not designated a successor prior to 
his murder, a number of candidates presented themselves after 
his death. The leading contender from the north was Henry 
Christophe, but he was not popular enough in the south to off- 
set the desire there for a mulatto leader. Consequently, the 
Constituent Assembly worked out an arrangement that created 
a weak presidency and a strong legislature. Christophe would 
be president, and Alexandre Petion would head the legislature, 
thus beginning a tradition of "politics by understudies" (poli- 
tique de doublure), where, typically, a black president would be 
manipulated from behind the scenes by a mulatto. However, 
this arrangement failed because Christophe was not content to 
be a figurehead president. 

Partition of Haiti, 1811-20 

After military attacks to displace Petion failed, the country 



273 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

split into two parts. Christophe ruled the north from Cap-Hai- 
tien, while Petion governed the south and west. In 1811 Chris- 
tophe crowned himself King Henry I of Haiti, and the 
northern dominion became a kingdom. He installed a nobility 
of mainly black supporters, who assumed titles of earl, count, 
and baron. 

Christophe, who was born a slave in Grenada and served 
masters at sea, in Georgia, and in Saint-Domingue, remained a 
life-long anglophile. He spelled his first name, Henry, with the 
English orthography. As president, he hired English teachers 
to establish national schools, and encouraged British invest- 
ment in Haiti. 

Christophe's career was also influenced by his association 
with Toussaint Louverture. During the Haitian Revolution, 
Christophe had become a protege of Toussaint and helped 
develop the fermage program that returned Haitians to the 
plantations as paid laborers. When Christophe became presi- 
dent, he also attempted to restore the sugar plantations, using 
workers who were bound to the land. 

Christophe sought to open up international trade, but he 
was afraid such trade would encourage foreign invasions. He 
brought 4,000 warriors from Dahomey in West Africa, the 
Royal Dahomets, as a security force to protect himself and Haiti 
and to encourage honesty and morality among his subjects. 
Christophe remains conspicuous among Haitian leaders for his 
emphasis on public and personal morality. 

Meanwhile, in the south and west, Alexandre Petion was 
head of a military oligarchy. He ruled under two constitutions. 
Under the first, he was president of the republic from 1807 to 
1816, and under the second, he became president for life. 

An important difference between the northern kingdom 
and the southern republic was the treatment of land owner- 
ship. Christophe gave the bulk of the land to the state and 
leased large tracts to estate managers. Petion distributed state- 
owned land to individuals in small parcels. He began distribut- 
ing land to his soldiers in 1809, and later extended the land 
grant plan to other beneficiaries, lowering the selling price to a 
level that almost anyone could afford. Petion's motivation was 
to reward people for the travails of slavery. A legacy of this well- 
intentioned program has been to create a region of family- 
owned farms, which have become increasingly unproductive 
through subdivision according to inheritance laws. 



274 



Haiti: Historical Setting 



To Christophe's chagrin, his subjects continued to defect 
from the harsh conditions in the north to the more benevolent 
situation in the south. In 1818, when Petion, known to his citi- 
zens as Father Good Heart (Papa Bon Coeur), died without 
naming a successor, the Senate selected General Jean-Pierre 
Boyer to fill his post. Boyer was a mulatto, who had been born 
in Port-au-Prince and joined the revolutionary forces with 
Toussaint. After independence, he served Petion as secretary 
and commander of the Presidential Guard. 

After Petion's death in 1818, Christophe sought to reunite 
Haiti, but the south rejected the prospect of domination by a 
black leader. In October 1820, following a stroke that had 
caused him to lose control of the army, his principal power 
base, Christophe committed suicide. Boyer immediately took 
advantage of the situation, and on October 26, he entered Cap- 
Haitien with 20,000 troops and reunited the country. 

Jean-Pierre Boyer Reunites Haiti, 1820-43 

Boyer inherited a country with diminishing agricultural pro- 
duction caused by Petion's policy of land distribution. He tried 
to revive the plantation system through the enactment of the 
Rural Code (Code Rural). Its regulations included forced labor 
to produce export crops and the use of rural police to restrict 
the movement of peasants and make them work. However, gov- 
ernment laxity and lack of cooperation from plantation owners 
caused the system to fail and led to the ultimate demise of the 
plantation economy. Sugar production continued to decline as 
a result of the move toward small subsistence farms. Through- 
out the nineteenth century, coffee remained the principal 
export, while food crops were raised for local consumption. 

Like previous Haitian rulers, Boyer feared another invasion 
of Haiti. To eliminate foreign presence on the island, he seized 
the Spanish colony of Santo Domingo in 1822. This ended sla- 
very in Hispaniola but created a legacy of poor relations 
between the French and Spanish-speaking sides of the island. 

Three years later, Boyer undertook another measure 
intended to remove the threat of foreign invasion and open 
Haiti to international commerce. He agreed to compensate 
France for its losses during the revolution. In return for a 150- 
million-franc indemnity and halving customs charges for 
French trade, Haiti received diplomatic recognition from 
France. Britain recognized Haiti the following year. This act 
ended Haiti's diplomatic isolation, but did not preclude inter- 



275 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

vention. Although the indemnity was reduced in 1838 to 60 
million francs, the payments had a disastrous effect on the Hai- 
tian economy and led to years of French domination of Haiti's 
finances. 

Social and class divisions based on color and property owner- 
ship hardened during Boyer's rule. Despite his efforts to 
appoint blacks to responsible positions, his government 
increasingly fell into the hands of the mulatto elite. Unedu- 
cated rural blacks found few opportunities in the bureaucracy 
and turned to the army. 

Nevertheless, the immediate threat to Boyer came from 
mulattoes opposed to the political and social status quo. In the 
late 1830s, Herard Dumesle, a mulatto member of Congress, 
founded the Organization for the Social Rights of Man and Cit- 
izen, which was critical of the economy, corruption, and nepo- 
tism and called for an end to Boyer's rule. Although Dumesle 
and his congressional sympathizers were expelled from the leg- 
islature, dissatisfaction with the government continued. On 
January 27, 1843, Charles Riviere-Herard, a cousin of Dumesle, 
overthrew Boyer in what is referred to as the Revolution of 
1843. Boyer sailed to Jamaica, the destination of other dis- 
placed Haitian rulers in the nineteenth century. The Domini- 
cans took this opportunity to declare their independence. 

Boyer's presidency was remarkable for its length, the longest 
in Haitian history, and for its relative placidity. During his rule, 
the nation was reunited internally and internationally. How- 
ever, Boyer's presidency also saw a hardening of class and social 
divisions based on skin color and property ownership. Blacks, 
who had been excluded from power under Boyer, reasserted 
themselves after his overthrow. The subsequent struggle for 
power led to a succession of short-lived governments. 

Increasing Instability, 1843-1915 

The period between 1843 and 1915 was marked by a pattern 
of political instability and struggle in which a succession of 
incompetent or brutal leaders came and went rapidly and vio- 
lently. Of the twenty-two heads of state between 1843 and 1915, 
only one served out his prescribed term of office. Three died 
while serving. One was blown up in the palace, one was poi- 
soned, one was hacked to pieces by a mob, one resigned, and 
fourteen others were deposed by coups. 

This was also a period of economic stagnation. Revenues 
from agriculture declined as the ill-tended and subdivided land 



276 



Haiti: Historical Setting 



yielded less and less. Payments to France emptied the federal 
reserves, and the national treasury was chronically in default. 
Presidents appealed to foreign countries for loans and help to 
stay in power. A new and lucrative business emerged: coup- 
making. German merchants funded rebellions on speculation, 
and Haitian mercenaries, known as cacos, carried out the 
coups. 

Interspersed among these short-lived presidencies were a 
few longer-lasting dictatorships in which black leaders were 
manipulated by elite mulatto politicians or merchants. Another 
phenomenon was a growing rivalry between Liberal (mulatto) 
and National (black) parties. 

The life of most Haitians was dismal. As late as 1915, more 
than 90 percent of the population was illiterate. The average 
annual income was only US$20. Not only were people poor, but 
tropical diseases such as malaria, hookworm, yaws, and intesti- 
nal infections were endemic, leading to high mortality rates. 

The presidency of Charles Riviere-Herard (1843-44) was cut 
short because of international and domestic difficulties. In 
March 1844, Herard returned from a failed effort to take Santo 
Domingo to diminished support. Two months later, bands of 
peasants called piquets (a term derived from the stakes they car- 
ried as weapons) overthrew Herard at the behest of an army 
officer, Louis Jean-Jacques Acaau, who demanded an end to 
mulatto rule. 

As property values declined, politics became more lucrative. 
Between 1844 and 1849, mulattoes in the Senate, including 
Beaubrun Ardouin and his brothers, ruled behind the scenes, 
installing a series of black leaders and taking the profit. The 
first was the eighty-seven-year-old Philippe Guerrier (1844-45), 
who had been a member of the peerage under Christophe. In 
short order, he was succeeded by Jean-Louis Pierrot (1845-46) 
and Jean-Bap tiste Riche (1846-47). 

The fourth mulatto presidential choice, Faustin Soulouque 
(1847-59), was a little-known black from the Presidential 
Guard, whom the Ardouin brothers had selected. Soulouque 
was ambitious and ruthless. After arresting, exiling, and killing 
his sponsors, he established a secret police force, the zinglins, to 
terrorize adversaries; he used piquets to frighten the merchants 
of Port-au-Prince and then executed the piquet leader, who had 
become too powerful. 

A year after taking office, Soulouque crowned himself 
Emperor Faustin I. Perhaps fear of foreigners prompted his 



277 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

renewed attacks on the Dominican Republic. Both of his incur- 
sions were defeated, however, and they contributed to his over- 
throw by General Nicholas Geffrard. Soulouque was the last 
Haitian leader to have been a slave. 

Geffrard, a dark-skinned mulatto, restored the old order of 
elite rule. His relatively long rule (1859-67) was peaceful and 
progressive, in contrast to that of his predecessor. He is cred- 
ited with a number of accomplishments: he produced a new 
constitution based on Petion's 1816 document, promoted edu- 
cation and organized a medical school, cut the army by half, 
and tried to improve the quality of cotton production. He also 
signed a concordat with the Vatican in 1860 that ended a sixty- 
year schism with Rome, led to abler clergy, and gave Roman 
Catholicism a privileged position among religions in Haiti. Gef- 
frard also won recognition for Haiti from the United States in 
1862. 

The 1860s were a difficult decade for Haiti politically and 
economically. Geffrard was harassed by the elites and the 
piquets throughout his rule. Under siege in Cap-Haitien, Gef- 
frard called in the British for support. He was the first Haitian 
president to stay in power with foreign support, but not the 
last. In 1867 General Sylvain Salnave, a light-skinned mulatto 
populist with support from northern blacks and the poor in 
Port-au-Prince, forced Geffrard to leave the country for 
Jamaica. 

Salnave, however, lacked the support of the cacos. After wag- 
ing several unsuccessful battles against them, he was pursued to 
the Dominican border, captured, tried, and executed on Janu- 
ary 15, 1870. 

After setting up an interim provisional government, the 
National Assembly selected Nissage Saget as president. Saget 
completed his term of office (1870-74) and stepped down vol- 
untarily. His successor, President Boisrond Canal, resigned in 
1879 in the absence of legislative cooperation. All of the subse- 
quent presidencies until 1915 began and ended with force or 
the threat of it. 

Rebellion, intrigue, and conspiracy continued to be com- 
monplace even under the rule of Louis Lysius Felicite Salomon 
(1879-88), the most notable and effective president in the late 
nineteenth century. From a political southern black family he 
was well educated, well traveled, and politically experienced. 
After living in France following his expulsion bv Herard. he 



278 



Haiti: Historical Setting 



had returned to Haiti and served as minister of finance under 
Soulouque. 

President Salomon was a populist. He established a national 
bank, brought some order to public administration, revived 
agriculture to an extent, linked Haiti to the outside world 
through the telegraph, opened rural schools, and imported 
French teachers. Salomon also paid off the indemnity to 
France. Although known as a nationalist, Salomon encouraged 
investment by permitting foreign companies to own Haitian 
land. 

Salomon's support of the rural masses and efforts to contain 
elite-instigated plots kept him in power longer than the strong- 
men who preceded and followed him; however, when he tried 
to stay in office beyond his term, Salomon was evicted by Lib- 
eral Party forces and other opponents. 

The final exception to the short-lived presidencies of the late 
1800s was that of Florvil Hyppolite (1889-96). Hyppolite is 
remembered for his Ministry of Public Works, which built 
bridges, docks, iron markets, and public buildings throughout 
Haiti and installed telephone and telegraph lines. After Hyppo- 
lite, Haitian politics became even more unstable and the gov- 
ernments particularly short-lived. This was the case until the 
United States occupation in 1915. 

United States Involvement in Haiti, 1915-34 

The turn of the century was a period of expansion for the 
United States. It was becoming an extraterritorial economic 
and military power, accumulating possessions in the Caribbean 
and Central America that included Cuba, Puerto Rico, and 
parts of Panama. The Monroe Doctrine in 1823 and the 
Roosevelt Corollary in 1904, the opening of the Panama Canal 
in 1914, the beginning of World War I, and Admiral Alfred 
Mahan's doctrines concerning the strategic importance of sea- 
lanes of communications all contributed to a growing view that 
the Caribbean was an American lake in the United States' own 
backyard. 

One of the Caribbean countries where the United States had 
interests was Haiti. By 1915 the United States controlled Haiti's 
banking and railroads and accounted for most of the country's 
imports. Only Germany, which had considerable business and 
strategic interests in the area, provided real competition. Ger- 
many was rumored to be interested in acquiring Mole Saint- 
Nicolas as a refueling station, a prospect that concerned the 



279 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

United States because it would place a potential European 
enemy in relative proximity. 

Between 1849 and 1915, the United States Navy sent war- 
ships to Haiti on twenty-six occasions to extract debt payments 
from reluctant Haitian governments and to prevent the British, 
French, and Germans from gaining a greater foothold. After 
the fall of President An toine Simon in 1910, six Haitian leaders 
seized power during the next four years, four of whom were 
killed in office. In December 1914, following news of addi- 
tional caco revolts, a United States ship entered Port-au-Prince, 
removed US$500,000 from the Haitian Bank, a sum that the 
United States claimed it was due, and deposited it in the 
National City Bank of New York. This action was regarded as a 
significant affront by Haitians. 

The event that caused the United States Marines to invade 
Haiti occurred on July 27, 1915. Seeing that his downfall was 
imminent, President Vilbrun Guillaume Sam ordered the kill- 
ing of 167 political prisoners in the national penitentiary and 
then sought refuge in the French embassy. However, an irate 
crowd stormed the embassy, dragged Guillaume Sam out, 
pulled him apart, and then paraded parts of him through the 
streets. The next day, the United States deployed 330 marines 
aboard the USS Washington to protect its citizens, stabilize the 
Haitian government, and secure United States financial inter- 
ests. The United States Marines remained in Haiti for the next 
nineteen years. 

The marines took rapid control of Haiti. They imposed mar- 
tial law, disbanded the Haitian army, installed Philippe Sudre 
Dartiguenave, a mulatto from an elite family, in the presidency, 
and then appointed lesser officials. 

On September 15, 1915, the marines announced complete 
political and administrative control of Haiti. A treaty, the Hai- 
tian-American Convention, decreed that United States citizens 
would collect customs and oversee all government outlays, 
approve all debt requests, advise the treasury, direct public 
works and health programs, and launch an agricultural train- 
ing campaign. Article 10 decreed that the United States would 
create and head a new constabulary. Not surprisingly, Haitians 
resented this treaty, which was originally to be in force for ten 
years but which, in March 1917, was extended for another ten 
years. 

The marines also changed the Haitian constitution. After 
the Haitian congress refused the first draft proposed, the 



280 



President Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave (seated at center) 

with ministers and bodyguards 
Courtesy National Archives 



marines dissolved congress and resubmitted the draft to a 
closely monitored national plebiscite, which accepted it almost 
unanimously. The authorship of this constitution is still 
debated. Some argue that the author was the young assistant 
secretary of the navy, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. 

The 1918 constitution included a novel provision for Haiti — 
white foreigners would be permitted to own land. Many North 
American companies took advantage of this opportunity to 
lease large tracts of Haitian land. 

During the nineteen-year occupation, the marines under- 
took numerous initiatives under the presidencies of Philippe 
Sudre Dartiguenave (1915-22) and Louis Borno (1922-30). 
They attempted to improve the country's infrastructure by 
building roads, bridges, wharves, lighthouses, and irrigation 
systems. They tried to improve health conditions by upgrading 
the sanitation system and providing clean water. They brought 
in United States physicians to create a public health program 
that included the establishment of hospitals, clinics, and train- 
ing schools for doctors and nurses and mounted campaigns 



281 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

against syphilis, yaws, malaria, and hookworm. They tried to 
modernize agriculture by creating an agricultural-technical sys- 
tem, the Service Technique, with the help of United States agri- 
cultural experts. They sought to professionalize the security 
forces by replacing the constabulary, or gendarmerie, with a 
National Guard. They attempted to stabilize the Haitian cur- 
rency, the gourde, by linking it to the dollar. 

Whatever initial Haitian enthusiasm existed for the United 
States invasion dimmed quickly. Haitians increasingly disliked 
the marine presence and governance. They resented the legal- 
ization of land ownership by foreigners and the forced drafts of 
peasants for road building, known as corvee. 

A particular problem was the racial prejudice of the United 
States Marines. The marines favored the predominantly light- 
skinned mulatto elite and installed a series of mulatto presi- 
dents that lasted through Stenio Vincent (1930-41). 

The marines were charged with promoting stability. As part 
of this mission, they created and trained a gendarmerie, which 
came to be called the Garde d'Haiti, and was a precursor to the 
Haitian army. The Garde was increasingly employed to hunt 
down and kill Haitians who opposed the occupation and may 
ultimately have killed as many as 6,000 and put another 5,500 
into labor camps. The intolerance of North American whites of 
the occupying force caused indignation, resentment, and even- 
tually a racial pride that was reflected in the work of a new gen- 
eration of Haitian historians, ethnologists, writers, artists, and 
others, many of whom later became active in politics and gov- 
ernment. 

In 1918 Charlemagne Peralte, a former military officer from 
a rural, middle-class family, proclaimed himself leader of the 
cacos (mercenary bands) and announced that he was deter- 
mined "to drive the invaders into the sea and free Haiti." 
Peralte attacked outlying military establishments and then, on 
October 7, 1919, Port-au-Prince itself. Peralte became a 
national hero, but, shortly afterward, he was betrayed, 
ambushed at gunpoint, killed, and then publicly displayed as a 
warning to other rebels. Benoit Batraville took his place, but 
after his murder in 1920, armed resistance to the occupation 
ended. 

The marine occupation continued after World War I, 
although it was an embarrassment to President Woodrow Wil- 
son at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, where national 
self-determination was a major topic. It was not until 1929, 



282 



Haiti: Historical Setting 



after many Haitians were killed and wounded in student upris- 
ings and a strike at Les Cayes, that the United States Congress 
demanded an inquiry into the occupation. 

President Herbert Hoover appointed W. Cameron Forbes, a 
former governor general of the Philippines, to head an investi- 
gatory commission. The commission found that although the 
marines had made material improvements, they had excluded 
Haitians from a real role in government and from the Garde 
d'Haiti. The commission concluded that "the social forces that 
created [instability] remained — poverty, ignorance, and a lack 
of a tradition or desire for orderly free government." The com- 
mission recommended withdrawal of the occupation forces, 
and United States withdrawal was underway by 1932, when 
Franklin D. Roosevelt became president. The last contingent of 
marines departed in August 1934, after a formal transfer of 
authority to the Garde; a financial mission remained until 1941 
to safeguard United States holdings. The departure was wel- 
comed by Haitians of all colors, classes, and sectors of society. 

Although the United States occupation was intended to 
bring political and financial stability to Haiti, dictatorships 
soon returned, and the improvements to the country's infra- 
structure made by the marines were allowed to deteriorate. 

Racial prejudice in Haiti dates from the colonial experience, 
but the Revolution of 1946, which brought black leaders to 
power, was a direct reaction to the United States occupation. 
Historically, educated Haitians had taken pride in their famil- 
iarity with France, ability to speak French, and their Roman 
Catholicism. After the occupation, increasingly, Haitians came 
to reject anything to do with whites and the West. They began 
to explore and take pride in their African roots and in Haitian 
history, and openly to practice voodoo, the religion of most 
Haitians. In 1957 Francois Duvalier played on these anti-white, 
anti-Western, pro-black and pro-voodoo sentiments to gain the 
presidency and hold power. 

The occupation led to another unforeseen and tragic result. 
In October 1937, some 5,000 to 12,000 Haitians were killed by 
the Dominican military on orders from dictator Rafael Leoni- 
das Trujillo. These Haitians were living in an area on the Hai- 
tian-Dominican border that the United States Marines had 
incorporated into Haiti during the occupation. Historically dif- 
ficult relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic 
worsened because of the killings and because of Dominican 
resentment of previous Haitian control. 



283 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

From the End of the United States Occupation to 
Duvalier, 1934-57 

The 1930 presidential election was the first since the occupa- 
tion began in which the marines did not interfere. The winner 
was Stenio Vincent, a former senator with populist tendencies. 
A charismatic speaker, Vincent was the first Haitian head of 
state to make official speeches in Creole rather than French. 

Beyond efforts to remove the marines from Haiti and 
improve infrastructure and services, President Vincent increas- 
ingly used his office and the Garde to increase his own power 
and wealth. In 1935 he forced a new constitution through Con- 
gress that allowed him sweeping powers to dissolve the legisla- 
ture, reorganize the judiciary, appoint ten out of twenty-one 
senators, and rule when the legislature was not in session. 
Then, he held a plebiscite that transferred economic matters 
from the legislature to the executive. Vincent repressed opposi- 
tion and censored the press, but when he sought to remain in 
office for a third term, the United States objected. He relin- 
quished the presidency to Elie Lescot in 1941. 

Elie Lescot was a light-skinned mulatto like his three prede- 
cessors. His previous experience as ambassador to the Domini- 
can Republic and in other government jobs seemed promising. 
However, Lescot exacerbated racial sensitivities by placing 
light-skinned people at all levels of the government irrespective 
of their competence. He exacerbated religious sensitivities by 
facilitating an anti-superstition campaign (1941-42) that the 
Roman Catholic Church organized against voodoo. Lescot also 
became increasingly authoritarian. He declared himself com- 
mander in chief of the military, repressed the people, censored 
the press, and compelled Congress to grant him extensive pow- 
ers to handle the budget and fill legislative vacancies without 
elections. 

Lescot's declining popularity sank further when correspon- 
dence was made public that revealed that he had been under 
the influence and pay of Dominican President Trujillo when 
he was ambassador to the Dominican Republic, and that 
Trujillo's money might have helped get him elected. After 
Lescot jailed the Marxist editors of a journal called La Ruche 
(The Beehive) in early January, students took to the streets to 
protest and demand more civil liberties. Then, on January 11, 
1945, army officers, led by Major Paul E. Magloire, forced 
Lescot to resign, and the Garde took power. The Garde acted 



284 



Haiti: Historical Setting 



in a singular fashion, on behalf of the nation rather than an 
individual. Further, it pledged to hold free elections and did. 

The Revolution of 1946, as the elections were called, was the 
result of incompetent, dishonest, and repressive governance 
and exasperation at mulatto domination. The spectacle of 
mulattoes everywhere in the administration turned many 
blacks into pro-black activists, or noiristes. A contemporary 
writer, Roger Dorsainville, described the popular mood, saying, 
"I was a noiriste. And I will add that anyone in my social class in 
Haiti, after Lescot, under Lescot, whoever was not a noiriste 
would have been scum 

In May 1946, Haitians elected a National Assembly whose 
purpose was to select a president on August 16, 1946. The 
three major candidates were black. The leading candidate, 
Dumarsais Estime, was from a modest black family in Verrettes. 
He had been a school teacher, assembly member, and minister 
of education under Vincent. Felix d'Orleans Juste Constant was 
leader of the Communist Party of Haiti (Parti Communiste 
d'Haiti — PCH). Demosthenes Calixte was a former Garde com- 
mander and a stand-in for Daniel Fignole, head of the progres- 
sive coalition that included the Worker Peasant Movement 
(Mouvement Ouvrier Paysan — MOP); Fignole was too young to 
run himself. 

Dumarsais Estime was anti-elitist and therefore regarded as 
anti-mulatto. His base of support came from blacks, particu- 
larly from the emerging middle class and the north. Although 
Estime was a civilian, he had the blessings of the Garde d'Haiti 
and won easily on the second round of polling. 

Dumarsais Estime enjoyed broad support in the early years 
of his presidency. Under a new constitution in November 1946, 
he launched a series of reforms intended to improve the condi- 
tion of life in the cities and countryside. He brought more mid- 
dle-class and lower-class blacks into the public sector, increased 
the daily minimum wage, raised salaries of civil servants, and 
proposed the nation's first social security laws. He expanded 
the school system, encouraged rural cooperatives, sent agrono- 
mists to Puerto Rico to study farming techniques, and encour- 
aged the United States and the Export-Import Bank to invest in 
a Haitian Tennessee Valley Authority for the Artibonite River. 

However, President Estime made enemies, who finally con- 
tributed to his overthrow. He alienated the elites by purging 
mulatto officials from his administration and pursuing an 
agenda that encouraged labor unions and forced people to pay 



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Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

income tax for the first time. Although Estime was a practicing 
Roman Catholic, he disturbed Catholics and the church with 
his endorsement of voodoo. Finally, even some blacks deserted 
him, characterizing the regime as ineffectual. 

President Estime had sought the support of the Garde by 
turning it into the Haitian army, but when he attempted to 
amend the constitution in 1950 to prolong his presidency, the 
new army, under Colonel Paul Magloire, sent him to exile in 
Jamaica, with the tacit support of the elite and little public 
opposition. The people who had ensured the transfer of power 
from Lescot to Estime called for new elections. 

Colonel Magloire resigned from the junta to run for presi- 
dent. With the blessings of the military and the elite and the 
absence of electoral opposition, he won a term in the first elec- 
tions in Haiti in which all men over twenty-one could vote. 

President Magloire was an appealing figure who managed to 
captivate blacks while restoring the elites to prominence. 
Under his presidency, the business community and govern- 
ment benefited briefly from favorable economic conditions, as 
did the country's infrastructure, agricultural sector, and school 
and health systems, all with the help of foreign loans. 

By Haitian presidential standards, Magloire was firm but not 
harsh. He jailed political opponents, prohibited labor strikes, 
and periodically shut down printing presses. On the other 
hand, he allowed unions and sometimes the presses to func- 
tion. 

However, Magloire's increasing corruption disillusioned 
many Haitians. He controlled the sisal, cement, and soap 
monopolies and built mansions for himself. Then, after Hurri- 
cane Hazel devastated Haiti in 1954, Magloire appropriated 
relief funds that had been earmarked for recovery. In May 
1956, after an attempt to prolong his stay in office, protesters 
demanded that he step down. In December 1956, after strikes 
shut down Port-au-Prince, Paul Magloire fled to Jamaica. 

The period between the ouster of Magloire in December 
1956 and the election of Francois Duvalier in September 1957 
was marked by political instability. During that interval, there 
were three provisional presidents, one of whom resigned, and 
two others who were ousted by the army. 

Francois Duvalier, 1957-71 

Francois Duvalier came from a modest but upwardly mobile 
black family in Port-au-Prince. He attended the Lycee Petion, a 



286 



Haiti: Historical Setting 



good state school, with other children of academically ambi- 
tious parents of limited means. After graduation, Duvalier stud- 
ied medicine in Haiti. Then, he took an internship at Saint 
Francois de Sales Hospital near the capital. Afterward, he took 
a post that attempted to eradicate yaws and became director of 
a clinic. In August 1944, Duvalier briefly attended Michigan 
State University to study public health, but before completing 
the program returned to Haiti to continue his work against 
yaws. 

Francois Duvalier's interest in literature, ethnography, and 
politics led him to start the Haitian negritude movement in 
1929 with Lorimer Denis, a black lawyer, nationalist, and mys- 
tic. He founded a pro-voodoo, African-focused organization, 
Les Griots (a Guinean term meaning The Bards) in the late 
1930s. Then he helped Dr. Price Mars form the Bureau of Eth- 
nology, an organization dedicated to the study and propaga- 
tion of indigenous Haitian customs and values. 

Francois Duvalier's first overtly political act was to become 
general secretary of Daniel Fignole's party of young profession- 
als, the MOP. In 1946 he became a protege of Dumarsais 
Estime, then the MOP candidate. When Estime was elected 
president, Duvalier entered the cabinet as minister of labor. 
When Estime was ousted from office in 1950, Duvalier also lost 
his job. In September 1956, Francois Duvalier entered the race 
for president as the heir to Dumarsais Estime. 

Although Francois Duvalier was not everyone's favorite can- 
didate, he had broad support. His proponents saw him as edu- 
cated, mild mannered, lacking in undue political ambition, 
and having good international connections. He had worked 
with poor and sick Haitians, he was a pro-black nationalist, and 
he cared about voodoo and ethnicity. This father-figure 
demeanor and manner caused him to be refered to as "Papa 
Doc." Finally, he had the support of the Haitian army. 

The election was historic. All Haitians over the age of twenty- 
one were eligible to vote for a president. However, whether the 
peoples' will was done is debatable. There were no official elec- 
tion observers, the army disqualified the most popular candi- 
date, Fignole, and there were claims of fraud. In any case, 
Francois Duvalier claimed a decisive victory, and his followers 
captured two-thirds of the legislature's lower house and all the 
seats in the Senate. In September 1957, Francois Duvalier was 
installed as president. 



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Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

In his first speech on October 22, 1957, President Duvalier 
promised government unity, reconciliation, and financial redis- 
tribution. However, within weeks, he began to destroy all past 
or potential opposition in order to centralize power in himself 
and remain in power. 

Duvalier's apparent lack of political ambition was a sham. In 
October 1961, he extended his presidency another six years 
and replaced the bicameral legislature with a unicameral body. 
In June 1964, unwary voters in a plebiscite discovered that they 
had approved a constitutional change making Francois Duva- 
lier president for life. 

President Duvalier reigned supreme for fourteen years. Even 
in Haiti, where dictators had been the norm, Francois Duvalier 
gave new meaning to the term. Duvalier and his henchmen 
killed between 30,000 and 60,000 Haitians. The victims were 
not only political opponents, but women, whole families, whole 
towns. Duvalier also used other techniques to eliminate opposi- 
tion, including imprisonment, intimidation, and exile. Many 
left in what became the first wave of Haitian emigration. 

To protect himself against the military, Duvalier repeatedly 
reshuffled the high command and promoted junior black offic- 
ers. In July 1958, when a coup attempt occurred, Duvalier cre- 
ated a separate Presidential Guard within the army for one 
purpose only, to enable him to remain in power. In 1959 Duva- 
lier created the Volunteers for National Security (Volontaires 
de la Securite Nationale — VSN), or makout, as they were 
dubbed, in reference to mythical Haitian bogeymen who carry 
off sleeping children in sacks. The VSN was a secret, private, 
armed paramilitary group reporting directly to the palace, 
whose members used terror and blackmail to get patronage for 
the regime and themselves (see The Duvalier Era, 1957-86, ch. 
10). Duvalier used religion as a form of control. He co-opted 
voodoo priests as spies in the countryside, and for added pro- 
tection, he himself dressed as a well-known voodoo figure. 
Finally, the president created a new elite, who owed its wealth 
and status to him. 

President Duvalier weathered a series of foreign political cri- 
ses early in his tenure, which enhanced his power and contrib- 
uted to his view of himself as the "personification of the Haitian 
fatherland." By 1961 Duvalier had received US$40.4 million in 
foreign assistance, mainly as gifts from the United States. How- 
ever, in mid-1962, President John F. Kennedy cut aid to Haiti 
after Duvalier arrogantly refused to account for its disburse- 



288 



Haiti: Historical Setting 



ment. Even so, Duvalier continued to receive funds secretly. 
After Kennedy's death, Duvalier again received aid openly. In 
return, he remained outside the communist camp and voted 
with the United States to expel Cuba from the Organization of 
American States (OAS). 

In April 1963, when an army officer suspected of trying to 
kidnap two of Duvalier's children took refuge in the Domini- 
can chancery, Duvalier ordered the Presidential Guard to 
occupy the building. The Dominicans were incensed; President 
Juan Bosch Gaviho ordered troops to the border and threat- 
ened to invade. However, the Dominican commanders were 
reluctant to enter Haiti, and Bosch was obliged to turn to the 
OAS to settle the matter. 

After the government, the military and the Roman Catholic 
Church were the two most powerful institutions in Haiti, and 
President Duvalier sought to weaken both. Although he was 
less violent with the church, he employed similar techniques 
with both institutions. Duvalier co-opted clergy, arrested those 
who opposed him, exiled several bishops, a papal nuncio, and 
numerous clergy, and confiscated church property. Despite 
such actions, on October 25, 1966, he succeeded in having the 
Vatican sign an accord that allowed him to nationalize the 
church, effectively putting himself at the head of the church in 
Haiti. The most significant change in the concordat was that 
the president was given the power to name archbishops and 
bishops, with the approval of the Holy See. Duvalier nominated 
five bishops, four of whom, including the archbishop, were 
black. According to the president, the new church would pro- 
mote Haitian unity. The church would no longer be a white, 
largely French, institution with foreign loyalties. For the 
remainder of his presidency, Duvalier continued to control the 
church and expel those, such as the Holy Ghost Fathers, whom 
he accused of being antigovernment. With regard to the army, 
Duvalier exiled or eliminated officers who opposed him, closed 
the Military Academy because he considered it a potential 
source of opposition, and expelled the United States mission in 
1963, fearing its influence (see The Duvalier Era, 1957-86, ch. 
10). 

The social and economic liabilities of the Francois Duvalier 
government far outweighed its marginal benefits. The attrition 
of the population through exile and murder was a terrible blow 
to the country's economic and political development and to its 
image in the world. Religious and racial tensions increased as a 



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Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

result of Duvalier's endorsement of voodoo and his support for 
the black urban middle class at the expense of the mulatto 
elite. Despite substantial multilateral and bilateral economic 
support, the economy stagnated as a result of neglect and the 
diversion of as much as 10 million dollars a year from the trea- 
sury. Among the few positive things that can be said about his 
presidency is that Francois Duvalier provided some new oppor- 
tunities for the black urban middle class. Before his presidency, 
the army command had been a bastion of the mulatto elite. 
Duvalier turned it into a medium for black upward mobility. 
Another progressive aspect of his presidency was the Haitianiz- 
ing of the Catholic hierarchy, which acted as a stimulus to Hai- 
tianize the rest of the church. 

Jean-Claude Duvalier, 1971-86 

Only nineteen years old in 1971, when his father died peace- 
fully in his sleep, Jean-Claude Duvalier (referred to as "Baby 
Doc") protested that he was too young and inexperienced to be 
president. Although it is unclear whether he was in fact men- 
tally prepared to be president, there is near unanimity that he 
was ill-suited for it. For the first few years, Jean-Claude's politi- 
cally ambitious mother, Simone Ovide, ran the government, 
while he lived the life of a playboy. 

For many Haitians and foreign observers, Jean-Claude's 
youth, approachability, and his political promises were encour- 
aging. The United States was heartened when the new presi- 
dent announced that "his father had accomplished the 
political revolution, and his administration would realize the 
economic revolution." 

There were initial signs of political openings that included 
more freedom of the press and respect for human rights. By 
neglecting his role in government, however, Jean-Claude 
squandered a considerable amount of domestic and foreign 
goodwill and facilitated the dominance of Haitian affairs by a 
clique of hard-line Duvalierist cronies, who later became 
known as dinosaurs. 

On May 27, 1980, Jean-Claude Duvalier married Michele 
Bennett. The wedding made the Guinness World Book of Records 
for lavishness and highlighted for most Haitians the disparities 
between their lives and that of the Duvaliers. Everything about 
the wedding was contentious. Although the bride was a 
divorcee, the couple was married in the Port-au-Prince cathe- 
dral by an archbishop. In addition, she was a light-skinned 



290 




mulatto, whose former husband was the son of a man who had 
attempted a coup against Francois Duvalier. Michele's father, 
Ernest Bennett, had a reputation for shady business deals, 
including narcotics trafficking. 



The marriage alienated many Haitians, particularly blacks 
and Duvalierists, the very people Francois Duvalier had culti- 
vated. Increased political repression added to the volatility of 
the situation, which continued until 1986. 

Jean-Claude's personal interest in government was extrac- 
tive. His principal source of revenue was the Tobacco and 
Matches Administration (Regie du Tabac et des Allumettes) , 
established by President Estime as a tobacco monopoly. Jean- 
Claude expanded the monopoly to include profits from other 
state-owned industries. Over the years, he drew hundreds of 
millions of dollars from this "nonfiscal account." An additional 
source of income for the first family was the business commu- 
nity, which Jean-Claude's wife, Michele Bennett, canvassed and 
from which donations were extorted. 

Corruption and intimidation extended well beyond the first 
family. The mahout and section chiefs, or chefs de section (the 
paramilitary rural constabulary) , also used a method of extor- 
tion called "squeeze and suck" (peze souse) referring to the way 



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Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Haitian popsicles are eaten by squeezing the bottom and suck- 
ing from the top) . 

At the beginning of the 1980s, a period of economic decline 
and stagnation set in. Based on all the economic indicators, 
Haiti fell to the bottom of the group of least-developed nations. 
Bad governance, combined with a series of natural disasters, 
increased discontent and misery. By 1986 nearly half of all Hai- 
tians were unemployed, and many more were underemployed. 
Many people were not getting enough to eat and were dying of 
treatable illnesses. 

In the first half of the 1980s, Haiti's problems intensified. In 

1982 Hurricane Allen destroyed plantations growing coffee, 
one of Haiti's principal agricultural products. In 1982 and 
1983, droughts further devastated agricultural production. In 

1983 Reynolds Aluminum, which mined bauxite in Haiti, left. 
The same year, the worldwide economic crisis hit Haiti. Then, 
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) became associ- 
ated with Haiti, causing tourism to plummet and some foreign- 
owned assembly plants to leave. To avoid the spread of African 
swine fever, Haitian black pigs were all eradicated by 1984. 
These pigs had been the major protein source for Haitians 
and, in effect, their savings account (see Livestock and Fishing, 
ch. 8). In addition, high population growth caused the subdivi- 
sion of land into plots too small to support a family. Overculti- 
vated and deforested terrain was causing soil erosion and 
depletion of charcoal, the major energy source. 

Dissatisfaction with Jean-Claude increased following a one- 
day visit by Pope John Paul II on March 9, 1983. The govern- 
ment encouraged the visit, hoping it would revive the presi- 
dent's declining reputation. The president, his ministers, and a 
crowd estimated at 200,000 met the pontiff at the airport. Jean- 
Claude spoke first, conceding his concordatory right to name 
the church hierarchy. Then the pope spoke. He recalled that 
Haiti was the first Latin American country to proclaim liberty 
and added how important it was to have liberty. The Eucharis- 
tic and Marial Congress he had come to attend reminded him 
that the meaning of the Eucharist was service and love, and the 
Haitian church needed to serve everyone, especially the poor- 
est. The slogan of the Congress was "something has to change 
here," and the pope agreed. He continued, saying that there 
was a "deep need for justice, a better distribution of goods, 
more equitable organization of society and more participation. 
There was a legitimate desire for freedom of expression, access 



292 



Haiti: Historical Setting 



to food, care, schools, literacy, honest and dignified work, 
social security, and the fundamental rights of man." All of this 
had to be done "without violence . . . out of respect and love of 
liberty." Many Haitians were deeply moved by the papal visit. 
The government was not. The papal message seemed to pro- 
vide permission to the clergy and laity to pressure the govern- 
ment for reform, and ultimately, if it could not change, for 
Jean-Claude Duvalier to leave office. 

Subsequently, the popular church, or small church ( ti-legliz) , 
and the Catholic radio station, Radio Soleil, sought to make 
Haitians aware of the role that government should have and to 
urge people to protest when anyone's rights were usurped. The 
response of the government to increased public discontent and 
demands for openness was more repression. Demonstrators 
were shot. Meetings and church services were invaded. Newspa- 
per publishers and owners of radio stations, including Radio 
Soleil, which became the symbol of anti-Duvalierist resistance, 
were killed or deported, and their newspapers were closed. 

In early 1985, the government passed legislation that would 
allow political parties, and it released some political prisoners. 
That July the government held a referendum on the presi- 
dency, but the patently sham ballot did not fool Haitians, and 
these staged events, including the October firing of Roger 
Lafontant, the brutal minister of interior, served only to recon- 
firm opinion that the government was beyond repair. 

On November 26, 1985, the commemoration of a 1980 gov- 
ernment crackdown turned the next day into a demonstration 
for "an end to misery, the Constitution, and the Duvalier gov- 
ernment." On November 28, troops intervened in Gonaives 
and randomly opened fire, killing three previously uninvolved 
students. The government announced the formation of a com- 
mission to investigate the events at Gonaives but closed Radio 
Soleil to prevent its broadcasts. These events convinced Hai- 
tians that Duvalier had to go. Antigovernment protests, 
marches, and school and university strikes spread to other cit- 
ies. 

In last-ditch efforts to save his presidency, Duvalier 
revamped his cabinet, lowered the cost of cooking oil and sev- 
eral other basic consumer items, invited the church for talks, 
announced a military reform and the dissolution of the politi- 
cal police, and promised to bring to trial those presumed 
responsible for the killings in Gonaives. The public was neither 



293 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

appeased nor intimidated. Demonstrations spread, paralyzing 
the whole country. 

In January 1986, the Reagan administration began to pres- 
sure Duvalier to leave Haiti, as did Congressman Walter Faun- 
troy, chair of the Congressional Black Caucus, who had been 
interested in Haiti since 1979. The United States refused a 
request to provide asylum for Duvalier, but offered to assist 
with the dictator's departure. Duvalier had initially accepted 
the offer on January 30, but then changed his mind. 

On January 31, the United States prematurely announced 
Duvalier's departure, and Haitians were overjoyed. Jean-Claude 
responded to the demonstration by declaring a state of siege, 
dispatching the makout and the army. Despite these threats, 
Haitians continued to demonstrate all over the country. On 
that same day, the United States Department of State reduced 
its US$56 million aid package to Haiti. This action distanced 
Washington from the Duvalier regime and denied the regime a 
significant source of income. At this point, two leading officers 
who had devised a plot to remove the Duvaliers, army chief of 
staff Lieutenant General Henri Namphy and Military Academy 
head Colonel Williams Regala, confronted the Duvaliers and 
demanded their departure. Left with no bases of support, Jean- 
Claude agreed. 

After hastily naming a National Council of Government 
(Conseil National de Gouvernement — CNG), made up of 
Namphy, Regala, and three civilians, Jean-Claude and his fam- 
ily, his entourage, and a caravan of trucks loaded with posses- 
sions departed Haiti on the night of February 7, 1986, aboard a 
C-141 transport provided by the United States. Spontaneous 
street demonstrations and church masses were held all over 
Haiti to celebrate. People felt free. A popular slogan was "the 
muzzle is off." Graffiti on walls thanked Radio Soleil, and many 
Haitians wore a teeshirt emblazoned on the front with the 
newly restored Haitian red and blue flag and the words "Liber- 
ation of Haiti, February 7, 1986", and on the back, "operation 
to uproot evil accomplished." 

Post-Duvalier Era, 1986-90 

The widespread joy and expectations for a new Haiti soon 
dimmed. Haitians had hoped to rid the country of Duvalierists 
and makout and bring to trial those who had committed crimes. 
Instead, a number of high-ranking officers, including the head 
of the makout and the former army intelligence chief, managed 



294 



Haiti: Historical Setting 



to slip out of the country. Others known to have committed 
crimes were freed after army courts found insufficient evidence 
to convict them. Some Duvalierists remained in high positions. 
Haitians described the situation they were experiencing as 
"Duvalierism without Duvalier." As a result, some took the law 
into their own hands. In the weeks after Duvalier fled, mobs 
killed a number of known mahout. Crowds looted the home of 
former secret police chief Luc Desir and prevented him from 
leaving the country. A Creole term for this vigilante justice was 
dechoukaj, "uprooting evil." Dechoukaj was particularly focused 
on mahout and voodoo priests and priestesses, houngans and 
mambos, who were presumed to have been associated with the 
makout or Duvaliers. The spokesperson for the national voodoo 
organization, however, blamed the Roman Catholic Church, 
accusing it of inciting a new anti-superstition campaign. 

Haitians were also concerned about the composition and 
agenda of the CNG, which was charged with preparing the way 
for elections. The interim government was led by Lieutenant 
General Henri Namphy, army chief of staff. The group con- 
sisted of four other Duvalierists: three military officers (colo- 
nels Prosper Avril, Williams Regala, and Max Valles) , and one 
civilian (Alex Cineas, former minister of public works under 
Duvalier) . In addition, the CNG had two civilians known for 
their opposition to Duvalier: Gerard Gourgue, an educator, 
lawyer, and president of the Haitian League for Human Rights; 
and Rosney Desroches, a well-known and respected educator. 
These last two members had short-lived tenures in office, how- 
ever. Gourgue resigned after two months to protest army 
repression, and Desroches was removed a year later, when the 
CNG abandoned its reformist facade and moved sharply to the 
right. Before long, the CNG became a military junta composed 
of Duvalierists. 

Initially, the CNG dismantled some of the unpopular vestiges 
of the Duvalier era. It rescinded the 1983 constitution provid- 
ing for a presidency for life, disbanded the VSN, restored the 
original red and blue flag of 1804 that Francois Duvalier had 
replaced by a red and black banner, replaced the Duvalierist 
National Assembly with a new thirteen-member ministerial cab- 
inet, nationalized properties belonging to the Duvaliers, freed 
political prisoners, permitted political organizations to exist 
and political exiles to return to Haiti, and pledged to respect 
human rights and freedom of the press. However, the CNG did 
not attempt to uproot Duvalierism, as the public demanded, 



295 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

because the army was still full of Duvalierists; and by disman- 
tling the VSN, the CNG restored the army to its dominant posi- 
tion in Haiti. 

Within months, the CNG embarked on a policy of repres- 
sion. On April 26, 1986, police shot into a peaceful crowd led 
by Jean-Bertrand Aristide, gathered to commemorate prisoners 
killed and incarcerated at Fort Dimanche, Haiti's most infa- 
mous Duvalier prison. In November, police disrupted a demon- 
stration protesting the abduction and murder of two literacy 
workers. By the end of its first year in office, the CNG was 
responsible for the deaths of more civilians than in fifteen years 
of Jean-Claude Duvalier's government. 

Hopes for greater freedom revived briefly in March, when a 
CNG working committee produced a new constitution that 
Haitians readily approved by referendum on March 29, 1987. It 
put planning and execution of presidential elections in the 
hands of a Provisional Electoral Council (Conseil Electoral Pro- 
visoire — CEP) , to be composed of civilians. It reduced the pow- 
ers of the presidency, and Article 291 prohibited the 
participation in government for ten years of anyone who had 
been "an architect of dictatorship and its maintenance during 
the past twenty-nine years." 

However, the CNG, the military, and Duvalierists were not 
happy with the new constitution and prospective presidential 
elections, seeing them as a challenge to their continued politi- 
cal dominance. Soon afterward the CNG announced that it 
would dissolve the CEP and take over its functions. Although 
Haitians were outraged, military strength triumphed. 

The political environment was gloomy. However, on election 
day, November 29, 1987, prospects of a new constitution and 
president combined with a sense of security offered by the pres- 
ence of international observer teams and reporters, brought 
people to the polls. When they opened that morning, Duva- 
lierist thugs and soldiers shot openly at the lines of waiting vot- 
ers, killing between 22 and 200 and seriously wounding many 
others. The CNG immediately canceled the elections and dis- 
banded the CEP. According to Namphy, this action was to pre- 
vent the CEP from handing the presidency to a leftist, 
insinuating that Gourgue of the National Cooperative Front 
(Front National de Concertation — FNC) was a leftist and 
would have won, although an August opinion poll indicated 
that World Bank (see Glossary) economist Marc Bazin was the 
leading candidate. 



296 



Haiti: Historical Setting 



As a consequence of what came to be called the "election-day 
massacre," the four principal candidates condemned the CNG, 
called for the restoration of an independent CEP, and agreed 
to abstain from any new elections organized by the CNG. 
Responding to domestic and international pressure, the CNG 
agreed to hold new elections in January, under an electoral 
council of its choosing. 

The candidate preferred by the military and the United 
States in the rescheduled presidential elections was Leslie 
Francois Manigat. The military anticipated that he would be 
malleable, and the United States viewed the Haitian academic 
and anti-communist, who had left the country a generation 
earlier and had ties to the United States and the Caribbean, as 
more qualified than the other candidates. When the CNG- 
orchestrated elections took place on January 17, 1988, the 
major candidates and most Haitians boycotted them; less than 
10 percent of those eligible voted. Manigat was declared the 
winner of elections marked by fraud and abstention. 

Leslie Manigat held office for five months, during which he 
made some powerful enemies, including the Roman Catholic 
Church, drug traffickers, and the military. After the church 
had boycotted the presidential elections, Manigat did not 
invite the bishops to his inauguration. Wearing a Masonic sash, 
he had a voodoo priest give the blessings. Several months later, 
Manigat informed the church that he was going to change the 
concordat, implying a reduction in its power. 

President Manigat's initially cordial relations with the mili- 
tary soon soured. Unable to obtain foreign military and eco- 
nomic assistance, as he had promised, Manigat attempted to 
find other sources of income. He initiated legal mechanisms to 
recover hundreds of millions of dollars allegedly stolen by Jean- 
Claude Duvalier. Haiti had become a major transshipment 
point for drugs en route to the United States from Latin Amer- 
ica. Manigat tried to stop the corrupting flow. Both of these 
actions threatened vested interests within the armed forces. On 
June 20, 1988, when President Manigat attempted to gain civil- 
ian control over the military and remove top army officers, he 
was removed from office by noncommissioned officers, and 
General Namphy took control. On the same day, General Nam- 
phy dissolved the National Assembly, suspended the 1987 con- 
stitution, placed the country under strict military control, and, 
because he felt the country was not ready for elections or 
democracy, declared himself president. 



297 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Namphy was supported by the army as president of the new 
military government, but divisions existed in the army com- 
mand, and each faction vied for control of the presidency. As a 
consequence of his lack of support within the military hierar- 
chy, Namphy sought additional support outside, from hench- 
men of the Duvalier regime and former mahout. To intimidate 
civilian resistance, Namphy unleashed a campaign of terror. 
Victims included Lafontant Joseph, a distinguished lawyer and 
human rights advocate, and members of the activist sector of 
the church. In one week, three churches were stormed. The 
first assault was particularly vicious. Armed men burst into St. 
Jean Bosco on September 11, killing eleven worshipers and 
wounding seventy others in an unsuccessful attempt to reach 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the officiating priest. 

On September 17, 1988, noncommissioned officers ousted 
General Namphy in a coup, dispatched him to the Dominican 
Republic, and took charge — arresting and demoting officers 
with Duvalierist connections. Hope grew, and talk about house- 
cleaning to complete efforts begun in February 1986 
unleashed new efforts to uproot mahout all over Haiti. 

This coup was different from previous ones. The noncom- 
missioned officers had more in common with most Haitians 
than their officers. Excluded from perquisites and poorly paid, 
they issued a list of demands that called for restoration of the 
1987 constitution, legislative and presidential elections, respect 
for human rights, removal of makout from the army, the disarm- 
ing of paramilitary gangs, separation of the army from the 
police, and an end to political brutality. 

Inexplicably, the noncommissioned officers turned over 
control of the government to Brigadier General Prosper Avril. 
Within a short time, he accused them of planning a coup 
against him and arrested fifteen of the leaders. By December 
1988, President Avril, who had been installed by the army in 
September 1988, was in full control of the government. 

President Avril was an astute politician and tactician, skills he 
had learned from service to the Duvaliers. Prior to becoming a 
member of the CNG, the general had commanded Duvalier's 
Presidential Guard, been financial manager for the Duvalier 
family, and served as a personal aide to Jean-Claude Duvalier. 

Avril cultivated loyalty by giving a share of the goods that 
Haiti imported to his friends for resale, a practice that contrib- 
uted to a US$60 million increase in the budget deficit. He also 
co-opted potential enemies by including various sectors of soci- 



298 



Haiti: Historical Setting 



ety in his cabinet. However, Avril, who used spies to create an 
atmosphere of fear in the country, increasingly used force to 
remain in power, initiating a wave of assassinations, arrests, tor- 
ture, and deportations that led to growing opposition to his 
rule. Twenty-five political organizations formed a common 
Front Against Repression (Front Contre la Repression) and six 
political parties called for Avril's departure and a transfer of 
power to the Supreme Court. Haitians were outraged when 
three political activists were arrested, tortured, and publicly dis- 
played on Halloween 1989. When the army attacked an anti- 
Avril demonstration in Petit Goave, resulting in the death of an 
eleven-year-old girl on March 5, 1990, Haitians demonstrated 
throughout the country. To avoid further bloodshed, United 
States ambassador Alvin Adams encouraged Avril to leave 
office. On March 12, Avril resigned and was flown to Florida by 
the United States. 

Following Avril's departure, the 1987 constitution was 
restored and used as a basis for a transition government. The 
constitution called for the appointment of an interim presi- 
dent from the Supreme Court, and Ertha Pascal Trouillot, 
whose political leanings were relatively unknown, was selected. 
It also called for a ministerial cabinet and a Council of State 
(Conseil d'Etat) consisting of representatives of the political 
parties to oversee the government. 

Although Trouillot was obliged to cooperate with the Coun- 
cil of State, she began to act unilaterally in selecting members 
of the cabinet, including choosing a Duvalierist to be minister 
of finance, and allowing some notorious Duvalierists to return 
to Haiti. These included General Williams Regala, who was 
accused of complicity in the November 1987 election massacre, 
and Roger Lafontant, head of the mahout accused of torturing 
prisoners while he was minister of interior. When Lafontant 
formed a political party, the Union for National Reconciliation, 
and announced his candidacy for president, outraged Haitians 
went on strike and called for his arrest. After the government 
had issued an arrest warrant for him and the military police 
had refused to execute it, Trouillot dropped the matter. Her 
action, showing lack of democratic resolve, led the council to 
say it could no longer work with her and to demand her resig- 
nation. 

The Council of State turned to the 1987 constitution for 
guidance in preparing for elections. Using Article 191, it cre- 
ated an independent Permanent Electoral Council (Conseil 



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Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Electoral Permanent) to develop electoral laws and organize 
and support elections. Under Article 291, which prohibited 
close collaborators of the former government from holding 
public office for a decade, it barred Roger Lafontant's candi- 
dacy. Then, the Permanent Electoral Council announced the 
parliamentary and presidential elections for December 16, 
1990. Prospects for successful elections looked poor, given a 
new wave of violence that included the murder of a council 
member and associate, and a record since 1986 of delayed, can- 
celed, or rigged elections. 

Aristide Presidency, February 7, 1991 -September 30, 
1991 

The two leading presidential candidates were Marc Bazin 
and Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Bazin, a former World Bank econo- 
mist and right of center candidate of his party 7 , the Movement 
for the Installation of Democracy in Haiti (Mouvement pour 
l'lnstauration de la Democratic en Haiti — MIDH) , was referred 
to as the "American candidate" because he was seen as being 
the choice of the United States, where he had lived for many 
years. By contrast, Aristide was an outspoken anti-Duvalierist 
and a priest who entered the race at the last minute with tan- 
gential links to the National Front for Change and Democracy 
(Front National pour le Changement et la Democratic — 
FNCD). 

The campaign was punctuated by violence and derogatory 
rhetoric directed at Aristide — one rally was interrupted by a 
grenade explosion that killed seven and wounded fifty others. 
However, the December 16, 1990, elections went smoothly and 
were judged to be honest. For both reasons, they were unprece- 
dented in Haitian election history. The elections were moni- 
tored by international observer teams from the United States 
led by Jimmy Carter, the OAS, and the UN. Aristide, or "Titid," 
as he was affectionately called by his supporters, won a land- 
slide victory. Seventy-five percent of the eligible voters had 
gone to the polls, and 66.48 percent had voted for him while 
14.22 percent voted for Bazin. Having condemned makoutism, 
Duvalierism, the excesses of the elite, and conservatism of the 
church, Aristide had won a clear mandate to create a more just, 
equal, and democratic Haiti. 

Although most Haitians were jubilant, there were efforts to 
sabotage Aristide even before he took office. On January 1, 



300 



Haiti: Historical Setting 



1991, Archbishop Francois Wolff Ligonde gave a homily in the 
Port-au-Prince Cathedral in which he called the president-elect 
a "socio Bolshevik," and wondered whether this was the begin- 
ning of a dictatorship. But he urged his parishioners not to be 
afraid, saying "this, too, shall pass." On January 6, Roger Lafon- 
tant attempted a coup. He arrested President Trouillot, forcing 
her to resign, then went on television saying he had the sup- 
port of the army. Infuriated Haitians took to the streets in two 
days of clashes with the police and army, and violence against 
church property before the military arrested Lafontant and 
restored President Trouillot to office. On January 27, Haitians 
stifled the threat of a coup involving the imprisoned Lafontant. 
On February 3, someone fire-bombed Aristide's orphanage, 
Family Is Life (Lafanmi Selavi), killing four children. In the 
seven weeks prior to the inauguration on February 7, 125 peo- 
ple died of street violence and clashes with the army and 
police. 

The transfer of power on February 7, 1991, from President 
Trouillot to an elected president, was unexpected and unprece- 
dented. Few people expected that Aristide would be allowed to 
take office or that his presidency would last. They were half- 
right. 

Jean-Bertrand Aristide was born in 1953 to a property-own- 
ing peasant family from Port-Salut in southern Haiti. He was 
sent to Port-au-Prince to be educated by the Salesian Order; 
then, in 1966, to a seminary in Cap-Haitien. Thereafter he 
became a novice in the Dominican Republic. Before ordina- 
tion in 1982, Aristide studied in Canada, Israel, Greece, and 
Italy. Returning to Haiti in 1985, Father Aristide helped oust 
Jean-Claude Duvalier and, subsequently, worked to eliminate 
residual traces of Duvalierism. 

Aristide's efforts created enemies. In 1986 his march to com- 
memorate victims of the notorious prison, Fort Dimanche, was 
interrupted by bullets intended for him. In 1987 his jeep ride 
to Jean Rabel to commemorate the peasants murdered by the 
military almost cost him his life. In 1988 his mass at St. Jean 
Bosco was halted by the military and by thugs who killed thir- 
teen, wounded seventeen others, and burned the church. In 
1988 the Salesians removed him from their order for "incite- 
ment of hatred and violence, glorifying class struggle, and pro- 
fanation of the liturgy." Aristide emerged stronger from each 
of these confrontations. His popularity was reflected at the 



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Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

polls, and witnessed to by the huge crowd outside the palace on 
inauguration day. 

Aristide's skilled use of language and symbolism was evident 
at his inauguration. A peasant woman helped put on the presi- 
dential sash, and most of the speech was in Creole, the only 
language of most Haitians. In his speech, Aristide noted that 
there were people under the table and on top of it but that 
everyone should be at the table together (the next morning, 
he served breakfast to hundreds of homeless people and street 
children at the palace). He called for a marriage between the 
army and people to oppose the mahout and anti-democrats, and 
said that since marriages require sacrifices, he would retire the 
high command, reassign several top-ranking officers, and pro- 
mote and commission others. Among the promoted was Colo- 
nel Raoul Cedras, who would lead the coup against him seven 
months later. Because no party had won a majority in the 
National Assembly, President Aristide selected a friend, Rene 
Garcia Preval, as prime minister and minister of interior and 
national defense. For the cabinet, he chose friends and allies — 
mostly university educated and progressive technocrats. 

In lieu of a political party, President Aristide formed an orga- 
nization called Lavalas, a Creole phrase meaning "cleansing 
flood" (Organisation Politique Lavalas — OPL), which drew 
support from the masses, including the rural and urban poor. 
OPL produced the Lavalas Development Model, which con- 
tained Aristide's goals. The goals included "transition from mis- 
ery to poverty with dignity" and promotion of social democracy 
in Haiti based on the European model. After the inauguration, 
Aristide announced his priorities. They included addressing 
poverty and corruption, improving the infrastructure, decen- 
tralizing the role of Port-au-Prince, achieving food self-suffi- 
ciency, bringing criminals to justice, collecting taxes, and 
instituting essential public spending programs. 

During his first seven months, President Aristide made 
progress against military-related corruption, drug trafficking, 
and human rights abuses. He dismantled the section chief sys- 
tem found in rural areas (see Role of the Army in Law Enforce- 
ment Prior to 1995, ch. 10) and closed Fort Dimanche. He 
created a human rights commission and commissions to inves- 
tigate and bring to justice those accused of crimes between 
1986 and 1990. He curbed waste and corruption by closing 
offices and agencies and reducing budgets and salaries, includ- 
ing his own. 



302 



Haiti: Historical Setting 



President Aristide achieved a positive balance in the treasury 
for the first time in years through the collection of taxes and 
arrears; invitations to the "10th Department," as he called the 
Haitian diaspora, to invest in Haiti; and foreign assistance. By 
July 1991, he had accumulated US$511 million in grants and 
concessionary loans and by September, a US$48 million appro- 
priation in standby loans from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF — see Glossary) . 

Aristide and his achievements did not meet with everyone's 
approval. The military feared reduction of its budget, demobi- 
lization of its infamous Leopard Corps, establishment of a sepa- 
rate presidential security force, interruption of its lucrative 
drug trade, and investigations into its involvement in the elec- 
tion day and Jean Rabel massacres and the destruction of St. 
Jean Bosco. The rich were afraid of the empowerment of the 
social classes they had historically dominated and the prospect 
of paying taxes and obeying laws. The Roman Catholic Church 
hierarchy was apprehensive about the ti-legliz movement and its 
loss of influence in a more egalitarian institution. The United 
States had misgivings about Aristide because he had been criti- 
cal of "the frigid north." 

Opposition to Aristide and his government became increas- 
ingly evident. Several plots were devised by former or current 
mahout and former military officers. Civilians and soldiers 
attempted to assassinate or overthrow him. On April 16, mahout 
burned the Hyppolite Public Market in Port-au-Prince while 
former supporters complained that the effort to curb the mah- 
out and lower the cost of living was too slow. 

On September 26, 1991, Aristide learned that a coup was 
planned for his return from the UN, where he had just pro- 
claimed that "democracy (in Haiti) has won out for good." In 
Haiti the next day, Aristide addressed the nation, denouncing 
the mahout and elites. He urged the people to give the elites 
what they deserved, a burning tire around their necks, or 
"necklace" (pere lebruri), and extolled the device, "What a beau- 
tiful tool! It has a good smell." Such statements alarmed civil 
libertarians as examples of presidential intimidation of the leg- 
islature and courts and abuse of presidential power. 

Military Coup Overthrows Aristide, September 30, 
1991 -October 1994 

The coup began on September 29, 1991, when soldiers 



303 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

attacked Aristide's residence. Although Aristide escaped, on 
September 30 he was captured at the palace, delivered to Briga- 
dier General Cedras, flown to Venezuela, and soon thereafter 
was in Washington. Violence and terror spread across the coun- 
try as soldiers hunted down Aristide supporters. One victim was 
Silvio Claude, the ardent anti-Duvalierist and perennial Protes- 
tant presidential candidate, who was "necklaced." Approxi- 
mately 1,500 people were killed in the first few days after the 
coup. 

On October 3, 1991, the military held a news conference. 
According to Cedras, head of the junta, the coup was justified 
because Aristide had abused power by undermining the consti- 
tution, preaching class warfare, and encouraging violence and 
mob rule. Yet, opposition to the coup continued, and the army 
responded with more violence. Amnesty International 
reported murders, arrests, torture, disappearances, and attacks 
against community and church organizations. 

The junta reversed Aristide's reforms. It restored the section 
chiefs, fired Aristide-appointed prosecutors and judicial offic- 
ers, and released prisoners convicted of human rights viola- 
tions. It created a civilian government, appointing an eighty- 
year-old Supreme Court justice, Joseph Nerette, president and 
former Duvalier minister of tourism Jean-Jacques Honorat as 
prime minister. 

Foreign reaction was swift and negative. United States Secre- 
tary of State James Baker condemned the coup leaders and 
informed them that "this coup will not stand." Then the United 
States imposed a series of penalties on the regime. The OAS 
also condemned the coup. It called for Aristide's reinstate- 
ment, attempted to have a dialogue and hold meetings with the 
junta, and imposed hemispheric trade sanctions on Haiti. 
Additionally, the UN Security Council condemned the coup, 
refused to recognize its leaders, and issued a statement of 
moral support for President Aristide's return. 

The junta thwarted efforts to negotiate and countered with 
an attack on Aristide, quoting statements by him that endorsed 
"necklacing." The Haitian bishops then weighed in. They 
favored a state of law and a democratic society in Haiti but 
denied that restoring Aristide would result in a return to 
democracy. This propaganda had an effect. Initial enthusiasm 
for returning the president diminished as these critical reports 
about him began to circulate. 



304 



Haiti: Historical Setting 



Haitians, meanwhile, were suffering from the brutality of the 
junta and the effects of sanctions and embargoes. There were 
food shortages, 65,000 Haitians lost jobs, fuel shortages para- 
lyzed public services, and unprecedented numbers of Haitians 
tried to leave Haiti — crossing the border to the Dominican 
Republic or attempting to go by boat to the United States, 
which turned back most of them. 

On June 23, 1993, frustrated by failed diplomatic initiatives, 
the UN Security Council imposed a worldwide fuel and arms 
embargo on Haiti; this action succeeded in bringing the junta 
to the negotiating table. On July 3, Aristide and Cedras signed 
an accord at Governors Island, New York, that provided for 
Aristide's return, suspension of the embargo, installation of a 
new prime minister and government, separation of the army 
and police, the presence of a UN force in Haiti, and amnesty 
for the military high command on its resignation. 

Once the embargo was lifted, violence recurred against par- 
tisans of democracy. Five men were gunned down outside city 
hall as they waited to welcome the new prime minister. Antoine 
Izmery, an associate of Aristide, was pulled out of church and 
shot in the street in front of an international team. A new orga- 
nization, the Revolutionary Front for the Advancement and 
Progress of Haiti (Front Revolutionnaire pour l'Avancement et 
le Progres d'Haiti — FRAPH) , composed of armed civilian sup- 
porters of the junta, took credit for some of the violence. 

On October 11, 1993, the USS Harlan County was prevented 
by armed thugs from docking in Port-au-Prince. It had been 
transporting a lightly armed contingent of United States and 
Canadian troops, the vanguard of the UN force, to oversee the 
return of democracy to Haiti. The incident ended the Gover- 
nors Island Accord and led to resumption of economic sanc- 
tions. The junta displayed its contempt for the forces 
attempting to restore democracy by gunning down Francois 
Guy Malary, Aristide's minister of justice, along with his driver 
and bodyguard, and allowing some of the worst Duvalierist tor- 
turers to return to Haiti. 

In the United States, President Aristide, President William J. 
Clinton, and Congress differed on what to do. The situation 
was compounded after Aristide called for a total embargo on 
Haiti. Some called Aristide callous. The New York Times implied 
that he had brought the coup on himself by forcing out newly 
elected officials who had opposed Duvalierism. Moreover, a 
leaked Central Intelligence Agency report described Aristide as 



305 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

mentally unstable, which contributed to the clamor against 
him in Washington and beyond. 

Initiatives by a few individuals forced the United States and 
the UN into action. On April 22, 1994, six congressmen, five of 
them members of the Congressional Black Caucus, demon- 
strated in front of the White House to protest United States 
policy toward Haiti and were arrested. On April 12, Randall 
Robinson, executive director of TransAfrica, a lobbying organi- 
zation on Africa and the Caribbean, began a hunger strike that 
he announced would last until the administration fired special 
envoy to Haiti Larry Pezzullo and changed its policies toward 
the Haitian military and the refugees. Twenty-seven days later, 
Pezzullo was fired, and the hospitalized Robinson received 
assurances that his other demands would be met. Robinson 
then ended his strike. 

The Department of State named a new special envoy to Haiti 
and promised asylum hearings for Haitian refugees aboard 
United States ships. President Clinton took new steps to cut off 
the junta from oil supplies and their foreign bank accounts. On 
April 28, President Clinton gave the junta an ultimatum: a glo- 
bal trade embargo or resignation within fifteen days. On May 6, 
the UN Security Council approved a near total trade embargo 
on Haiti along with restrictions on the junta, with a deadline of 
May 12. 

The junta demonstrated that it had no intention of relin- 
quishing power. On May 11, it installed Emile Jonaissant, an 
eighty-one-year-old Duvalierist Supreme Court justice, as provi- 
sional president; he selected his own prime minister and cabi- 
net. When President Clinton applied additional pressure, 
ending United States-Haitian commercial flights and urging 
United States citizens to leave the country, the junta attempted 
to provoke nationalist and anti-United States sentiments by air- 
ing television films of the 1915 invasion. The situation led Pres- 
ident Jonaissant to declare a state of emergency and impose a 
curfew. Infantrymen paraded through the streets. 

In response, the United States asked the UN to endorse a 
United States-led military intervention in Haiti, and on July 31, 
1994, the UN Security Council passed a resolution (S/Res/ 
940) approving a plan to raise a Multinational Force, Opera- 
tion Uphold Democracy, which would "use all necessary means 
to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military dictator- 
ship." 



306 



Haiti: Historical Setting 



Preparations for both forcible and permissive entries pro- 
ceeded. The United States, Canada, France, and Venezuela 
(referred to as the Friends of Haiti) played a key role. Ten 
countries ultimately agreed to participate, and the United 
States deployed a battleship, the USS Eisenhower to the Carib- 
bean, increasing pressure on General Cedras. 

On September 15, President Clinton addressed the United 
States public, justifying the need for an invasion by citing the 
terrorism of the military regime. The next day, Clinton made a 
final effort to avoid a military invasion of Haiti by sending 
former president Jimmy Carter, former chair of the United 
States Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, and Senator 
Sam Nunn of Georgia to Haiti to arrange a peaceful departure 
of the junta. On September 18, with airplanes headed toward 
Haiti, Carter phoned Clinton to say that the junta would step 
down in return for an amnesty for themselves and the Haitian 
military. President Aristide gave his approval. 

On September 19, 1994, United States troops entered Haiti 
peacefully and unopposed. Haitians greeted the United States 
forces warmly but cautiously, fearing reprisals from the Haitian 
military. However, as the people became more festive, Haitian 
police killed two people while United States forces watched, 
unsure of their mandate. Other incidents occurred in Cap-Hai- 
tien and Gonaives. 

The junta left Haiti within a month. On October 4, former 
police chief Joseph Michel Francois fled to the Dominican 
Republic. On October 10, General Cedras resigned in a brief 
ceremony in which he had to be protected from jeering 
crowds, and on October 13, generals Cedras and Biamby left 
for exile in Panama. 

Democracy Restored, 1 994-96 

President Aristide made a triumphal return to Haiti on 
October 15, 1994. For the first time, an exiled Haitian presi- 
dent was restored to office. A jubilant crowd, estimated at 
10,000, gathered in front of the presidential palace to see and 
hear him. President Aristide spoke to them about reconcilia- 
tion and justice, repeating the phrase, "No to violence, no to 
vengeance, yes to reconciliation." The next day, October 16, 
the UN Security Council lifted all economic sanctions against 
Haiti. 

A sense of disillusionment soon set in among many of Aris- 
tide's followers, however. Their champion of social justice 



307 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

entertained the wealthy, contemplated privatization of state 
industries, and selected a businessman as prime minister. His 
obvious wealth, his move to a mansion, marriage and subse- 
quent fatherhood were disturbing changes in the former 
priest. 

Haitians had also changed. Most were much worse off than 
before 1991. The economy had been destroyed by sanctions; 
the departure of the pivotal assembly industry left 70 to 80 per- 
cent of Port-au-Prince unemployed; and the infrastructure and 
agricultural sectors had collapsed. Many educated, technically 
skilled, and formerly politically involved Haitians had left, and 
3,000 to 4,000 others had been killed. 

President Aristide faced multiple challenges on his return to 
Haiti, not the least of which were the high expectations of his 
supporters and a mere fifteen months left of his term. He 
announced a detailed economic recovery program designed to 
streamline the bloated and corrupt public sector and renew 
private-sector job creation. In response, the international com- 
munity pledged a major emergency economic aid package of 
US$1.2 billion. Aristide used this assistance to support the gov- 
ernment, and create temporary public works jobs for the 
immediate alleviation of poverty, avoiding unpopular and con- 
troversial measures. In view of the magnitude of Haiti's eco- 
nomic problems, the reforms needed time to succeed. 

President Aristide took bold action in dealing with the issue 
of domestic security. In early 1995, he disbanded the military 
and paramilitary organizations that had tyrannized Haitians 
and prevented a society based on laws. A new Haitian National 
Police under the Ministry of Justice and Public Security super- 
seded the armed forces as the agency dealing with the nation's 
serious problem of maintaining law and order. Meanwhile, the 
international force, which consisted in large measure of United 
States troops, remained to guarantee basic security and assist in 
training the Haitian National Police. A beginning was made on 
the reform of the judicial system by weeding out corrupt and 
incompetent judges, and measures were taken to improve 
prison conditions (see Justice System, ch. 10). As one of his first 
actions, Aristide created a National Commission of Truth and 
Justice to investigate and write a report on some of the worst 
crimes committed between 1991 and 1994. The commission 
finished its investigation and presented its findings to the Min- 
istry of Justice in January 1997; no further action has been 



308 



Haiti: Historical Setting 



reported. In the area of social reform, President Aristide cre- 
ated a National Secretariat for Literacy and began land reform. 

The June 25, 1995, municipal and parliamentary elections 
were contentious. The elections were delayed twice, and the 
Provisional Electoral Council reviewed candidates and printed 
ballots up to the last minute, leading to a boycott by three polit- 
ical parties, and a low turnout. Despite UN monitoring, some 
fraud occurred, necessitating a rerun on August 13. Except for 
Lavalas, which did well, nearly all of the other political parties 
called for an annulment. 

Presidential elections followed in November. Aristide cam- 
paigned for Rene Preval, his prime minister and friend, until 
the last moment, when Aristide himself appeared to consider 
staying in office. Thereafter, neither Aristide nor his disap- 
pointed supporters, who had hoped that Aristide would run 
again, showed much enthusiasm for Preval. Only 30 percent of 
the eligible voters went to the polls, and 80 percent of those 
who did voted for Preval on the OPL ticket. Regardless of the 
turnout, the election was unprecedented. When Preval took 
office on February 7, 1996, for the first time in Haitian history 
power was transferred from one democratically elected presi- 
dent to another. 

President Preval (1996- ) is an agronomist, who was a baker 
in Port-au-Prince before Jean-Bertrand Aristide selected him to 
be prime minister. Viewed as a hard worker, his main appeal 
came from his association with Aristide. Over time, however, 
the relationship became strained, and Preval's popularity 
decreased. 

President Preval inherited a daunting array of problems. As 
of early 1996, the depressed economy continued to decline 
while the astronomical unemployment rate continued to 
climb. Inflation had already reached 30 percent and was 
expected to increase. In response to these indicators and 
because of the new openness and availability of weapons, com- 
mon crime was increasing, straining the capabilities of the new 
National Police. Foreign assistance had declined drastically — 
from US$230 million in fiscal year (FY — see Glossary) 1995 to 
US$90 million in FY 1996, depriving President Preval of an 
external cushion. 

Although Haitians carried out an historic transition from 
one democratically elected president to another, the future of 
democracy in Haiti remained uncertain. Upcoming congres- 
sional elections would give Haitians the opportunity to correct 



309 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

the marred 1995 congressional elections and create a perma- 
nent electoral council. Although President Preval seemed com- 
mitted to the privatization of state-owned industries, as of early 
1996 it remained to be seen whether he would be able to over- 
come congressional and public opposition. To date, Haiti had 
not begun the process of economic recovery nor reached a 
consensus on how it might be achieved. 

* * * 

Historical works on Haiti traditionally have focused on the 
leaders of the war of independence, the early heads of state, 
Francois Duvalier, and voodoo. Recently, however, a number of 
comprehensive studies on Haiti have appeared. Among these 
are David Nicholls' From Dessalines to Duvalier, Robert and 
Nancy Heinl's Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People, 
1492-1995, James Leyburn's The Haitian People, Selden Rod- 
man's Haiti: The Black Republic, and Robert Rotberg and Chris- 
topher Clague's Haiti: The Politics of Squalor. For precolonial and 
colonial history, see M.L.E. Moreau de Saint-Mery, A Civiliza- 
tion that Perished. For the revolution, consult C.L.R. James, The 
Black Jacobins, Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolu- 
tion. The United States occupation of Haiti is chronicled in 
Hans Schmidt's The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934. 
For more about Francois Duvalier, see Bernard Diederich and 
Al Burt's Papa Doc et les Tontons Macoutes. For the Duvalier 
dynasty, consult Elizabeth Abbott's Haiti: The Duvaliers and Their 
Legacy. For a chronology of efforts to restore Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide to power, see Haitian Democracy Restored: 1991-1995 by 
Roland I. Perusse. For the role of religions in Haiti, look at 
Anne Greene's The Catholic Church in Haiti: Political and Social 
Change and for voodoo, consult Voodoo and Politics in Haiti, Voo- 
doo Heritage, and Etudes sur le vodou haitien by Michel S. 
Laguerre. (For further information and complete citations, see 
Bibliography.) 



310 



Figure from a painting by Prosper Pierrelouis 



IN 1804 HAITI EMERGED FROM thirteen years of revolution 
as the New World's second republic, having attained indepen- 
dence from France. Sharply defined social distinctions in the 
colonial system set the stage for Haiti's evolution as an inde- 
pendent but deeply divided society — a majority of peasant free- 
holders, formerly slaves, dominated by a small ruling class, 
formerly free men of color. These social distinctions fostered 
the creation of contrasting cultural and linguistic forms. 

Peasant society emerged as largely self-regulating and defen- 
sive in response to military rule in rural areas and the absence 
of a voice in government. The exclusion of peasants from 
national institutions created the opportunity for a flowering of 
local cultural forms, including the Creole language and the 
voodoo religion. A rich Haitian tradition of cultural innovation 
has long coexisted with the French language and the Roman 
Catholic Church favored by the urban elite. 

As a post-colonial state in 1804, Haiti was ahead of its time 
and was treated by the outside world as a pariah state. Conse- 
quently, Haiti went its own distinctive way far more than other 
countries in the region. Culturally, it continues to be marked 
far more than other New World societies by African cultural 
influences as well as its Franco-Haitian heritage, and by linguis- 
tic and cultural isolation from its neighbors. Haiti's remarkable 
cultural heritage includes a sophisticated repertoire of tradi- 
tional dance, music, religion, oral literature, and artistic 
expression. 

In the early nineteenth century, small yeoman farmers sup- 
planted the plantation system as the dominant mode of pro- 
duction. Haitian agriculture shifted rapidly from large-scale 
monocropping for export to a diverse mix of food and cash 
crops produced on thousands of dispersed plots. Haiti's emer- 
gent elite moved from plantation production into mercantile 
pursuits based on agricultural exports and industrial imports. 
The economically powerful also gained control of the appara- 
tus of state. Newly independent Haiti maintained a sizable 
standing army inherited from the revolutionary period, and up 
to the 1990s the Haitian army consistently exercised a powerful 
political role. 

With a total population of around 7.6 million, Haiti in 1998 
was the most rural, the poorest, and the most densely popu- 



313 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

lated country in the hemisphere. Most Haitians continue to be 
small peasant farmers. Intense class stratification persists 
despite the growth of intermediary classes since the 1950s, sig- 
nificant out-migration, and a phenomenal rate of urban 
growth centered on Port-au-Prince, a metropolitan area of 
around 2 million people. Despite a high rate of rural out- 
migration, the rural population continues to expand. Demo- 
graphic pressures exert acute stress on the country's natural 
resource base. 

By international standards, the majority of Haitians are very 
poor. This alarming level of poverty reflects the poor distribu- 
tion of national wealth, the precipitous decline of agriculture 
in the past few decades, acute land scarcity, a highly degraded 
environment, weak institutions of government, and prolonged 
political and economic crisis since the mid-1980s. Efforts in the 
1990s to decentralize and democratize the state have yet to 
make a palpable difference in the daily lives of most people. 

In the late 1990s, even the most remote rural areas of the 
country have significant contact with the outside world. This 
contact is the result of the growth of influence of foreign mis- 
sionaries and nongovernmental agencies since the 1950s, sig- 
nificant out-migration since the 1970s, rapid growth of Creole- 
language radio programs and stations since the early 1980s, 
turbulent political struggles since the mid-1980s, and interna- 
tional political and military intervention in Haiti in the mid- 
1990s (see Multinational Security Assistance, ch. 10). 

Geography 

Haiti occupies the mountainous western third of Hispaniola 
(La I si a Espanola), the second largest island of the Greater 
Antilles. The island is divided between Haiti and the Domini- 
can Republic (see fig. 1). The two countries share a 388-kilome- 
ter border established in a series of treaties, the most recent 
being the 1936 Protocol of Revision of the Frontier Treaty of 
1929. Haiti's eastern border runs along mountain ranges and 
the Pedernales River in the south and the Massacre River in the 
north. The Atlantic Ocean borders Haiti to the north, and the 
Caribbean Sea borders it on the west and south. The Windward 
Passage separates Haiti from Cuba. Haiti's close neighbors also 
include Jamaica and Puerto Rico. 

Haiti occupies an area of about 27,750 square kilometers, 
about the size of Maryland. Two large peninsulas in the north 
and south dominate Haiti's mainland. The country has around 



314 



Haiti: The Society and Its Environment 

1,300 kilometers of coastline. The land area includes numer- 
ous small islands and four large islands: lie de la Gonave (680 
square kilometers) adjoining the Baie de Port-au-Prince, lie de 
la Tortue (180 square kilometers) off the north coast, and lie a 
Vache (fifty-two square kilometers) and Grande Cayemite 
(forty-five square kilometers) off the southern peninsula. 

Haiti has very few plains; they make up only 22 percent of 
the national territory. Slopes in excess of 20 percent cover 63 
percent of this rugged, mountainous land, and only 29 percent 
of the country has less than a 10 percent slope. The northern 
tier of the country includes the Plaine du Nord — the country's 
largest coastal plain — an area of 2,000 square kilometers, and 
the smaller Plaine des Moustiques and Plaine de l'Arbre in the 
arid northwestern peninsula. The northern mountain range, 
the Massif du Nord, is an extension of the Cordillera Central of 
the Dominican Republic. It varies in elevation from 600 to 
1,100 meters and extends from Haiti's eastern border into the 
northwestern peninsula. 

Haiti's geographic center includes the Central Plateau, 
around eighty-five kilometers long and thirty kilometers wide. 
To the southwest of the plateau lies the range of Montagnes 
Noires with a maximum elevation of 1,400 meters, and the 
lower Artibonite River Valley measuring around 800 square 
kilometers. The Artibonite delta is the country's major rice- 
producing area. Other important lowland areas include the 
Plaine de l'Estere and Plaine des Gonaives. South of the Artibo- 
nite Valley are the mountains of the Chaine des Matheux and 
Chaine du Trou d'Eau — an extension of the Sierra de Neiba 
range of the Dominican Republic. 

The southern tier of Haiti includes the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac 
and the Plaine de Leogane near Port-au-Prince, the Plaine des 
Cayes, other small coastal plains, and the high mountain 
ranges of the southern peninsula. The Plaine du Cul-de-Sac is a 
natural depression twelve kilometers wide that extends thirty- 
two kilometers from the Dominican border to the coast of the 
Baie de Port-au-Prince. The mountains of the Massif de la Selle 
are an extension of the Sierra de Baoruco range in the neigh- 
boring republic and run in an east-west direction in the upland 
interior of the southern peninsula. The Morne de la Selle 
(Montague Terrible) is the highest point in Haiti with an eleva- 
tion of 2,684 meters. In the southwestern portion of the penin- 
sula, the steep and rugged Massif de la Hotte rises to 2,347 
meters on Pic de Macaya. 



315 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Haiti has a large number of streams that carry torrential 
flows during the wet season and slow to a trickle in the dry sea- 
son. Streams tend to be short and swift flowing because of the 
narrow peninsulas and numerous mountain ridges. Five rivers 
generate most of the country's water catchment: the Artibon- 
ite, Grande-Anse, L'Estere, Trois Rivieres, and Cavaillon. The 
Artibonite is the largest drainage system in the country. Its 
headwaters are the Libon River in the foothills of the Massif du 
Nord. The Libon crosses the border into the Dominican 
Republic and then forms part of the border before reentering 
Haiti as the Artibonite River. At the border, the river expands 
into the Lac de Peligre formed by a dam in the southern part 
of the Central Plateau. Peligre Dam, constructed in 1956, is the 
country's major hydroelectric facility. The Artibonite drains 
some 10,000 square kilometers, including 6,570 square kilome- 
ters in Haiti. The 400-kilometer river is only one meter deep 
during the dry season and may dry up completely in certain 
spots. During the wet season, it is more than three meters deep 
and subject to flooding. 

The 150-kilometer Trois Rivieres is the most important river 
in the northern region. It has an average width of sixty meters, 
and is three to four meters deep. The ninety-five-kilometer 
Guayamouco River flowing through the Central Plateau is one 
of the principal tributaries of the Artibonite River. It has an 
average width of sixty meters and a depth of three to four 
meters. The most prominent body of water in the southern tier 
of the country is the Etang Saumatre in the Plaine du Cul-de- 
Sac. A brackish lake that is gradually becoming less salty, it has 
an elevation sixteen meters above sea level and is twenty kilo- 
meters long and six to fourteen kilometers wide. 

Haiti lies within the Low Subtropical Region at 18 to 20 
degrees North latitude. The Holdridge Life Zone Classification 
System identifies nine subtropical life zones in Haiti: Thorn 
Woodlands, Dry Forest, Moist Forest, Wet Forest, Rain Forest, 
Lower Montane Moist Forest, Lower Montane Wet Forest, 
Lower Montane Rain Forest, and Montane Wet Forest. The 
Moist Forest, filled by growths of mahogany and tropical oaks, 
is the most commonly represented natural life zone. Tempera- 
tures are almost always high in lowland areas, ranging from 
15°C to 25°C in the winter months and 25°C to 35°C during the 
summer. 

The period from December through February is generally a 
dry season with little or no rainfall. Most of the country has a 



316 



Haiti: The Society and Its Environment 

major rainy season in the spring and minor rains in the fall. 
Northeast trade winds and mountainous terrain create 
extreme weather conditions and highly variable temperatures. 
Tropical storms, drought, floods, and hurricanes are common. 
Rainfall patterns range from 300 millimeters in the northwest 
to more than 3,000 millimeters on Pic de Macaya in the high 
mountains of the southwest. One-fourth of the country has 
annual precipitation less than 1,200 millimeters. Most areas 
have at least 1,000 millimeters of annual precipitation, and a 
substantial percentage of the country receives 1,500 millime- 
ters or more. 

Geologists hold that Hispaniola was formed by three distinct 
land masses that collided over geologic time and were formed 
by the uplifting of oceanic crust. Exposed rock formations are 
sedimentary, metamorphic, or igneous; in Hispaniola sedimen- 
tary limestone deposits are by far the most abundant (80 per- 
cent). These limestone-based soils are more fertile than 
igneous-derived soils; the most fertile soils are alluvial deposits 
in river valleys and coastal plains. The permanent rise in sea 
level over geologic time has given rise to a notable degree of 
local endemism, resulting in a number of plant species pecu- 
liar to the region. 

Natural Resources 

Land Use and Water 

The amount of arable land is small in relation to the size of 
the population. The rich soil tends to be found in small, non- 
contiguous areas and is concentrated along the coast or valley 
bottoms. Four large parcels of contiguous good land dwarf all 
others: the Plaine du Nord, the river basins of the lower Artibo- 
nite and of L'Estere, and the Plaine des Cayes and the Plaine 
du Cul-de-Sac. 

By agronomic standards, 63 percent of all land in Haiti is too 
steep for sustainable agricultural production; however, land- 
use data indicate that two-thirds of all cultivated land is on 
mountain slopes and that the bulk of production on mountain 
slopes takes the form of erosion-intensive, annual food crops. 
Therefore, the scale of mountain cultivation is double that con- 
sidered suitable even for perennial crops. 

Land-use studies show roughly 80 percent of the country 
occupied by an agricultural landscape, including land actively 
farmed, fallow lands, farmhouses and compounds, pastures, 



317 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

and wood lots. Experts classify at most 11 percent of the land, 
and perhaps only 7 percent, suitable for crop production 
under present techniques of cultivation. This analysis further 
suggests that no more than 28 percent of the land should be 
cultivated if using optimum techniques for soil and water con- 
servation. These numbers are remarkable since survey national 
data from 1995 show 48 percent of total land area under active 
cultivation. Assuming a total population of 7,630,997 in 1998, 
the overall population density is 581 individuals per square 
kilometer of cultivated land, or 989 per square kilometer of 
land deemed cultivable. 

This situation is clearly untenable and has catastrophic con- 
sequences for the environment and for rural livelihood. Data 
from the 1980s show a pattern of negative growth in agricul- 
tural production combined with ongoing population increase 
in the rural sector. Agriculture's share of total exports fell from 
around 90 percent in the 1950s to less than 10 percent in the 
late 1990s (see Agriculture, ch. 8). In terms of food consump- 
tion, the data also show a decline of 33 percent in the number 
of calories consumed per person per day since 1980. 

Haiti's most acute environmental problem is undoubtedly 
soil erosion. A high proportion of cultivated land is farmed far 
beyond its carrying capacity, and forest cover has been largely 
decimated for agricultural use. By deforesting the landscape 
and degrading the land, agricultural forces have imposed acute 
pressure on the resource base. By some estimates, the equiva- 
lent of 6,000 hectares or more of arable land is lost annually 
because of erosion. Perhaps 88 percent of erosion stems from 
the cultivation of slopes that exceed 50 percent incline. Fur- 
thermore, the application of landscape-wide conservation tech- 
niques is complicated by the fragmentation of holdings. Recent 
data suggest that average farm size is 1.8 hectares divided into 
3.7 noncontiguous plots. 

The productive potential of irrigated land is significantly 
underused in Haiti; irrigated land is estimated to be less than 
40,000 hectares. Technically, an additional 22,000 hectares 
could be rehabilitated and brought back into production. By 
some estimates, new investment in this sector could develop an 
additional 80,000 hectares. A limiting factor is a decrease in the 
quantity of surface water available for irrigation as a result of 
the effects of reduced vegetative cover on river discharge. 
There is evidence that base flows in Haiti's rivers and streams 
are diminishing. Aside from its use in irrigation, surface water 



318 



Haiti: The Society and Its Environment 

is also the primary source of water used by most Haitians for 
domestic household needs. In general, groundwater is signifi- 
cantly underused for both household use and irrigation. The 
use of groundwater for irrigation is mostly limited to the Plaine 
du Cul-de-Sac. 

Forestry and FueSwood 

There is a paucity of current data on forest cover. The most 
reliable national data are based on aerial photographs dating 
back to 1978. However, the United Nations Food and Agricul- 
ture Organization (FAO) has made some estimates based on 
the rate of deforestation prevalent in the late 1980s (see For- 
estry, ch. 8) . In general, Haiti's forest cover is fast disappearing 
because of the press of people on the land, the clearing of land 
for food production, growth in the demand for construction 
material, and the harvest of fuelwood. In the case of many tree 
species, only a few relic stands of natural forest remain. 

Several important stands of mangrove forest can be found in 
Haiti's coastal areas and estuaries. The most notable pine tract 
is the pine forest of the Massif de la Selle, a 28,000-hectare tract 
of state land that has been severely disturbed by illicit wood 
harvest and agricultural incursions. Much of Haiti was origi- 
nally covered by broadleafed forest. Important stands remain 
in the northern region of Le Borgne-Anse-a-Foleur and around 
Pic de Macaya. Semi-arid forest, indicated by natural stands of 
mesquite, is found near the Etang Saumatre and around Grand 
Gosier and Cotes de Fer. Natural stands of arid-land scrub, 
characterized by cactus, succulents, and thorny shrubs, are 
found between in the Savane Desolee between Gonaives and 
Anse Rouge. 

In the sixteenth century, forests of various types covered 
much of the island of Hispaniola although some observers esti- 
mate that less than half of Haiti was then covered by merchant- 
able forest. Haiti exported precious woods throughout the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and was for a time the 
largest exporter of logwood in the hemisphere. In addition, 
Haiti exported considerable quantities of mahogany, Spanish 
cedar, and lignum vitae. Since at least the 1940s, significant 
wood product shortages and growing wood imports have been 
reported. Perhaps 8 percent of the territory was covered by nat- 
ural forest in 1954. 

Reliable national data from 1978 indicated that only 6.4 per- 
cent of the country was covered by forest — roughly one-third 



319 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

dense forest canopy and two-thirds open forest. Between 1978 
and 1984, monitoring of three representative sites character- 
ized as degraded, open, and closed forest showed rates of 
deforestation ranging from 1.0 to 3.4 percent. It is clear that 
the process of deforestation has continued unabated since 
1978; it was thought in 1993 that forests represented as little as 
2.2 percent of the land. In general, the remaining parcels of 
forest today are highly fragmented and concentrated along 
watershed divides and on steep slopes vulnerable to erosion. 

The primary cause of deforestation is the sheer scale of agri- 
cultural occupation of the landscape; however, demand for 
woodfuels is another significant contributor to deforestation. 
Per capita consumption of fossil fuels is the lowest in the hemi- 
sphere. Haiti is currently 80 percent self-sufficient in energy — 
based on wood as the primary cooking fuel in rural areas and 
wood charcoal in urban areas. 

Fuelwood alone constitutes 70 percent of the national supply 
of energy. Residential consumption makes up more than 50 
percent of total energy demand. Fuelwood, bagasse, and wood 
charcoal also supply 63 percent of industrial demand. Two- 
thirds of national charcoal consumption is attributed solely to 
Port-au-Prince. Ninety percent of Port-au-Prince households 
use wood charcoal for cooking. To a certain extent, growing 
national demand for charcoal parallels the growth of Port-au- 
Prince as an urban center. 

Charcoal production is an important source of off-season 
employment for an estimated 67,000 small farmers. Its produc- 
tion is decentralized and produced by traditional methods. 
Since the 1970s, production has shifted from traditional supply 
zones of the arid northwest and lie de la Gonave to a much 
broader range of production sites in all nine administrative 
departments of the country. Charcoal is generally acquired at 
prices far below its actual replacement cost. This fact signifi- 
cantly limits market incentive to manage w T ood as a renewable 
resource base for charcoal production. The mining of wood 
resources therefore contributes to degradation of the environ- 
ment. 

Mining 

There is little mining activity in Haiti except for construction 
materials. Deposits of bauxite on the Rochelois Plateau near 
Miragoane and copper near Terre Neuve were mined in the 
past; the bauxite mine closed in 1982 and the copper mine in 



320 



Haiti: The Society and Its Environment 



1971. Some copper can be found in Vallieres, some gold in 
Faille-Perches, and some lignite with a high sulfur content on 
the Central Plateau and Azile. Salt flats exist in Gonaives and 
Caracol. High-grade calcium carbonate has been identified at 
Miragoane and Dufort, and marble has been found in the Arti- 
bonite, Camp Perrin, Jacmel, and Margot. Deposits of clay in 
Hinche and the Plaine du Nord have good characteristics for 
pottery and tile manufacture. There are also numerous sites 
where gravel, limestone, and river sands are extracted for use 
as construction material for roads and buildings. Such mining, 
which is virtually unregulated, disfigures the landscape and cre- 
ates a high risk of erosion and landslides. 

Coastal and Marine Resource 

Haiti's impressive coastal and marine habitats include man- 
grove wetlands, seagrass meadows, coral reefs, and numerous 
protected bays and estuaries. The diverse coastal system has 
white coral sand beaches, limestone cliffs, and rocky shore- 
lines. Haiti's near-shore underwater landscapes are considered 
to be spectacular. These habitats are well developed and could 
potentially be managed as renewable resources for fishing and 
tourism. 

The country's insular shelf (0-200 meters in depth) is quite 
narrow and covers an area of 5,000 square kilometers. This sed- 
imentary platform generally extends no more than 300 meters 
offshore, then drops abruptly to the ocean floor to depths of 
300 to 4,000 meters. The waters surrounding Haiti are not nat- 
urally productive because of the narrowness of the insular 
shelf, the unusual depth of the adjoining Caribbean, the 
warmth of surface waters, and the limited supply of nutrients. 
There is relatively higher production of fish stocks off the west- 
ern tip of the southern peninsula. 

An estimated 180 square kilometers of coastal areas are cov- 
ered by mangrove forests. The mangroves are valued for their 
wood products and serve an extremely important role as reser- 
voirs of plant and animal species. Significant stands of man- 
groves are found along the north coast between the Baie de 
l'Acul and Fort Liberte, the Artibonite estuary, and the off- 
shore islands of lie de la Gonave, Grande Cayemite, and lie a 
Vache. The mangroves are largely unaffected by coastal devel- 
opment but are subject to growing pressures as a result of 
unregulated harvest for polewood and charcoal. 



321 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

In general, the mangroves are a critical habitat for threat- 
ened or endangered animal species, including the American 
crocodile, green sea turtle, hawksbill turtle, loggerhead turtle, 
American flamingo, roseate spoonbill, reddish egret, West 
Indian tree duck, masked duck, white-crowned pigeon, Hispan- 
iolan trogon, peregrine falcon, and West Indian manatee. Criti- 
cal marine and coastal habitats deserving of special protection 
include the following: Les Arcadins, a group of small islands 
and reefs in the Baie de Port-au-Prince; the Baie de Baraderes 
and the Cavernites archipelago, including 1,200 hectares of 
mangroves; lie a Vache, an island south of Les Cayes with man- 
groves, reefs, crocodiles, and numerous shorebirds; and the 
small bays of Labadie and Cadrasses on Haiti's Atlantic coast in 
the north. 

An estimated 8,000 to 10,000 fishermen practice small-scale 
traditional fishing using small boats. A fleet of some 3,000 sail- 
boats and rowboats operates within a radius of about five kilo- 
meters from shore; there is widespread over-fishing in near- 
shore areas and underuse of other resources at a greater dis- 
tance (see Agriculture, ch. 8). Most fishermen are oriented pri- 
marily to consumption needs. The major species found in local 
markets are snapper, spiny lobster, conch, shrimp, and parrot 
fish. Haiti exports significant quantities of coral, sea turtles, 
aquarium fish, and shells. 

Biodiversity 

Haiti's ecological diversity has created a rich and varied 
flora. Some 5,000 species of plants have been identified, 
including more than 3,000 woody plants, trees, and shrubs; 600 
species of fern, and 160 orchids. Thirty-six percent of all plants 
are endemic. Plant species have adapted to a broad diversity of 
life zones, including dry desert and high mountain rainforest. 
Selecting for species utility, adaptability, and tradition, peasant 
farmers have retained a diverse range of tree and shrub species 
within the densely occupied agricultural landscape. 

Haiti also has a rich fauna, especially the more than 220 bird 
species including seventy-five resident species and endemics 
such as the La Selle thrush, Hispaniolan trogon, Hispaniolan 
parrot and parakeet, chat tanager, palmchat, black-crowned 
palm tanager, and the gray-crowned palm tanager — a species 
unique to Haiti. The country is also home to significant num- 
bers of water birds, including American flamingos, frigate 
birds, white-tailed tropicbirds, and the nearly extinct black- 



322 



Haiti: The Society and Its Environment 

capped petrel, a seabird that nests in the high cliffs of La Selle 
and the Massif de la Hotte. 

The island has few remaining endemic mammals. There are 
relic populations of two unusual rodents, the hutia and the 
long-nosed solenodonte. A small population of manatees sur- 
vives in coastal waters. Reptiles include significant numbers of 
the American crocodile, iguanas, and a variety of unusual boas 
and other snakes. 

The major threats to wildlife are population pressure; habi- 
tat destruction; hunting; non-native species such as rats and 
mice, feral dogs and cats, and the mongoose; lack of govern- 
ment regulation; and weak national institutions for biodiversity 
protection and management. Inadequate regulation of biologi- 
cal exports also poses a risk to wildlife. Haiti exports live rep- 
tiles, amphibians, arachnids, and tortoise shell and has been 
the largest Caribbean supplier of raw coral and ornamental 
fish to the United States. 

Government decrees of 1980 and 1983 created three major 
protected areas — the Pine Forest Reserve, La Visite National 
Park, and Pic de Macaya National Park — but the government 
does not effectively manage these resources. All three sites are 
located in the southern highlands of Massif de la Selle and 
Massif de la Hotte and include the nation's two highest points, 
Pic de Macaya and Morne de la Selle. All three have a high rate 
of species endemism. Collectively, these sites are by far the 
most significant remnants of high mountain forest habitats, 
including the rainforest of Pic de Macaya. In the mid-1990s, the 
government initiated new programs to protect the environ- 
ment and launched a national system for direct management 
of protected areas. The Pine Forest is managed as a mixed-use 
facility, and the two parks are operated for protection of biolog- 
ical diversity and upper watersheds. 

Environmental Crisis 

Haiti's resource base is under acute stress. The Haitian peas- 
antry is faced with overwhelming challenges to its way of life. 
Agricultural production per capita has dropped at least 33 per- 
cent since 1980 and produces a declining share of the gross 
national product (GNP — see Glossary). Recent broad-based 
surveys classify the vast majority of peasant farmers as indigent 
according to standards of the FAO. The anarchic growth of 
urban areas also reflects the crisis in rural livelihood and con- 
tributes to deterioration of the resource base. 



323 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



AGE-GROUP 



80 and over 
75-79 
70-74 
65-69 
60-64 
55-59 
50-54 
45-49 
40-44 
35-39 
30-34 
25-29 
20-24 
15-19 
10-14 
5-9 
0-4 



600 400 200 200 400 600 

POPULATION IN THOUSANDS 



Source: Haitian Institute for Statistics and Information Technology in Pan American 
Health Organization, Health Situation Analysis: Haiti, 1996, Port-au-Prince, 
1996, 153. 

Figure 12. Haiti: Population Distribution by Age and Sex, 1995 



Sustainable agriculture in lowland areas requires vastly 
increased forest cover in Haiti's upper watersheds. From an 
environmental perspective, a significant portion of the high- 
lands should be returned to forest and perennial crops, and 
existing forest cover should be protected and better managed. 
The decline in quality of water resources reflects the destruc- 
tion of forest cover. According to one report, the volume of 
spring water in the Port-au-Prince area has declined by more 
than 50 percent within a five-year period. The decline of natu- 
ral forest cover also has a serious impact on the remaining 
endemic species of flora and fauna. 

Haiti is faced with a number of pollution problems. The two 
most pressing pollution-related problems are assuring safe 
water and the sanitary disposal of human waste. Contamination 
of surface and groundwater from human waste and other solid 
and liquid wastes is increasing. Water-related diseases are preva- 



324 




Haiti: The Society and Its Environment 

lent. An estimated 53 percent of the population of Port-au- 
Prince has access to safe water. Growing levels of air pollution 
in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area also pose a threat; the 
problem has been exacerbated by a dramatic increase in auto- 
mobile imports since the mid-1990s. 

Population 

Demographic Profile 

According to census-based projections, the estimated popu- 
lation of Haiti in 1998 was about 7.6 million with an average 
density of 282 people per square kilometer. Since 1985 Haiti's 
annual rate of population growth has been estimated to be 
around 2.2 percent. Life expectancy in the late 1990s was sixty- 
one years compared to an average of sixty-nine years in the 
Latin America region. The crude birthrate in the mid-1990s 
was estimated to be 44.5 per 1,000 and the crude death rate 
12.2 per 1,000. Haiti's population pyramid shows 40 percent of 
the total population to be less than fifteen years of age (see fig. 
12). Sex distribution data indicate a predominance of females 
because of higher male mortality and emigration rates. 

Haiti has conducted only a few censuses throughout its his- 
tory. At the time of independence in 1804, Haiti had a total 
population estimated to be well under 500,000, increasing to 
780,000 in 1850 and to 1.6 million by 1900. A survey in 1918-19 
reported 1.9 million people. In 1950 Haiti's first formal census 
indicated a total population of 3.1 million. In 1971 the second 
census estimated a population of 4.2 million, a figure that rose 
to 5.1 million in the country's third and most recent national 
census (1982). Critics have argued that Haiti's censuses are 
inadequate and tend to undercount the population. The coun- 
try's census information is clearly out of date. Old geographic 
definitions of urban areas, for example, do not reflect the terri- 
torial expansion of urbanization in the 1980s and 1990s (see 
table 15, Appendix). 

Port-au-Prince and other cities, including Cap-Haitien, 
Saint-Marc, Gonaives, and Les Cayes, report significant expan- 
sion in the 1990s (see table 16, Appendix). Assuming a rede- 
fined metropolitan area, an unprecedented 41 percent of the 
population may now be living in urban areas — primarily Port- 
au-Prince and its urbanized environs — and only 59 percent in 
rural areas. Despite rapid urbanization, Haiti still has one of 
the lowest urban-to-rural population ratios in the region. The 



325 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

country's rural population has been estimated at 2.7 million in 
1950, 3.4 million in 1971, 3.8 million in 1982, and 4.5 million 
in 1998. 

Between 1980 and the late 1990s, annual growth rates of 
metropolitan Port-au-Prince averaged 4.4 percent — more than 
double the estimates of national growth and three times the 
average rate of rural growth (1.2 percent). Census-based pro- 
jections indicate that some 66 percent of the country's urban 
population is concentrated in the metropolitan area of Port-au- 
Prince. In 1998 the city and its environs were estimated to have 
2 million inhabitants. In 1995 the city of Cap-Haitien had an 
estimated population of 108,294, Saint-Marc 75,507, Gonaives 
72,109, and Les Cayes 54,252. These projections are likely 
underestimated because they rely on 1982 data and exclude 
new urban agglomerations around the old city centers. 

Migration 

The rate of population growth in Haiti's rural areas is less 
than one-third that of urban areas despite a much higher rural 
fertility rate. The main reason for this disparity is out-migra- 
tion. Some 29 percent of rural households reported out-migra- 
tion of one or more household members in a recent 
comprehensive survey of rural Haitians. The most common 
destinations are urban areas or other countries. 

In the 1990s, the Haitian diaspora is estimated to number 
around 1.5 million people residing primarily in the United 
States, the Dominican Republic, and Canada. Census surveys of 
the 1980s identified the United States as the primary destina- 
tion between 1950 and 1985, with the United States receiving 
68 percent of Haitian emigrants during this period. There were 
also significant levels of emigration to the Dominican Repub- 
lic, Canada, the Bahamas, Guadeloupe, Martinique, French 
Guiana, and France. 

Haitian emigrants in the 1950s and 1960s were commonly 
urban middle- and upper-class opponents of the Francois Duva- 
lier government (see Francois Duvalier, 1957-71, ch.6). In the 
1970s, the profile of emigrants to the United States shifted to 
include growing numbers of lower-class Haitians from both 
rural and urban areas. By the mid-1980s, there were sizable 
numbers of Haitians in New York, Miami, Boston, Chicago, and 
Philadelphia, including an estimated 20 percent with illegal 
immigration status. Census data from 1990 indicate that 
although small numbers of Haitians live in widely dispersed 



326 



Haiti: The Society and Its Environment 

areas of the United States, most live in only four states. Accord- 
ing to the 1990 census, nearly three-fourths of immigrant Hai- 
tians and Haitian-Americans lived in New York and Florida and 
most of the rest in Massachusetts and New Jersey. The vast 
majority immigrated to the United States after 1970, and the 
largest number entered between 1980 and 1986. In the 1980s, 
the primary United States destination shifted away from New 
York to Florida; during this period immigrants were more com- 
monly single, female, and less well-educated compared to ear- 
lier immigrants. 

Since the early 1970s, thousands of Haitians have sought to 
emigrate to the United States in small boats and without docu- 
mentation. Between 1972 and 1981, the United States Immi- 
gration and Naturalization Service (INS) reported more than 
55,000 Haitian "boat people" arriving in Florida. The INS esti- 
mated that up to 50 percent of the arrivals escaped detection. 
About 85 percent of "boat people" from this period settled in 
Miami. 

Small-craft departures from Haiti continued throughout the 
1980s and early 1990s but declined after 1992. In September 
1981, the United States entered into an agreement with Haiti 
to interdict Haitian boats and return prospective immigrants to 
Haiti. Between 1981 and 1992, some 54,000 Haitians were 
picked up at sea under the interdiction program. During the 
first eight months of the Raoul Cedras military regime (1991- 
94), some 34,000 Haitians were interdicted at sea. Thousands 
made application for refugee status and were held at the 
United States military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, pending 
resolution of their status. This period also saw an immense rate 
of internal displacement within Haiti as a result of army repres- 
sion and the extended political crisis. 

Haiti has a longstanding history of temporary and seasonal 
migration of workers to neighboring countries. Between 1915 
and 1929, an estimated 220,000 Haitians migrated to Cuba and 
thousands more to the Dominican Republic for seasonal 
employment in sugarcane fields. In the late 1950s and 1960s, 
the government of Francois Duvalier recruited 30,000 Haitian 
canecutters annually for the Dominican sugar harvest. The 
Dominican Republic continues to be an important destination 
for temporary and permanent Haitian migrants. Much of this 
migration is undocumented. In the late 1990s, an estimated 
800,000 Haitians and Dominico-Haitians resided in the Domin- 
ican Republic. Americas Watch and other observers report that 



327 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Haitian workers in the Dominican Republic are subject to abu- 
sive working conditions and forced labor practices. 

Out-migration tends to moderate Haiti's population growth. 
Internal rural-urban migration, for example, softens the 
impact of the high fertility rate in rural areas but also imposes 
acute stress on Haiti's urban communities and public services. 
An estimated 70 percent of Haiti's internal migrants are 
between ten and twenty-nine years of age. Migration is clearly 
an escape valve and has an overall moderating effect on Hai- 
tian poverty. At the same time, emigration causes heavy loss of 
professional and skilled personnel from both urban and rural 
areas. Remittances from abroad, however, do support thou- 
sands of poor families and inject a massive infusion of capital 
into the Haitian economy. Overseas remittances are estimated 
to be between US$350 million and US$500 million annually — 
some 12 to 15 percent of Haiti's GNR Urban households are 
more likely to benefit from overseas remittances than rural 
households. Migration studies suggest that women are more 
likely to migrate to cities and men to go abroad. 

The large number of Haitians living abroad is playing a 
growing role in domestic cultural, social, and political trends. 
Emigration creates greater latitude for upward social mobility. 
Hence emigration has an impact on social relations within 
Haiti, a society traditionally marked by rigid social distinctions. 
The use of English as a second language has also expanded 
considerably because of the preponderance of United States 
influence and its role as the primary destination for emigrants. 
Emigration also tends to increase the number of female- 
headed households in Haiti. In the 1990s, the Haitian diaspora 
has been a notable factor in domestic Haitian politics. As early 
as 1990, presidential candidate Jean-Bertrand Aristide referred 
to the Haitian diaspora as Haiti's "Tenth Department." After 
the return of constitutional government in late 1994, the Aris- 
tide government created a new ministry devoted to the Haitian 
diaspora. 

Social Structure 

The indigenous population of Haiti first came into contact 
with Europeans when Christopher Columbus landed in the 
country in 1492. The encounters with Europeans, first the 
Spanish and then the French, proved disastrous for the inhabit- 
ants; by the first decade of the seventeenth century, the Amer- 
indian population was extinct (see Spanish Discovery and 



328 



Haiti: The Society and Its Environment 

Colonization, 1492-1697, ch. 6). As a result, the social struc- 
ture implanted in colonial Saint-Domingue was determined 
primarily by French colonial policy, slave labor, and the highly 
stratified plantation system. Major planters and government 
officials dominated the colonial ruling class and carefully con- 
trolled all segments of the population, especially African slaves 
and their descendants. Society was structured around the rapid 
production of wealth for the planters and French investors. 

The French imposed a three-tiered social structure in Saint- 
Domingue. A small European elite (grands blancs) controlled 
the top of the social pyramid, and African slaves (noirs) and 
their descendants occupied the lowest rung of society. An inter- 
mediary class of free men and women of color (affranchis) 
emerged as a result of sexual unions between slaves and slave 
owners and also from ex-slaves who purchased their freedom 
or were given their freedom by former slave owners. Some 
mulatto freedmen inherited land, became relatively wealthy, 
and owned slaves. Perhaps one-fourth of all slaves in Saint- 
Domingue belonged to freedmen. Nevertheless, racial codes 
kept the affranchis socially and politically inferior to Europeans. 
Another intermediary class was made up of poor whites (petits 
blancs) , who considered themselves socially superior to mulat- 
toes although they were generally inferior in economic terms. 
In 1791 the total population of Saint-Domingue was 519,000 — 
87 percent slaves, 8 percent white, and 5 percent free men and 
women of color. Because of the brutality of the slave regime 
and harsh working conditions, many slaves died, and new slaves 
were constantly imported. At the time of the slave rebellion in 
1791, most slaves had been born in Africa rather than Saint- 
Domingue. 

The Haitian Revolution changed the country's social struc- 
ture. The colonial ruling class and white population were elim- 
inated, and the plantation system was largely destroyed. The 
earliest black and mulatto leaders attempted to restore a plan- 
tation system based on free labor under strict military control, 
but the system collapsed under the presidency of Alexandre 
Petion (1807-18) (see Early Years of Independence, 1804-43, 
ch. 6). The newly independent state confiscated old colonial 
estates and distributed land to former slaves, revolutionary sol- 
diers, and army officers. In this process, the new Haitian upper 
class lost control over agricultural land and labor, the eco- 
nomic base during colonial times. To maintain its economic 
and social position, the new Haitian upper class turned away 



329 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

from agricultural pursuits in favor of urban-based activities, 
particularly government, the professions, and the export trade. 

The nineteenth-century Haitian ruling class consisted of two 
groups, the urban elite and the military leadership. The urban 
elite was primarily a closed group of educated, comparatively 
wealthy, French-speaking mulattoes. Birth was an important 
determinant of elite social position; intermarriage and shared 
values reinforced class solidarity. The military was an avenue of 
social mobility for disadvantaged black Haitians. In a shifting, 
uneasy alliance with the military, the urban elite ruled the 
country and isolated the peasantry from national affairs. The 
urban elite promoted French norms and models as a means of 
separating itself from the peasantry. French language and man- 
ners, orthodox Roman Catholicism, and light skin were impor- 
tant criteria of high social position. The elite disdained manual 
labor, industry, and local commerce in favor of genteel profes- 
sions such as law and medicine. 

A small, politically important middle class emerged during 
the twentieth century. Opportunity for social mobility 
increased slightly, but the traditional elite retained its social 
and economic preeminence. Francois Duvalier presided over 
an expanding black middle class based in part on increased 
access to government patronage and corruption. Since the 
1980s and 1990s, peasants have been somewhat less isolated 
from national politics. Economic hardship in rural areas has 
heightened rural-urban migration and expanded the lower 
and middle classes of urban areas. Despite these changes, the 
peasantry as a social sector continues to be dominated by 
urban political and economic interests. 

The Upper Class 

By some estimates, Haiti's upper class constitutes 4 percent 
of the total population and controls 67 percent of national 
income in contrast to the poor majority — 70 percent of the 
population with control over 20 percent of the nation's 
resources. The upper class includes the traditional elite and 
others who have gained wealth and power through the political 
system. Others have moved into upper ranks through wealth 
accrued in industry or export-import businesses. 

Members of the traditional elite hold key positions in trade, 
industry, real estate, and the professions. They are identified by 
membership in "good families" with recognized status over a 
period of generations. Elite membership generally entails a 



330 



Haiti: The Society and Its Environment 

knowledge of European cultural refinements and French lan- 
guage and customs. Light skin and straight hair are important 
characteristics of this group although there are important phe- 
notypical exceptions, particularly among old elite families orig- 
inating in the northern region. French surnames are common 
among the mulatto elite, but increased immigration from 
Europe and the Middle East in the late nineteenth and the 
early twentieth centuries introduced names of other national 
origins to the roster, including German, English, Danish, and 
Arabic. 

To a certain extent, people of Arab origins in Haiti are iden- 
tified as an ethnic minority; these people include descendants 
of Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian traders who first arrived in 
the late nineteenth century. From their beginnings as itinerant 
peddlers of fabrics and other dry goods, Arab merchants 
moved into the export-import sector, engendering the hostility 
of Haitians and foreign rivals. Many have Haitian citizenship 
and use French and Creole as their preferred languages. For- 
merly spurned by elite mulatto families, families of Arab ori- 
gins in the 1990s commonly intermarry with Haitians and take 
part in all aspects of upper-class life, including the professions 
and industry. 

The Middle Class 

The middle class was essentially nonexistent during the nine- 
teenth century. It became somewhat more sharply defined 
around the time of the United States occupation (1915-34). 
Occupation policies fostered the growth of intermediary 
classes, including the creation of a professional military and 
expansion of government, urban growth, and increased cen- 
tralization of economic and political power in Port-au-Prince. 
Educational reform in the 1920s, an upsurge in nationalism 
and black consciousness, and the wave of economic prosperity 
after World War II also fostered the emergence of an expanded 
middle class. The mulatto elite dominated government in the 
1930s and the early 1940s, however, and thwarted the political 
aspirations of the black middle class. Under Dumarsais Estime 
(1946-50) and Francois Duvalier (1957-71), an active member 
of the negritude movement, and his son Jean-Claude Duvalier 
(1971-86), the black middle class grew in size and political 
influence. Since the 1970s, broad-based emigration has tended 
to expand the Haitian middle class as a result of upward mobil- 
ity, overseas remittances, and a stream of return migration in 



331 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

the 1980s and 1990s. Nevertheless, the middle class remains a 
small minority in the late 1990s, perhaps 15 percent of the pop- 
ulation. 

Despite greater access to political power, the middle class 
tends to be insecure in its social position and culturally ambiva- 
lent, subject to conflict between Franco-Haitian and .Afro-Hai- 
tian cultural traditions. Social characteristics of members of the 
middle class include a moderate income, literacy, knowledge of 
French, a preference for occupations that do not require man- 
ual labor, and upward mobilitv through education and urban 
residence. Despite their emulation of the upper class, middle- 
class Haitians resent the social preeminence and class and 
color prejudice of the elite. 

Peasants 

Since 1950 the population of rural Haiti has increased by an 
estimated 167 percent to a total of 4.5 million people, mostly 
small peasant farmers. During this period, rural areas dropped 
proportionally from 88 percent to only 59 percent of the popu- 
lation. Current evidence indicates that rural poverty is more 
severe than urban poverty. The majority of rural households 
are highly vulnerable to food shortages, and more than 80 per- 
cent fall below the poverty line according to FAO standards. 

Peasant occupation of the agricultural landscape is based on 
widely dispersed homesteads and several noncontiguous plots 
within each farm unit (see Natural Resources, this ch.). Most 
farms include productive activity on sites the farmer does not 
own. Farmers are simultaneously owner-operators, landlords, 
and tenants, depending on the plot. Many are land poor, but 
the number of landless farmers who rely solely on wage labor is 
relatively small. Landless peasants are likely to migrate to urban 
areas. 

Unlike peasants in much of Latin America, most of Haiti's 
peasants have owned land since the early nineteenth century. 
Land is the most valuable rural commodity, and peasant fami- 
lies go to great lengths to retain it and to increase their hold- 
ings. 

Peasants in general have control over their landholdings. 
but many lack clear title to their plots. Haiti has never con- 
ducted a cadastral survey, but it is likely that many families have 
passed on land over generations without updating land titles. 
Division of land equally among male and female heirs has 
resulted in farm plots that are too small to warrant the high 



332 




A house-raising 
Courtesy Inter-American Foundation 
Haitian peasants 
Courtesy Pan-American Development Foundation 



333 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

costs of a surveyor. Heirs occasionally survey land before taking 
possession of it, but more frequently heirs divide plots among 
themselves in the presence of community witnesses and often a 
notary. Undivided plots are often used for grazing or farmed 
on a rotating basis. Families commonly sell land to raise cash 
for such contingencies as funerals or to pav the expenses of 
emigration. Purchasers often hold land with a notarized 
receipt rather than formal registtation and transfer of tide. 

Peasants have a strong sense of identity as Haitians and culti- 
vators of the land. However, thev have little or no sense of class 
solidarity, and rivalries among peasant families and local fac- 
tions are common. Since the 1940s, small rotating labor groups 
have tended to replace large labor societies more common ear- 
lier in the century. Peasants organize work parties and 
exchange labor to supplement family labor and meet the inten- 
sive labor requirements of peasant agriculture. Peasants also 
buy and sell daily wage labor. 

Rural social arrangements are firmly rooted in kin ties, fic- 
tive kinship, patron-client relations, other special ties and obli- 
gations, and competing factions. Community solidaritv is 
weakly developed. In the late 1950s, outside development agen- 
cies began to organize peasant councils as a self-help strategy to 
promote community development. By the 1980s, such councils 
had been organized in most of rural Haiti. In the early 1980s, 
the government of Jean-Claude Duvalier sought to politicize 
and control this widespread network of rural councils. Despite 
rhetoric of local autonomy and democratic representation, 
peasant councils came to be dominated by traditional power 
holders and outside interests. 

In the 1960s and 1970s, church leaders and other reformers 
promoted small pre-cooperative groups called gwoupman in 
lieu of the old community councils. The most successful of 
these groups were built on indigenous sociocultural forms ori- 
ented to kinship, labor exchange, or traditional rotating credit 
groups. In the period since 1986, the gwoupman movement and 
other peasant organizations have been severely persecuted 
under various military regimes, especially under the de facto 
government of Raoul Cedras (1991-94). With the return of 
constitutional rule in late 1994, this persecution ceased. In the 
latter 1990s, few of the older community councils remained 
active, and the small group movement has expanded into many 
areas of rural Haiti. In a distinct break with the past, numerous 
members of local peasant organizations have been elected to 



334 



Haiti: The Society and Its Environment 



public office as parliamentarians, mayors, and members of new 
rural governing councils in keeping with the constitution of 
1987. 

For most of Haiti's history, the Haitian peasantry has been 
notably isolated from national institutions, excluded from a 
voice in government, and subject to unfair taxation and urban 
domination. In the late twentieth century, especially in the 
period since 1986, peasants have become highly politicized. 
Rural areas have civilian local government bodies for the first 
time in history. Peasants have unprecedented contact with the 
outside world for a variety of reasons, including radio, the Cre- 
ole media, severe economic crisis in rural Haiti leading to high 
rates of out-migration to Port-au-Prince and abroad, political 
turbulence for more than a decade, and the presence of inter- 
national civilian and military personnel. 

Urban Lower Class 

The urban lower class is concentrated in Port-au-Prince and 
the sprawling slums of major coastal towns, especially Cap-Hai- 
tien, Gonaives, and Les Cayes. An estimated two-thirds of Port- 
au-Prince is concentrated in slum districts, some dating back to 
colonial times and others dispersed more recently into ravines 
and lowland flood plains. High rates of rural-urban migration 
feed the growth of high-density neighborhoods. As early as 
1976, field research found the average density of Port-au- 
Prince slums to be 890 inhabitants per hectare, with a quarter 
of this population exceeding 1,200 persons per hectare. In con- 
trast, high-income neighborhoods of the city averaged 100 per- 
sons per hectare. 

Urban slums are composed largely of displaced peasants, pri- 
marily young people. Many residents maintain contact with 
home communities in rural Haiti. Rural points of reference 
influence urban social organization in low-income districts. 
Studies of Cite Soleil — the capital's well-known coastal slum dis- 
trict — found only 9 percent of residents native to the district, 
67 percent rural born, 50 percent single young people, and 33 
percent made up of households headed by single-parent 
females. There is evidence of high demand for education in 
slum districts, and a much higher than average rate of liter- 
acy — 75 percent — compared to the nation as a whole (at most 
50 percent). In the politically turbulent period since 1986, 
pressure groups have emerged in urban slum neighborhoods. 
Despite problems of internal disunity and fragmentation, these 



335 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

groups have successfully organized mass demonstrations and 
exercised a degree of political influence. 

The urban lower class operates primarily within the informal 
sector. Access to water and electricity is controlled privately 
rather than by official utilities. Fewer than 40 percent of Port- 
au-Prince residents have access to potable water. In the 1990s, 
many unoccupied lands of the city were taken over for housing; 
however, studies of Cite Soleil suggest that most residents are 
renters not squatters. Sixty-seven percent of the housing is 
rented or built on rented sites; however, rents are paid to a 
class of speculative landlords who acquire land by taking over 
unoccupied state land or other lands left vacant because of 
exile, political looting, or theft. 

A large percentage of the active labor force is self-employed, 
working part-time, or working in the services sector — tradition- 
ally the largest employment sector in the city. Perhaps 25 per- 
cent of workers in Port-au-Prince are employed in domestic 
service. Reports in the latter half of the 1990s indicate that 35 
to 45 percent of actively employed slum residents are engaged 
in commerce. An estimated 67 percent of the population lives 
on less than US$25 a month. In the 1980s, a high percentage of 
residents in the St. Martin slum district borrowed money at 
interest rates ranging from 15 to 95 percent per month. 

Gender Roles and Marriage 

Haiti's population is disproportionately young and female. 
Demographic data suggest a shortage of men in most age- 
groups older than age ten — a tendency more pronounced in 
urban than in rural areas. Females are economically active at a 
young age, including an estimated 10 percent of all girls 
between the ages of five and nine years old and 33 percent of 
ten- to fourteen-year-old girls. Rural-urban migrants are far 
more likely to be women than men. Female heads of house- 
hold are much more common in urban areas. Official 1996 
data indicate that 26 percent of rural households and 46 per- 
cent of urban households are headed by women. By some esti- 
mates, 50 to 70 percent of households in Port-au-Prince are 
headed by women responsible for their own livelihood. In any 
case, Haitian women are the central figures in sustaining fami- 
lies under the prevailing conditions of economic decline and 
poverty. 

In general, Haitian women participate in the labor force to a 
far greater extent than is the case in other countries in the 



336 



Boats arriving for market day in Restel, southern Haiti 

region. Women dominate Haiti's internal market system. Some 
women specialize as market intermediaries, buying and selling 
produce and serving as links between local markets and 
regional or urban markets. Women with enough capital to be 
full-time market traders are often economically independent of 
men. An estimated 70 percent of women in the services sector 
are employed as servants, especially in Port-au-Prince. In the 
assembly industry, more than 50 percent and perhaps as much 
as 75 percent of factory workers are women, according to vari- 
ous estimates. 

In rural areas, men and women play complementary roles. 
Men assume primary responsibility for farming, especially the 
heavy field labor. Women commonly assist in weeding and har- 
vesting. Women assume primary responsibility for selling 
household agricultural produce in local markets. In peasant 
farming, the income generated through agricultural produc- 
tion belongs to both husband and wife. Women may own or 
inherit land, but men usually control land transactions and the 
primary land base for peasant farming. Women are responsible 
for most household tasks, including cooking, laundry, gather- 
ing wood, and carrying water. Haitian families are patriarchal, 
but women play a key economic role — ultimately the pivotal 
role in day-to-day operations of the household economy. 



337 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

The most common marital relationship is based in plasaj, a 
form of customary marriage. Such relationships are considered 
normal and proper in peasant families and the urban lower 
class. Spouses generally have an explicit economic agreement 
at the beginning of either legal or customary marriage. In rural 
Haiti, this understanding is negotiated, oftentimes between the 
families of the two parties to a marital union, and usually 
requires the husband to provide a house and cultivate at least 
one plot of land for his new wife. 

For the most part, lower-class men and women undertake 
legal marriage primarily for social prestige. Given the signifi- 
cant expense of weddings, many couples in plasaj unions delay 
legal marriage for many years. In the 1960s, this pattern began 
to change among Protestant families who belonged to 
churches that strongly promote legal marriage and provided 
affordable weddings. It is not unusual for men to have extra- 
marital relationships. Some enter into polygamous marriages 
by custom, although most men cannot afford the expense. 
Men and women both value children and contribute to child- 
care, but women bear most of the burden. 

Women's rights are not the equal of men's in a court of law. 
Women do not inherit from their partners' plasaj. In addition, 
legal sanctions for adultery are far greater for women than for 
men. Women are also subject to physical abuse. According to 
one study, 29 percent of women reported that their first sexual 
experience was non-consensual. A legal reform in 1983 
accorded adult rights to married women for the first time, and 
the constitution of 1987 expanded legal protection for all fami- 
lies whether or not based on legal marriage. 

Among the traditional elite, civil and religious marriages are 
the norm. Divorce was once rare, but has become more accept- 
able. Upper-class wives have entered the labor force in growing 
numbers since the 1970s. In general, social trends, rapid 
urbanization, and out-migration have extracted a severe toll on 
marital unions and family life across class boundaries. 

There have been associations of urban women since the 
1930s. A number of women's organizations were established in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Since 1986 there has been dynamic 
growth in women's groups, greater media interest in women's 
issues, and somewhat greater participation of women in politics 
and government. After the return of constitutional govern- 
ment in 1994, the Aristide administration created a new gov- 
ernment ministry devoted to women's issues. The ministry acts 



338 




primarily as an advocacy and policy-making institution. 
Women's groups are playing a growing role within grassroots 
peasant organizations and rural savings and loan associations. 



The Language Question 

French and Creole 

Two languages are spoken in Haiti: Creole and French. The 
social relationship between these languages is complex. Per- 
haps nine out of ten Haitians speak only Creole — the everyday 
language for the entire population. Only about one in twenty is 
fluent in both French and Creole. Thus, Haiti is neither franco- 
phone nor bilingual. Rather, two separate speech communities 
exist: the monolingual majority and the bilingual middle and 
upper classes. 

All classes value verbal facility. Public speaking plays an 
important role in political life; the style of a speech is often 
more important than its content. Repartee enlivens the daily 
parlance of monolingual peasant and bilingual urbanite alike. 



339 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Small groups gather regularly to listen to storytellers. The 
social status of French and Creole helps define the Haitian 
social and cultural dilemma. 

Language serves as a complicating factor in interactions 
between members of the elite and the masses. Haitians of all 
classes take pride in Creole as the national language. Neverthe- 
less, some Haitians regard Creole as a non-language, claiming 
that "it has no rules" in contrast to the high-status mystique of 
French. At the same time, most bilingual Haitians harbor 
ambivalent feelings about French. In Creole the phrase "to 
speak French" means "to be a hypocrite." 

Fluency in French is more important than skin color as an 
indicator of elite social status. Public use of French tends to 
exclude the Creole-speaking majority from political discourse, 
government, legal documents, the judicial system, and intellec- 
tual life. Bilingual families use French primarily on formal and 
public occasions. Creole is a language of open self-expression, 
informal gatherings, storytelling, slang, and jokes. Haitian 
French generally lacks these relaxed, informal qualities. Mono- 
lingual Creole speakers avoid formal situations requiring the 
use of French. In certain social contexts, some monolingual 
Creole speakers use French-sounding phrases to impress their 
audience. Middle-class bilinguals in Port-au-Prince frequently 
encounter social situations where French would be appropri- 
ate, but imperfect mastery of the language may betray lower- 
class origins. Because of the defining social role of language, 
middle-class use of French is often stiff and self-conscious in 
comparison to its use by upper-class speakers. 

The origins of Creole are still debated. Some scholars 
believe it arose from a pidgin used for communications 
between French colonists and African slaves. Others believe 
that Creole came to the colony of Saint-Domingue as a fully 
developed language that originated as a maritime trade lan- 
guage. Whatever its origins, Creole is linguistically a distinct 
language, not a French dialect. The Creole lexicon is derived 
primarily from French, but Creole grammar is not like French, 
and the two languages are not mutually comprehensible. 

There are regional and class variations in Creole. Regional 
variations include lexical items and sound shifts, but the gram- 
matical structure is consistent throughout the country. Bilin- 
gual speakers tend to use French phonemes in their Creole 
speech. The Port-au-Prince variant has attained special status 
and influence as the emerging standard form of the language. 



340 



Haiti: The Society and Its Environment 

The use of French and Creole during the colonial era set 
speech patterns for the postindependence period. During the 
colonial period, French was spoken mainly by whites and 
mulatto freedmen. With the collapse of slavery and the planta- 
tion system, French became a status marker distinguishing 
those who had attained personal freedom before the revolu- 
tion (anciens libres) and those who achieved freedom during 
the revolution. After independence French became the lan- 
guage of government, commerce, culture, and refinement. 
Even the most ardent nationalists of the nineteenth century 
placed little value on Creole. 

In the twentieth century, attitudes toward Creole began to 
change, especially after the United States occupation in 1915. 
The occupation forced Haitian intellectuals to confront their 
non-European heritage. A growing black consciousness and 
nationalism led many Haitians to consider Creole as the 
nation's "authentic" language. Written Creole first appeared in 
1925, and the first Creole newspaper was published in 1943. 

In the 1950s, a movement to give Creole official status began 
to evolve. The constitution of 1957 reaffirmed French as the 
official language but permitted Creole in certain public func- 
tions. In 1969 Creole attained limited legal status; the language 
could be used in the legislature, the courts, and clubs, but it 
was not allowed in accredited educational institutions. In 1979 
a decree permitted Creole to be used as the language of 
instruction in classrooms. The constitution of 1983 declared 
both Creole and French to be national languages but specified 
that French would be the official language. Creole attained full 
status as a national language in the constitution of 1987. 

Changes in Language Use 

Since the 1970s, use of Creole in public has greatly increased 
even on formal occasions. Conversations at elite dinner tables, 
once held strictly in French, now switch fluidly between French 
and Creole mid-sentence. Use of Creole by radio and television 
media increased rapidly as advertisers learned the value of mar- 
keting products in the native tongue of growing numbers of 
consumers in the Port-au-Prince region. In 1986 Creole news- 
casts played an important political role in the fall of Jean- 
Claude Duvalier. Creole was the primary vehicle for political 
campaigns in the Haitian elections of the 1980s and 1990s. 
Since the mid-1990s, a rapidly growing network of local and 
regional radio stations has broadcast entirely in Creole. 



341 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

English has become far more important than ever before 
and competes in some respects with French as the high-status 
language. It is the key language for international trade in an 
island economy dependent on exports, imports, light industry 
based on United States contracts, and overseas remittances 
from the United States. The sheer scale of Haitian emigration 
to the United States promotes the use of English, as does a 
smaller stream of return migration. Members of the elite now 
commonly send their children to study in United States institu- 
tions of higher education. 

Use of English cuts across class lines. Hundreds of French- 
speaking elite families spent years of exile in the United States 
during the Duvalier period and returned to Haiti fluent in 
English. Most migrants to the United States have settled there 
permanently; however, there has been significant travel back 
and forth and a small stream of permanent migration back to 
Haiti since 1986. Monolingual Creole speakers emigrated to 
the United States and returned to Haiti as literate speakers of 
English with little or no knowledge of French. The presence of 
so many Haitians in the United States has deeply marked the 
Creole lexicon with new words and expressions. For Creole 
monolinguals, learning English may seem more practical than 
learning French, and English poses fewer social and psycholog- 
ical obstacles. English-language television programs are now 
readily available on Haiti's private cable service and have 
helped familiarize Haitians with the language. In addition to 
English, Spanish is a common second or third language in 
Haiti, largely because of seasonal Haitian migration to the 
Dominican Republic and some return migration to Haiti of 
long-term residents. 

Creole, Literacy, and Education 

Haiti's national language policy has been inconsistent as a 
result of conflicting political interests. Former governments 
that claimed to represent the masses hesitated to give Creole 
and French equal legal status. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
however, the government approved the use of Creole in educa- 
tion, the National Pedagogic Institute announced an official 
orthography for Creole, and the Ministry of National Educa- 
tion, Youth, and Sports announced national reforms in educa- 
tion (see Education, this ch.). 

The most controversial aspect of these reforms was the intro- 
duction of Creole as a medium of instruction in primary 



342 



Haiti: The Society and Its Environment 

schools. In many rural and urban schools, textbooks were in 
French, but classroom discussion took place in Creole. The 
education reform was intended to boost performance through 
instruction in the native language, but many opposed the use 
of Creole. Bilingual families believed the use of Creole would 
erode their linguistic advantage in society by de-emphasizing 
French. Elements of the upper class opposed Creole instruc- 
tion since they did not support mass popular education. Many 
poor people also opposed the reform because they preferred 
the social status of French rather than Creole. The government 
eventually declared that students would initially study in Creole 
and shift to French when they entered the fifth grade. Most pri- 
vate schools simply ignored the curriculum reforms. As of the 
late 1990s, the education reforms of the late 1970s and early 
1980s had never really been implemented as national policy. 

In 1996 the Ministry of National Education, Youth, and 
Sports completed a draft National Education Plan and held a 
national conference to plan for the future of education in 
Haiti. The draft plan proposed to expand access to education, 
especially in rural areas, and to implement curriculum reform 
in keeping with the education reform of 1982. 

Adult literacy programs in Haiti have generally emphasized 
Creole rather than French. Catholic and Protestant missionar- 
ies first promoted adult Creole literacy in the 1930s and 1940s. 
In the 1960s, the government established adult literacy pro- 
grams in Creole, and in the mid-1980s the Roman Catholic 
Church sponsored nationwide literacy programs. In the late 
1990s, grassroots peasant organizations continued to sponsor 
adult literacy training in Creole. Community leaders and devel- 
opment workers use the language in recording the minutes of 
meetings and project reports. Growing numbers of monolin- 
gual speakers regularly use Creole to write letters and personal 
notes. 

There is a small but growing written literature in Creole. Ear- 
lier, most Creole texts were produced by church groups or 
community development organizations. Many of these texts 
were training materials or church newsletters. Both the Old 
Testament and the New Testament are available in Creole. Pub- 
lications in Creole now include a broader range of topics, 
including news, history, sociopolitical analysis, and sophisti- 
cated literary works, poetry, and novels by well known authors 
such as Frank Etienne and Felix Morisseau-Leroy. 



343 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Religious Life 

Roman Catholicism is the official religion of Haiti, but voo- 
doo may be considered the country's national religion. Most 
Haitians believe in and practice at least some aspects of voo- 
doo. Most voodooists believe that their religion can coexist 
with Catholicism. Most Protestants, however, strongly oppose 
voodoo. 

Voodoo 

Misconceptions about voodoo have given Haiti a reputation 
for sorcery and zombies. Popular images of voodoo ignore the 
religion's basic character as a domestic cult of family spirits inti- 
mately linked to sickness, health, and well-being. Adherents of 
voodoo do not perceive themselves as members of a separate 
religion; most consider themselves Roman Catholics. In fact, 
there is no word for the voodoo religion in the Creole lan- 
guage of rural Haiti. The Creole word vodoun refers to a kind 
of dance and in some areas to a category of spirits. Roman 
Catholics who are active voodooists say that they "serve the spir- 
its," and they do not consider that practice to be inconsistent 
with Roman Catholicism. Haitians also distinguish between the 
service of family spirits and the practice of magic and sorcery. 
The belief system of voodoo revolves around family spirits 
(often called loua or miste) who are inherited through maternal 
and paternal lines. The loua protect their "children" from mis- 
fortune. In return, families must "feed" the loua through peri- 
odic rituals in which food, drink, and other gifts are offered to 
the spirits. There are two basic kinds of services for the loua. 
The first is held once a year; the second is conducted much less 
frequently, usually only once a generation. To save money, 
many poor families wait until they feel a need to restore their 
relationship with their spirits before they conduct a service. 
Services are usually held at a sanctuary on family land. 

In voodoo, there are many loua. Although there is consider- 
able variation among families and regions, there are generally 
two groups of loua: the rada and the petro. The rada spirits are 
mostly seen as "sweet" loua, while the petro are seen as "bitter" 
because they are more demanding of their "children." Rada 
spirits appear to be of African origin while petro spirits appear 
to be Haitian. 

Loua are usually anthropomorphic and have distinct identi- 
ties. They can be good, evil, capricious, or demanding. Because 



344 



Haiti: The Society and Its Environment 

loua most commonly show their displeasure by making people 
sick, voodoo is used to diagnose and treat illnesses. Loua are 
not nature spirits, and they do not make crops grow or bring 
rain. The loua of one family have no claim over members of 
other families, and they cannot protect or harm them. Voodoo- 
ists are therefore not interested in the loua of other families. 

Loua appear to family members in dreams, and more dra- 
matically through trances. Many Haitians believe that loua are 
capable of temporarily taking over the bodies of their "chil- 
dren." In voodoo men and women enter trances during which 
they assume the traits of particular loua. People in such a 
trance feel giddy and usually remember nothing after they 
return to a normal state of consciousness. Voodooists say that 
the spirit temporarily replaces the human personality. Posses- 
sion trances usually occur during rituals such as services for 
loua or a vodoun dance in honor of the loua. When loua appear 
to entranced people, they may bring warnings or explanations 
for the causes of illnesses or misfortune. Loua often engage the 
crowd around them through flirtation, jokes, or accusations. 

Ancestors ( lemd) rank with the family loua as the most impor- 
tant spiritual entities in voodoo. Elaborate funeral and mourn- 
ing rites reflect the important role of the dead. Ornate tombs 
throughout the countryside also reveal how much attention 
Haiti gives to its dead. Voodooists believe the dead are capable 
of forcing their survivors to construct tombs and sell land. In 
these cases, the dead act like family loua that "hold" family 
members to make them ill or bring other misfortune. The 
dead also appear in dreams to provide their survivors with 
advice or warnings. 

Voodooists make a strong distinction between inherited fam- 
ily spirits and purchased spirits. They believe that loua can be 
paid to bring good fortune or protection from evil and that 
dead souls can be paid to attack enemies by making them ill. 
The "purchase" of spirits in this manner has an instrumental or 
manipulative character. People view this type of transaction as 
dangerous and antisocial. 

Folk belief includes zombies and witchcraft. Zombies are 
either spirits or people whose souls have been partially with- 
drawn from their bodies. Some Haitians resort to boko special- 
ists in sorcery and magic. Secret societies whose members 
practice sorcery can also be found in Haiti. Witchcraft and 
charges of witchcraft are rooted in social relationships, and 
reflect the real-life conflicts between people. In this sense, 



345 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

witchcraft is a kind of social leveler and is used to protect per- 
sonal or property rights. 

Witchcraft is also important in diagnosing illness and per- 
forming healing rites. Voodoo specialists, male houngan and 
female mambo, mediate between humans and spirits through 
divination and trance. They diagnose illness and reveal the ori- 
gins of other misfortunes. They can also perform rituals to 
appease spirits or ancestors or to repel magic. In addition, 
many voodoo specialists are accomplished herbalists who treat 
a variety of illnesses. 

Unlike Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, voodoo lacks 
a fixed theology and organized hierarchy. Each specialist devel- 
ops his or her own reputation for helping people. Former pres- 
ident Francois Duvalier recruited voodoo specialists to help 
him control all aspects of Haitian life. Although Duvalier indi- 
cated that he retained power through sorcery, voodoo is essen- 
tially a decentralized, family-based cult, and Duvalier failed to 
politicize the religion to any great extent. 

Roman Catholicism 

Before the Haitian Revolution, the church played a minor 
role in colonial life. Plantation owners feared that religious 
education for slaves could undermine their basis for control, 
and they expelled the education-oriented Jesuits in 1764. 
Roman Catholicism gained official status in several postinde- 
pendence Haitian constitutions, but there was no official 
Roman Catholic presence in the country until the signing of a 
concordat with the Vatican in 1860. The Vatican had previously 
refused to recognize the Haitian government. The concordat 
provided for the appointment of an archbishop in Port-au- 
Prince, designated dioceses, and established an annual govern- 
ment subsidy for the church. An amendment to the concordat 
in 1862 assigned the Roman Catholic Church an important 
role in secular education. 

Initially, a small number of priests and members of religious 
orders ministered primarily to the urban elite. Until the mid- 
twentieth century, the majority of priests were francophone 
Europeans, particularly Bretons, who were culturally distant 
from their rural parishioners. Roman Catholic clergy were gen- 
erally hostile toward voodoo, and they led two major cam- 
paigns against the religion in 1896 and 1941. During these 
campaigns, the government outlawed voodoo services, and 
Catholics destroyed voodoo religious objects and persecuted 



346 



Haiti: The Society and Its Environment 



practitioners. Catholic clergy have not been consistently mili- 
tant in opposing voodoo, and they have not been successful in 
eradicating or diminishing the popular religious practices of 
the rural and urban poor. The clergy have generally directed 
their energies more toward educating the urban population 
than eradicating voodoo. Since the 1970s, the use of drum 
music has become common in Roman Catholic services. Incor- 
porating folk elements into the liturgy, however, did not mean 
the Roman Catholic Church's attitude toward voodoo had 
changed. 

Nationalists and others came to resent the Roman Catholic 
Church in the 1940s and 1950s because of its European orien- 
tation and alliance with the mulatto elite. Francois Duvalier 
opposed the church more than any other Haitian president. 
Between 1959 and 1961, he expelled the archbishop of Port-au- 
Prince, the Jesuit order, and numerous priests. In response to 
these moves, the Vatican excommunicated Duvalier. When 
relations with the church were restored in 1966, Duvalier pre- 
vailed. He succeeded for the first time in having a Haitian 
named an archbishop and also gained the right to nominate 
bishops. 

The mid-1980s marked a profound change in the church's 
stance on issues related to peasants and the urban poor. 
Reflecting this change was the statement by Pope John Paul II 
during a visit to Haiti in 1983 that "things must change here." 
Galvanized by the Vatican's concern, Roman Catholic clergy 
and lay workers called for improved human rights. Lay workers 
fostered an emerging peasant rights movement. The Roman 
Catholic radio station, Radio Soleil, played a key role in dissem- 
inating news in Creole about government actions during the 
1985-86 crisis and encouraged opponents of the Duvalier gov- 
ernment. The bishops, particularly in Jeremie and Cap-Hai- 
tien, actively denounced Duvalierist repression and human- 
rights violations. 

In the aftermath of Jean-Claude Duvalier's departure in 
1986, the church took a less active role in Haitian politics. The 
church hierarchy, however, strongly supported the 1987 consti- 
tution that granted official status to Creole and guaranteed 
basic human rights, including the right to practice voodoo. 
The alliance with the lower classes in the 1980s left the Roman 
Catholic Church internally divided in the late 1990s. These 
divisions reflect in part the church hierarchy's ambivalent rela- 
tionship to the political movement it supported in the 1980s, 



347 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

including the dramatic role of a former priest, ex-president 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who continues to play an active role in 
Haitian politics (see Aristide Presidency, February 7, 1991-Sep- 
tember 30, 1991, and Democracy Restored, 1994-96, ch. 6). 

Protestantism 

Protestantism has existed in Haiti since the earliest days of 
the republic. By the mid-nineteenth century, there were small 
numbers of Protestant missions in the country, principally Bap- 
tist, Methodist, and Episcopalian. Protestant churches, mostly 
from North America, have sent many foreign missions to Haiti. 
Almost half of Haiti's Protestants are Baptists; pentecostals are 
the second largest group. A range of Protestant denominations 
includes Nazarenes, Seventh Day Adventists, Jehovah's Wit- 
nesses, the Salvation Army, Mennonites, and Presbyterians. 
Protestantism in Haiti has grown rapidly since the 1950s. By 
some estimates, around 25 percent of the population are Prot- 
estant. The number of Protestant adherents, especially pente- 
costals, continues to grow. 

Protestantism appealed initially to the middle and the upper 
classes, and has long played an important role in education. 
Protestant churches subsequently focused their attention on 
the poor and did so far earlier than the Roman Catholic 
Church. Protestant churches and clergy are found even in 
remote areas. Having long used Creole rather than French, 
Protestant clergy promote adult literacy in Creole. They have 
also established numerous schools and clinics in communities 
otherwise without access to these much-needed services. Prot- 
estant congregations encourage baptisms and marriages and 
generally perform them free. 

Protestantism actively opposes voodoo and for many Hai- 
tians provides an alternative to serving voodoo spirits. Most 
Protestant denominations consider all loua, including family 
spirits, as demons. When people convert to Protestantism, they 
often come to view the folk religion as diabolical. Some Hai- 
tians convert to Protestantism when they reject family spirits 
that have failed to protect them. Others become Protestants as 
a way to gain new forms of protection from misfortune. 

In his struggle with the Roman Catholic Church, Francois 
Duvalier welcomed Protestant missionaries, especially from the 
United States. Although Protestants tend to compete with the 
Roman Catholic Church and other Protestant churches for 
adherents, in 1986 in an unusual show of interreligious solidar- 



348 



Haiti: The Society and Its Environment 

ity Protestant leaders and radio media joined Roman Catholics 
in public opposition to the government during the political 
troubles leading to the fall of Jean-Claude Duvalier. 

Education 

Haiti's postcolonial leaders announced progressive educa- 
tion policies, and the constitution of 1805 called for free and 
compulsory primary education. Although policy goals were 
never fully implemented, early rulers Henry Christophe 
(1807-20) and Alexandre Petion (1807-18) constructed 
schools. By 1820 there were nineteen primary schools and 
three secondary lycees. The Education Act of 1848 created 
rural primary schools with a more limited curriculum and 
established colleges of medicine and law. A comprehensive 
education system was never developed, however, and the emer- 
gent elite who could afford the cost sent their children to 
school in France. The signing of the concordat with the Vatican 
in 1860 resulted in the arrival of clerical teachers, further 
emphasizing the influence of the Roman Catholic Church 
within Haiti's best-educated social class. The Roman Catholic 
Church became a state church, and Catholic schools turned 
into public schools jointly funded by the Haitian government 
and the Vatican. 

The new teachers, mainly French clergy, concentrated on 
developing the urban elite, especially in the excellent new sec- 
ondary schools. In the classroom, they promoted an attach- 
ment to France and expounded on Haiti's backwardness. In 
the nineteenth century, few priests ventured to rural areas to 
educate peasants. In both urban and rural settings, the schools 
run by clergy followed a classical curriculum emphasizing liter- 
ature and rote learning. The curriculum changed little over 
time except during the United States occupation, when author- 
ities established vocational schools. The elite resisted these 
efforts, and the government restored the old system in 1934. 

In the 1970s, the Haitian government, with support from the 
World Bank (see Glossary) and the United Nations Educa- 
tional, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 
began to reform its educational system, mostly at the primary 
level. In 1978 the government unified educational administra- 
tion for the first time by putting rural schools under the same 
authority, the Department of National Education, as urban 
schools. 



349 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

At the end of the nineteenth century, there were 350 public 
schools in Haiti. This number increased to 730 schools in 1917; 
the schools, however, served a mere 11 percent of the country's 
school-age children. The 1940s saw some expansion of public 
education. Public schools grew very slowly between 1960 and 
1971, a trend that has continued to the present. To compen- 
sate, religious communities and private individuals have 
opened a growing number of schools. Private education repre- 
sented 20 percent of enrollment in 1959-60 and 57 percent of 
primary school enrollment in 1979-80. By 1996-97, private 
schools accounted for more than 75 percent of primary and 
secondary school enrollment. Therefore, private education is 
the norm in Haiti today, and public schools cater to less than 
10 percent of the school-age population. 

More than 67 percent of Haiti's private schools are religious, 
including 10 percent Roman Catholic and some 59 percent 
Protestant and nondenominational. There are a number of 
secular community schools, and a rapidly growing number of 
schools that operate as commercial enterprises, mostly unli- 
censed and unmonitored. According to the 1996-97 school 
census, 42 percent of all primary schools and 64 percent of sec- 
ondary schools are less than ten years old. An estimated 67 per- 
cent of private schools are affiliated with the Haitian Private 
School Foundation (Fondation Haitienne d'Enseignement 
Prive — Fonhep), founded in the late 1980s with support from 
the United States Agency for International Development. 

Access to quality education in Haiti runs parallel to the class- 
based structure of Haitian society. The best schools serve about 
5 percent of total enrollment. These are mostly religious 
schools in urban areas, such as the venerable College St. Louis 
de Gonzague in Port-au-Prince. The public school system, an 
increasingly small proportion of all schools, constitutes a mid- 
dle range in quality. The remaining vast majority of private 
schools fall into the bottom category, offering poor instruction 
and limited materials. As a result, the overall quality of educa- 
tion is low. 

Parents and families — and most families are poor — bear the 
primary financial burden of getting an education in Haiti. 
According to figures from 1996-97, families cover a phenome- 
nal 61 percent of all educational expenditures, compared to 7 
percent from the national budget and 32 percent from nongov- 
ernmental organizations and large donor agencies. 



350 



Classroom, University of Haiti, Faculty of Medicine and Pharmacy, 

Port-au-Prince 

Partially completed addition to an elementary school 
Courtesy Inter-American Development Bank 



351 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

More than 33 percent of this youthful country is of school 
age (five to eighteen years); the number is estimated at 
2,460,160 for the year 1995. Statistics on enrollment show rela- 
tively little evidence of gender discrimination in enrollment; 
girls make up 48 percent of the enrollment in both primary 
and secondary schools. Some evidence exists of changing pat- 
terns in which families enroll all or nearly all of their children 
in school rather than sending just one or two as has been 
reported in the past. 

There is a strong urban bias in both the quality of education 
and in access to schools. Only 23 percent of rural children have 
access to formal education compared to more than 90 percent 
of urban children of school age. Furthermore, only 20 percent 
of educational expenditures goes to rural areas where the vast 
majority of the population lives. At the secondary school level, 
82 percent of schools are located in urban areas and 55 percent 
of all secondary school enrollment is in the Port-au-Prince 
area. 

For more than a decade, Haiti's protracted political crisis 
caused sporadic disruption of school operations, especially 
during the years 1986-88 and 1991-94. Despite this turbu- 
lence, school enrollment has grown tremendously overall. 
Since 1988, primary school enrollment has increased by 39 per- 
cent in public schools and 103 percent in private schools. Dur- 
ing this same period, secondary school enrollment increased 
by 198 percent in public schools and 93 percent in private 
schools; however, only 15 percent of those between the ages of 
twelve and eighteen were enrolled in school in 1996-97. 

This growth in enrollment takes place in a context of high 
illiteracy and immense demand, especially by the poor major- 
ity, who invest heavily in education despite meager resources. 
Estimates of illiteracy range from 47 to 80 percent. Illiteracy in 
Haiti is far higher than in other countries in the region, which 
average 15 percent. 

The Ministry of National Education, Youth, and Sports spon- 
sors a program in supplementary education, including literacy 
training. Most non-formal training in Haiti is offered by non- 
governmental organizations and focuses primarily on adult lit- 
eracy, community organization skills, civic education, public 
health, and various types of community development. 

Primary Schools 

The school year begins in October and ends in July, with two- 



352 



Haiti: The Society and Its Environment 

week vacations at Christmas and Easter. Regular primary edu- 
cation consists of six grades, preceded by two years of kinder- 
garten (enfantin) . Primary education consists of preparatory, 
elementary, and intermediate cycles, each of which lasts two 
years. Promotion between grades depends on final examina- 
tions and class marks recorded in trimesters. At the end of the 
sixth year, students who pass final examinations receive a grad- 
uation certificate (certificat d' etudes primaires) . After receiving 
the certificate, students can take examinations for entry into 
either secondary school (seven-year cycle) or higher-primary 
school (three-year cycle). 

The Ministry of National Education, Youth, and Sports esti- 
mates that 64 percent of primary school-age children (six to 
twelve years old) were enrolled in school in 1996-97, com- 
pared to 25 percent in 1971 (ages six to eleven) and 40 percent 
in 1982. These figures show rapid expansion; however, Haiti 
still has the lowest rate of primary-school enrollment in the 
hemisphere. The Ministry of Education estimates a total enroll- 
ment of 1,429,280 primary-school students in 1996-97. 

According to the National Education Plan, 43 percent of stu- 
dents entering first grade reach fifth grade, and only 38 out of 
1,000 children who enter first grade finish secondary school. 
The overall dropout rate is 17 percent in primary schools and 
10 percent in secondary schools. There is a high proportion of 
overage students, including 75 percent of primary school stu- 
dents, 80 percent of public secondary school, and 90 percent 
of private secondary school students. 

Statistics from 1996-97 report 9,528 primary schools in Haiti 
and 41,170 primary school teachers (see table 17, Appendix). 
Private school teachers are generally less qualified than public 
school teachers. About 33 percent of public school teachers 
have diplomas from teacher training colleges, but only 5 per- 
cent of private school teachers hold such credentials. The tre- 
mendous growth of private schools has broadened general 
access to schooling, but the quality of this expanded education 
is generally poor. In addition to primary schools, in 1996-97 
Haiti had 409 public preschools and 4,949 private preschools 
(see table 18, Appendix). 

Secondary Schools 

General secondary education consists of a three-year basic 
cycle and a four-year upper cycle that leads to a baccalaureate 
(baccalaureat) certificate and possible university matriculation. 



353 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

The curriculum emphasizes the classics and the arts to the det- 
riment of the sciences. Despite these limitations, general sec- 
ondary education is often of high quality. Secondary-school 
graduates usually qualify for admission to the University of 
Haiti or institutions of higher learning abroad. 

In 1996-97, approximately 15 percent of twelve- to eighteen- 
year-olds, some 327,980 students, attended 1,170 secondary 
schools. In addition to general secondary schools, several voca- 
tional and business schools exist, most of them in metropolitan 
Port-au-Prince. 

Higher Education 

Unlike primary and secondary school, enrollment at the 
university level is primarily in public schools. Haiti's most 
important institution of higher education is the University of 
Haiti. Its origin dates to the 1820s, when colleges of medicine 
and law were established. In 1942 the various faculties merged 
into the University of Haiti. Enrollment at the state university 
has more than doubled since the early 1980s. In 1994-95 there 
were close to 10,000 students at the University of Haiti. About 
25 percent of university students were enrolled in the Faculty 
of Law and Economics; 33 percent at the National Institute of 
Administration, Management, and International Studies; and 
the remainder in agriculture, education, ethnology, applied 
linguistics, medicine, pharmacy, science, and human sciences. 
Most professors work part-time, teach several courses at differ- 
ent institutions, and are paid on an hourly basis, leaving little 
time available for broader contact with students. The Univer- 
sity of Haiti is an urban system dispersed into a number of 
small facilities. It has chronic shortages of books, equipment, 
and materials. 

Since the 1980s, a new trend has developed in higher educa- 
tion, the establishment of small, private, multidisciplinary insti- 
tutions. Such institutions include the Universite Quisqueya in 
Port-au-Prince with 1,100 students (1995) and the Haitian 
Adventist University (Universite Adventiste d' Haiti) with 500 
students (1995). Several other smaller institutions have a com- 
bined enrollment under 1,300 (1995), including the Carib- 
bean University (Universite Caraibe), American University of 
the Caribbean, Haitian Southern Baptist Evangelical Mission 
University (Universite Mission Evangelique Baptiste du Sud 
d'Haiti), the University of King Christophe (Universite du Roi 
Christophe) (Cap-Haitien), and the Jean Price Mars University 



354 



Doctor examining infant, 
Miragodne 
Courtesy Inter-American 
Development Bank 




(Universite Jean Price Mars). In addition, Haiti has seven pri- 
vate law schools located in provincial towns, including 
Gonaives, Les Cayes, Jacmel, Hinche, Fort Liberte, Saint-Marc, 
and Cap-Haitien. Total enrollment in law schools in secondary 
cities is estimated to be around 800 students, including the Law 
School of Gonaives with an enrollment of 524 in 1995. Ten 
small private schools offer training in engineering, and more 
than two dozen offer specialized training in religion (Catholic 
and Protestant seminaries), business and commerce, journal- 
ism and communications, medical programs, and education. 

Health 

Fertility and Family Planning 

In view of intense population pressure, fertility and family 
planning are critical issues in Haiti. In the 1990s, studies show 
an overall decline in Haiti's fertility rate since the 1960s despite 
rising rates reported for the 1980s. The total fertility rate in 
1996 was 4.8 percent — far higher than the regional average of 
2.8 percent. In rural Haiti, the rate of fertility is 5.9 children 
per woman compared to 3.0 in Port-au-Prince. Studies show a 



355 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

strong correlation among urban residence, literacy, and declin- 
ing fertility. The reduced fertility rate in urban areas is closely 
tied to a lower rate of marital unions for urban women, and 
double the rate of unstable unions for urban women compared 
to rural women. 

Rates of contraceptive use are up since the late 1980s. In the 
mid-1990s, reported rates of contraceptive use were 13 percent 
for women and 17 percent for men. Rates of contraceptive use 
are higher in urban than rural areas. Studies suggest that the 
demand for family planning services exceeds available pro- 
grams and that many women lack access to modern contracep- 
tives and birth-control information. 

Nutrition and Disease 

According to mid-1980s surveys, average daily nutritional 
consumption was estimated to be 1,788 calories per person, 80 
percent of the FAO daily minimum requirements. An esti- 
mated 50 percent of Haitians consume less than 75 percent of 
recommended caloric intake. Cereals and vegetables supply 
more than 50 percent of food energy, and meat and dairy 
products supply about 5 percent. One study found that 25 per- 
cent of households had consumed no animal products in the 
preceding week. Millet and starchy roots are key sources of 
nutrition in low-income households, and bread is tending to 
replace other cereal foods in urban areas. Peasant households 
confronting chronic malnutrition are inclined to adopt agricul- 
tural strategies that limit risk and ensure short-term survival 
rather than long-term well-being. Witness the shift away from 
cereals into higher production of starchy root crops since 1950. 
Inadequate nutrition is an important factor in Haitian disease. 
Anemia, for example, is common among children and women. 

Infant and child health is poor. Infant mortality in 1996 was 
seventy-two per 1,000 live births, about double the regional 
average. Although comparative data show evidence of a decline 
in infant mortality in recent decades, almost half of all deaths 
occur within the first five years. Children ages twelve to twenty- 
four months are at high risk for malnutrition because of 
increased vulnerability during weaning. The proportion of 
one-year-old children who die before reaching age five has 
increased somewhat since the late 1980s, a period that coin- 
cides with severe economic and political crisis. 

For children ages one to five, the principal causes of death 
are diarrheal illnesses (37 percent), malnutrition (32 percent), 



356 



Haiti: The Society and Its Environment 

and acute respiratory illness (25 percent). In this age-group, 
the mortality rate of children born to women with no educa- 
tion is three times that of children born to women who have 
completed secondary school. Smaller family size and wider 
spacing between children correlate with lower child mortality 
rates. 

Acute respiratory infections and diarrheal diseases are the 
most common illnesses treated at primary health care clinics. 
Other serious diseases are bronchopneumonia, malaria, syphi- 
lis, tetanus, typhoid, tuberculosis, parasitic diseases, meningo- 
coccemia, measles, and xerophthalmia. In addition to 
malnutrition, poor sanitation is a key contributor to poor 
health indicators. Investment in this area has not kept pace 
with urban growth. Access to safe water declined in the mid- 
1990s, going from 60 percent in 1985 to less than 30 percent of 
urban residents and 25 percent of rural residents. In 1984 less 
than 20 percent of the population had toilets or latrines. In the 
1980s and 1990s, violence has been a major public health prob- 
lem, especially political violence. 

The earliest cases of Kaposi's sarcoma in Haiti, later identi- 
fied as AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome), were 
diagnosed in Port-au-Prince in 1979 and the early 1980s. In 
response, Haitian physicians and scientists formed the Haitian 
Study Group on Kaposi's Sarcoma and Opportunistic Infec- 
tions in 1982. Review of the evidence suggests that the virus was 
then new to Haiti, and that the emergent Haitian epidemic was 
closely related to an earlier North American epidemic of AIDS. 
In its early stages, the Haitian epidemic affected men more 
than women, and tended to be correlated with prostitution and 
contact with non-Haitians or returned Haitians. 

The total number of confirmed cases of AIDS in Haiti is 
unknown at present because there has been no systematic 
reporting of AIDS diagnosis since 1992. Human immunodefi- 
ciency virus (HIV) studies were carried out in rural and urban 
zones in 1986 and 1992. Some monitoring of Red Cross blood 
transfusion centers has occurred. The Centers for Disease Con- 
trol (CDC) studied the incidence of HIV among Haitian refu- 
gees at Guantanamo in 1992. In the absence of systematic study 
of the broader population of Haiti, the best data on the inci- 
dence of HIV and AIDS stem from studies of pregnant women. 
Such data have been used as the basis for broader population 
projections. 



357 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

According to projections for the year 2000, the national inci- 
dence of HIV is estimated at 5.4 percent to 7.7 percent 
(260,000 to 365,000 people), or 8.4 to 12 percent HIV positive 
in urban areas and 4.1 to 5.8 percent HIV positive in rural 
areas. The ratio of males to females with AIDS has shifted over 
time from five to one in 1982 to one to one in the late 1990s. 
Some 30 percent of children born to infected women contract 
the virus. AIDS is having a significant impact on the life expect- 
ancy of Haitians, estimated at 47.4 to fifty-one years as opposed 
to sixty-one years without the AIDS effect. Deaths resulting 
from AIDS are estimated at 125 persons per day. Cumulative 
deaths from AIDS may rise to 1 million by the year 2010. 
According to current estimates, Haiti has between 163,000 and 
235,000 AIDS orphans. Tuberculosis is the primary cause of 
death for people who test positive for HIV; 40 to 50 percent of 
people who are HIV positive also have tuberculosis. 

Health Services 

Modern health services in Haiti are inadequate, mostly pri- 
vate, and largely urban. Some 660 facilities provide the nation's 
health services, including public facilities (30 percent), private 
nonprofit (30 percent), mixed public/private (30 percent), 
and for-profit facilities (10 percent) (see table 19, Appendix). 
Nongovernmental organizations provide about 70 percent of 
the health services in rural areas. There are some 400 dispensa- 
ries, 140 health centers providing outpatient services, sixty 
health centers with beds, and fifty departmental and national 
hospitals. Since the late 1980s, per capita spending on public 
health has dropped 50 percent. 

In 1994 the country had 773 physicians, 785 nurses, and 
1,844 auxiliary nurses; Haiti had a ratio of 1.6 physicians, 1.3 
nurses, and 0.4 dentists for every 10,000 inhabitants. Health 
services are strongly concentrated in the area of the capital. 
About 52 percent of hospital beds, 73 percent of physicians, 
and 67 percent of the nation's nurses are concentrated in the 
region of the capital city. An estimated 50 percent of the popu- 
lation is served by modern health-care facilities. Some 80 per- 
cent of women give birth at home. Vaccination coverage affects 
about 25 percent of the population. 

The majority of people use traditional religious practices 
and healers to diagnose and treat illness. Herbal medicine is 
widely used, especially in rural areas, although environmental 
deterioration has made some herbs more difficult to obtain. In 



358 



Haiti: The Society and Its Environment 

addition to home remedies, herbal specialists (doktefey) pro- 
vide massage and remedies. Many voodoo specialists and divin- 
ers (houngan) are also experts in herbal remedies. An 
estimated 11,000 traditional midwives attend most rural births. 
Some midwives receive training in modern methods from pub- 
lic and private community health programs. Home remedies 
and traditional healers provide important services in the 
absence of modern medical facilities for the majority of rural 
people. 

Welfare 

Social security and welfare services are very limited. The gov- 
ernment provides pensions to some retired public officials, but 
there are no guaranteed pensions for civil servants. A social- 
insurance system for employees of industrial, commercial, and 
agricultural firms provides pensions at age fifty-five after twenty 
years of service and compensation for total incapacity after fif- 
teen years of service. A system of work-injury benefits also cov- 
ers private and public employees for partial or total disability. 
The Ministry of Social Affairs administers these programs. 

The dearth of government social programs forces most Hai- 
tians to rely on their families. Individuals without kin or land in 
rural areas are truly destitute. A large number of international 
donors and nongovernmental organizations provide public 
goods and services in the absence of state services. In general, 
Haitians cultivate personalized networks of kinship and other 
traditional ties and obligations in order to cope with hardship, 
scarcity, and the limited availability of public services. 

* * * 

Classic works on Haiti in English include James G. Leyburn's 
The Haitian People, an excellent social history, especially the 
1966 edition with a forward by anthropologist Sidney Mintz; 
Life in a Haitian Valley by Melville J. Herskovits, detailing the life 
of peasants and townspeople in the 1930s; Harold Courlander's 
interesting study of Haitian folklore in The Drum and the Hoe: 
Life and Lore of the Haitian People', Alfred Metraux's landmark 
study, Voodoo in Haiti', and the pioneering work of Haitian eth- 
nologist Jean Price-Mars, Thus Spoke the Uncle (Ainsi parla 
Voncle), which appeared in 1928 and was published in English 
in 1983. 



359 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

The work of David Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier: Race, 
Colour, and National Independence in Haiti, is an insightful history 
of Haitian political and social ideologies since the early nine- 
teenth century. The volume of essays edited by Charles R. Fos- 
ter and Albert Valdman, Haiti — Today and Tomorrow: An 
Interdisciplinary Study, continues to be a useful source for vari- 
ous aspects of Haitian society especially the sections devoted to 
cultural perspectives, language and education, and rural devel- 
opment. Mats Lundahls's Peasants and Poverty: A Study of Haiti is 
an important general work that views Haitian economic 
decline in terms of overpopulation, environmental degrada- 
tion, and government passivity. Simon Fass's Political Economy in 
Haiti: The Drama of Survivals the first detailed examination of 
the urban lower class and remains current. 

In the 1990s, several authors have treated contemporary 
themes. Some examples are physician-anthropologist Paul 
Farmer, who wrote a social analysis of acquired immune defi- 
ciency syndrome, AIDS and Accusation: Haiti and the Geography of 
Blame, Alex Dupuy's Haiti in the World Economy: Class, Race, and 
Underdevelopment since 1 700; former United States Ambassador 
Ernest H. Preeg's The Haitian Dilemma: A Case Study in Demo- 
graphics, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy; and the treatment 
of Haitian migration and poverty by Anthony Catanese in Hai- 
tians: Migration and Diaspora. 

Recent works also include medical anthropologist Paul 
Brodwin's Medicine and Morality in Haiti: The Contest for Healing 
Power, examining the role of Haitian religion in defining strate- 
gies for dealing with sickness and healing; a theological treat- 
ment of Haiti's popular religion by Leslie Desmangles, The 
Faces of the Gods: Vodoun and Roman Catholicism in Haiti; a collec- 
tion of articles on Haitian religion and artistic expression, The 
Sacred Arts of Haitian Vodou, edited by Donald Consentino; and 
a literary treatment of Haitian history and religion, Haiti, His- 
tory, and the Gods, by Joan Dayan. 

The best synthesis of information on the Haitian natural 
environment is still the Haiti Country Environmental Profile: A 
Field Study prepared by Marko Ehrlich and other authors for 
the United States Agency for International Development. Joel 
Timyan's recent Bwa Yo: Important Trees of Haiti amasses a con- 
siderable amount of information on useful tree species of 
Haiti. The World Bank has published a series of technical 
papers with current information on Haitian poverty, health, 
education, and governance, Haiti: The Challenges of Poverty 



360 



Haiti: The Society and Its Environment 

Reduction. (For further information and complete citations, see 
Bibliography.) 



361 



Chapter 8. Haiti: The Economy 



Figure from a painting by Prosper Pierrelouis 



ONLY ONE YEAR AFTER Christopher Columbus landed on 
Hispaniola in 1492, the Spanish established themselves as the 
dominant European colonial presence on the Caribbean 
island. With the decline of Spain as a colonial power in the late 
seventeenth century, however, the French moved in and started 
their colonization of the western part of Hispaniola, sustaining 
themselves by curing the meat and tanning the hides of wild 
game. What is now known as Haiti was used by French bucca- 
neers to harass British and Spanish ships until Spain ceded the 
western third of the mountainous island to France and agreed 
to the borders delineated by the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697. 

As piracy was gradually suppressed, more and more French- 
men became planters and made Saint-Domingue — as the 
French portion of the island was called then — one of the rich- 
est colonies of the eighteenth-century French empire. Another 
factor contributing to this success was the large number of Afri- 
can slaves being imported to work the sugarcane and coffee 
plantations. But it was this same slave population, led by Tous- 
saint Louverture (also seen as L'Ouverture), Jean-Jacques Des- 
salines, and Henry Christophe, that revolted in 1791 and 
gained control of the northern part of Saint-Domingue. 

After a bloody, twelve-year rebellion by descendants of Afri- 
can slaves, Haiti became the world's first independent black 
republic on January 1, 1804. It is also the second oldest repub- 
lic in the Western Hemisphere, after the United States. It occu- 
pies an area about the size of Maryland — 27,750 square 
kilometers — with a population variously estimated at between 7 
and 8 million. The World Bank (see Glossary) estimated in 
mid-1997 that approximately 80 percent of the rural popula- 
tion lives below the poverty level. The majority of these people 
do not have ready access to safe drinking water, adequate medi- 
cal care, or sufficient food. With a gross domestic product 
(GDP— see Glossary) per capita of US$225, in the late 1990s 
Haiti had the dubious distinction of being the poorest country 
in the Western Hemisphere and the fourteenth poorest nation 
in the world. 

Stages of Development 

The Haitian Revolution (1791-1803) devastated agricultural 



365 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

output. The leadership of the new nation faced the daunting 
task of reviving economic activity without relying on slavery. 
After the 1806 assassination of Haiti's first national leader, Jean- 
Jacques Dessalines, Haiti operated under a dual economy, with 
forced labor on large plantations in the north and small-scale 
farming in partitioned land in the south. The 1820 unification 
of the nation entailed the abandonment of plantation agricul- 
ture and the establishment of a peasant-based agricultural 
economy. Although policies of land redistribution and limited 
social and economic reform improved the lives of the former 
slaves, the policies also produced a severe and ultimately irre- 
versible decline in agricultural production. 

Haiti's slave-based plantation economy, which had made the 
island France's most lucrative overseas possession, with thou- 
sands of profitable large plantations producing massive 
amounts of sugar, coffee, and cotton, was badly shattered by 
the dismantling of the large estates. The products produced on 
these estates accounted for almost 65 percent of French com- 
mercial interests abroad and about 40 percent of foreign trade. 
They also accounted for 60 percent of the world's coffee and 40 
percent of the sugar imported by Britain and France. The 
sharp decline in economic productivity was largely caused by 
the fact that small landholders lacked the motivation to pro- 
duce export crops instead of subsistence crops. Although cof- 
fee dominated agriculture in the south because of its relative 
ease of cultivation, the level of production was too low to gener- 
ate worthwhile quantities of exports. Sugar production, which 
was primarily in the north, also dropped off, and when sugar 
was no longer exported in substantial quantities, the cultiva- 
tion of cane ceased and sugar mills were closed. 

Despite the lowered productivity, this system lasted until 
plantation agriculture was replaced by a peasant-based agricul- 
ture economy. The shift took place after the rival regimes of 
Henry Christophe's kingdom north of the Artibonite River and 
Alexandre Petion's republic in the south were unified in 1820 
(see Early Years of Independence, 1804-43, ch. 6). Land redis- 
tribution policies and limited social and economic reform 
improved the lot of the peasantry, but these same policies also 
resulted in a severe and irreversible decline in agricultural pro- 
duction. 

In 1825 Haiti's economy was crippled when its leaders 
agreed to pay France a staggering indemnity of 150 million 
francs in exchange for recognition. United States recognition 



366 



Haiti: The Economy 



occurred in 1862 during the American Civil War. Meanwhile, 
social conditions deteriorated seriously, and heightened con- 
flicts between the black majority and the ruling mulattoes pro- 
duced severe economic disorders and alarming political 
instability. The ensuing government chaos and the steady 
decline of the economy led to gradual involvement in Haiti's 
affairs by European and United States interests. In 1915, con- 
cerned about European — especially German — economic com- 
petition and political rivalry in the Caribbean, the United 
States used the opportunity of an internal crisis and numerous 
government changes during a particularly unstable period of 
Haiti's history to intervene militarily and occupy the Caribbean 
island nation. The immediate pretext for the intervention was 
the execution on July 27 of more than 150 political prisoners, 
provoking an angry mob to parade the dismembered corpse of 
the president through the streets of Port-au-Prince. This shock- 
ing spectacle prompted the United States to land military 
forces in Haiti's capital exactly one day later, on July 28, 1915 
(see United States Involvement in Haiti, 1915-34, ch. 6). 

The nineteen-year occupation ended in 1934, when United 
States forces were withdrawn at the request of the elected gov- 
ernment of Haiti. That the occupation's impact was of a last- 
ing — and significant — nature, was evidenced by the fact that 
within only six weeks of the landing, Marine Corps command- 
ers were serving as administrators in the provinces. Civilian 
United States representatives also were in control of Haitian 
customs and other administrative institutions. However, United 
States occupation forces aroused sharp resistance and strong 
nationalist sentiments among black intellectuals, who resented 
the entrenchment of the mulatto minority in power by what 
they perceived to be United States connivance. 

On the government-to-government front, nevertheless, a 
treaty passed by the Haitian legislature in November 1915 gave 
the United States authority to appoint financial advisers and 
receivers and to run the country's public works and public 
health programs. Among the positive economic aspects of the 
occupation were major infrastructure projects carried out by 
United States forces, occasionally employing forced labor. The 
forces concentrated on constructing hospitals, schools, roads, 
bridges, wharves, and lighthouses, and creating clean water 
facilities and telephone systems. United States financial advis- 
ers and receivers also managed to keep Haiti current on its for- 
eign debt payments at a time when default by other borrowers 



367 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

was common. The administration of the country's fiscal and 
monetary policies was considered such a success that United 
States economic advisers continued to manage the national 
treasury for seven years after the withdrawal of United States 
troops. 

Haiti's mulatto ruling class made a special effort during the 
following decade to strengthen its position: a new professional 
military establishment was created and dominated by mulatto 
officers, and successive governments were run almost totally by 
mulatto ministers. The mulattoes' entrenchment in power, 
however, ended in 1946, when president Elie Lescot (1941-45) 
was overthrown by Dumarsais Estime (1946-50), a black leader 
who resented the stranglehold of the mulatto minority on the 
economy and who aroused nationalist and leftist sentiments 
among disaffected black intellectuals. The brief hold on power 
of Estime and his liberal trade unions was terminated by a mili- 
tary coup on May 10, 1950, amid deteriorating domestic condi- 
tions. 

The same junta that had taken over from Lescot reinstated 
itself, and one of its members, Paul E. Magloire, won the coun- 
try's first direct elections and assumed office in December. He 
managed to make some infrastructure improvements and to 
establish a good working relationship with the business com- 
munity, while allowing labor unions to function. But when he 
tried to dispute the termination date of his presidential term in 
1956, labor leaders and thousands of other Haitians took to the 
streets and forced him to flee to Jamaica, leaving the task of 
restoring order to the army. 

In 1957, a year of turmoil in Haiti's history during which six 
different governments held power, another black nationalist 
and a former labor minister in Estime's cabinet, Francois Duva- 
lier, was elected president. One of his declared objectives was to 
undermine the mulattoes' political influence and limit their 
economic dominance. A small black middle class emerged, but 
the country suffered from economic stagnation, domestic 
political tension, and severe repression under Duvalier. After a 
seven-year period of dynastic rule, Duvalier extended his ten- 
ure in office by amending the constitution in 1964 and declar- 
ing himself president for life. All economic and military 
assistance from the United States was suspended in 1963 after 
Duvalier expelled the United States ambassador. Aid was not 
resumed until 1973. 



368 



Haiti: The Economy 



Shortly before his death in April 1971, Duvalier bequeathed 
power to his nineteen-year-old son, Jean-Claude, also making 
him president for life. "Baby Doc" continued many of his 
father's economic development policies. Although these 
projects were intended in most instances to contribute to his 
personal enrichment, the country experienced a brief period 
of economic recovery. But Jean-Claude ultimately failed to pro- 
vide the leadership necessary for Haiti's sustained develop- 
ment. The country was precipitously plunged into economic 
stagnation, with famine spreading in rural areas and thousands 
of "boat people" fleeing to the United States. As popular 
demands for reform aimed at alleviating the suffering of the 
vast majority of the population living in poverty were ignored 
by the government, public discontent kept mounting until the 
first antigovernment riots in twenty years broke out, and food 
warehouses were looted. The ensuing and heightened civil dis- 
order, which lasted for months without letup, finally forced 
Jean-Claude Duvalier into exile in France (arranged by the 
United States) on February 7, 1986. 

Political turmoil following the demise of the twenty-nine- 
year dictatorship of the Duvaliers caused the economy to 
decline sharply, with devastating effects on the poorest seg- 
ments of the population. A constitution providing for an 
elected two-chamber parliament, as well as an elected presi- 
dent and prime minister, was adopted in 1987. But when Duva- 
lierist gangs attacked polling stations on election day, 
November 29, the election was canceled. Most major aid 
donors, including France, Canada, and the United States, sus- 
pended their assistance and investment programs in protest. 
The United States and the Organization of American States 
(OAS) brought pressure for another election, which occurred 
in 1988, and resulted in the election of Leslie Manigat, a pro- 
fessor. Manigat, who had been elected in a low turnout, was 
overthrown four months later, and during the next two years, a 
series of military leaders played musical chairs. 

In elections held in December 1990, a Roman Catholic 
priest and long-time opponent of the Duvalier regimes, Jean- 
Bertrand Aristide, won 67 percent of the vote (see Aristide 
Presidency, February 7, 1991-September 30, 1991, ch. 6). The 
installation of Haiti's first freely elected president on February 
7, 1991, prompted a group of Western countries to promise 
more than US$400 million in aid. Aristide responded by initiat- 
ing a reform program aimed at collecting more taxes and 



369 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

reducing inflation, corruption, and smuggling. When he was 
overthrown by dissatisfied elements of the military only seven 
months later, on September 30, 1991, he left his homeland first 
for Venezuela, then for the United States. Almost immediately 
upon his departure, Haiti's foreign assets were frozen and an 
international trade embargo was imposed on all items, with the 
exception of basic food and medical supplies. 

The impact of the trade embargo on the country's economy 
was very severe. More than 100,000 jobs were lost. Starvation 
spread through most rural areas and into provincial towns. The 
flight of approximately 300,000 people from Port-au-Prince to 
the countryside worsened poverty and health conditions. 
Thousands of boat people managed to flee the country. Smug- 
gling and evasion of sanctions continued to increase to an 
alarming degree. 

From October 1991 to October 1994, Haiti was ruled by a 
succession of military-backed regimes of which Raoul Cedras 
was the principal figure (see Military Coup Overthrows Aris- 
tide, October 1991-October 1994, ch. 6). They perpetuated 
repression and terror, tolerated human rights violations, and 
sanctioned widespread assassinations in open defiance of the 
international community's condemnation. The international 
embargo and suspension of most external aid caused inflation 
to rise from 15 percent to 50 percent. A dramatic drop in 
exports and investment also took a toll on the country's indus- 
trial productivity and further damaged its already weak infra- 
structure. 

Economic Policies 

At the time of the military coup in 1991, Haiti's per capita 
GDP had fallen steadily by 2 percent a year since 1980. The 
country's economic stagnation was caused by permissive poli- 
cies that tolerated massive corruption and inefficiency in the 
public sector, and by social polarization, mismanagement, and 
total neglect of human resources. From 1991 to 1994, real GDP 
fell 30 percent and per capita GDP dropped from US$320 to 
US$260. 

Aristide's return to power on October 15, 1994, after a com- 
plex process that included threats of military intervention by 
the United States and a coalition of multinational forces, raised 
the hope of economic revival. With the situation gradually sta- 
bilizing, a conference of international donors held in Paris in 
August 1994 produced approximately US$2 billion — including 



370 



Haiti: The Economy 



US$425 million from the United States — in pledges of assis- 
tance by 1999 in exchange for a commitment from the Haitian 
government to adhere to a program of economic reform, 
trade/ tariff liberalization, privatization, macroeconomic stabi- 
lization, and decentralization. But implementation of these 
programs was slowed down by parliamentary bickering, opposi- 
tion to structural reform, and public dissatisfaction with the 
lack of progress in the stagnating economy. Negotiating an 
International Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) offer of 
US$1 billion in aid, with stringent conditions relating to struc- 
tural adjustment and privatization of nine major state enter- 
prises, proved to be tortuous. Other attempts at economic and 
social reform, such as implementing an increase in the mini- 
mum wage, also proved to be futile. 

Faced with popular demonstrations against the controversial 
concept of privatization while he was trying to tackle the daunt- 
ing challenge of rebuilding his country's crumbling physical 
infrastructure, Aristide decided in October 1995 not to pro- 
ceed with the privatization of a state-owned cement plant and a 
flour mill. As a result, no further progress on privatization was 
possible during his term. Moreover, lack of commitment to 
civil service reform and other structural reforms tied to loans 
from the World Bank and IMF derailed the signing of two 
credit agreements with those international organizations and 
prompted Aristide's prime minister to resign in October 1995. 

Structural Policy 

When President Rene Garcia Preval took office in February 
1996, he vowed to implement the structural adjustment pro- 
gram that had been suggested to Aristide. His government ini- 
tiated a program to reduce expenditures and eliminate 
thousands of civil service jobs occupied by "ghost employees." 
Another acute problem was the huge budget deficit caused by 
central government support for inefficient state-owned enter- 
prises and a bloated public sector in general. Parliament even- 
tually enacted economic reform legislation authorizing the 
executive branch to proceed with privatization. The new legis- 
lation allowed the granting of management contracts for form- 
ing joint ventures with private investors through partial 
divestiture of state-owned enterprises. 

The government also put in motion an Emergency Eco- 
nomic Recovery Plan (EERP) whose main objective was to 
achieve rapid macroeconomic stabilization and to attend to the 



371 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

most pressing needs in health, nutrition, sanitation, and infra- 
structure. A medium-term strategy to address the country's 
urgent needs for rehabilitation and economic development 
also was supported by an IMF stand-by agreement. Economic 
performance improved significantly under the EERP: real GDP 
grew by 4.5 percent in fiscal year (FY — see Glossary) 1994-95 
and the twelve-month rate of consumer price increases 
declined to 30 percent from 40 percent in FY 1993-94. In spite 
of a stronger than projected revenue performance, however, 
the government deficit for FY 1994-95 was higher than con- 
templated. The deficit may have resulted, however, from 
higher expenditures on a job-training program and larger than 
anticipated wage adjustments in the priority Ministry of Public 
Health and Population and Ministry of National Education, 
Youth, and Sports. As the government started to improve its 
historically poor record of tax collection and exercise better 
control over expenditures, it also managed to meet IMF 
requirements to sign an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facil- 
ity (ESAF) agreement in October 1996. 

The government's role in the country's market-oriented 
economy has been sharply reduced since 1987, when govern- 
ment attempts to control prices or supplies were undercut by 
contraband or overwhelmed by the great number of retailers. 
Even when the government sets prices for such basic items as 
flour and cement, consumer prices are governed by supply and 
demand. Gasoline prices and utility rates, which are more 
effectively regulated, are the exception to the rule — perhaps 
because gasoline prices are required by law to be adjusted to 
reflect changes in world petroleum prices and exchange rate 
movements. 

Because Haiti's tax system is inefficient, direct taxes amount 
to only about 13 percent of government receipts. Tax evasion is 
so rampant and so few taxpayers are registered with the tax 
bureau (Direction Generale des Impots — DGI) that the gov- 
ernment has made improved revenue collection a top priority. 
The DGI has a large taxpayers' unit that focuses on identifying 
and collecting the tax liabilities of the 200 largest taxpayers in 
the Port-au-Prince area, which are estimated to account for 
more than 80 percent of potential income tax revenue. Efforts 
are also being made to identify and register other taxpayers. In 
addition, the value-added tax has been extended to include 
sectors previously exempt, such as banking services, agribusi- 
ness, and the supply of water and electricity. Collection remains 



372 



Haiti: The Economy 



weak and inefficient, and the DGI is frequently forced to physi- 
cally collect payments. 

Otherwise, the role of the government in the economy con- 
tinues to be minimal. There are few government subsidies, and 
goods are traded at market prices. Indeed, the government has 
made a special effort to reduce tariff and nontariff barriers and 
has reiterated its commitment to further trade liberalization. 
During the three years of the international embargo following 
the military coup of 1991, the country's imports dropped from 
US$449 million to US$141 million, declining more than 65 
percent in 1994 alone. By the late 1990s, the government had 
eliminated many of the steps formerly involved in importing 
goods and simplified the import process to such an extent that 
more than 70 percent of all goods on the Haitian market were 
imported. Pent-up demand also may have contributed to the 
steady rise in imports. 

Inducing private-sector participation in state-owned enter- 
prises was another policy issue the government had to tackle. A 
presidential commission of seven government officials and fif- 
teen private-sector representatives was established in 1994 to 
recommend measures for "modernization of the economic and 
financial infrastructure" of the country. The law on the mod- 
ernization of public enterprises, as proposed by the Council for 
the Modernization of Public Enterprises (Conseil de Moderni- 
sation des Entreprises Publiques — CMEP) , prompted the gov- 
ernment in 1997 to target nine of Haiti's inefficient parastatals 
for privatization, including the telephone company (Tele- 
communications d'Haiti — Teleco) , electric company (Electricite 
d'Haiti — EdH), airport authority, and two commercial banks. 

The original aim was to complete the privatization process 
by March 1998. However, by mid-1998, even such a small com- 
pany as Cimenterie d'Haiti, which was to be one of the first to 
be privatized, had not been sold. Claims by about 42,000 state 
employees and some members of the governing Lavalas coali- 
tion that the government's plan was tantamount to "putting the 
country up for sale" seemed to send another signal to slow 
down implementation of the privatization process. 

In mid-1999, hundreds of striking longshoremen shut down 
the Haitian capital's port for three days running in protest 
against the government's plan to put the port authority up for 
sale by the end of 1999. They also accused the port director of 
mismanagement and demanded an audit of his accounts. The 
airport union membership, who feared they would lose their 



373 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

jobs, accused the airport authority director of incompetence 
and demanded his resignation. Most of the street demonstra- 
tions that followed, which involved setting fire to tire barri- 
cades — and cost millions of dollars in lost business and customs 
duties — were led by supporters of former President Aristide, 
who reportedly remains opposed to the government's privatiza- 
tion program. 

Despite these protests, Prime Minister Jacques Edouard 
Alexis decided in mid-1999 to resume the privatization process 
after a two-year hiatus. He transferred majority ownership of 
the Cimenterie d'Haiti to private hands for US$15 million. The 
cement company was the second enterprise to be privatized. 
The first was La Minoterie flour mill, which was turned over to 
private ownership in September 1997. It had been closed, and 
hundreds of its workers, who were not hired back when it 
reopened, blocked the entrance to the mill with flaming tires 
and demanded compensation for their toil and lost income. 

Lack of progress on the privatization front was only one of 
the many concerns of the international community trying to 
help Haiti. The international community, including the United 
States, repeatedly voiced impatience with the slow pace of both 
economic and political reforms. United States displeasure at 
Haiti's sluggish pace of reform was bluntly expressed by then- 
Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Larry Summers at the annual 
meeting of the Inter-American Development Bank in March 
1998. Former chairman of the United States National Security 
Council, Anthony Lake, also visited the island nation several 
times in 1998, trying to energize Haitian reform efforts. On the 
congressional side, many Republican members showed no 
enthusiasm for approving administration requests for more 
assistance to Haiti. On the contrary, most members strongly 
criticized the lack of progress on judicial reform, the continu- 
ing corruption of the police force, and the increasing amounts 
of drugs entering the United States through Haiti. 

Fiscal Policy 

The banks mentioned on the privatization list did not 
include the Bank of the Republic of Haiti (Banque de la 
Republique d'Haiti — BRH), which was founded in 1880 as a 
public-sector institution and which started functioning as a 
central bank in 1934, when it became known as the National 
Republic Bank of Haiti (hereafter Central Bank). The other 
two state-owned commercial banks are the National Credit 



374 



Haiti: The Economy 



Bank (Banque Nationale de Credit) and the Haitian People's 
Bank (Banque Populaire Haitienne). Other commercial banks 
operating in Port-au-Prince include two from the United States 
(Citibank and First National Bank of Boston), one Canadian 
(Bank of Nova Scotia), and France's National Bank of Paris 
(Banque Nationale de Paris). After a new banking law issued in 
1979 empowered the Central Bank with monetary-manage- 
ment responsibilities, it became involved in controlling credit, 
setting interest rates, assessing reserve ratios, restraining infla- 
tion, and issuing Haiti's national currency, the gourde (G; for 
value of the gourde — see Glossary) . 

The gourde has been pegged to the United States dollar 
since 1919 at the rate of five gourdes to the dollar. The value of 
this fixed exchange remained strong for decades, fluctuating 
only with the movement of the dollar. No black market existed 
for gourdes until the early 1980s, when unusually high infla- 
tion and large budget deficits eroded the value of the gourde 
and brought premiums of up to 25 percent for black-market 
transactions. The political crises of the early 1990s and the 
ensuing uncertainty, however, exerted heavy downward pres- 
sure on the gourde, despite the Central Bank's efforts to halt 
the decline. The effects of the international embargo and the 
sharp drop in government revenues reduced the value of the 
currency by about 80 percent by 1994. In the year after Aris- 
tide's return in October 1994, the gourde fluctuated between 
G14 and G15.5 to US$1. Although the Central Bank pumped 
more than US$37 million into the foreign exchange market in 
1996, the gourde fell from 15 gourdes to the United States dol- 
lar in September of that year to 16.9 gourdes to the United 
States dollar in August 1997. The effects of the depreciation, 
together with rising food prices, raised the inflation rate from 
15.6 percent in December 1996 to 17.2 percent in July 1997. 

In an effort to reduce the rate of inflation and to protect the 
stability of the gourde without trying to fix the nominal 
exchange rate, the government decided to embark on a strin- 
gent fiscal policy and an aggressive tax collection program. The 
government took a number of measures relating to the fiscal 
program for FY 1996-97. To cite one example: an important 
piece of legislation provided for broadening the base of the 
sales tax and unifying its rates, reducing tax evasion among 
larger companies, minimizing the number of tax and customs 
exemptions, and introducing new mechanisms to help control 
public expenditures. Although statistical data in Haiti are, in 



375 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

general, of poor quality, there are reliable Central Bank statis- 
tics showing that tax revenues rose by 58 percent from G2.25 
billion in October 1996 to G3.54 billion in June 1997. (The 
ESAF agreement signed in October 1996 calls for enacting a 
new law to strengthen the role and effectiveness of the Haitian 
Statistical Institute and the Central Bank.) 

The constantly diminishing external budgetary support — 
especially with US$150 million being frozen pending resolu- 
tion of political squabbles — made the Central Bank resort to a 
tight monetary policy to counteract the destabilizing effect of 
fiscal imbalances caused by high-interest bonds issued earlier. 
The salutary outcome was a 3.8 percent drop in the inflation 
rate to 11.8 percent by mid-1998 (from 15.6 percent the previ- 
ous year) . The IMF anticipated a further drop to 9 percent in 
1999. 

Restructuring the country's tax system to increase govern- 
ment revenues and reduce reliance on external aid is only one 
ingredient in the government's fiscal reform agenda. A second 
key element is that the growth in current expenditures be con- 
sistent with available domestic and external resources and be 
allocated mainly to priority sector programs. Realizing that the 
unusually high level of external support for the budget in the 
immediate post-crisis period of the early 1990s could not be 
expected to be sustained indefinitely, the government feels 
that its budgetary savings would need to be increased consider- 
ably from their level of -3.4 percent of GDP in FY 1995-96. 
Third, the country's civil service system needs to be restruc- 
tured, not only to improve the efficiency of the public adminis- 
tration but also to reduce its burden on the budget. Civil 
service reform legislation proposing a 16 percent reduction of 
7,000 jobs from a total of 42,000 jobs was approved at the end 
of 1996, but political resistance has stalled implementation. 
(The IMF estimate of the needed reduction in civil service jobs 
goes as high as 22 percent: "In FY 1996/97 government 
employment will be reduced by at least 7,500 persons, plus 
3,500 'ghost workers,' from a total of some 50,000 by means of 
attrition, voluntary separation, and early retirement.") Fourth, 
public investment, which dropped to negligible levels during 
the army's three-year rule in the early 1990s, needs to be raised 
to a level high enough to rebuild the infrastructure and 
encourage private investment. International financial institu- 
tion estimates suggest that public investment would need to 
total about 6 to 7 percent of GDR 



376 



Haiti: The Economy 



Another problem facing the government in FY 1996-97 was 
the proliferation over the years of tax and customs duty exemp- 
tions given nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other 
humanitarian and religious organizations. Although recogniz- 
ing the valuable contributions of these organizations in 
addressing the country's dire social needs, tax authorities have 
expressed concern about the effect of the many exemptions on 
their revenue. To ascertain that requests for tax exemption 
from these organizations are legitimate and that exempt items 
are not traded commercially, tax authorities have instituted a 
recertification procedure to ensure that only bona fide organi- 
zations are granted exemptions. To ensure the transparency of 
the process, the Ministry of Economy and Finance has been 
publishing monthly information on exemptions and the result- 
ant loss of revenue. 

Finance 

All these revenue-generating programs notwithstanding, as 
of 1999 Haiti's budget had failed to reverse a historical trend of 
very large deficits — even after adding external assistance as a 
source of revenue. As far back as the Duvalier era, public 
finances were openly used for the benefit of the president and 
his family and friends, without regard to their negative impact 
on the economy. In the early 1980s, when Jean-Claude Duvalier 
expanded public-sector investments in poorly managed flour 
mills, sugar factories, and oil processing plants, these invest- 
ment decisions were based mainly on how much they would 
benefit him and his entourage. Such gross misallocations of 
public finances had a negative impact on the flow of external 
assistance, which dropped further after the November 1987 
election massacre (see Post-Duvalier Era, 1986-90, ch. 6). As a 
result, the government was forced to try to curtail deficit 
spending and to reduce further its meager allocations for eco- 
nomic and social development. But the continuing need to 
finance large public-sector deficits and to allocate more 
resources to military spending forced the government to 
increase its domestic borrowing, thereby adding to the deficit. 

The revenue-deficit picture in the 1990s may have been 
caused by a different set of circumstances, but it did not differ 
significantly. The budget process remained cumbersome and 
continued to suffer from poor management and lack of effec- 
tive controls. Expenditure control procedures were constantly 
being circumvented through the use of at least 250 discretion- 



377 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

ary ministerial spending accounts. In addition, the lack of over- 
sight controls in the form of audits and accountability was 
bound to result in the misappropriation and misallocation of 
public funds. Although the government had agreed to the IMF 
structural adjustment program in 1996, Haiti lacked the cash 
to implement the program. In view of Haiti's bad financial situ- 
ation, the United States advanced it US$10 million in budget 
support in 1997. Lack of funding from other foreign sources, 
as well as rapidly growing public expenditures, added consider- 
ably to the budget deficit and compelled Haitian authorities to 
resort to Central Bank funding. By the end of FY 1995-96, 
internal debt was G9.2 billion, about 21 percent of GDP. 

In early 1996 at the behest of international financial institu- 
tions, the Haitian government instituted tight controls over the 
budget, trying to turn it into a policy instrument. The budget 
was under the jurisdiction of two different ministries and was 
not treated as a consolidated central government budget. The 
Ministry of Economy and Finance was charged with preparing 
the operational budget, relying on domestic resources. How- 
ever, investment outlays financed from external sources were 
not included in the operational budget but rather were the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Planning and External Cooper- 
ation. Hence, in order to verify all expenditures, especially 
those from the various ministries' discretionary accounts 
(comptes courants), the government introduced strict expendi- 
ture control procedures. The verification procedure led to the 
closing of two-thirds of such accounts. Another policy deci- 
sion — to freeze for three years the government wage bill calling 
for pay-scale raises — was designed to divert more funds to 
higher priority social programs. The government also started 
to seriously implement a fiscal reform agenda that would fur- 
ther restructure the tax administration system and simplify it in 
such a way as not only to raise tax revenues substantially but 
also to reduce reliance on external donors. 

In an effort to raise the revenue-to-GDP ratio, the govern- 
ment decided to reduce exemptions from taxes and customs 
duties. By the end of 1996, the rates of the sales tax (taxe sur le 
chiffre d'affaires — TCA) were unified at 10 percent, and the base 
of this tax was extended to cover most goods. (According to 
IMF estimates, TCA- related measures would amount to almost 
1 percent of GDP annually.) Other taxes and fees were raised, 
including airport taxes, car registration fees, and passport fees. 
The government failed in 1998 to introduce scheduled legisla- 



378 



Haiti: The Economy 



tion to tighten the eligibility criteria for fiscal incentives under 
the investment code. Nor did action occur with regard to initi- 
ating a plan to energize provincial revenue collections. The 
intent was not only to broaden the tax base but also to 
strengthen public-service delivery in the interior of the country 
outside Port-au-Prince, which had been long neglected. 
Strengthening local administrations and expanding public ser- 
vices beyond the capital and a few other major urban areas 
remained an objective of the government's decentralization 
efforts. Problems related to relocating personnel to rural areas 
and scarcity of resources generated locally, however, continued 
to present almost insurmountable obstacles as late as 1999. 

Balance of Payments 

Foreign trade as such has not constituted a major factor in 
the Haitian economy in recent decades. However, foreign trade 
deficits represent a significant element in Haiti's balance of 
payments and will be considered in that context here. Haiti has 
traditionally registered substantial trade deficits, a trend that 
dates back to the mid-1960s, lasted through the 1980s, and has 
continued into the late 1990s. The deficits were partially offset 
by generous remittances from the many Haitians working 
abroad and by official aid. But such inflows tend to dry up spo- 
radically, as was the case after the 1987 election violence and in 
the wake of the 1991 military coup and the ensuing interna- 
tional trade embargo. During the three-year embargo, the pub- 
lic deficit was financed mainly by Central Bank credit and the 
accumulation of arrears. Net Central Bank credit to the public 
sector rose by an average of 65 percent annually from 1992 to 
1994. According to data from the IMF, Haitian exports in 1997 
were valued at 1,995 million gourdes, whereas imports cost 
10,792 million gourdes, indicating a very unfavorable trade bal- 
ance (see table 20, Appendix). 

Haiti's balance of payments is particularly sensitive to 
changes in the rate of trade development, import prices, and 
the rate of export growth — more so than many other countries 
with similar economic problems. For example, if the country's 
export growth slows as a result of a decline in a major sector 
such as the assembly industry, the overall balance of payments 
would register a significant deficit. Similarly, if the terms of 
trade deteriorate one year because of lower prices for an 
export such as coffee and higher petroleum product prices, 
the overall balance of payments would be weaker. This scenario 



379 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

played itself out in FY 1995-96 when the terms of trade deterio- 
rated as a result of higher food and oil prices, adversely affect- 
ing the balance of payments. 

The external current account deficit, which was estimated to 
be 19 percent of GDP in FY 1994-95, is projected to drop grad- 
ually until it reaches 10 percent of GDP by FY 1999-2000, a rate 
below its 1990 level. An anticipated sharp rise in exports from 
the light manufacturing assembly sector is expected to push 
total export receipts from their level of 4.2 percent of GDP in 
FY 1995-96 to 7.6 percent of GDP by FY 1998-99. Following a 
reversal of the initial surge related to restocking and rehabilita- 
tion needs in the wake of lifting the embargo, imports 
increased considerably in FY 1996-97, returning to 1990 levels. 

External Debt 

Haiti's foreign debt has fluctuated little over the years and 
has been relatively manageable, especially when compared to 
that of neighboring countries. The country's total external 
debt was about US$726 million in 1991, almost US$770 million 
in 1993, and US$778 million in 1995 (see table 21, Appendix). 
Haiti's sluggish economy may be the reason why most of Haiti's 
debt has been in the form of concessional loans — favorable 
interest rates and long grace periods. Private loans have 
accounted for a negligible percentage of the debt. However, 
debt-service payments, as a percentage of exports, have been 
rather high and continued to be so in the late 1990s, depend- 
ing on the performance of the economy. 

When Aristide was elected in 1990, most bilateral official 
creditors decided to cancel Haiti's debts. But three years after 
the military coup, the debt-service payments were so far behind 
that arrears to multilateral commercial lenders alone 
amounted to more than US$82 million. At the end of 1994, 
after the restoration of the legitimate government, the United 
States and nine other countries paid off the arrears. In May 
1995, Haiti reached a debt rescheduling agreement with its 
Paris Club (see Glossary) creditors on concessional terms, 
whereby the Paris Club canceled two-thirds of Haiti's debt, 
about US$75 million, and rescheduled the other third over 
twenty-three years. 

Haiti's external debt stood at 34 percent of GDP in FY 1995- 
96 and was projected to rise to about 40 percent of GDP in FY 
1998-99. However, since most of the debt is to multinational 
institutions mainly on concessional terms and future external 



380 



Unloading flour, Port-au-Prince harbor 
Courtesy Inter-American Development Bank 
Section of National Highway Two near Miragodne 
Courtesy Inter-American Development Bank 



381 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

assistance is expected to be provided as grants or concessional 
loans, the country's debt-service payments were projected to 
drop from 26 percent of exports of goods and services in FY 
1995-96 to 18 percent in FY 1998-99 and to about 13 percent 
in FY 1999-2000 (see table 22, Appendix). 

Foreign Aid 

Haiti's history of chronic political instability, ill-advised eco- 
nomic policy, and constant environmental deterioration, as 
well as its lack of good arable land, has made it heavily depen- 
dent on external assistance. Because the country's economic 
problems have been caused by a succession of unstable 
regimes, international assistance has — not surprisingly — paral- 
leled the political situation. Although Haiti had received a con- 
siderable amount of development aid until 1991, external 
contributions dropped dramatically after the September coup 
of that year, when almost all economic aid ceased, except for 
limited shipments of humanitarian items (see table 23, Appen- 
dix). 

The amount of humanitarian assistance rose from a total of 
US$65 million in 1992 to almost US$110 million for two years 
running. The United States contribution accounted for 66 per- 
cent of the total; the United Nations (UN) and the European 
Union (EU) provided 13 percent each. Canada contributed 
about 4 percent, and France provided approximately 2 per- 
cent. 

After the Aristide administration returned to power in 1994, 
most donors resumed aid to Haiti; 45 percent of the country's 
operating budget for 1994-95 came from foreign sources. The 
World Bank provided an emergency loan of US$400 million. At 
a meeting held in Paris in January 1995, fourteen countries 
and nineteen multinational institutions pledged a US$1.2 bil- 
lion aid package over an eighteen-month period. The interna- 
tional community also promised US$500 million of assistance 
annually through the year 2000. 

Because of its keen interest in shoring up Haiti's fragile sta- 
bility, the United States has been the largest single bilateral 
donor, providing US$100 million in aid in FY 1995 and US$135 
million in FY 1996. The World Bank, the Inter-American Devel- 
opment Bank (IDB), and the EU are the major multilateral 
donors. In addition to financial support, United States efforts 
to strengthen the Haitian economy have included restarting 
the Peace Corps program in 1996 (the Corps had first entered 



382 



Haiti: The Economy 



Haiti in 1983), and establishing the United States-Haitian Busi- 
ness Development Council and an Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation commercial loan program. 

Haiti's share of the FY 1998 appropriations for the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) totaled 
US$140 million, consisting of US$72 million in Economic Sup- 
port Funds, US$26 million in development assistance, and 
US$42 million in Public Law-480 (see Glossary) food aid. 
Channeled through NGOs to circumvent public-sector ineffi- 
ciencies and vagaries, these funds are used to provide humani- 
tarian aid, increase agricultural productivity, promote health 
projects, strengthen private-sector economic growth, redirect 
relief efforts toward developmental activities, and help Haiti 
pay its arrears to international institutions. Humanitarian assis- 
tance from NGOs has included food for approximately 1 mil- 
lion Haitians and help in upgrading the planning and 
management capabilities of the Ministry of Public Health and 
Population. Over and above sponsoring vaccination programs, 
the United States has financed basic health services for more 
than 2 million people. 

As the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere, Haiti has 
been the recipient of generous economic assistance from 
numerous multilateral and bilateral development agencies and 
financial institutions. However, historically, the United States 
has been the major aid source. United States aid, which began 
in 1944, three years after the last United States economic advis- 
ers of the occupation left Haiti, has, however, been punctuated 
by interruptions dictated by political developments. Because 
President John F. Kennedy terminated all but humanitarian aid 
to the Francois Duvalier government in 1963, Haiti did not par- 
ticipate in the Alliance for Progress development program for 
Latin America. United States assistance resumed ten years later 
during Jean-Claude Duvalier's regime, and it continued until 
January 1986, a month before the end of the Duvalier era. 
United States aid was restored in unprecedented amounts 
three weeks after Duvalier's exile, only to be suspended again 
when President Ronald Reagan stopped nonhumanitarian aid 
flows after the electoral violence of November 1987. Develop- 
ment assistance resumed in the late 1980s but was terminated 
after the 1991 military coup. The United States joined other 
major donors in resuming aid in 1994, when a constitutional 
government returned to Haiti. 



383 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

As the only country that has maintained a resident aid mis- 
sion in Haiti since the 1970s, the United States has made signif- 
icant contributions to the country's economy through USAID. 
USAID's efforts have concentrated on such programs as nutri- 
tion, family planning, watershed management, agro-forestry, 
and improving rural conditions through soil conversion. 
USAID also has pursued narcotics interdiction, migration con- 
trol, and political reform. United States assistance between 
1982 and 1987 accounted for 35 percent of Haiti's total exter- 
nal aid and 60 percent of its bilateral aid. 

USAID was credited in 1982 with setting a new trend of dis- 
tributing larger amounts of its assistance through NGOs rather 
than through Haitian ministries. By the late 1980s, other 
donors followed suit, and more and more humanitarian aid 
was distributed through a network of NGOs. When Haitian offi- 
cials complained about lack of coordination among these orga- 
nizations, USAID financed the creation of the Haitian 
Association of Voluntary Agencies (HAVA), an umbrella NGO 
whose function is to coordinate all aspects of humanitarian aid 
and whose membership exceeds 100. As a result, in the late 
1990s most aid continued to be distributed through NGOs. 

Labor 

Haiti's labor force was estimated to be 2.94 million in 1992, 
according to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of 
the United Nations. About two-thirds of the workers are 
engaged in agriculture, despite the shift to services and manu- 
facturing over the past several decades. More than two-thirds of 
Haitians are still not part of the formal economy, however, and 
continue to live by subsistence farming. Assembly plants, most 
of which are concentrated in the Port-au-Prince area, provide 
the bulk of manufacturing employment. Approximated 
150,000 manufacturing jobs were lost after the military coup of 
1991. Although some thirtv plants were reopened after Aris- 
tide's return to power in 1994, unemployment in the late 1990s 
was estimated at between 60 percent and 70 percent, compared 
with 49 percent in the late 1980s. As with other statistics, unem- 
ployment figures vary, depending on the methodologies used 
in gathering such data. 

Figures vary widely as to the numbers of Haitians living and 
working in the Dominican Republic (see Haitians, ch. 2). Two 
United States analysts believe there were some 500,000 Hai- 
tians and Dominico-Haitians (Dominicans of Haitian ancestry) 



384 



Planting beans at 
Gallette Chambon in the 
Cul-de-Sac Plain 
Courtesy Inter-American 
Development Bank 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

in the Dominican Republic in 1995. Historically, more than 
20,000 Haitians have worked annually in the Dominican sugar- 
cane fields during the harvesting season, although the number 
of such workers has decreased in recent years. But in bad times, 
greater numbers of indigent Haitians travel to the Dominican 
Republic, imposing a heavy burden on their neighbor's social 
services. For this reason, periods of political tension between 
the two countries are occasionally punctuated by calls for more 
stringent immigration regulations; these occasions usually 
result in the forced expulsion of many undocumented Haitians 
from the Dominican Republic. Most of those expelled manage 
to return fairly quickly, however, mainly because of the lack of 
adequate controls on both sides of the border. 

In fairness it should be noted that the Haitian community 
resident in the Dominican Republic makes significant contri- 
butions to the Dominican economy by performing many 
menial jobs that the average Dominican worker tends to shun. 
Indeed, the ambivalence of Dominicans toward their Haitian 
neighbors is seen in the stance of some senators representing 
Dominican frontier provinces who have expressed concern 
over a possible avalanche of illegal Haitian immigration (trig- 
gered by dire socioeconomic conditions) ; they have called on 
the international community to promote social and economic 
development in Haiti instead of concentrating only on institu- 
tionalizing democratic rule. Other Dominicans have gone so 
far as to suggest that their country might be wise to encourage 
more Dominican investment in Haiti. After all, the Dominican 
Republic's exports to Haiti exceed US$30 million a year, while 
its imports from Haiti fall short of US$1 million; moreover, 
Haiti buys 77 percent of all Dominican exports to the Carib- 
bean. 

Haiti established a labor code in 1961, but revised it in 1984 
to bring legislation more in line with standards set by the Inter- 
national Labour Organisation (ILO). Conformity with ILO 
guidelines was a prerequisite for certification under the Carib- 
bean Basin Initiative (CBI — see Glossary) enacted by the 
United States Congress in 1983. The country's most fundamen- 
tal labor law, the minimum wage, is the most controversial. Low 
wage rates have attracted foreign assembly operations. In 1989 
the average minimum wage stood at the equivalent of US$3 a 
day, with small variations for different types of assembly work. 
The minimum wage in the late 1980s was below the 1970 level 
in real terms, but assembly manufacturers and government 



386 



Haiti: The Economy 



officials refused to increase wages because they needed to 
remain competitive with other Caribbean countries. Although 
labor laws include an array of provisions protecting workers, 
the government does not enforce many of these provisions. 

Haiti's constitution and its labor code guarantee the right of 
association and provide workers the right to form unions with- 
out prior government authorization. However, the law requires 
unions to register with the Ministry of Social Affairs within sixty 
days of their formation. Six labor federations represent about 5 
percent of the total work force. The labor code protects trade 
union organizing activities and stipulates fines for those who 
interfere with this right. Organized labor activity is concen- 
trated in the Port-au-Prince area, in state-owned public enter- 
prises, the civil service, and the assembly sector. The high 
unemployment rate and anti-union sentiment among some fac- 
tory workers have limited the success of union organizing 
efforts, however. Collective bargaining is nearly nonexistent, 
especially in the private sector, where employers can generally 
set wages unilaterally. 

The minimum employment age in all sectors is fifteen years; 
fierce adult competition for jobs ensures that child labor is not 
a factor in the industrial sector. However, as in other develop- 
ing countries, rural families in Haiti often rely on their chil- 
dren's contribution of labor to subsistence agriculture, and in 
urban environments children under the age of fifteen usually 
work at informal-sector jobs to supplement family income. 
Despite the labor code's prohibition of forced or compulsory 
labor, some children continue to be subjected to unremuner- 
ated labor as domestic servants. This situation appears to be 
true primarily for rural families. Because such families are 
often too large for adult members to support all family mem- 
bers, children are sometimes sent to work at informal-sector 
jobs to supplement family income. The ILO has criticized as 
inadequate the Ministry of Social Affairs' enforcement of child 
labor laws. 

Agriculture 

Much of Haiti's countryside is mountainous, and its soil fer- 
tility is low, mostly because of erosion and drought but partly 
because of population density. Perhaps 28 percent of the land 
is considered arable, but population pressure puts 48 percent 
of it under cultivation, mostly in small plots. Of a total arable 
area estimated at 771,500 hectares, about 142,000 hectares are 



387 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

deemed suitable for irrigation, but only some 40,000 hectares 
are served by irrigation systems. Indeed, irrigation is rare, 
except in the main valley, the Artibonite, and the Port-au- 
Prince and Les Cayes plains in the southwest. 

Nevertheless, agriculture remains the mainstay of the econ- 
omy and continues to account for two-thirds of the total work 
force, followed by commerce and manufacturing. The signifi- 
cance of the agricultural sector in the 1980s and 1990s dif- 
fered, however, from that in the 1950s, when it employed 80 
percent of the labor force, represented 50 percent of GDP, and 
contributed 90 percent of exports. Agriculture in the mid- 
1980s accounted for 35 percent of GDP and for 24 percent of 
exports, compared with about 30 percent of GDP and less than 
10 percent of exports in the late 1990s. In the late 1990s, the 
sector barely produced 20 percent of the country's domestic 
food requirements. The constantly deteriorating rural infra- 
structure, continuing fragmentation of land holdings, primi- 
tive farming techniques, migration out of rural areas, insecure 
land tenure, and deforestation as well as other ecological and 
natural disasters are among the problems that have taken a toll 
on the sector. Population pressure also has caused a shift from 
the production of cash crops such as coffee and sugar to the 
production of food crops such as rice and beans. Nevertheless, 
food production has not kept pace with the increase in popula- 
tion, and the situation has resulted in higher food-importing 
bills. Malnutrition is another problem facing the country. Mal- 
nutrition was so widespread in 1994 that relief organizations 
were feeding about 700,000 people daily. 

The agriculture sector suffered a more devastating blow 
than originally thought when Hurricane Georges hit the island 
on September 22-23, 1998. The government estimated the 
number of deaths at no fewer than 400 and the cost of damage 
at more than US$300 million. Most of the losses were incurred 
through the destruction of crops and the indirect damage to 
supporting infrastructure, with the main problem being flood- 
ing in flat and low-lying areas. Irrigation and drainage systems 
of the important Artibonite area also were damaged, adversely 
affecting future production. Almost 70 percent of the second 
rice crop in this largest rice-growing valley was destroyed. 

The United States committed US$12 million for the emer- 
gency reconstruction effort, and the IMF agreed to offer a 
US$20 million loan. The IDB could have offered additional 
badly needed disaster relief, but the lack of a prime minister 



388 



Cleaning drinkers at a 
chicken farm 
Courtesy Inter-American 
Development Bank 



and the refusal of parliament to ratify foreign loans prevented 
the IDB from disbursing any loans. The only silver lining in 
Hurricane Georges was that the reconstruction drive in its 
wake was expected to stimulate the island's construction sector. 

Land Tenure 

During the colonial period, runaway slaves, or maroons 
(marrons), had already established themselves as independent 
agriculturists in remote areas. After 1804 ex-slaves expanded 
this pattern and laid informal claim to unoccupied land as 
small peasant farmers. The newly independent Haitian state 
formally confiscated French colonial holdings and asserted 
state ownership of all unclaimed lands. Early rulers of Haiti dis- 
tributed land to thousands of newly independent citizens, ex- 
soldiers, and former officers in the revolutionary army. 
Because of these early patterns of land reform and dispersion, 
landholdings in Haiti today are significantly more egalitarian 
than elsewhere in the Latin American region. 

National census data on land distribution in 1950 and 1971 
are unreliable and out of date. USAID has played a key role in 
generating more current information, including the Agricul- 
tural Development Support survey of 1,307,000 parcels (1988), 
a national survey of 5,000 households under the Interim Food 
Security Information System (1995), and a national baseline 



389 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

survey of 4,026 households in 1994—96, including data on land 
tenure. The latter survey noted that 90 percent of farmers sur- 
veyed have access to land, they own two-thirds of the land they 
farm, average farm size is 1.7 hectares, and farms average 3.7 
dispersed plots. The largest 1 percent of farms in the survey 
occupy 10 percent of the land. 

In addition to private land, Haiti has large state holdings 
farmed by tenant farmers and squatters. By some estimates, 
there are around 35,000 leaseholders on state lands, including 
large and small holdings. Small farmers undertake most agri- 
cultural activity on state lands. Such activity amounts to per- 
haps 5 percent of rural households and 10 percent of all 
agricultural land. Estimates of state land vary from 100,000 to 
300,000 hectares; there are, however, no reliable inventories of 
state land. 

Community studies and surveys find that landholding in 
rural Haiti has the following characteristics. Private property is 
the rule. Peasant smallholdings predominate over large hold- 
ings and are made up of several distinct parcels. The vast 
majority of peasant farmers are owner-operators of their own 
land. Most peasant farmers are both landlords and tenants, 
and inherited land is divided equally among all children of the 
deceased. Land is readily bought and sold without updating 
title. Formal entitlement to land is commonly avoided or post- 
poned, and land is most often held on the basis of customary 
arrangements. 

There is immense pressure on the land as an agricultural 
resource. Agriculture is in decline while population pressures 
show marked increase. Overall population density has 
increased from about 207 people per square kilometer of ara- 
ble land in 1900, to 401 people in 1950, and 989 people per 
square kilometer in 1998. Clearly, the cultivable land base has 
far surpassed its carrying capacity (see Land Use and Water, 
and Demographic Profile, ch. 7). 

Since 1986 a series of highly politicized land disputes and 
land invasions have occurred in the aftermath of the Duvalier 
regime and subsequent military governments. In the 1990s, the 
rapid growth of Port-au-Prince and other urban areas has been 
marked by a notable increase in urban squatting. Land dis- 
putes in Haiti are generally not well served by the national sys- 
tem of justice. The traditional or customary system of land 
tenure continues to function fairly well, especially at the local 
level in most rural areas. Some grassroots peasant organiza- 



390 



Haiti: The Economy 



tions have organized around land rights and dispute resolu- 
tion. In 1995 the Aristide government created the National 
Institute of Agrarian Reform (Institut National de la Reforme 
Agraire — Inara) , whose mission is policy reform and restruc- 
turing of the national land tenure system. 

Cash Crops 

Grown by some 380,000 peasants, coffee has had a promi- 
nent role in Haiti's agriculture since it was introduced by the 
French from Martinique in 1726. Production of the colony's 
main cash crop, which peaked in 1790, declined steadily after 
independence. It fell precipitously during the 1960s. After a 
boom in prices and in production in the late 1970s, output 
declined again from 42,900 tons in 1980 to 30,088 tons by 
1987. Coffee trees covered an estimated 133,000 hectares in 
the 1980s, with an average annual yield of 35,900 tons. Haiti's 
coffee is sold through a system of intermediaries, speculators, 
and large-scale merchants. The high taxes involved in the sys- 
tem make production erratic and compel farmers to alternate 
between coffee and food crops, depending on price fluctua- 
tions and profit expectations. Although Haiti is a member of 
the International Coffee Organization (ICO), it was unable to 
fulfill its ICO export quota, which stood at 300,000 bags of 60 
kilograms each (18,000 tons) in 1988. Total coffee production 
fell from 697,000 bags of 60 kilograms (41,820 tons) in 1982 to 
359,000 bags (21,540 tons) in 1994, but it registered a rise to 
496,000 bags (29,760 tons) in 1995. Coffee export earnings, 
however, amounted to only US$9.1 million in 1991-92 (latest 
figures available), which represented barely 10 percent of 
export revenue, compared with 35 percent five years earlier. 

Soon after Columbus brought sugarcane to Haiti on his sec- 
ond voyage to Hispaniola, sugar became one of the island's 
most important cash crops. But after 1804, production never 
returned to pre-independence levels, perhaps because it was in 
the hands of small peasants rather than large plantations. The 
sugar harvest fell to under 4 million tons by the early 1970s, but 
a sharp increase in the world price of the commodity helped it 
rebound to nearly 6 million tons by the middle of the decade. 
Lower prices and structural problems combined to cause a 
drop in sugar output in the 1980s. By the end of the decade, 
sugarcane covered fewer than 114,000 hectares of the coastal 
plains, and sugarcane planting yielded fewer than 4.5 million 
tons annually. Only about 45,000 hectares were planted in the 



391 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

late 1990s. The production cost of Haitian sugar was three 
times more than the world price in the 1980s. 

Shifts in the world sugar market, caused mainly by interna- 
tional substitution of corn-based fructose for sugarcane, 
exerted further pressure on Haitian producers, and produc- 
tion stagnated. Total sugar exports dropped from 19,200 tons 
in 1980 to 6,500 tons in 1987. In 1988 Haiti exported no sugar. 
The country's three major industrial sugar mills, including the 
oldest one, the Haitian American Sugar Company (HASCO) 
near Port-au-Prince, have ceased operations, citing losses 
caused by competition from cheap legal and illegal imports. 
Another industrial mill, the Centrale Dessalines, produced 
20,000 tons of sugar in 1994. In addition, Haiti has almost 
1,000 peasant-run mills. Total production of raw sugar in 1994 
was estimated at 30,000 tons. Sugar export earnings fell from 
G22.7 million in 1986-87 to G2 million in 1990-91. Haiti is 
now a net importer of sugar. 

Other cash crops include cocoa, cotton, sisal, and essential 
oils. Cacao plants covered an estimated 10,400 hectares in 1987 
and yielded about 4,000 tons of cocoa a year. But cocoa has 
been declining in importance, as shown by the drop in its 
export earnings from US$4 million in 1987-88 to US$660,000 
in 1995-96. 

Cotton cultivation peaked in the 1930s, before Mexican boll 
weevil beetles ravaged the crop. In the 1960s, growers intro- 
duced a higher quality of cotton, which was processed in local 
cotton gins and then exported to Europe. But when cotton 
prices fell in the 1980s, cotton plantings shrank from 12,400 
hectares in 1979 to under 8,000 hectares by 1986, and exports 
ceased. 

Sisal, exported as a twine since the 1920s, peaked in the 
1950s, when industries spawned by the Korean War used up 
much of the nation's 40,000-ton output. As the substitution of 
synthetic fibers for sisal reduced most large-scale growing of 
the plant in the 1980s, however, Haiti exported an average of 
only 6,500 tons a year, mainly to the Dominican Republic and 
Puerto Rico. 

The export of essential oils, derived from vetiver, lime, 
amyris, and bitter orange for the cosmetics and pharmaceutical 
industries, peaked in 1976 at 395 tons. Exports gradually lev- 
eled off at a little more than 200 tons, generating an average of 
US$5 million in foreign exchange. 



392 



Cleaning mud from an old irrigation canal in the Artibonite Valley 
Making mountainside terraces at Dofourmi, above Port-au-Prince, 

for reforestation planting 
Courtesy Inter-American Development Bank 



393 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 
Food Crops 

The fall in prices for cash crops in the 1980s was accompa- 
nied by a rise in the output of food crops, such as corn, sor- 
ghum, rice, bananas, beans, and potatoes. Real per capita food 
production, however, declined, and Haiti continued to import 
millions of tons of grains. The trend toward increased produc- 
tion of food crops also has had negative ecological conse- 
quences because the planting of more tuber staples has 
accelerated soil erosion. But underfed farmers realistically 
could not be expected to grow tree crops in place of these 
badly needed staples. 

Corn, the leading food crop, is sown on more hectares — 
about 220,000 — than any other crop. It is grown separately in 
the south and interspersed with legumes in other areas. Sor- 
ghum often replaces corn during the second growing season as 
the leading crop, but total hectares planted average only 
156,000. Rice became an increasingly common cereal begin- 
ning in the 1960s, and its production increased considerably in 
the 1980s as a result of improved irrigation schemes in the Arti- 
bonite Valley. Rice production, however, has fluctuated consid- 
erably and remains dependent on government subsidies. An 
estimated 60,000 hectares yielded an average of 123,000 tons, 
from 1980 to 1987 (latest data available). But the sharp reduc- 
tion of protective tariffs in the mid-1990s led to increased 
imports of rice, mostly from the United States, and a corre- 
sponding decrease in production. The reopening of ports also 
led to large-scale smuggling of cheap rice and reductions in the 
planted area to less than 36,000 hectares. 

Other food crops cultivated in Haiti include a variety of red 
and black beans, which provide the main source of protein in 
the diet of millions. As many as 129,000 hectares provided 
67,000 tons of beans in 1987 (latest data available). Potatoes, 
one of the country's largest food crops, grow on an estimated 
100,000 hectares and yielded 260,000 tons of produce a year in 
the 1980s. Banana palms are also common and provide, on the 
average, more than 500,000 tons of produce annually, almost 
entirely for domestic consumption. Although the flimsy trees 
are vulnerable to hurricanes and droughts, rapid replanting 
has helped sustain the crop. The significant lowering of import 
tariffs, decreed by IMF reforms in 1994, has increased smug- 
gling of cheaper food products from the Dominican Republic, 
particularly bananas. 



394 



Haiti: The Economy 



Forestry 

Haiti has had a long and sad history of deforestation, which 
has had a devastating effect on the country's economy. The 
most direct effect of deforestation is soil erosion. In turn, soil 
erosion has lowered the productivity of the land, worsened 
droughts, and eventually led to desertification, all of which 
have increased the pressure on the remaining land and trees. 
As far back as the 1950s, it was becoming obvious that environ- 
mentally unsound agricultural practices, rapid population 
growth, and increased competition over scarce land were accel- 
erating deforestation problems uncontrollably. Intensified 
demand for charcoal has worsened the situation by accelerat- 
ing logging operations. The FAO estimated that deforestation 
was destroying 6,000 hectares of arable land a year in the 1980s. 
As a result, an impetus to act came from abroad. USAID's Agro- 
forestry Outreach Program, Proje Pyebwa, was the country's 
major reforestation program in the 1980s. Between 1982 and 
1991, the project distributed some 63 million trees to more 
than 250,000 small peasant farmers. Later efforts to save Haiti's 
trees — and thus its ecosystem — focused on intensifying refores- 
tation programs, reducing waste in charcoal production, intro- 
ducing more wood-efficient stoves, and importing wood under 
USAID's Food for Peace program. Much of the tree cover con- 
tinued to be cut down indiscriminately for use as charcoal until 
the cutting reached alarming proportions in the 1990s. Only 
an estimated 60,000 hectares, 2.2 percent of the total land area, 
were forested in 1993. 

Livestock and Fishing 

Most peasants possess a few farm animals, usually goats, pigs, 
chickens, and cattle. Few holdings, however, are large, and few 
peasants raise only livestock. Many farm animals, serving as a 
kind of savings account, are sold or are slaughtered to pay for 
marriages, medical emergencies, schooling, seeds for crops, or 
a voodoo ceremony. Haiti had an estimated 200,000 pigs in 
1994, compared with a record high of 1.2 million in the early 
1980s. In the late 1970s, the island's pig stock became infected 
with the highly contagious African swine fever, which had 
spread from Spain to the Dominican Republic and then to 
Haiti via the Artibonite River. Panicked farmers first slaugh- 
tered their own infected animals, about one-third of the total 
pig population. Fear of further infection eliminated another 



395 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

third. Then a government eradication program almost wiped 
out what remained of the 1.2 million pigs by 1982. Angry farm- 
ers complained about the government's inadequate compensa- 
tion for their slaughtered livestock and about its restocking 
program using pigs imported from the United States. The 
large imported pink sentinel strain of pig offered as a replace- 
ment for the hardy creole breed was considered unsuitable for 
Haiti's environment. Farmers also complained that the United 
States variety required a level of upkeep they could not afford. 
To supplement the sentinel pigs, Jamaican creole pigs were 
added to Haiti's livestock population. After the swine-fever epi- 
demic, chicken replaced pork as the most widely consumed 
meat in the Haitian diet. 

Goats are one of the most plentiful farm animals in Haiti 
and, like the creole pigs, adapt well to the terrain and sparse 
vegetation. Their numbers increased from 400,000 in 1981 to 
more than 1 million by the end of the 1980s (latest figures 
available). Approximately 54 percent of all farmers own goats. 
Sheep are raised in some areas, but they are not particularly 
well adapted to the island's climate. 

Some 8,000 to 10,000 Haitians fish the 1,500-kilometer coast- 
line on a full-time or part-time basis, netting an average annual 
catch of 5,000 tons of fish. Although Haiti's immediate coastal 
waters are over-fished, deep-sea fishing is underdeveloped 
because most Haitian fishers lack the modern equipment 
required for profitable fishing on the high seas. Thus, fishing 
in general has remained undeveloped into the late 1990s, even 
though it potentially could have been a major source of badly 
needed protein in the population's diet. The country imports 
more than 12,000 tons of fish products a year to satisfy domes- 
tic demand. 

Industry 

Manufacturing 

Like almost everything else in Haiti, manufacturing, which 
was the most dynamic sector of the economy in the 1980s and 
which accounted for more than 18 percent of GDP in 1980 
(and almost 14 percent of GDP in 1991), suffered several crip- 
pling blows in the wake of Aristide's overthrow and the ensuing 
embargo imposed by both the UN and the OAS. Of 180 com- 
panies operating in four free zones, 130 closed their factories 
in the aftermath of the 1991 coup. However, almost thirty 



396 



Women making rugs at Fort 
Jacques, near Port-au-Prince 
Courtesy Inter-American 
Development Bank 




Plaiting banana tree bark for 
baskets at Port-au-Prince 
Industrial Park 
Courtesy Inter-American 
Development Bank 




397 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

plants reopened within a year after the reestablishment of con- 
stitutional government in October 1994. The sector managed 
to revive slowly; by mid-1997 (latest data available), it employed 
approximately 23,000 people — considerably fewer than the 
100,000 employed prior to the miliary coup — and its contribu- 
tion to GDP had reached 1 1 percent. 

Manufacturing recorded strong growth that averaged about 
10 percent per year in the 1970s and almost 12 percent per 
year by 1980. Manufactured goods replaced agricultural com- 
modities as the country's leading exports during this decade. 
In 1991 manufacturing accounted for 14 percent of GDP. By 
the end of the 1980s, the manufacturing sector comprised 500 
enterprises, most of which were family owned and small or 
medium-sized (latest available data). Major products include 
processed foods, electrical equipment, textiles, toys, sporting 
goods, clothing, and handicrafts. Most of these items are not 
destined for local consumption, however. Principal production 
for the local market is in the area of food and beverages. 

Assembly Sector 

In the late 1980s, attracted to Haiti by the prevalence of 
extremely low wages, more than 150 firms, mostly United 
States-controlled, set up operations on the edge of Port-au- 
Prince to assemble light industrial products for re-export. The 
factories generated about 60,000 jobs (two-thirds held by 
women) for workers assembling electronic components, toys, 
sporting goods, and clothing. Their contribution to govern- 
ment revenue was insignificant, however, since they were 
exempted from taxation for up to fifteen years and were free to 
repatriate profits. In its attempt to attract the assembly indus- 
try, Haiti had benefited from both its proximity to the United 
States and its access to such organizations as the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP — see Glossary) and the CBI. Its 
special position in assembly production was eventually eroded, 
however, as other countries in the region, such as the Domini- 
can Republic, Jamaica, and Costa Rica, began to capitalize 
more aggressively on the advantages of the CBI. Haiti's pros- 
pects in the assembly industry were hampered by a combina- 
tion of factors, including an underdeveloped infrastructure, an 
illiterate work force, scarce managerial personnel, and — per- 
haps most important — the highest utility costs in the Carib- 
bean. The country's chronic political instability was another 
major factor that prompted many companies to relocate their 



398 



Twine factory 
Courtesy Inter-American 
Development Bank 




assembly operations to more stable countries in the Caribbean, 
mostly to the free zone in the neighboring Dominican Repub- 
lic. By the late 1990s, Haiti's once-thriving assembly sector was 
operating at a fraction of its capacity. 

Construction 

It was not surprising that the demise of the assembly manu- 
facturing subsector would deal Haiti's construction industry as 
devastating a blow as it did in the 1990s. Construction had 
depended heavily on industrial structures related to assembly 
manufacturing since the 1970s. It had also concentrated 
heavily on extravagant houses being built in the residential 
areas of Port-au-Prince and its exclusive suburb of Petionville; 
these construction projects almost halted during the political 
instability and economic turmoil of the 1990s. Meanwhile, the 
country's disadvantaged majority continued to labor and build 
their own dwellings with a mixture of raw materials, mostly 
wood and palm thatch in rural areas and corrugated metal, 
cardboard, or wood in urban shantytowns. 

Mining 

Haiti has few natural resources; they include small amounts 



399 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



of gold, silver, copper, iron, nickel, and marble. The country's 
insignificant mining sector, which accounted for less than 1 
percent of GDP and employed less than 1 percent of the labor 
force in the early 1980s, all but vanished in 1983, when a 
United States firm, Reynolds Company, decided to close its 
bauxite mine at Miragoane after forty years of operation. The 
plant produced an average of 500,000 tons of bauxite a year, 
but the declining metal content of the ore, coupled with high 
production costs and the oversupplied international bauxite 
market, made it a losing business venture. 

A Canadian mining company, Sainte Genevieve, which 
started prospecting for gold in the northern part of the island 
in 1995, decided to relocate its operations to the Dominican 
Republic in late 1997. Although it had created more than 300 
jobs, the local community expressed strong concerns about the 
adverse effects the mining operation could have on their agri- 
cultural output. Their demands that the company finance 
rehabilitation of irrigation systems, bridges, and dams in their 
region prompted the firm's decision to depart. 

Energy 

Haiti had limited energy resources in the late 1990s. The 
country has no petroleum resources, little hydroelectricity 
potential, and rapidly diminishing supplies of wood fuels. 
Local timber and charcoal account for 75 percent of the total 
energy used in the country, imported petroleum for 15 per- 
cent, bagasse (sugarcane residue) for 5 percent, and hydroelec- 
tric power for 5 percent. In addition, only a meager 10 percent 
of the country had access to electricity in 1995. Even in Port-au- 
Prince, where almost half the population has electricity, the 
supply is so limited that many industries must resort to private 
generators. Although most provincial towns have intermittent 
electricity, only 3 percent of the rural population has any. 

The Haitian Electricity Company (Electricite d'Haiti — 
EdH), established in 1971, operates the Peligre hydroelectric 
plant above the Artibonite Valley, which provides approxi- 
mately one-third of the island's public electricity. Four thermal 
plants in the Port-au-Prince area provide the other two-thirds. 
Tapping illegally into power lines has long been a fairly com- 
mon practice, and almost half of the current produced by the 
EdH was stolen. 

Haiti imports all of its petroleum. When a petroleum 
embargo was imposed in 1993, thousands of people made a liv- 



400 



Haiti: The Economy 



ing smuggling gas across the border from the Dominican 
Republic. The fuel embargo also increased the population's 
need for timber and charcoal, the major household fuel, result- 
ing in greater deforestation as well. 

By the mid-1990s, the country's installed electric power 
capacity was approximately 210 megawatts. The power indus- 
try's performance is far below par, however, because of the 
dilapidated condition of production and transmission equip- 
ment, lack of maintenance, silting at the Peligre Dam, and low 
stream discharge during the dry season. Power interruptions 
resulting from generation and transmission equipment failures 
occur frequently. Blackouts are even more common in the 
provinces. The hydroelectric potential is estimated at 120 
megawatts, of which fifty-four megawatts have been installed. 
Peak demand in Port-au-Prince is capped at 100 megawatts 
because that is all the supply that is available. But the potential 
demand from Port-au-Prince could be higher than 200 mega- 
watts, if there were reliable supplies and adequate distribution 
systems. Generation capacity was largely rebuilt after 1995, 
which has enabled the EdH to supply eighteen to twenty-four 
hours a day of electric power to almost all of Port-au-Prince 
during the rainy season. Power supplies are usually unreliable 
between December and March, when production at the Peligre 
dam declines. 

Transportation and Communications 

Haiti's transportation system remains inadequate in the 
1990s, in spite of the major infrastructural improvements that 
accompanied the growth period of the 1970s (see fig. 13). Poor 
transportation hinders economic growth, particularly in the 
agricultural sector. Like other services in the economy, trans- 
portation — when it is available — is prohibitively expensive for 
most citizens. 

Roads are considered the most important part of the coun- 
try's transportation system. Of a total of 4,050 kilometers of 
roads, 950 kilometers are paved, another 950 kilometers are 
gravel or otherwise improved, and 2,150 kilometers are unim- 
proved and almost impassable during the torrential rainy sea- 
son. Besides the paved streets in Port-au-Prince, Haiti has only 
two main highways. These highways, which were paved in 1973, 
link the northern and southern regions of the country. 
National Highway One extends north from the capital to Cap- 
Haitien via the coastal towns of Montrouis and Gona'ives. 



401 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 




Figure 13. Haiti: Transportation System, 1999 



National Highway Two proceeds south from Port-au-Prince to 
Les Cayes by way of Miragoane with a spur to Jacmel. Road 
travel outside these two arteries, which themselves had badly 
deteriorated by the mid-1990s because of poor road mainte- 
nance and lack of repair, is quite difficult and requires four- 
wheel-drive vehicles that are equipped to travel on the washed- 
out roads that are especially common during the rainy season. 

In view of the condition of Haiti's roads, the World Bank 
approved a US$50 million loan program for road construction. 
However, the loan program was suspended in late 1998 when 
auditors uncovered major irregularities in contract awards — 
but only after the Bank had disbursed almost US$23 million. 
Subsequently, in January 1999 the Bank decided to halt the 
program altogether because of mismanagement and suspected 
corruption. A spokeswoman for the Bank confirmed that at 
least a US$6 million portion of the loan was declared a "mis- 



402 



Haiti: The Economy 



procurement," adding that the Bank was demanding repay- 
ment. 

The government provides extremely limited and unreliable 
public transportation, leaving road transport in the hands of 
small operators who run trucks, vans, and taxis without much 
regard to safety concerns. In the late 1990s, most Haitians were 
continuing to use "tap-taps," brightly colored and overcrowded 
jitneys that service almost every corner of the island. Nearly all 
vehicles in Haiti are imported; an estimated 50,000 vehicles 
were in use in 1991, compared with 36,600 vehicles ten years 
earlier. 

Ports are another major component of the country's trans- 
portation sector. Haiti has fourteen ports. Although most of 
these ports are provincial and small, they have turned into 
. major centers of imported contraband, especially after the 
upheavals of the 1990s. Port-au-Prince remains the major port, 
and is equipped with container facilities and berths for large 
liners. It also remains the island's central shipping site for most 
registered imports and exports. Beside its container capability 7 , 
it offers a roll-on/roll-off facility, a thirty-ton gantry crane, and 
a fifty-ton mobile crane in addition to its older mechanical han- 
dling equipment and two transit warehouses. Port fees are so 
expensive, however, that the port is underused. Wharfage costs 
are four times higher than those of the neighboring Domini- 
can Republic. Also, most of the port's equipment is in very 
poor condition. Perhaps for this reason, legislation relating to 
the modernization of public enterprises had recommended 
that management of the port be turned over to a private opera- 
tor. The legislation was still pending in parliament in late 1999. 

Cap-Haitien was the second major port until the end of the 
1980s, handling most cruise-ship traffic as well as domestic and 
international merchant ships. In the 1990s, it was replaced by 
Miragoane, which in 1999 remained a major export port. 
Lesser used ports include Les Cayes, Fort Liberte, Gonaives, 
Jacmel, Montrouis, and Jeremie. They play a role in internal 
commerce, mainly as an alternative to the island's poor road 
system and as a conduit for contraband trade out of the 
Dominican Republic and Miami. Although smuggling may 
have stimulated economic activity at these small provincial 
ports, it has resulted in the loss of millions of dollars in import 
duties. The porous border with the Dominican Republic also 
continues to be a favorite route for imported contraband. 



403 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Haiti's main, and only international, airport is located about 
ten kilometers north of Port-au-Prince. Opened in 1965, it is 
equipped for international flights and handles most domestic 
flights as well, with the exception of Cap-Haitien. The country's 
other airfields (about ten) are operational, but they are no 
more than grass strips. The government-owned Air Haiti is the 
only airline that services these provincial airports. Air Haiti 
operates under the control of the National Civil Aviation Office 
(Office National de l'Aviation Civile — ONAC). The National 
Airport Authority (Autorite Aeroportuaire Nationale — AAN) 
regulates the country's airports. Air links abroad were sus- 
pended in July 1994, as part of internationally imposed sanc- 
tions, but were restored before year's end. Some ten airlines 
from Europe, the Caribbean, and the Americas regularly 
schedule services to Port-au-Prince airport. 

Haiti, with a 1998 ratio of six telephones per 1,000 people, 
the same as in the mid-1980s, ranks below some of Africa's 
poorer nations — eight telephones per 1,000 inhabitants. The 
39,000 telephone lines of the 1980s increased to 64,000 in the 
late 1990s, but 80 percent of them remained concentrated in 
the Port-au-Prince area, where only about 25 percent of the 
total population live. Telephone service to provincial towns 
remains so unreliable that many rural areas must depend on 
two-way radios. By contrast, subscribers with international ser- 
vice (again, almost all in the capital area) can dial directly to 
the United States and Europe via a satellite station at Sabourin; 
rates are high, however. The country's telephone system is 
operated by Teleco, under the Ministry of Public Works, Trans- 
portation, and Communications. Teleco, 96 percent of which is 
owned by the government, is on the list of public enterprises to 
be privatized. 

Approximately sixty amplitude modulation (AM) and fre- 
quency modulation (FM) stations and twenty television stations 
operated in Haiti in the late 1990s. In 1997 Haiti had some 
38,000 television sets and some 415,000 radios. The only radio 
station whose signal covers the entire country is Radio Nation- 
ale d'Haiti, which is government-operated and located in the 
capital. Another radio station that also has a large audience is 
Radio Soleil, which is run by the Archdiocese of Port-au-Prince 
and broadcasts in both Creole and French. Cable television ser- 
vice, carrying several United States channels, is a pay-cable sta- 
tion broadcasting on thirteen channels in French, Spanish, and 
English; it is owned by a private operator, Tele-Haiti. Television 



404 



Riders on a "tap-tap" (jitney) 
near Gonaives 
Courtesy Inter-American 
Development Bank 



Colorful "tap-taps" on Avenue 
Dessalines, Port-au-Prince 
Courtesy Inter-American 
Development Bank 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Nationale d'Haiti is the state television station, broadcasting on 
four channels in Creole, French, and Spanish. 

Tourism 

A new international airport in 1965 and improved relations 
with the United States helped Haiti's tourism industry to flour- 
ish in the 1970s. Tourist arrivals (139,000 by air and 163,000 by 
sea) peaked in 1980, and net expenditures on tourism (US$44 
million) reached their highest level in 1981 before a series of 
events made Haiti unpopular among tourists. One of these 
events was publicity surrounding Haiti as a possible origin of 
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and the high 
number of AIDS cases among Haitians. The former allegation 
proved false, but the portrait lingered along with television 
images of political violence, dire poverty, "boat people," and 
general instability. As political instability spread to many parts 
of the island, tour operators began to express concerns about 
their customers' security, and the number of cruise ships visit- 
ing Haiti declined considerably. The number of tourist arrivals 
fell sharply after the September 1991 coup. According to the 
Central Bank, the number of visitors in 1991-92 was down to 
82,493 (latest figures available). The declining number of tour- 
ists forced many hotels to close. The number of hotel rooms 
available to tourists also dropped consistently, from 3,000 in 
1981 to 1,500 in 1987 to 800 by mid-1996. 

Trouble with the island's tourism continued into the late 
1990s. Radio Galaxie announced in April 1999 that Haiti Club 
Med would close almost immediately. Although the closure was 
supposed to be "temporary," the government's quick response 
was to announce that it was taking steps to encourage more 
tourists to visit Haiti. The measures included the abolition of 
visa requirements, which raised concerns as to the degree this 
would facilitate illegal traffic from Haiti to the United States via 
the Bahamas. 

Outlook 

The critical situation in which Haiti finds itself stems mainly 
from its chronic political instability, which occasionally borders 
on chaos. This instability has scared away international donors 
and dried up the external aid on which the country has 
depended for decades. In turn, lack of aid has adversely 
affected an economy stagnant for some years and taken a 



406 




severe toll on a population already living in abject poverty. 
Haiti also has other deep-rooted endemic problems: an 
unskilled population, lack of resources, maldistribution of 
wealth, marked disregard for social justice among traditional 
power holders, a dysfunctional judiciary, growing scarcity of 
productive land, lack of off-farm labor opportunities, paucity 
of investment in human and social capital, deficits in capital 
and credit markets, an ingrained tradition of corruption, 
unemployment and underemployment of unskilled labor, an 
entrenched and inefficient bureaucracy, and — perhaps most 
important — a lack of will on the part of the country's leaders to 
stop the political infighting and start implementing whatever 
reforms have been legislated. 

Both the United Nations secretary general and the United 
States secretary of state have voiced on separate occasions their 
concern over the Haitian government's inaction, which caused 
the suspension of badly needed international aid. In urging 
Haiti's political leaders to "resolve their differences," the secre- 
tary of state said in April 1998 that the Haitian people "deserve 
the ability to have the fruits that the international community 
is trying to give them." Similarly, in early 1998 members of the 
Foreign Relations Committee of the United States House of 
Representatives warned that United States funding for Haiti 



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Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

would be suspended if Haitian leaders did not make more seri- 
ous efforts to reach a political solution. Meanwhile, substantial 
amounts of aid from other foreign donors were withheld for 
the same reason. 

Important as it may be for any Haitian leader to renew the 
flow of external aid, it is far more important for Haiti to be 
committed to the concept that economic development must be 
based on trade and investment and institutional reforms. Such 
measures involve factors that include job creation and the 
improvement of social services for the disadvantaged, rather 
than a growing dependence on international assistance. R. 
Quentin Grafton of the University of Ottawa and Dane Row- 
lands of Carlton University make the point that Haiti's political 
instability is "symptomatic of its institutional arrangements 
where the powers of the state are viewed as a means to personal 
enrichment." Haiti's institutional structure is such that it has 
encouraged economic exploitation and intimidation, as well as 
political repression and stark inequities between the privileged 
and disadvantaged segments of the population. To reverse 
these tendencies, a leadership is needed that acknowledges 
that appropriate institutional reform is essential for Haiti's 
development. The country's social, economic, and political 
structure needs to be modified so as to assure the poor their 
fair share of resources and social services and to ensure the 
participation of the less advantaged communities in shaping 
their institutional environment. 

The role of leadership need not be the government's exclu- 
sive domain. A good example of private initiative was a three- 
day economic conference held in April 1998 in Jacmel. A 
group of Haitian mayors and some forty Haitian-Americans, 
including ten businessmen from New York, met to discuss ways 
of energizing Haiti's development process. They chose to hold 
their encounter at some distance from the capital to show that 
private efforts can be mounted without state sponsorship. 
Bringing together elected officials of small provincial towns, 
who had been accustomed to obeying directives of the central 
government, with a group of potential investors and business 
leaders also made the point that thousands of Haitian emi- 
grants living abroad could be tapped for financial assistance to 
development projects in rural communities. Haitians living in 
the United States alone reportedly send home an estimated 
US$3 million a day. 



408 



Haiti: The Economy 



Two World Bank projects provide another example of a dif- 
ferent approach to socioeconomic development in Haiti. 
When the country's gross domestic product fell by about 40 
percent during the 1991-94 embargo years, and large numbers 
of jobs were lost, the World Bank initiated a two-year Employ- 
ment Generation Project, which provided short-term jobs for 
325,000 of Haiti's poorest. Another social safety-net program 
geared toward directly assisting the underprivileged and 
improving social services is known as the Basic Infrastructure 
Project, which involves the poor in its design and implementa- 
tion. The project's goal is the rebuilding of critical infrastruc- 
ture in serious disrepair (roads, sanitation facilities, and flood 
controls) in provincial towns. The objective is achieved 
through consultation with local communities and use of local 
labor in construction, thereby providing opportunities for 
more sustained employment. 

Whatever approach the Haitians choose to reform their 
country's basic institutional structure and to embark on a 
coherent economic development program, their task is bound 
to be daunting. Dealing with an economy in ruins, a popula- 
tion in despair, an administrative system in shambles, and a 
government at a standstill will not be easy and may take years, 
even with substantial aid from the international donor commu- 
nity. 

* * * 

Reliable statistical data on Haitian economics are hard to 
obtain. Most publications acknowledge that their figures are 
based largely on estimates. For example, despite the obvious 
breadth and depth of their research, the International Mone- 
tary Fund and the World Bank note that they have little confi- 
dence in the statistical data provided on Haiti. 

Perhaps the best source on Haiti's economy is the Economist 
Intelligence Unit, which publishes an annual country profile as 
well as four quarterly country reports on the island nation. The 
profile typically includes a comprehensive analysis of the coun- 
try's economic developments, while providing an insightful 
political backdrop to put them in perspective. The quarterly 
updates furnish what is tantamount to a running chronicle of 
economic and political events as they unfold on the Haitian 
scene. It is also useful to consult publications by major donors 
such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development 



409 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Bank, and the United States Agency for International Develop- 
ment. These and other donors issue reports of surveys, policy 
research, and other current information on Haiti. A good 
recent collection of such reports is available from the World 
Bank, Haiti: The Challenges of Poverty Reduction. 

Mats Lundahl, a Swedish economist, has written an eco- 
nomic history, Peasants and Poverty: A Study of Haiti, and other 
useful books and articles on Haiti; and Simon Fass has pub- 
lished an interesting study on the economics of survival and 
informal credit among the urban poor, Political Economy in 
Haiti: The Drama of Survival. Development initiatives are treated 
in a collection of articles edited by Derrick Brinkerhoff and 
Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor, Politics, Projects, and People: Institu- 
tional Development in Haiti. 

More recent works include The Haitian Dilemma: A Case Study 
in Demographics, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy by Ernest H. 
Preeg, an economist and former United States ambassador to 
Haiti. A conference on Haiti after the return of Aristide gener- 
ated a collection of papers edited by Robert I. Rotberg, Haiti 
Renewed: Political and Economic Prospects. There is also a recent 
volume on political economy by Alex Dupuy, Haiti in the New 
World Order: The Limits of the Democratic Revolution, and an earlier 
volume entitled Haiti in the World Economy: Class, Race, and 
Underdevelopment since 1 700. (For further information and com- 
plete citations, see Bibliography.) 



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Chapter 9. Haiti: Government and Politics 



Figure from a painting by Dieuseul Paul 



AS HAITI APPROACHES ITS 200th anniversary of indepen- 
dence from France, it is struggling to discard deeply rooted leg- 
acies of centralized government based on authoritarian rule 
and of politics predicated upon elitism, cronyism, and exclu- 
sion. Historically, the Haitian state has ignored the need to 
develop institutions and to enact programs required to 
advance the nation's well-being, and to be accountable to citi- 
zens. Haiti's leaders have neglected to build political institu- 
tions with a numerically significant or sustained citizen 
involvement. Rather, since independence in 1804, the coun- 
try's governments, led by military strongmen, charismatic lead- 
ers and/ or elites whose interests were shared by the army, 
generally have done little more than seek to maintain power 
and prey upon those over whom they exercised such power. 
Particularly vulnerable to state-sponsored predation and politi- 
cal exclusion have been the urban poor and the country's 
demographic majority: its peasants. 

From the February 1986 demise of the twenty-nine-year 
Duvalier family dictatorship up to the September 1994 interna- 
tional intervention that dislodged a brutal de facto military 
regime, Haiti's deeply dichotomized political system experi- 
enced a period of profound transition (see table 24 and table 
25, Appendix). Characterized by constant turmoil and pro- 
tracted violence, these eight years witnessed a struggle between 
two largely juxtaposed groups with fundamentally different 
visions of their country's future. Supporters of Haiti's tradi- 
tional political power structure — often simply referred to as 
mahout and composed of the army and other henchmen, and 
their allies among the political and economic elites — sought to 
maintain the status quo or, under international and domestic 
pressure, to accept at least cosmetic change. Traditionalists 
were challenged by a cacophony of voices calling for social, 
economic, and political reform. Those voices were led by indi- 
viduals who emanated principally from community and reli- 
gious groups, and the middle-class nongovernmental 
organizations and professional associations of Haiti's increas- 
ingly organized civil society. These new political actors saw the 
Ayiti Libere (Liberated Haiti) of 1986 as an opportunity to end 
authoritarianism, to democratize and decentralize the state, 
and, as such, to provide political access to the largely disenfran- 



413 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

chised moun andeyo (outsiders) — the rural and urban poor and 
working classes. Two popular political slogans that sprang up in 

1986 illustrate the differences between these two groups and 
their aspirations. The slogan Chaque quatre ans (Every four 
years) , calling for regular elections and implying participatory 
democratic governance, was embraced by those seeking 
reform. Vive Varmee (Long live the army) was adopted by those 
opposing change. 

The 1986-94 post-Duvalier transitional period witnessed an 
incessant tug-of-war between these two tendencies. Political 
recidivists, significantly outnumbered by their opponents, 
resorted to the raw power of weapons and violence when neces- 
sary, to maintain their position. An early example of this tactic 
was the massacre of voters that led to the abandonment of the 

1987 presidential election. This incident and the instances of 
intimidation and murder that followed were eclipsed by the 
slaughter of some 3,000 Haitians that accompanied the late 
September 1991 military coup d'etat and the subsequent three- 
year reign of terror led by the Armed Forces of Haiti (Forces 
Armees d'Haiti— FAd'H) . 

Confronting the grim reality of brute force, Haiti's incipient 
reformers relied upon determination, resilience, and sheer 
strength of numbers throughout the transitional period. They 
early achieved such key victories as the 1986 election of a con- 
stituent assembly and the 1987 ratification of a new, democratic 
constitution. Ultimately, they resisted the "Duvalierism without 
Duvalier" of the late 1980s to build a national reformist politi- 
cal movement — Lavalas (a Creole phrase meaning "cleansing 
flood") — that coalesced around an outspoken Roman Catholic 
priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. With complementary support 
from international players, Haiti's reformers achieved a tran- 
scendent milestone in Haiti's political history: the free, fair, 
and internationally recognized parliamentary and presidential 
elections of December 1990. 

Although that accomplishment was reversed with the 1991 
military coup, it was not erased. The coup leader, General 
Raoul Cedras, and his co-conspirators succeeded in grasping 
power during three years of despotic rule, but they were unable 
to consolidate their hold on power and to gain the national 
and international legitimacy they desperately sought. The 
strength and depth of Haitian support for the government of 
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the legitimacy granted to 
it as a result of the 1990 elections, ultimately enabled Haiti's 



414 



Haiti: Government and Politics 



nascent democratic political process to triumph over the 
attempt by the putschists to return Haiti to its past. 

By late 1994, following eight difficult years of post-Duvalier 
transition, Haiti's formula of governance by military strong- 
men symbiotically linked with the country's elites had entered 
into an advanced state of disintegration. The influence of polit- 
ical charisma, however, especially in the presence of Jean-Ber- 
trand Aristide, had not decreased. As the junta's leaders were 
escorted from power following the United Nations (UN) -sanc- 
tioned and United States-led multinational military interven- 
tion of September 1994, and Haiti's legitimately elected 
officials were restored to office, the country exploded with 
relief and joy. Once those emotions subsided, Haiti and its 
leaders turned their attention to an uncertain political future. 
Was the country witnessing an end to the difficult transition 
from predatory rule and political exclusion to an era when 
accountability and the politics of inclusion would characterize 
patterns of governance, and the Haitian state would serve the 
nation? Or, would Haiti witness the re-emergence of patterns of 
politics and governance that would do little more than repli- 
cate those of the past? 

From an International Intervention to the Presidency 
of Rene Preval, September 1 994-December 1999 

Restoration of Constitutional Government, September 1 994- 
September 1995 

On September 19, 1994, the first contingents of what would 
become a 21,000-strong Multinational Force (MNF) landed in 
Haiti to oust the de facto regime and restore Haiti's legitimate 
government to power. Because a last-minute permissive inter- 
vention had been negotiated, bloodshed was averted, and dam- 
age to Haiti's urban and rural infrastructure — already 
crumbling from years of neglect — did not occur. As Haiti's 
putschists were escorted from power, or fled on their own, how- 
ever, they left behind a country in total shambles. Public cof- 
fers were empty. The economy, under international sanctions 
for most of the previous three years, had shriveled. Damage to 
Haiti's already fragile natural environment had worsened. 
Political parties and civil society organizations were in varying 
states of disarray, and most citizens carried either physical or 
psychological scars of violence and terror. 



415 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

The infrastructure and institutions of government were 
equally in ruin. Key government posts, including that of prime 
minister, were vacant. During the three years of de facto rule, 
most public officials elected in 1990 or appointed by the 
elected government either had fled the country or had gone 
into hiding. As they returned en masse — many via a chartered 
aircraft that flew back home dozens of parliamentarians who 
had sought asylum in the United States and Canada — they 
found dysfunctional conditions for governance. Not only were 
state coffers empty, but reforms initiated prior to the coup to 
streamline and upgrade the civil service had been reversed as 
the FAd'H placed cronies in public office and padded the civil 
service payrolls with thousands of supporters. Government 
offices had been stripped clean, as the army and its allies took 
vehicles, equipment, furniture, supplies, and even light bulbs 
from offices as they vacated them. When President Aristide was 
restored to his office and quarters in the National Palace in 
mid-October, there was one functioning telephone, and, 
because the furniture had been stolen or destroyed, he had to 
sleep on a cot. 

Regardless of these conditions, the Aristide government, 
with massive assistance from the international community, had 
to move with haste to confront a broad array of challenges. The 
first order of business was to address the quandary of what to 
do about the discredited FAd'H. The army, although removed 
from power and stripped of its heavy weapons by the MNF, 
remained as an institution whose legitimacy was established in 
the 1987 constitution. President Aristide wasted little time com- 
pleting the dismantling process begun by the MNF and, as 
such, removed the institution from its role as political arbiter. 
He nevertheless found a way to respect the constitution. Fol- 
lowing a violent demonstration in December 1994 by members 
of the FAd'H over salary and pensions, the Haitian executive 
initiated a series of steps that emasculated the force. By May 
1995, all that was left of the Armed Forces of Haiti was a small 
military band. Without an army to block the way, Haiti now 
stood before an unprecedented clear path for political reform. 

The disappearance of the FAd'H meant that Haiti no longer 
had a police force. That fact, which called for urgent attention, 
opened up space for genuine reform of the country's public 
safety apparatus. Once again with significant international 
assistance, steps were taken quickly not only to reform the 
police, but also to fulfill the as-yet unmet constitutional man- 



416 



Haiti: Government and Politics 



date to place the police under the civilian control of the Minis- 
try of Justice and Public Security. Following the creation by the 
MNF of an Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) composed 
principally of former FAd'H personnel vetted for blatant 
human rights abuse, and under the supervision of UN-affili- 
ated International Police Monitors (IPMs), international 
experts began training new recruits for the Haitian National 
Police (Police Nationale d'Haiti — PNH) . As the PNH began to 
deploy in mid-1995, it gradually replaced the IPSF. Decommis- 
sioned IPSF members were invited to join other former FAd'H 
personnel in an internationally supervised program of reinte- 
gration through skills training. Ultimately, 5,482 of the FAd'H's 
6,250 demobilized. soldiers enrolled in that program. By Febru- 
ary 1996, the 5,200-member PNH was fully trained and 
deployed under the watch of UN-affiliated civilian police men- 
tors (Civpols). 

Haitian officials also had to confront the complicated status 
of elected officials. While exiled officials who were elected in 
1990 were reclaiming their offices in the aftermath of the inter- 
vention, others who had sympathized with the coup leaders or 
had been installed by them were vacating their posts. Among 
the latter were the nine senators, who had been "elected" to six- 
year terms in 1993, but whose legitimacy was unrecognized. By 
late 1994, the terms of all officials elected in 1990 either had 
expired or were about to end, with the exception of nine sena- 
tors elected to six-year terms and the president of the republic, 
whose term would expire in February 1996. Hence, after 
incumbent office holders were restored to office, there was a 
pressing need to conduct nationwide general elections for 
almost all elected posts. 

Before elections could be conducted, key preparatory 
actions were required. A prime minister had to be nominated 
and confirmed, his cabinet installed, and a new Provisional 
Electoral Council (Conseil Electoral Provisoire — CEP) 
selected. The Lavalas movement and smaller political parties, 
in varying states of disarray following the three years of de facto 
rule, had to reorganize themselves and identify qualified candi- 
dates. The electoral infrastructure, destroyed by the FAd'H, 
had to be recreated, beginning with voter registration. 

In October 1994, Smarck Michel, a businessman and former 
minister of commerce, was nominated by Aristide as the new 
prime minister, received parliamentary ratification, and 
formed a new government that began to restore order and 



417 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

function to the executive branch. Subsequently, a CEP was 
formed and, working with massive international assistance, 
gradually oversaw the creation of a framework for parliamen- 
tary, municipal, and communal section elections. Between 
June and September 1995, the elections were held. Interna- 
tional observers deemed the elections "free, fair, and flawed," 
the latter characterization resulting principally from the com- 
mission's mixed performance (see Democracy Restored, 1994- 
96, ch. 6). Thousands of candidates from dozens of political 
parties stood for election to communal section councils, 
municipal councils, and the parliament — a total of 2,192 posi- 
tions. Few incumbents won re-election. Swept into office was a 
new generation of political leaders, practically all of whom ran 
either as candidates of Lavalas Political Organization (Organi- 
sation Politique Lavalas — OPL) or one of the three other polit- 
ical parties that had joined the OPL to form the Lavalas 
Political Platform (Plate-forme Politique Lavalas — PPL), or 
simply as Lavalas independents. In a break with Haiti's political 
past, the victorious candidates were residents of the constituen- 
cies they were elected to represent or to govern, and few 
counted themselves as members of the traditional political 
class ( classe politique) . 

Presidential Transition, October 1995-March 1997 

As Haiti's newly elected officials took office, Smarck Michel 
resigned in October 1995, largely over issues linked to eco- 
nomic policy. Michel had endorsed macroeconomic policies 
promoted by the multilateral and bilateral donors who in Janu- 
ary 1995 had pledged approximately US$2.8 billion in aid for 
Haiti's recovery. That policy, based largely on such reform mea- 
sures as the divestiture of state enterprises ("privatization") and 
reduced tariffs ("free trade"), became a contentious issue 
among Lavalas partisans who did not want to undermine the 
state, but rather to make it finally render services to citizens. 
Michel was quickly replaced by Claudette Werleigh, the sitting 
minister of foreign affairs, nominated by Aristide, whose posi- 
tion on macroeconomic policies was enigmatic, and confirmed 
by the new, pro-Lavalas parliament. Werleigh's government, 
however, did not move on economic reform policies, thus pre- 
cipitating a slow-down in aid flows, as internationally identified 
conditionalities to disbursements went unmet. 

Attention to this crisis was diverted, however, by a growing 
focus on the status of the presidential election scheduled for 



418 



Haiti: Government and Politics 



late 1995. As the election date drew near, speculation centered 
around two questions: would President Aristide seek to extend 
his term by three years to make up for the time spent in exile, 
and, if not, to whom would he give the Lavalas nod as candi- 
date. Both questions remained unanswered until several weeks 
prior to the election date. Ultimately, Aristide did not respond 
to pressure from among his partisans for his additional three 
years and endorsed his close friend and first prime minister, 
Rene Garcia Preval, as the Lavalas candidate. Running under 
the Bo Tab la (Everyone Around the Table) symbol of Lavalas, 
Preval easily defeated the handful of barely known opposition 
candidates from small political groups. Although his margin of 
victory was huge, voter turnout, at just 28 percent, was signifi- 
cantly lower than the 51 percent for the parliamentary and 
municipal elections held just months earlier. Haiti experienced 
the first peaceful transition in its history of democratically 
elected presidents at Preval's inauguration on February 7, 
1996. As Jean-Bertrand Aristide handed over the presidential 
sash, his successor assumed the difficult roles of leading a 
country still reeling from decades of bad governance and of 
succeeding an enormously popular, and young, national hero. 

Preval chose agronomist and OPL partisan Rosny Smarth as 
his prime minister nominee. Smarth easily won parliamentary 
confirmation as the post-intervention international military 
presence continued to diminish. The MNF had already with- 
drawn on March 31, 1995, handing over its authority to a much 
smaller UN peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Mission 
in Haiti (UNMIH), whose mandate was set to end a year later. 
Through a series of UN Security Council resolutions respond- 
ing to requests from the government of Haiti, however, 
UNMIH's mandate was extended to July 1996. The UN peace- 
keepers ultimately remained in Haiti until November 1997, 
however, through a vastly scaled down United Nations Support 
Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) between July 1996 and July 1997, 
and an even smaller United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti 
(UNTMIH) from August to November 1997. 

While the international military presence was diminishing 
and the PNH was assuming complete responsibility for Haiti's 
public safety, the Preval/Smarth government enacted pro- 
grams and policies aimed at addressing Haiti's most pressing 
social and economic problems. To emphasize its advocacy of 
decentralization, the government spotlighted programs that 
would move resources out of Port-au-Prince to the countryside. 



419 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

President Preval placed a strong emphasis on agrarian reform, 
winning parliamentary support for an increased budget for the 
National Institute of Agrarian Reform (Institut National de la 
Reforme Agraire — Inara) and mandating it to focus primarily 
on the Artibonite Valley, Haiti's breadbasket. Preval himself 
traveled frequently to the countryside to promote his agricul- 
tural reform programs. 

Concurrently, international economic assistance resumed 
principally as a result of the Smarck government's advocacy of 
economic reform measures that included policies for the mod- 
ernization of state enterprises. This approach called for the 
reform of state enterprises through public-private sector part- 
nerships rather than outright privatization. Still, key parliamen- 
tary leaders resisted modernization and managed to garner 
enough support for their position to block or delay passage of 
required economic reform legislation. 

In January 1997, the ruling Lavalas political movement was 
shaken to its roots, when a new political party personally identi- 
fied with former President Aristide, the Lavalas Family (La 
Famille Lavalas — FL) , was formally registered. This develop- 
ment further complicated the political picture. As the new 
organization coalesced around the still-popular, charismatic 
leader, the Lavalas movement began to splinter into two princi- 
pal groups. Elected officials and political activists either gravi- 
tated to the FL or stayed loyal to the OPL, which soon changed 
its name to the Organization of Struggling People (Organisa- 
tion de Peuple en Lutte), a name that enabled the organiza- 
tion to distance itself from Lavalas while maintaining its highly 
recognized acronym. Rumors and speculation swirled around 
the political allegiance of President Preval and the ability of the 
OPL-led government of Prime Minister Smarth to win support 
for its programs and policies in a now starkly divided parlia- 
ment. 

Balance of Power and Political Gridlock, April 1997-January 
1999 

The first opportunity for the FL to demonstrate its political 
power would be the elections set for April 6, 1997, that would 
renew one-third of the Senate and that would create two key 
institutions in the decentralization of government: the commu- 
nal section assemblies and town delegations. As voting day 
neared, controversy surrounding several FL senatorial candi- 
dates, particularly one with prior FAd'H affiliation, overshad- 



420 



Haiti: Government and Politics 



owed the fact that the FL was fielding slates of candidates 
(cartels) for most of the communal section assemblies and town 
delegation races. The dismally low 5 percent turnout on April 6 
reflected a growing trend of voter fatigue, frustration, apathy, 
and confusion. The election was plagued not only by a negligi- 
ble turnout, but also by controversy surrounding the extremely 
poor management of the process by the allegedly pro-FL CEP 
and resultant fraudulent vote counts in many races, including 
several close senatorial races where CEP determinations 
related to spoiled ballots pushed the FL candidate to outright 
victory. Pointing to widespread allegations of fraud, few inter- 
national observers recognized the elections as free and fair. 
The government^ yielding to this pressure, as well as that 
applied vehemently by the OPL, refused to recognize the 
results, but did little to resolve the matter quickly. 

While the election controversy festered, the country tum- 
bled into an unprecedented political crisis. Government 
became gridlocked, as relations between the executive and par- 
liamentary branches worsened and the Chamber of Deputies 
and the Senate, fraught with internal divisions, failed to reach 
consensus on most pressing legislative matters, including the 
passage of the government's budget and legislation related to 
economic reform. In June Prime Minister Smarth, unable to 
work effectively with the parliament and personally disgusted 
by the way political in-fighting had paralyzed the country — 
"power is a disease in this country," he stated — resigned, throw- 
ing the executive branch into a turmoil. Although many mem- 
bers of his cabinet followed him, leaving their posts, others 
remained in caretaker roles to manage ongoing programs. 
However, they were unable to initiate programs until a new gov- 
ernment was formed. As remaining ministers combined portfo- 
lios, spreading a thin executive branch even thinner, external 
assistance once again began to dry up, a significant develop- 
ment in a country whose budget is approximately two-thirds 
derived from foreign aid. Alarmingly, by October 1997, only 
US$1 billion of the US$2.1 billion pledged almost three years 
earlier had been disbursed. 

In the meantime, President Preval, standing somewhere 
between the FL and the OPL, appeared to be unable to find a 
way out of the electoral crisis. Indeed, many viewed him as 
remaining surprisingly aloof from it. After a delay of several 
months, he nominated Ericq Pierre, an agronomist and Haiti's 
representative to the Inter-American Development Bank 



421 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

(IDB), as his next prime minister. Pierre failed to win confir- 
mation, however, because many parliamentarians were uncom- 
fortable with his links to an organization viewed as promoting 
Haiti's controversial economic policies. In late 1997, Preval 
sent his second nomination, Herve Denis, to the legislative 
body for confirmation. Denis, an economist and playwright 
with close ties to Aristide, was denied the post as the OPL ral- 
lied against him. 

In July 1998, Preval sent his third nomination, Jacques 
Edouard Alexis, an educator and minister of national educa- 
tion, youth, and sports in the Smarth cabinet, to parliament. 
Initially, with strong national and international pressure build- 
ing for the confirmation of Alexis as a pivotal first step toward 
resolution of the increasingly debilitating political crisis, it 
appeared that Haiti would finally have a new prime minister. 
Once in office, Alexis and his government would face not only 
the task of forging the government's role in rebuilding the 
nation, but also the challenge of organizing the municipal and 
parliamentary elections mandated by the end of 1998. Alexis 
was eventually confirmed by the severely divided parliament, 
but not until December 17, much too late to organize the elec- 
tions. Before the new prime minister completed the required 
next steps of the parliamentary ratification process — present- 
ing his general policy statement and his cabinet — Haiti's politi- 
cal crisis deepened even further. 

On January 12, 1999, President Preval, citing the 1995 elec- 
toral law that identified January 11 as the expiration date of the 
term of public officials elected in 1995, issued a presidential 
decree dismissing the entire Chamber of Deputies and Senate, 
with the exception of the nine senators who had been elected 
to six-year terms. On January 22, Preval issued another decree, 
converting the positions of elected mayors and communal sec- 
tion council members, whose terms also expired, into "interim 
executive agents" assigned to the Ministry of Interior. The Hai- 
tian chief executive's actions ushered the country into yet 
another period of governance by decree, albeit this time by a 
legitimately elected president and prime minister who had 
been confirmed personally, but whose government had not 
completed the confirmation process. Haiti's defunct lawmakers 
vehemently protested Preval's decision, citing constitutional 
irregularities and calling for the populace to rally to their 
cause. Ultimately, however, Haiti's Supreme Court failed to rule 
against the president's actions, and ordinary Haitians, "disillu- 



422 



Haiti: Government and Politics 



sioned with their dysfunctional democracy," failed to respond 
to the parliamentarians' call. 

Unbalanced Power: January-December 1999 

Following what Preval's critics labeled a "political coup 
d'etat," Haiti entered into a period characterized by protracted, 
tedious, and often byzantine political negotiations, and by 
spasms of demonstrations and politically related unrest. The 
next twelve months were also characterized by widespread 
speculation of veiled political intrigue, particularly as it related 
to the involvement of former President Aristide and his parti- 
sans, and uncertain progress toward the resolution of the polit- 
ical deadlock that had all but derailed the country's mean- 
dering march toward democratic governance. 

Shortly after the president's dismissal of parliament, six 
political parties, including the OPL, formed the Coalition to 
Defend Democracy (L'Espace de Concertation pour la Sauveg- 
arde de la Democratic) and opened negotiations with the exec- 
utive branch to resolve the crisis. In late February, the OPL 
withdrew from the coalition, just prior to the murder of still-sit- 
ting Senator Yvon Toussaint, a member of the party. On March 
6, the remaining five members of the coalition signed an 
accord with the executive to resolve the crisis. The agreement 
mandated the quick creation of a CEP to begin organizing the 
overdue municipal and parliamentary elections. On March 16, 
Preval named by decree a nine-member CEP that included 
three members chosen by the coalition. Reaction to Preval's 
actions varied. The coalition members and the FL welcomed 
the formation of the CEP. The OPL and several conservative 
political organizations reacted coolly, noting that while the 
members appointed to the body were individuals of integrity, 
the body itself had not been formed in consultation with parlia- 
ment, as required by law. Next, on March 24 Preval named a 
government. Led by Prime Minister Alexis, the cabinet of min- 
isters, sworn in on March 26, was viewed by the government's 
critics as composed principally of supporters of President 
Preval and former President Aristide. 

Before the CEP could move toward elections, it was obli- 
gated to resolve the still-festering controversy surrounding the 
outcome of two Senate seats contested in April 1997 and 
claimed by the FL. On June 11, the CEP effectively annulled 
the results of those elections by announcing that the upcoming 
Senate race would include the two contested seats. It then set 



423 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

the date for the first round of municipal and parliamentary 
elections as November 28. Although a number of political orga- 
nizations, notably the OPL, refused to commit to the elections, 
the FL quickly announced that it would participate. The task 
facing the nascent electoral body was enormous. In addition to 
the need to obtain the support and participation of the Haitian 
people, it had to obtain funding and then oversee such com- 
plex tasks as voter and candidate registration and the creation 
of the election's administrative infrastructure, including the 
appointment of officials to administer the decentralized pro- 
cess. 

In view of the enormity of these tasks, few were surprised 
when the election date was changed to December 19 and then 
to March 19, 2000. As the dates for municipal and parliamen- 
tary elections edged into the new century, however, another 
issue emerged: whether these elections would ultimately be 
held separate from the end-of-2000 election for the person who 
would succeed President Preval on February 7, 2001. Delays in 
progress toward bifurcated municipal/legislative and presiden- 
tial elections were widely viewed as playing into the hands of 
the FL, whose leader had already announced his candidacy for 
the presidency. In spite of widespread speculation that the pop- 
ularity of President Aristide, who had left the priesthood, mar- 
ried, and had a family, had slipped somewhat from its 1990 
levels, political observers in Port-au-Prince still viewed his elec- 
toral coattails as long enough to assure an FL municipal and 
parliamentary sweep in a combined, general election. At issue, 
also, was that of the level of voter turnout. Having declined to 5 
percent in April 1997, election officials, civil society leaders, 
and politicians faced the need to identify effective strategies to 
return voter participation to the levels experienced a decade 
earlier. 

As the country crept toward either one or two elections in 
2000, other issues continued to weigh upon those of politics 
and governance. The ability of Haiti's National Police force to 
remain independent from partisan politics was tested repeat- 
edly as various political factions called upon the force to sup- 
port their position and cause. Although informed observers 
remained cautiously optimistic that the police, under the lead- 
ership of Director General Pierre Denize, were maintaining 
their autonomy, they also acknowledged the fragility of this sta- 
tus, particularly in view of increased corruption within the 
force, mostly linked to Haiti's increased role as a conduit for 



424 



Haiti: Government and Politics 



international cocaine trafficking, and the late 1999 resigna- 
tion, following months of pressure from FL partisans, of Robert 
Manuel, secretary of state for public security and close ally of 
President Preval. The severe and continuing lack of progress in 
judicial reform also continued to plague the PNH's ability to 
conduct its mission. An additional challenge facing the PNH 
was that of providing security for upcoming elections. Under- 
manned, thinly spread, and confronting an increasingly armed 
society, the spectre of isolated or general election-related vio- 
lence — and the PNH's ability to face it — loomed as a large 
question mark on the horizon. 

Concurrently, as Haiti continued to strain under the enor- 
mity of the tasks before it, international presence continued to 
taper off. In August 1999, Washington announced the early 
2000 withdrawal of the United States Support Group, a 500-sol- 
dier training mission remnant of the 20,000 strong MNF force 
sent to Haiti in 1994. In December the United Nations 
announced a final extension of its 280-member Civilian Police 
Mission in Haiti and the eighty-member International Civilian 
Mission to March 2000. A new, smaller, and entirely civilian UN 
umbrella mission with a year-long mandate to cover civilian 
police, human rights, and judicial reform, functioning in tan- 
dem with the UN development mission and under the auspices 
of the UN General Assembly, however, would follow. In all, 
Haiti's political landscape at the dawn of the new century could 
best be described as "fluid and fragile." 

Toward Municipal, Parliamentary, and Presidential Elections 

As debilitating as the political crisis that prevailed in Haiti 
following the April 1997 elections was, it can be viewed as an 
indicator of considerable progress toward the reform of Haiti's 
system of government and politics, particularly in the use — or 
lack thereof — of power or force to resolve a political crisis. 
Indeed, the absence of the army as the traditional means to 
resolve political problems has given birth in Haiti to the phe- 
nomenon of political gridlock. Unfortunately, however, the 
ability of Haiti's political leaders to dialogue and use political 
compromise as a non-violent, democratic means to resolve dis- 
putes remains underdeveloped. Nevertheless, the fact that dis- 
putes were confronted, if not resolved, by debate and political 
maneuvering, not by violence or weapons, is a positive change 
in Haiti's political culture. 



425 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Less clear during the crisis has been irreversible progress in 
the evolution of Haiti's political culture from one based on an 
all-powerful president to one based on principles of democ- 
racy, the balance of power, and stable political institutions. The 
dismissal of parliament in early 1999, the assignment of local 
elected officials to the Ministry of Interior, and the renewal of 
presidential rule by decree are all troublesome indicators in 
the country's struggle to divest itself of the dominant role 
played by the person who occupies the Presidential Palace. 

Given these mixed signals, the future of Haiti's nascent and 
fragile democracy as it moves toward the next round of elec- 
tions is far from guaranteed. Thirteen years after the resound- 
ing approval by the populace of a new constitution, many of its 
envisaged institutions of decentralized and responsive govern- 
ment are not in place. The elections instrumental to achieving 
them are still uncertain exercises, involving increasing contro- 
versy and decreasing voter participation. In addition, those 
elections are still subject to apparent manipulation and post- 
ponement, hindering the implementation of important elec- 
tion calendars that correspond with the duration of terms in 
office. 

Perhaps the most problematic aspect of Haiti's quest for 
political reform and democratization is what former Prime 
Minister Smarth referred to as the "disease of power" that is 
deeply rooted in the country's political culture. Haiti's struggle 
to systematize free and fair elections is an example of the debil- 
itating effects of that disease. Before this disease can be cured, 
the country must achieve the emplacement of a permanent 
electoral council (Conseil Electoral Permanent) that can con- 
duct elections according to schedule and objectively. Also, as 
Haiti's political leaders maneuver to ensure their advantage, 
they must find effective and efficient means of reaching work- 
able solutions of compromise with their political opponents. 
The disease of power appears to manifest itself in the continu- 
ing tendency among many Haitians to seek solutions in the 
form of a charismatic leader rather than from a political pro- 
cess that builds strong institutions and seeks progress through 
negotiation, compromise, and consensus. 

As Haiti struggles toward the full implementation of the 
reformed government and politics sought by most citizens after 
1986, many obstacles remain in its path. An examination of the 
country's constitutional framework provides some understand- 



426 



Haiti: Government and Politics 



ing of the reforms sought by many Haitians, but that have 
proven extremely elusive. 

Constitutional Framework 

Haitian heads of state, often drafting and abolishing the 
nation's constitutions at will, have treated the documents as 
their own personal charters. The 1987 constitution, although 
drafted by an independent commission and ratified by referen- 
dum, initially suffered the same treatment. Repeatedly, govern- 
ments that held power in Haiti between 1986 and 1994 either 
ignored constitutional provisions, applied them selectively, or 
suspended them altogether. Only following the restoration of 
legitimate government in late 1994 was the constitution fully 
reinstated. 

The 1987 constitution is a modern, progressive document. It 
guarantees a series of basic rights to the citizenry. It declares 
the intent to establish and maintain democracy in Haiti and 
includes ideological pluralism, electoral competition, and the 
separation of powers. Mindful of the perfidious manipulation 
of constitutions by previous governments, the Haitian jurists 
who crafted the 1987 constitution carefully prescribed a com- 
plex process that requires a two-thirds majority approval of 
amendments by two consecutive sessions of the National 
Assembly (Assemblee Nationale) prior to their enactment 
(Articles 282-1 to 284-1). The articles also ban a sitting presi- 
dent from initiating and enacting amendments during his term 
of office (Article 284-2) and eliminate the practice of amend- 
ment by popular referendum (Article 284-3) . 

Key provisions of the exacting document, which contains 
298 articles, have begun to reshape the governmental system 
and political tradition bequeathed to Haiti by previous genera- 
tions of leaders. In particular, the reduction of the president's 
constitutional powers, the decentralization of governmental 
authority, and the creation of elected councils for local govern- 
ment have initiated processes of profound change. The consti- 
tution establishes the segregation of police and army functions, 
a point that has become somewhat moot given the 1994—95 dis- 
mantling of the Armed Forces of Haiti, but a key provision at 
the time of ratification. The constitution also establishes an 
independent judiciary. An extremely popular provision of the 
1987 document barred from public office for ten years individ- 
uals who had served as "architects" of the Duvalierist dictator- 
ship, enriched themselves from public funds, inflicted torture 



427 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

on political prisoners, or committed political assassinations 
(Article 291). The constitution abolishes the death penalty and 
focuses on the protection of civil rights through detailed 
restrictions on the arrest and detainment of citizens. It calls for 
the establishment of a career civil service based on merit and 
for job security, and it recognizes both Creole and French as 
official languages. 

The constitution established a complex system of govern- 
ment based upon three major independent branches of gov- 
ernment: legislative, executive, and judicial. Legislative powers 
are vested in two houses, the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Senate. Deputies and senators are elected by direct suffrage. 
Eighty-three deputies are elected to represent electoral dis- 
tricts, and twenty-seven senators represent Haiti's nine geo- 
graphic departments. In the executive branch, the president of 
the republic serves as head of state. A prime minister, chosen 
by the president from the majority party in the legislature, 
heads the government. Other components of the executive 
branch include cabinet ministers and secretaries of state. The 
judiciary consists of a Supreme Court (the Court of Cassation), 
courts of appeal, and other lower courts. The president 
appoints judges on the basis of nominations made by various 
elected bodies, including departmental and communal assem- 
blies. 

The constitution also provides for several special institutions 
and autonomous governmental offices that include the Perma- 
nent Electoral Council (Conseil Electoral Permanent), the 
Superior Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes, the 
Conciliation Commission (a body responsible for settling dis- 
putes between the executive and legislative branches and 
between the two houses of the legislature), the Office of Citi- 
zen Protection (an ombudsman organization established to 
protect citizens against abuse by the government) , the Univer- 
sity of Haiti, the Haitian Academy (responsible for standardiz- 
ing the Creole language), and the National Institute of 
Agrarian Reform. The constitution contains a number of provi- 
sions intended to guide the country during transitions between 
elected governments. These provisions include granting the 
Permanent Electoral Council sufficient autonomy to hold local 
and national elections, free of outside interference. 

The application of constitutional provisions has occasionally 
been the focus of vigorous political debate, both within the 
National Assembly and between the legislative and executive 



428 



Presidential Palace with statue of the Unknown Maroon in foreground, 

Port-au-Prince 

Courtesy United States Agency for International Development 

branches. Particularly protracted and animated has been the 
debate surrounding the creation and functioning of the Provi- 
sional Electoral Council (Article 289) and its transition to a 
Permanent Electoral Council (Articles 191-199), mandated to 
take place following the inauguration of the first democrati- 
cally elected president. Although that event occurred in Febru- 
ary 1991, as of late 1999, the Permanent Electoral Council was 
still not in place. 

Governmental System 

At the turn of the century, the complex system of govern- 
ment created by the 1987 constitution was still not completely 
in place, although progress had been made since the 1994 
ouster of de facto military rule by way of parliamentary and 
municipal elections in 1995, the presidential election of 1995, 
and programs for judicial reform. The disputed election of 
April 1997, the subsequent resignation of the prime minister, 
the protracted failure of the executive and legislative branches 
to agree on his replacement, and the resultant dismissal of par- 
liament and postponement of parliamentary and municipal 
elections have significantly stalled the completion of the gov- 



429 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

ernmental system and the initiation of a regular electoral cal- 
endar based upon the duration of the terms of office of elected 
officials. Progress toward the emplacement of a reformed judi- 
ciary capable of functioning as an independent branch of gov- 
ernment has likewise been stalled, in part because of delays in 
creating the government bodies responsible for nominating 
judges. 

Governmental Institutions 

Haiti's complicated system of government is premised on the 
need to decentralize governmental functions through the com- 
position of a series of executive and legislative bodies that cor- 
respond to the country's geopolitical units. Those units are 
departements, of which there are nine; communes (municipali- 
ties), of which there are 133, approximating United States 
counties; and sections communales (communal sections), of 
which there are 565, corresponding roughly to United States 
towns or districts. 

Voters in each of the 565 communal sections elect to four- 
year terms a three-member Communal Section Administrative 
Council and a seven- to twenty-five-member Communal Section 
Assembly. Communal section assemblies serve a parliamentary 
function; they are charged with advising and assisting the com- 
munal section administrative councils, which are responsible 
for administering the affairs of the communal section and, 
hence, serve as the executive branch of local government. 
Communal section assemblies also nominate justices of the 
peace and appoint a representative to the Municipal Assembly, 
which is the next legislative level of government (see table 26, 
Appendix) . 

Each of Haiti's 133 municipalities has both a Municipal 
Assembly and a Municipal Council. The assemblies are com- 
posed of one member per communal section, plus a town dele- 
gation whose members are elected to four-year terms. 
Municipal assemblies serve an essentially parliamentary func- 
tion, overseeing the three-member Municipal Council, which is 
elected to a four-year term and functions in an executive role. 
The president of the Municipal Council serves as mayor. 

The legislative and executive bodies in each of Haiti's nine 
departments are the Departmental Assembly and the Depart- 
mental Council, respectively. The assembly is constituted first, 
comprising one member from each Municipal Assembly within 
the department. The Departmental Assembly in turn elects 



430 



Haiti: Government and Politics 



three people to serve four-year terms on a Departmental Coun- 
cil. Members of the council do not have to be chosen from 
among assembly members. In addition to its role in electing 
members to the council, the Departmental Assembly nomi- 
nates candidates for the CEP and judges for the courts of 
appeal and the courts of first instance. It also selects a represen- 
tative to serve on the Interdepartmental Council. The nine 
members of the Interdepartmental Council become members 
of the Council of Ministers, which also includes the prime min- 
ister and his cabinet of ministers. Representatives of the depart- 
mental assemblies who become members of the Council of 
Ministers carry ministerial rank and voting rights on issues of 
decentralization and development. 

The executive branch is headed by a president elected by 
popular vote to a five-year, non-renewable term. The president 
names a prime minister, who, once confirmed by the National 
Assembly, or parliament, heads the government, selecting a 
council of ministers or cabinet and appointing their secretaries 
of state. The cabinet of Prime Minister Jacques Edouard Alexis 
in December 1999 was composed of fifteen ministers (see table 
27, Appendix). The president presides over the Council of 
Ministers, which must be composed of no fewer than ten mem- 
bers. He or she also appoints representatives to coordinate and 
control public service functions, excluding public safety, in 
each department. 

The legislative branch is headed by the National Assembly 
composed of a Senate (Senat) and a Chamber of Deputies 
(Chambre de Deputes). The three senators of each depart- 
ment are elected to staggered six-year terms, with one-third of 
the Senate coming up for election every two years. The eighty- 
three deputies are elected from smaller electoral districts 
determined by population distribution. Large urban areas can 
be represented by no more than three deputies. 

Haiti derived the formal aspects of its legal system from 
Roman law, the Napoleonic Code, and the French system of 
civil law. Like the executive and legislative branches of govern- 
ment, the judiciary is also decentralized, based on an ascend- 
ing order of courts, beginning at the municipal level with the 
Court of the Justice of the Peace and rising to the Court of Cas- 
sation (Supreme Court) . Justice of the peace courts are located 
in each of Haiti's municipalities. Each court has at least one 
judge and other officials. To be nominated as a justice of the 
peace, an individual must have a law degree, be at least twenty- 



431 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

five years old, be in good legal standing, and have completed a 
probationary period of at least one year. Justices of the peace 
hear civil law cases, including those that involve limited sums of 
money, and landlord and tenant disputes. Their jurisdiction in 
criminal matters extends only to cases where the penalty does 
not exceed six months in jail. 

Courts of first instance are either civil or criminal tribunals 
located in major cities. Each court has one judge and various 
other officers. The courts hear civil cases and all criminal cases, 
including those sent by the inspector general of the Haitian 
National Police. For nomination to this court, an individual is 
required to have practiced law for at least two years. Sitting 
above the courts of first instance are courts of appeals, of which 
there are four, located in Port-au-Prince, Les Caves, Gonaives, 
and Cap-Haitien. The appeals court in the capital has a presi- 
dent and five judges; those in the other cities have a president 
and four judges. These courts hear both civil and criminal 
cases, including all appeals from courts of first instance and 
criminal appeals from justice of the peace courts. For appoint- 
ment to a Court of Appeals, judges must have been on the 
bench of courts of first instance for at least three years. 

Haiti's highest court, the Court of Cassation, consists of a 
president, a vice president, and ten judges. It generally func- 
tions in two chambers with five judges each, but functions as a 
whole when hearing appeals and pleas concerning the uncon- 
stitutionality of laws and decrees. Judges of the Court of Cassa- 
tion must be at least thirty years old and must have held the 
position of judge or public attorney for at least seven years. 

In addition to these courts, there are also a Superior Court 
of Auditors and Administrative Disputes and special courts that 
oversee matters concerning property rights, juveniles, and 
labor conflicts. The Senate may constitute itself into a High 
Court of Justice to preside over crimes of state treason, embez- 
zlement, or abuse of power involving high state officials in the 
discharge of their duties. In 1996 a School of the Magistrature 
opened in Port-au-Prince to provide judicial training for cur- 
rent and new judges. 

Functions of Government 

Historically, most Haitians have viewed government func- 
tionaries as beneficiaries of patronage and the spoils system 
rather than as public servants. Governments traditionally sup- 
ported and maintained the established political order and 



432 



Haiti: Government and Politics 



extracted wealth from the population. Citizens therefore 
expected little or nothing from the state. Rather, reflected by 
the fact that the Creole word for state — leta — also means 
"bully," they saw government as an entity that confiscated, 
taxed, prohibited, or imprisoned. The notion of government 
working in partnership with its people, respecting a social con- 
tract to help improve all citizens' standing within the society, 
has been an abstraction. 

The Haitian government also traditionally served as a source 
of jobs. Payrolls of state ministries and state enterprises were 
inflated by leaders with cronies and family members, some of 
whom, the infamous zonbi (zombie) employees, appeared only 
to collect their salaries. Political favoritism and bribery plagued 
the system. Social scientists have used terms such as kleptocracy, 
predatory state, government-by-franchise, and auto colonization to 
describe the Haitian system of taxation, patronage, corruption, 
public monopolies, and private monopolies protected by the 
state. 

The Haitian state developed a relatively elaborate apparatus 
for taxing average citizens, but it provided them few public ser- 
vices. As a result, Haitians have relied heavily on foreign-assis- 
tance agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) , and 
remittances from abroad to receive or purchase services pro- 
vided by most other governments. Education, for example, has 
been the Haitian government's most elaborate public-service 
sector, but the majority of children attend costly private 
schools. The state's abdication of its role as service provider 
created a situation in which foreign-assistance agencies and the 
NGOs they support served as a kind of shadow government. 

Government institutions in Port-au-Prince have provided the 
facade of public services through the Ministry of Public Health 
and Population; the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural 
Resources, and Rural Development; the Ministry of National 
Education, Youth, and Sports; and others. These ministries 
have had no representatives in most rural areas, however, and 
they have provided relatively few services even in Port-au- 
Prince. Government budgets for public services generally 
accounted for salaries, but they provided little or no support 
for program implementation. 

In addition to the armed forces, the main Haitian institution 
bringing in revenue has been the customs house. The state also 
extracted wealth through its control over certain essential ser- 
vices and through public and private monopoly ownership of 



433 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



key commodity-based enterprises. Since the restoration of 
elected government, the dismantling of the army, and subse- 
quent progress in the democratic political process, the state's 
image as predator and bully is changing. State monopolies and 
franchises have disappeared or are in the process of being 
restructured. The oppressive section chief system that epito- 
mized the state as bully no longer exists (see Aristide Presi- 
dency, February 7, 1991-September 30, 1991, ch. 6, and Role 
of the Army in Law Enforcement Prior to 1995, ch. 10) . 

The government's income tax agency (Departement 
General des Impots — DGI) has become the object of reform 
efforts and has been restructured as part of an overall effort to 
collect taxes equitably from all citizens (wealthy Haitians have 
generally paid little, if any, government taxes) . The govern- 
ment's relationship with other institutions in the society, partic- 
ularly NGOs, is in flux as public policies now advocate a lead 
role for government in the provision of citizen services. In this 
regard, some elected and public officials, recollecting the cozy 
relationship that existed between certain NGOs and the Hai- 
tian army, have also vocalized their desire to dismantle the 
"Republic of NGOs." 

Haitians held high expectations that government would 
quickly demonstrate an improved capacity to serve its citizens 
following the end of de facto military rule. The renewed flow 
of bilateral and multilateral funding following the 1994 inter- 
vention heightened those expectations. Thus far, however, 
stated policies and initial efforts to decentralize governmental 
structure and function have not been widely matched by a flow 
of government resources from Port-au-Prince, an improved 
capacity of public officials to collect and manage public reve- 
nues, or an improved standard of life for ordinary citizens. 
While mayors, other local officials, and citizens struggle to find 
resources to sponsor or support local development activities, 
they see an inept and struggling national government that con- 
tinues both to be the country's principal employer and to 
spend most of its resources on itself. Although government is 
no longer necessarily perceived as a repressive and extractive 
entity, many have taken to viewing it as a grand mangeur (big 
eater) that uses public resources to feed only itself. 

Urban Dominance, Rural Exclusion: Confronting Entrenched 
Patterns 

First-time visitors to the country are often told that Haiti is 



434 



Haiti: Government and Politics 



actually two distinct countries — the Republic of Haiti and the 
Republic of Port-au-Prince — that have little contact with each 
other. The sharp division between them and between the out- 
siders of rural Haiti and the city dwellers is reflected in the 
dominance of the capital city. National political institutions 
and decisions, steadfastly focused on Port-au-Prince, have been 
far removed from the lives of most Haitians. The political sys- 
tem affects all Haitians, but changes in government have had 
little direct impact on the lives of rural dwellers. Governments 
have concentrated themselves in the capital, allocating two- 
thirds or more of their revenues to be spent in a city that tradi- 
tionally has held fewer than 20 percent of Haiti's people. For- 
eign assistance has tended to exacerbate rural-urban 
differences because about 40 percent of all foreign aid has 
directly benefited Port-au-Prince. 

In contrast to the relative, albeit selective and uneven, devel- 
opment of Port-au-Prince, provincial cities and towns and rural 
hamlets have remained undeveloped, lacking such basic twenti- 
eth-century amenities as electricity, piped water, sanitation ser- 
vices, and adequate roads. They offer their inhabitants little 
more than primitive conditions, few opportunities, and a place 
from which to try to escape, an option taken by ever-increasing 
numbers seeking perceived greater opportunities in Port-au- 
Prince and farther afield. As a result of shifting populations, 
Haiti's rural and urban demographics have begun to change, 
Port-au-Prince and its environs have expanded significantly, in 
all possible directions, and in 1998 held approximately 2 mil- 
lion inhabitants (see Population, ch. 7). 

Following the demise of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986, 
decentralization became a catch phrase of those seeking 
greater public-sector attention to secondary cities, small towns, 
and villages, and a reversal of historical trends of government 
investment. In the succeeding years of military rule, decentrali- 
zation came principally in the form of opening regional ports 
that had been closed by the dictatorship and fallen into disre- 
pair. The port openings, which could have increased customs 
revenue and fueled local development, resulted instead in the 
generation of wealth for those linked to the contraband trade 
that flowed in and out of the reopened ports. Key public insti- 
tutions responsible for controlling trade and overseeing reve- 
nue collection, notably the customs bureau, port authority, and 
coast guard, were either corrupt, inept, or nonexistent. 



435 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

With the restoration of elected government and the subse- 
quent renewed process toward a decentralized governmental 
system prescribed by the constitution, renewed attention has 
been placed on entrenched patterns of urban dominance and 
rural exclusion, and on developing or strengthening govern- 
ment institutions. Debates over the allocation of scarce public 
resources and the priority use of foreign assistance amid des- 
perate and growing needs in both of Haiti's "republics" now are 
joined by parliamentarians who originate from long-neglected 
areas, and are fueled by pressure from local elected officials 
and the voters who elected them. Although this dynamic of 
governance is still at an early and uncertain phase of develop- 
ment, it represents a fundamental change from the traditional 
and unchallenged domination of the capital and its political 
class. 

As debates continue, progress toward developing or 
strengthening government capacity, in both Port-au-Prince and 
elsewhere, has been minimal. Revenue generation for 
enhanced public investment remains ineffective as contraband 
continues to flourish. State institutions charged with the 
responsibility for overseeing measures of effective decentraliza- 
tion remain weak and/or disproportionately focused on Port- 
au-Prince. The Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources, and 
Rural Development, for example, has more employees in the 
capital than elsewhere in the country. Port-au-Prince, with its 
increased growth and myriad of highly visible and urgent prob- 
lems brought on by a deteriorated infrastructure and ever- 
increasing overcrowding, continues to receive a disproportion- 
ate amount of public attention and investment. 

Still, the preeminence of the capital in setting Haiti's politi- 
cal agenda is being challenged by the emergence of a decen- 
tralized governmental system. Heightened attention among 
the country's elected leaders to issues of urban dominance and 
rural exclusion, brought on in large part by shifting patterns of 
political participation, suggests that a change in the uneven 
relationships between Haiti's two "republics" is beginning to 
take place. 

Political Dynamics 

The Haitian political system historically has displayed certain 
enduring features. In recent years, especially since late 1994, 
many of these features have begun to change. 



436 



Poster bidding farewell to Jean-Bertrand Aristide, following his 

1994 overthrow 
Courtesy Anne Greene 

Political Players and Patterns of Participation 

Involvement in Haitian politics traditionally has been the 
domain of the army and urban elites. Other members of the 
society, the demographically dominant urban poor and the 
rural masses, largely excluded from meaningful participation 
in the country's political life, have been the target of Haiti's 
political players, particularly when they could be mobilized to 
serve ulterior motives of political leaders. The Duvaliers were 
masterful at mobilizing the masses to serve their ends: trucking 
peasants to the capital so they could demonstrate their "sup- 
port" of the regime; creating festive events and holidays during 
which the poor could receive hand-outs from their munificent 
leader such as food, currency in the form of five-gourde notes 
thrown at them from passing cars, and T-shirts emblazoned 
with a likeness of the president. 

With the demise of the Duvaliers, Haiti's political outsiders 
struggled to gain meaningful participation in their country's 
political process. The clear parameters for the equal participa- 
tion in political life for all citizens established by the 1987 con- 
stitution facilitated a tidal wave of outside voter registration in 
1990 immediately after their man, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, 
declared his candidacy for the presidency. Haiti's political elites 



437 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

were forced to confront an unexpected and sobering reality 
when the populist priest came from nowhere to defeat 
resoundingly their candidate and expected victor, Marc Bazin, 
on the strength of the independent participation of voters 
whose views and participation previously had not counted. 
Indeed, many observers have attributed the subsequent sup- 
port of the military by Haiti's established political class at least 
in part to the fact that they could not accept a political scenario 
where their votes were equal to those of their maids and illiter- 
ate peasants. 

Since 1990 the inclusion in Haiti's political life of its former 
political outsiders has expanded to include their participation 
as candidates in local and national elections, and their ascen- 
sion to various elected posts. These trends have resulted in the 
emergence of a heretofore largely unknown dynamic in Hai- 
tian politics, that of increased accountability of elected officials 
to their constituents. Port-au-Prince continues to be the center 
of Haiti's political life, and political players based there loom 
large in determining the country's political dynamics. Never- 
theless, the ascension of outsiders to meaningful inclusion in 
the country's politics, combined with the disappearance of the 
army as a political player and the partial eclipse of the domi- 
nant power of urban political elites, has created an important 
and fundamental alteration of Haiti's political dynamics. 

Maintenance and Transfer of Power 

During the twenty-nine-year rule of the Duvaliers, Haiti 
resembled not a republic, but a dynastic monarchy, where a 
leader extended his term of office at will, ultimately to become 
"president-for-life," and power was transferred from father to 
son. The Duvalier achievement of hereditary succession was 
new to Haiti, but arbitrary term extensions and for-life presi- 
dencies were not. Duvalier's immediate predecessors all tried 
to extend their prescribed terms in office, and nine of his pre- 
decessors had designated themselves chiefs of state for life. In 
short, the primary goal of most Haitian leaders has been to 
maintain themselves in power for as long as possible. 

The governmental system prescribed by Haiti's 1987 consti- 
tution, although still incomplete in its implementation, was 
created in large part to constrain such presidential perfidy. The 
five-year, nonconsecutive term of the top executives is only one 
of a number of constraints aimed at ensuring regular and 
orderly transitions of power. When President Aristide opted 



438 



Haiti: Government and Politics 



not to attempt to extend his term in office by three years to 
make up for the time lost in exile, but rather stood down and 
transferred power peacefully to Rene Preval, he established a 
positive precedent for his successors. In a country, however, 
where a well-known proverb reminds all that "Laws are made of 
paper, bayonets are made of steel," it was the dismantling of the 
army, not the constitution by itself, that enabled such a pre- 
scribed transition to occur. Unless this now-obsolete proverb 
can find its way back into Haiti's political lexicon, the mainte- 
nance and extension of the personal power of a president, if 
now achieved, must take place by a combination of nonconsec- 
utive terms and a political proxy, and under the watchful eyes 
of a parliament that may not be prone to making such a 
maneuver easy. 

The Presidency and Political Culture 

Although hundreds of positions were open in the 1990 elec- 
tions, it was only one — the presidency — that seemed to matter. 
In 1994 the restoration to power of one person, President Aris- 
tide, overshadowed all other issues linked to Haiti's three-year, 
post-coup crisis. Underscored by this attention to one office or 
to one person was a deeply ingrained Haitian political reality: 
the focus has always been on the presidency, the crown jewel — 
some might say the only jewel — in Haitian politics. For genera- 
tions, the aspiration of Haitian political leaders has been to 
achieve the all-powerful position of the presidency. Haitian 
writers have often described in pathological terms the obses- 
sion of Haiti and its political leaders with the presidency. Prior 
to becoming president, Francois Duvalier wrote about the his- 
torical "mania for the presidency" as the disease of "presidenti- 
tis." State and nation merged in the person of the president, an 
often godlike figure with life-and-death power over the citi- 
zenry. Presidents rarely represented a coalition of interest 
groups; instead they usually headed a faction or political move- 
ment that seized control of the state by any means possible, 
with the support, or at least the tolerance, of the army. 

These perceptions, and the reality of weakly developed polit- 
ical institutions and separation of powers, have reflected the 
disproportionate power of the country's chief executive and 
the existence in Haiti of a political culture based on who would 
be the president. Political parties or movements organized 
around a charismatic or powerful leader who could ascend 
directly to the position. Legislative bodies and elections, which 



439 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

have existed for centuries in form if not in substance, have gen- 
erally done little except assist the chief of state in obtaining 
whatever he wished. 

More than a decade after 1986's pivotal event, which 
unleashed the country's pent-up desire to modernize its gov- 
ernment and politics, there remains the fundamental chal- 
lenge to move from a political culture based on the presidency 
to one based on democracy. As Haiti's political institutions have 
strengthened themselves, governmental structure and function 
have begun to decentralize and devolve certain responsibilities 
from Port-au-Prince. As a result, separation of powers has 
gained real meaning, and the supremacy of the presidency has 
begun to decline. President Preval has endured much criti- 
cism — from both within and beyond Haiti — as a weak presi- 
dent. Although few would argue that he lacks the charisma of 
his predecessor, it is also true that his is the first administration 
to confront fully the realities of the constitutionally weakened 
presidency. As Haiti moves toward the election of Preval's suc- 
cessor, the weakened presidency may be challenged by the 
return of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. 

Perceptions of Democracy 

After the fall of Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986, talk of democ- 
racy was everywhere in Haiti. Average Haitians expected that 
life would improve dramatically with the muzzle of dictatorship 
gone and democracy at their doorstep. For most Haitians, how- 
ever, democracy was an abstract concept. They had not experi- 
enced anything close to real democracy, having been excluded 
from a voice in the political process. The political role models 
for most Haitians emerged during the Duvalier era. For many, 
notions of democracy meant only a change in the factions and 
the personalities of the people in power. For others, democracy 
meant their finally being able to take their turn at the spoils sys- 
tem. Some people believed that democracy meant an opportu- 
nity to do what one pleased — liberty without responsibility. 
Many felt that a democracy should provide everyone with jobs, 
food, and material goods. 

Between 1986 and 1991, Haitians had an opportunity to 
become better acquainted with the concept of democracy 
through their participation in a constitutional referendum and 
in election processes, and through their involvement in a spec- 
trum of political organizations, whose activities ranged from 
neighborhood committees to political parties. They also had an 



440 



Haiti: Government and Politics 



opportunity to experience democracy as a slow and difficult 
process, especially in a context such as Haiti's, and not as a sud- 
den elixir to eliminate problems. Between 1991 and 1994, 
when Haitians suffered painful setbacks to the fitful process of 
political change they had been able to put in motion, their 
commitment to what remained largely an abstraction was pro- 
foundly tested. Regardless of varying perceptions of what 
democracy was or would be, Haiti's people stood firm behind 
their commitment to it. 

Since the 1994 restoration of democratic governance, Haiti's 
experience with the democratic process has deepened, but the 
results have disappointed many. Although voters have shown 
thus far a penchant for denying new candidates or those stand- 
ing for re-election who appear susceptible to the deeply 
ingrained political role models of the past, fewer and fewer are 
voting; participation in elections has declined precipitously 
with each election. Voter disenchantment with the results of 
those exercises is a key factor contributing to the growing apa- 
thy. In spite of their participation in the process, few Haitians 
have seen improvement in their economic conditions. Indeed, 
most have seen their quality of life worsen as they witness, 
instead, titanic political struggles among factions in parliament 
and between the executive and legislative branches. As long as 
Haiti's democratic process fails to produce political results that 
can bring tangible improvements in overall and individual well- 
being to Haiti's citizens, it will remain fragile, nascent, and sus- 
ceptible to setbacks. 

The Mass Media and the Spread of Information 

The mass media in Haiti expanded rapidly between the 
1950s and the 1990s, with radio leading the way. The transistor 
radio brought news and information to previously isolated 
rural areas. Joining state-owned radio during the Duvalier years 
were stations established by private entrepreneurs and by Prot- 
estant missionaries and the Roman Catholic Church. The lat- 
ter's station, Radio Soleil, which emphasized educational 
broadcasts, played an important role in the fall of Jean-Claude 
Duvalier in 1986. Following that event, the approximately two 
dozen radio stations broadcasting in Haiti, at least half of which 
operated from Port-au-Prince, became the principal source of 
information on breaking political developments through their 
use of mobile units equipped for direct broadcast. Stations also 
became the venue used by political leaders and activists to issue 



441 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

declarations and demands. In 1996 Haiti had more than sixty 
radio stations, including twenty-nine in the Port-au-Prince area. 

Under 1991-94 de facto military rule, several radio stations 
were ransacked, and outspoken announcers were kidnapped 
and/or killed. Fearing the consequences of political reporting, 
stations undertook a mode of self-censorship. Objective reports 
on the political crisis reached Haiti via shortwave Voice of 
America (VOA) broadcasts, from stations broadcasting in Cre- 
ole from the Dominican Republic, and, at one point, from 
United States military aircraft equipped with radio transmit- 
ters. Since late 1994, Haiti's radio stations have resumed their 
pre-coup role as outlets for news, political commentary, decla- 
rations, and discussions. Their number has expanded consider- 
ably with the advent of low-power, community-based radio 
stations. 

In 1996 Haiti's print media were dominated by two daily 
newspapers published in Port-au-Prince with an estimated com- 
bined circulation of 29,000, four weekly newspapers including 
three edited in New York and Miami and sold in Haiti, and a 
variety of monthly publications. The number of publications 
varies over time, with some produced irregularly. Circulation 
outside Port-au-Prince is limited. Unlike radio, which broad- 
casts principally in Creole, Haiti's print media are primarily in 
French. In 1996 Haiti had six publishing houses and several 
dozen bookstores. 

In 1996 some twenty television stations, including a cable 
network, were broadcasting in Haiti. With the advent of small, 
independent stations in Haiti's secondary cities, broadcasts are 
much more available than before outside of Port-au-Prince. 
Those with means own satellite dishes that pick up television 
signals from abroad. During de facto military rule, interna- 
tional broadcasts picked up by these dishes played a major role 
in disseminating information. Telephones, faxes, and E-mail 
also played a key role in diffusing information, both during de 
facto military rule and after it. Their utility, however, is circum- 
scribed by the irregularity and low quality of Haiti's telephone 
service, and the limited number of available telephone lines. In 
1996 President Preval disbanded the government's Ministry of 
Propaganda and Information. Taking its place have been pub- 
lic relations offices and information officer positions in key 
government ministries and departments. 

Technology and modern communications notwithstanding, 
zen, that is, information and rumors passed from one person to 



442 



Haiti: Government and Politics 



the next, continues to play a key role in the reporting and dis- 
semination of news in Haiti. News of incidents occurring in far 
reaches of the country is often spread through zen more rapidly 
than by electronic or print media, which, given their own 
resource limitations, depend to a certain extent on zen net- 
works as their sources. If not carefully checked for accuracy, 
however, reporting based on zen can result in the spread of 
incomplete or distorted information. 

Creole has become Haiti's principal language of communi- 
cation in radio and television, and among officials in public 
positions and civil society organizations. Many candidates 
elected to office since 1995 speak only Creole. In recent years, 
ever since its orthography became standardized, written Creole 
has been used much more frequently. It has become the lan- 
guage of preference in adult literacy classes and has been more 
thoroughly incorporated into the formal education system. 
The production of materials written in Creole also has 
expanded tremendously since the 1980s. French, however, 
remains widely represented in the press, commercials, adver- 
tisements, street names, and the cultural scene. 

Interest Groups 

Since the 1986 demise of the Duvalier dictatorship, a variety 
of such interest groups as political parties, political activist 
organizations, private-sector and professional associations, and 
civil society organizations, including NGOs, regional peasant 
movements, and community groups, have become a greater 
part of the Haitian political landscape. The groups function 
with varying degrees of freedom, visibility, and effectiveness. 
Since late 1994, their ability to function freely, in accordance 
with the law, has been guaranteed. 

Political Parties 

Political parties in Haiti have existed in name since the nine- 
teenth century, but have not exerted independent influence 
on the political system. As a rule, they have been dominated by 
an elite, self-described political class based in the Republic of 
Port-au-Prince. Parties have been most active during presiden- 
tial election campaigns, when they have organized under the 
banner of specific individuals serving as their campaign vehi- 
cles. Parties have tended to be institutionalized around their 
founder/leader, to thrive or perish according to that individ- 



443 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



ual's political status. This historical tendency has changed 
slightly in recent years, particularly as parties have begun to try 
to build national constituencies and to compete for lesser 
offices. 

In the 1870s and 1880s, the emergence of the Liberal Party 
(Parti Liberal — PL) and the National Party (Parti National — 
PN) reflected the polarization between black and mulatto 
elites. In the wake of the United States occupation (1915-34), 
nationalist parties organized around the issue of resistance to 
foreign occupation. During the presidential campaign of 1946, 
there were many candidates and parties, including the Popular 
Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste Populaire — PSP) , Worker Peas- 
ant Movement (Mouvement Ouvrier Paysan — MOP), Commu- 
nist Party of Haiti (Parti Communiste d'Haiti — PCH), and a 
federation of groups known as the Haitian Revolutionary Front 
(Front Revolutionnaire Haitien — FRH) . 

The presidential campaign of 1956-57 included candidates 
who ran under the banners of the National Agricultural Indus- 
trial Party (Parti Agricole et Industriel National — PAIN) , the 
MOP, the PN, and the National Unity Party (Parti Unite 
National — PUN), which was led by Francois Duvalier. Both 
Duvalier governments banned, or severely restricted, opposi- 
tion political parties. As a result, about a dozen opposition par- 
ties operated in exile, including the established PAIN and 
MOP, and such newcomers as the National Political Assembly 
of Democrats (Rassemblement Democratique National Poli- 
tique — RDNP) formed by Leslie Manigat in Venezuela, the 
Unified Haitian Communist Party (Parti Unifie des Commu- 
nistes Haitiens — PUCH) based in France, and the National 
Progressive Revolutionary Haitian Party (Parti National Pro- 
gressiste Revolutionnaire Haitien — Panpra) headed by France- 
based Serge Gilles. 

With the ouster of the Duvalier dictatorship, exiled parties 
shifted their activities to Haiti, often coinciding with the "tri- 
umphal" return home of their leaders. During the presidential 
campaign of 1987, more than 100 individuals announced their 
candidacy. As of August 1987, twenty-one political parties had 
registered. None of these parties, however, developed a nation- 
wide organization, although four of them stood out from the 
rest prior to the violence that sabotaged the election: the Chris- 
tian Democrat Party of Haiti (Parti Democrate Chretien 
d'Haiti — PDCH), led by Sylvio Claude; the Movement for the 
Installation of Democracy in Haiti (Mouvement pour l'lnstau- 



444 



Haiti: Government and Politics 



ration de la Democratic en Haiti — MIDH), led by Marc Bazin; 
PAIN, led by its founder's son, Louis Dejoie II; and the 
National Cooperative Front (Front National de Concertation — 
FNC), represented by Gerard Gourgue. The FNC, a loose fed- 
eration of parties, community groups, and trade unions that 
had previously joined forces as the Group of 57, had the broad- 
est and most diverse following. It included two well-structured 
parties with some national membership — the National Com- 
mittee of the Congress of Democratic Movements (Comite 
National du Congres des Mouvements Democratiques — Cona- 
com) and Panpra. 

By the 1990 elections, the FNC had expanded its coalition to 
include the Unified Democratic Committee (KID, based on the 
Creole name) and its charismatic leader Evans Paul, altered its 
name to the National Front for Change and Democracy (Front 
National pour le Changement et la Democratic — FNCD), and 
become affiliated with Jean-Berti and Aristide 's amorphous Lav- 
alas movement when it persuaded him to be its standard- 
bearer. Although twelve other parties fielded presidential aspir- 
ants and slates of candidates for other posts, Marc Bazin of the 
MIDH was considered the chief rival to Aristide. Bazin, how- 
ever, drowned in Lavalas's cleansing flood as Aristide swept to 
office. His political ally and KID leader, Paul, captured what 
was perhaps the elections' second largest prize: Port-au-Prince 
City Hall. The victors of other parliamentary, municipal, and 
local offices were divided among the FNCD, MIDH, and other 
parties. 

Most political party activities shifted out of Haiti following 
the 1991 coup d'etat. However, three developments in Haiti 
affected the country's political party dynamics. First, in 1991 
Sylvio Claude was assassinated, effectively ending the PDCH. 
Second, in 1992 MIDH leader Bazin accepted an appointment 
as the military government's prime minister, inflicting the 
same fundamental damage to his future and that of his party as 
Leslie Manigat inflicted on himself and his RDNP when he 
accepted the presidency offered by the military in rigged elec- 
tions in 1988. Third, in 1993 supporters of Aristide in Haiti 
announced the formation of the Lavalas Political Organization 
(OPL), headed by political scientist Gerard Pierre-Charles, 
peasant movement leader Chavannes Jean-Bap tiste, and agron- 
omist Yrvelt Chery. 

Following the return of Aristide, the OPL became the lead- 
ing institution of the Lavalas movement, as Aristide broke with 



445 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Countn Studies 

the FNCD and his ally, Evans Paul. In the 1995 parliamentary 
and municipal elections, the FNCD presented itself as the main 
opposition to the Lavalas Political Platform, a coalition that 
pulled together the OPL, MOP, and two newer parties, the 
Open Gate Party (Pati Louvri Barye — PLB), which had its 
strongest following in the North Department, and the Resis- 
tance Committee of Grand' Anse (KOREGA, based on the Cre- 
ole name), a Lavalas group based principally in the Grand' 
Anse and South departments. Most other marginal political 
parties boycotted the elections, although some individuals affil- 
iated with them presented their candidacies. Their absence was 
not felt; voters endorsed the PPL or independent candidates 
linked with Lavalas by large margins of victory in most races. 
Without the Lavalas endorsement, Evans Paul failed to gain re- 
election as mayor of Port-au-Prince, and the FNCD was almost 
shut out. 

Of the fourteen candidates who ran in the December 1995 
presidential election, four were independents; nine were affili- 
ated with political parties. The landslide winner, Rene Preval. 
ran simply as Lavalas. As noted elsewhere, since those elections 
the Lavalas movement has splintered in two directions: toward 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide's Lavalas Family, created in 1997, and 
toward the OPL, which altered its name to the Organization of 
Struggling People to symbolize its break from Aristide's Lava- 
las. The OPL is headed by Gerard Pierre-Charles. The other 
parties that formed the 1995 PPL coalition — MOP, PLB, 
KOREGA — remain active, although they are currently over- 
shadowed by the FL-OPL division. The marginal parties, now 
including the FNCD and sometimes lumped together as "the 
opposition," still exist, but they are characterized by small fol- 
lowings. They are plagued by their inability to distinguish 
themselves from political pasts that do not appeal to most vot- 
ers, or to form effective coalitions. Since the contested elec- 
tions of April 1997, the OPL has occasionally taken a common 
position with these parties. 

Duvalierists and Makout 

Support for the de facto military regime was strong among a 
network of individuals and organizations that had participated 
in the well-developed patronage system of the Duvalier dicta- 
torships and the military regimes that followed. Among them 
were the former members of the infamous nationwide paramil- 
itary organization, the tonton makout, and Duvalierist or military 



446 



Haiti: Government and Politics 



sympathizers who lost their jobs when ministries were down- 
sized in 1990. Still others included the sons of past military and 
makout leaders, who, in 1993, organized the Revolutionary 
Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (Front 
Revolutionnaire pour l'Avancement et le Progres d'Haiti — 
FRAPH) , a paramilitary group that backed the military regime. 
Following the MNF intervention, decommissioned members of 
the FAd'H and some of their political allies joined this loose, 
anti-democracy network. With the abolition of the FAd'H, how- 
ever, the disparate groups and individuals that make up this 
network, although representing a destabilizing factor, have no 
established institutional base for coordination or support. 

The Elite 

The system of public and private monopolies, including par- 
astatals and import-substitution industries, developed under 
the Duvaliers and sustained by subsequent military regimes 
generated great wealth for a handful of powerful families in 
Port-au-Prince. Viewing itself threatened by changes in the 
political status quo, this elite sector backed the military govern- 
ments likely to protect their lucrative business privileges estab- 
lished under the old regime. Characterized as MREs (Morally 
Repugnant Elites) by international actors during the de facto 
military period, Haiti's upper crust has had to adapt to the 
country's altered political framework following an interna- 
tional intervention that came not to their assistance, but to the 
assistance of those they opposed. 

Not all of Haiti's elite can be assigned MRE status. Some, 
feeling the pinch of international sanctions and perhaps dis- 
gust with the FAd'H's mounting human rights atrocities, exhib- 
ited a willingness to work toward the restoration of the Aristide 
government prior to the intervention, as evidenced by their 
participation in a widely publicized meeting in Miami with Aris- 
tide and his supporters in early 1994. Since the restoration of 
democratic governance, they and others have opened relations 
with the Aristide and Preval administrations, seeking mutually 
beneficial relations and upholding the deeply established prac- 
tice of politique de doublure (political understudies) (see Early 
Years of Independence, 1804-43, ch. 6). Since 1994 some gov- 
ernment officials have privately expressed displeasure with the 
MRE characterization, feeling that it maintains polarization at 
a time when reconciliation is required. "This country will not 
develop without their participation," one high-ranking official 



447 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

stated. Some in government and among the elites emphasize 
the importance of recognizing generational differences and 
supporting the efforts of younger generations to "play by the 
rules." The creation of revamped chambers of commerce in 
the country's secondary cities and the work of the Center for 
Free Enterprise and Democracy (Centre pour la Libre Entre- 
prise et la Democratic — CLED), a private-sector association 
founded in 1993, are cited as examples of these efforts. 

Some of these younger members have emerged from the 
intermediate classes (those between the wealthy elite and the 
impoverished masses) that grew significantly during the Duva- 
lier era, principally as a result of Papa Doc's political strategy of 
providing avenues of patronage to the black middle class as a 
means for creating a new political constituency. Others are the 
educated sons and daughters of middle-class professionals who 
emigrated from Haiti in droves to Europe, Africa, Latin Amer- 
ica, and the Caribbean, and, most commonly, to North Amer- 
ica during the Duvalier years, or who have been educated 
abroad. Returning home, they bring resources, experience, 
expertise, attitudes, and values that reinforce Haiti's efforts to 
change. 

Civil Society 

In a report issued in 1992, the Inter-American Development 
Bank estimated that between 800 and 1,000 development 
NGOs were active in Haiti prior to the coup d'etat. Not 
included in the bank's figures were the thousands of commu- 
nity-based religious, social, and economic groups that had 
emerged by 1991 to become involved in improving the lives of 
their members and communities. The groups, and the national 
and international NGOs that work with them, tended to coa- 
lesce around such interests as literacy, agricultural production 
and marketing, credit, the status of women and children, civil 
and legal rights, and access to improved social and economic 
services. They should be distinguished from the so-called popu- 
lar organizations that arise in response to timely issues; these 
organizations are more informally structured, and sometimes 
do little more than serve as mouthpieces for various politicians. 

During the 1990s, particularly since 1994, civil society orga- 
nizations also have been deeply involved in reforming Haiti's 
political process and making the government responsive to citi- 
zens. Haitians in organized civil society associations formed the 
core of the Lavalas political movement's strength. By 1995, hav- 



448 



Haiti: Government and Politics 



ing seen their associations disintegrate, their leaders forced 
into exile or hiding, and their programs damaged or destroyed 
during the three years of de facto military rule, civil society 
activists seemed determined to engage the political system 
more profoundly — as candidates for political office or as 
appointees in public posts. As a result, many mayors, members 
of communal section administrative councils and of the parlia- 
ment, and government technicians throughout Haiti have 
their roots in grassroots groups or the NGOs that work with 
them. Their experience as grassroots activists has infused Hai- 
tian government, especially at the communal and municipal 
levels, with new and, at least initially, idealistic leadership that is 
well informed of the challenges that government needs to con- 
front. Given access to supporting resources, they are well posi- 
tioned to work in partnership with organized civil society and 
the modernizing business sector to begin to confront them. It 
is yet to be seen, however, if this new generation of leaders will 
change the entrenched political system or if the system will, 
indeed, change them. 

Foreign Relations 

A Haitian religious leader recently stated that his country's 
relative importance on the world stage is like an accordion: 
sometimes it is small; sometimes it is large. Although Haiti's rel- 
ative isolation through most of its history has constrained its 
foreign relations, keeping the imagined accordion small, at 
times Haiti has occupied a prominent place on the world stage. 
This was particularly the case between 1991 and 1996, when a 
violent military coup d'etat against the internationally recog- 
nized Aristide government, followed by three years of brutal de 
facto rule, led to international sanctions, intense multilateral 
diplomacy, a refugee crisis, and, ultimately, an international 
military intervention and peacekeeping operation sanctioned 
by the United Nations (UN) and led by the United States. The 
intense attention given to Haiti during this period not just by 
the UN and the United States, but also by the Organization of 
American States (OAS), member states of the Caribbean Com- 
munity and Common Market (Caricom) , a grouping within the 
UN referred to as The Friends of Haiti (Argentina, Canada, 
France, the United States, and Venezuela), and the govern- 
ments of the thirty-four countries that contributed personnel 
to the UN peacekeeping operation, has placed the relatively 
small Caribbean country on the world stage as never before, 



449 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

perhaps to such an extent that its isolation from the world com- 
munity has ended. 

Haiti achieved some prominence as a result of its successful 
revolution, but the governments of slaveholding countries 
either ignored or decried the country during the first half of 
the nineteenth century. In the United States, the question of 
recognizing Haiti provoked sharp debate between abolitionists, 
who favored recognition, and slaveholders, who vehemently 
opposed such action. The advent of the Civil War, however, 
allowed President Abraham Lincoln to recognize Haiti without 
controversy. Haiti became a focus of interest for the great pow- 
ers in the early twentieth century mainly because of the coun- 
try's strategic location. Competition among the United States, 
Germany, France, and Britain resulted in the breaching of 
Haiti's sovereignty and the nineteen-year occupation (1915- 
34) by United States forces (see United States Involvement in 
Haiti, 1915-34, ch. 6). Subsequent isolation stemmed from 
Haiti's cultural and linguistic uniqueness, its economic under- 
development, and international condemnation of the Duvalier 
dictatorship and subsequent military regimes. 

Relations with the United States 

Haiti has maintained a long-standing relationship with the 
United States. Economic ties to the United States are vital, as 
the latter country is Haiti's primary trading partner for both 
exports and imports. The United States is also Haiti's most 
important source of bilateral foreign assistance and the pri- 
mary target for Haitian emigration. A large number of United 
States private voluntary agencies and religious groups are 
active in Haiti, for example. The Haitian private sector is 
closely tied to the United States economy. In short, the eco- 
nomic and political influence of the United States in Haiti has 
been more extensive than the influence of any other country. 

United States diplomatic interest in Haiti has been uneven. 
Washington's interest in its neighbor arose chiefly because of 
the country's proximity to the Panama Canal and Central 
America. Haiti borders the Windward Passage, a narrow body 
of water on which maritime traffic could be easily disrupted. 
During World War I, the United States undertook a military 
occupation of Haiti, along with a number of other countries in 
the Caribbean and Central America. During the Cold War, 
Washington viewed Haiti as an anti-communist bulwark, partly 
because of the country's proximity to Cuba. Francois Duvalier 



450 



United Nations mission personnel in Moulin sur Mer, 1 996 

Courtesy Anne Greene 

exploited United States hostility toward the Cuban regime of 
Fidel Castro and United States fears of communist expansion 
in the Caribbean basin in order to deter the United States gov- 
ernment from exerting excessive pressure on his own dictator- 
ship. 

Since the 1980s, the United States has been particularly 
interested in curbing illegal Haitian immigration. Washington 
also has focused on Haiti as a transshipment point for narcotics 
destined for United States markets and has undertaken various 
efforts to curtail shipments. Between 1986 and 1994, Haitian 
army involvement in drug trafficking reduced the effectiveness 
of United States efforts. Following the 1996 departure of UN 
peacekeeping troops, United States attention to narcotics traf- 
ficking in Haiti has intensified because Haitian coasts have 
become particularly vulnerable to international traffickers 
seeking to land their product on Hispaniola for transfer to 
proximate United States ports of entry, notably Puerto Rico. 

From the 1970s until 1987, United States assistance to Haiti 
grew. Between 1987 and 1994, however, the flow of assistance to 
Haiti was disrupted on several occasions, notably following the 
1987 election massacre and during the 1991-94 period of de 
facto military rule. Following the restoration of Haiti's legiti- 
mate government in late 1994, the United States added a 
pledge of US$458 million to the US$2,342 billion pledged by 



451 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

other bilateral and multilateral donors for the rehabilitation 
and development of the country over five years. Four years 
later, the majority of those funds (approximately US$1.5 bil- 
lion) remained undisbursed, largely as a result of factors in 
Haiti (see Economic Policies, ch. 8). 

Relations with the Dominican Republic 

The second most important country to Haiti is the Domini- 
can Republic, with which it shares the island of Hispaniola. An 
enormous amount of trade, much of it informal, crosses the 
border. The Haitian economy has proved to be a desirable mar- 
ket for Dominican products. During the 1991-94 period of 
international economic sanctions on Haiti, the flow of goods 
from the Dominican Republic provided a lifeline for the de 
facto military regime and facilitated the market penetration of 
Dominican products as never before. By the mid-1990s, an esti- 
mated US$50 million in products flowed annually from the 
Dominican Republic into Haiti. 

Until recently, political relations between Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic have been strained. For generations, Hai- 
tians had informally crossed into the Dominican Republic in 
search of work. The perceived "blackening" of the Dominican 
population resulting from this population flow motivated dicta- 
tor Rafael Trujillo (1930-61) to carry out a notorious massacre 
of Haitians in 1937. Nevertheless, more than 250,000 people of 
Haitian parentage now live in the Dominican Republic. 

In recent decades, Haiti has supplied cheap labor to the 
Dominican Republic, mostly to harvest sugarcane and coffee, 
and, until 1986, through a formal intergovernmental 
exchange. The question of the status and treatment of those 
laborers, a prickly issue between the two countries, occasionally 
has spilled onto the international stage. In July 1991, for exam- 
ple, when United States congressional hearings on the treat- 
ment of Haitian laborers in the Dominican Republic exposed 
abusive treatment of Haitian children in the canefields, 
Dominican President Joaquin Balaguer responded by pushing 
thousands of poor, dark-skinned people, mostly Haitians, but 
also some Dominican-Haitians born in his country, across the 
border, creating a refugee crisis in the hemisphere's already 
poorest country. Although the issue of Haitians in the Domini- 
can Republic remains a difficult one, since the mid-1990s and 
the election of Presidents Rene Preval in Haiti and Leonel 
Fernandez in the Dominican Republic, relations between the 



452 



Haiti: Government and Politics 

two countries have improved considerably. The two govern- 
ments now explore cooperation on such issues as the environ- 
ment, drug trafficking, and economic development. 

Relations with Other Countries 

Ties with other Caribbean nations have been limited. Histor- 
ically, Britain and France strove to limit contacts between their 
dependencies and Haiti, in order to discourage independence 
movements. Haiti's cultural and linguistic distinctiveness also 
prevented close relations in the Caribbean. Haitian labor 
migration to the Bahamas since the 1970s has resulted in 
strained relations with that country in the late 1990s because in 
recent years Bahamian authorities have returned undocu- 
mented migrants to Haiti. Following the election of Aristide 
and the 1991 coup, a new awareness of Haiti arose in the Com- 
monwealth Caribbean, however. In 1994 Caricom troops were 
the first international contingent to land in Haiti following the 
entry of United States soldiers. By 1998 Haiti had achieved 
membership status in Caricom. In general, Haiti's relations 
with Latin America, historically limited, have expanded since 
Haiti became part of a broader movement toward democracy 
in the region in 1990, and then intensified as Latin American 
nations, especially Venezuela, Argentina, and Chile, assumed 
leadership roles in the resolution of the Haitian crisis of 1991- 
94. 

Other countries important to Haiti include the primary 
donor countries for foreign assistance, especially Canada, 
France, Germany, and the Republic of China (Taiwan). 
Increasingly, European assistance to Haiti has been coordi- 
nated under the auspices of the European Union, which, by 
1998, was the largest single donor of aid to Haiti. Haiti has 
maintained special cultural ties to France, even though the two 
countries are not major trading partners. Haiti also has 
enjoyed a supportive relationship with the Canadian province 
of Quebec, one of the few linguistically compatible entities in 
the Western Hemisphere and the home of a significant num- 
ber of Haitian emigres. The importance of Haiti to Quebec 
and to Canada is reflected in Canada's leadership in the resolu- 
tion of Haiti's political crisis and its deep involvement in UN 
peacekeeping and public safety programs since. Haiti's mem- 
bership in international and multilateral organizations 
includes the UN and its associated organizations, the OAS, the 
Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank (see Glos- 



453 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

sary), the Lome Convention (see Glossary), the International 
Monetary Fund (see Glossary), and the World Trade Organiza- 
tion. 

The Haitian diaspora, or Haitians living outside of Haiti, sev- 
eral million strong and concentrated principally in South Flor- 
ida, New York, and other North American cities, has become 
an important focus of Haitian foreign relations. Although Hai- 
tians overseas are prohibited from voting in Haitian elections, 
members of what is now referred to as Haiti's "Tenth Depart- 
ment" play influential roles in the transfer of resources, knowl- 
edge, and skills from their metropolitan base to the homeland. 
Additionally, they play key roles in advocating policies toward 
Haiti in Washington and Ottawa. 

Haitians have been proud of their history, particularly the 
accomplishments of such revolutionary figures as Jean-Jacques 
Dessalines and Toussaint and, in more recent years, such fig- 
ures as Charlemagne Peralte, Jean-Marie Vincent, Francois Guy 
Malary, and others who fought for freedom from foreign or 
authoritarian rule. Haiti has suffered not only from its unique- 
ness and from its similarity to other less developed nations, but 
also from the abuse of its own leaders. Since the demise of the 
Duvalier dictatorship, most Haitians have demonstrated a 
strong desire for the reform of the systems of governance and 
politics that have abused the country and its people. They 
steadfastly clung to their commitment to democracy through 
the shock of the 1991 coup and the repression and violence 
that followed. Although Haiti can now count itself among the 
democratic nations of the hemisphere, as it approaches the 
twenty-first century the country and its leaders face the enor- 
mous challenges of eschewing the past and completing reform 
processes of government and politics that run contrary to the 
country's history. 

* * * 

Among studies of Haiti's government and politics, two stand 
out in providing the comprehensive historical framework 
required for understanding contemporary issues: Haiti in the 
World Economy: Class, Race, and Underdevelopment since 1 700, by 
Alex Dupuy, and Haiti, State Against Nation: The Origins and Leg- 
acy of Duvalierism, by Michel-Rolph Trouillot. The analysis of 
politics and government in both of these works covers the 
period up to, and including, the demise of the Duvalier dicta- 



454 



Haiti: Government and Politics 



torship. Dupuy's more recent book, Haiti in the New World Order, 
provides a detailed description and analysis of political devel- 
opments between 1986 and the late 1994 intervention and res- 
toration of the Aristide government, with a parallel analysis of 
economic policies promoted and applied in Haiti during the 
post-Duvalier era. Libete: A Haitian Anthology, edited by Charles 
Arthur and Michael Dash, provides an insightful array of short 
essays on Haiti and its political culture. Finally, the writings of 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide offer many useful insights into Haiti's 
political culture and its best-known contemporary political 
leader. In the Parish of the Poor offers essays from the pre-presi- 
dential era, whereas Dignity includes assessments from the 
period of de facto rule and the author's restoration to the post 
of president. 

Several works focus more exclusively on the period of 1990- 
94, covering Jean-Bertrand Aristide's government prior to the 
military coup and the subsequent three years of de facto mili- 
tary rule. The Haiti Files: Decoding the Crisis, edited by James 
Ridgeway, compiles essays on the principal political players 
both in Haiti and internationally, including the Haitian 
diaspora. A number of its essays relate politics and government 
to drugs, migration, and international assistance. Haitian Frus- 
trations: Dilemmas for US Policy, edited by Georges Fauriol, also 
focuses on key political sectors, placing its emphasis on interna- 
tional actors and their involvement in Haiti's political crisis, 
and includes the texts of key political documents. Haitian 
Democracy Restored: 1991-1995, by Roland I. Perusse, provides a 
succinct description of developments during these crisis years. 
Haiti Held Hostage: International Responses to the Quest for Nation- 
hood, 1986-1996, by a team of researchers led by Robert Magu- 
ire, places the 1991 military coup d'etat and period of de facto 
rule in a broader perspective, examining both developments 
leading up to it, and the role of international actors in the 
period following the military intervention. It offers a conclud- 
ing chapter on lessons learned for future crises and interven- 
tions. 

Although material on the evolution of Haiti's politics and 
governance since 1994 exists principally in the form of individ- 
ual reports and articles, one published volume, Haiti Renewed: 
Political and Economic Prospects, edited by Robert Rotberg, pro- 
vides analyses by leading scholars and several political activists 
on an array of political and economic challenges confronting 
Haiti and offers policy recommendations. The World Bank's 



455 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



March 1998 report, Haiti: The Challenges of Poverty Reduction, 
includes technical papers that offer information on Haiti's 
political economy and analyses of overcoming obstacles to eco- 
nomic and political development. Finally, the Haiti Info Circu- 
lar, compiled three times annually since 1995 under the 
auspices of the Georgetown University Caribbean Project's 
Haiti Program and available on the project's website, repro- 
duces reports and analysis on Haiti and United States Haiti pol- 
icy written and published by a wide array of Washington-based 
government agencies, scholars, and private policy analysis orga- 
nizations. (For further information and complete citations, see 
Bibliography.) 



456 



Chapter 10. Haiti: National Security 




Figure from a painting by Prosper Pierrelouis 



BORN OF REVOLUTIONARY violence and plagued by socio- 
economic deterioration, Haiti has not succeeded in building 
permanent civilian institutions capable of exercising control 
over the military establishment. Until 1994 the armed forces 
had been a pillar of Haitian society based on an institutional 
cohesion that other organizations lacked. The military leader- 
ship acted with relative autonomy as a kind of government in 
reserve, ready to intervene in crises when civilian authority 
broke down. 

Upon his return to power in 1994 after three years of mili- 
tary rule, the elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, took 
the bold step of abolishing the armed forces. Although Haiti 
never before had a police force independent of the army, the 
country's security was entrusted to the newly created Haitian 
National Police (Police Nationale d'Haiti — PNH) under the 
supervision of civilians having no previous experience in mat- 
ters of public safety. The evolution of the PNH into a profes- 
sional, competent force for public order may be pivotal to the 
future of democratic government in Haiti. 

Until the United States occupation in 1915, much of Haiti's 
history had been the story of competing mercenary bands 
( cacos) and peasant groups {piquets) , who fought a ramshackle 
military. The most visible product of the occupation turned out 
to be the Garde d'Haiti, which evolved into the Armed Forces 
of Haiti (Forces Armees d'Haiti — FAd'H) . 

Under his autocratic rule, Francois Duvalier (1957-71) 
shrewdly brought the FAd'H under his control while ruthlessly 
suppressing all opposition groups. As a counterweight to the 
army's power, a sinister paramilitary organization was cre- 
ated — the Volunteers for National Security (Volontaires de la 
Securite Nationale — VSN) — to protect the regime and enforce 
its directives. During the tenure of Francois Duvalier's son, 
Jean-Claude Duvalier (1971-86), a reconstituted officer corps 
emerged, restoring the balance with the VSN. 

After popular discontent forced Duvalier into exile, a succes- 
sion of military coups and periods of internal military feuding 
were followed by the election of Aristide in 1990 (inaugurated 
1991). Although police functions traditionally had been the 
responsibility of the army, Aristide's intention to introduce a 
separate police force was unacceptable to the FAd'H leadership 



459 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

and contributed to his ouster in a military-led coup nine 
months after he took office. During the subsequent three years 
of military rule (1991-94), the armed forces deteriorated 
sharply as a result of the poor economic state of the country, an 
international arms and fuel embargo, and growing corruption 
and competition for spoils among members of the officer 
corps. When Aristide returned, supported by a United Nations 
(UN) force, he ordered a rapid demobilization. Some soldiers 
were transferred to an interim police force, but most found 
themselves suddenly deprived of their careers and incomes. 
Embittered and in many cases still armed, they formed a poten- 
tially dangerous dissident element. 

With international assistance, the government swiftly intro- 
duced a training program for the new national police, the first 
units of which took up their posts in mid-1995. As of late 1999, 
the police were close to their targeted strength of 6,732, a mod- 
est number for a country with Haiti's population and severe 
security and crime problems. All PNH recruits are obliged to 
go through a nine-month course at the police academy after 
meeting mandated educational standards and rigorous testing. 
Some officers and enlisted members of the FAd'H were 
accepted into the PNH after screening but have been required 
to undergo the same testing and training as civilian candidates. 
Former army officers remain a minority in the ranks of supervi- 
sory police. 

The remaining small UN military contingents were with- 
drawn between August and November 1997, leaving a mission 
of some 290 civilian police officers to train and provide men- 
toring to the young PNH recruits. A separate United States 
contingent of mainly engineering troops provides assistance in 
the construction of roads, schools, bridges, and other public 
works. 

The PNH is organized into two main elements: the Adminis- 
trative Police, which, operating through nine departmental 
directors, staffs city police stations, subprecincts, and rural 
posts; and the Judicial Police, which investigates cases on 
behalf of examining magistrates. Separate specialized units 
deal with crowd control and narcotics violations, and act as pro- 
tective forces to guard the president and high officials. The 
small Haitian Coast Guard is being trained in intercepting nar- 
cotics shipments and already cooperates with the United States 
Coast Guard in this regard. The staff of the inspector general 
investigates allegations of human rights abuses and crimes by 



460 



Haiti: National Security 



the police, and regularly surveys the operation of police sta- 
tions. 

Four years after it was first deployed, the PNH had achieved 
measurable success in a country that had no civilian police tra- 
dition. It has for the most part been politically impartial, 
refraining from involvement in the political dispute that para- 
lyzed the government in 1998 and 1999. Nevertheless, individ- 
ual police commanders have been accused in incidents of 
harassment and intimidation of critics of the government. 

This positive assessment of the PNH is clouded by a signifi- 
cant number of abuses, including the unnecessary use of force 
that has often resulted in deaths, mistreatment of detainees, 
failure to observe legal procedures in making arrests, and arro- 
gance in dealing with the public. At supervisory levels, officers 
of both civilian and military backgrounds demonstrate numer- 
ous weaknesses. 

The police are ill-equipped to deal with the country's rapidly 
growing role as a transshipment point for narcotics between 
Colombia and the United States. Although a number of police 
have been dismissed for drug corruption, the integrity of the 
force is seriously endangered by the influence of the traffick- 
ers. 

In spite of programs of international assistance, the justice 
system in Haiti remains barely functional and is afflicted with 
rampant corruption. Many judges are poorly educated, 
untrained, unqualified, and open to bribery. In addition, the 
legal process is extremely slow; only a small proportion of 
crimes reaches the trial stage. In 1998 some 80 percent of 
prison inmates were being subjected to illegal or prolonged 
detention. Because of the public's lack of confidence in the 
judicial process, vigilante activity against suspected criminals is 
commonplace. 

Aristide's daring move to do away with the armed forces has 
proved to be a major achievement. The civilian national police, 
in spite of its many shortcomings, is improving, and, although 
serious problems remain, they are being addressed by the 
authorities and are not on the massive or systemic scale that 
existed under the de facto military regime of 1991-94. Ex-sol- 
diers and other disaffected elements, as well as mounting crim- 
inal and narcotics activity, present continuing dangers to the 
regime. If the new police force can weather its current chal- 
lenges and remain apolitical, future civilian governments 



461 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

should be able to conduct the country's affairs without the risk 
of another military takeover. 

The Military in Haitian History 

The origins of Haiti's military lie in the country's revolution, 
which began with a slave rebellion in 1791 and culminated in 
French withdrawal in 1803 (see Fight for Independence, 1791- 
1803, ch. 6). A decade of warfare produced a military cadre 
from which Haiti's early leaders emerged. Defeat of the French 
demonstrated Haiti's considerable strategic stamina and tacti- 
cal capabilities, but Haiti's victory did not translate into a suc- 
cessful national government or a strong economy. Lacking an 
effective constitution, Haiti was usually ruled by force. The 
armed forces, which had been united against the French, frag- 
mented into warring regional factions. The militarv soon took 
control of almost every aspect of Haitian life, and officers 
assumed responsibility for the administration of justice and for 
municipal management. According to a Haitian diplomat, the 
country in its earlier days was "an immense militarv camp." 
Without viable civilian institutions, Haiti was vulnerable to mili- 
tary strongmen, who permanently shaped the nation's authori- 
tarian, personalist, and coercive style of governance. 

During the latter half of the nineteenth century, the army 
either failed to protect the central government or directly 
caused the government's collapse by means of a coup. In addi- 
tion, rural insurgent movements led by piquets and cacos limited 
the central government's authority in outlying areas. These 
groups carried on guerrilla warfare into the twentieth century; 
they remained active until put down by the United States 
Marines in 1919. 

Prolonged instability weakened the army. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, Haiti's militarv had become little more 
than an undisciplined, ill-fed, and poorly paid militia that 
shifted its allegiances as battles were won or lost and as new 
leaders came to power. Between 1806 and 1879, an estimated 
sixty-nine revolts against existing governments took place; 
another twenty uprisings or attempted insurrections broke out 
between 1880 and 1915. At the beginning of the twentieth cen- 
tury, Haiti's political problems attracted increasing foreign 
involvement. France, Germany, and the United States were the 
major actors. In 1915, as mob violence raged, the United States 
occupied the country (see United States Involvement in Haiti, 
1915-34, ch. 6). 



462 



Haiti: National Security 



During the occupation, the United States Marines dis- 
banded Haiti's army, which consisted of an estimated 9,000 
men, including 308 generals. In February 1916, the Haitian 
Constabulary (Gendarmerie d'Haiti) was formed. United 
States Marine Corps and United States Navy officers and non- 
commissioned officers (NCOs) commanded the group. The 
gendarmerie attempted to assure public safety, initially by sub- 
duing the cacos; to promote development, particularly road 
construction; and to modernize the military through the intro- 
duction of a training structure, a health service, and other 
improvements. The gendarmerie became the Garde d'Haiti in 
1928; the Garde formed the core of Haiti's armed forces after 
the United States administration ended in 1934. 

The United States had sought to introduce a modern, apolit- 
ical military establishment in Haiti. On the surface, it suc- 
ceeded; the organization, training, and equipment of the 
Garde all represented improvements over the military condi- 
tions existing before the occupation. What the United States 
did not (and probably could not) reform was the basic authori- 
tarian inclination of Haitian society, an inclination antithetical 
to the goal of military depoliticization. 

Some professionalization of the army continued for a few 
years after the United States occupation; however, Haiti's politi- 
cal structure deteriorated rapidly after 1934, weakening civil- 
military relations and ultimately affecting the character of the 
armed forces. After the coup that ended the populist govern- 
ment of Dumarsais Estime and led to Colonel Paul E. 
Magloire's election to the presidency in 1950, the army 
resumed a political role. This development divided the army 
internally and set the stage for Francois Duvalier's ascent to 
power in late 1957 (see Francois Duvalier, 1957-71, ch. 6). 

The Duvalier Era, 1957-86 

When Francois Duvalier came to power in 1957, the armed 
forces were at their lowest point professionally since 1915. 
Duvalier's establishment of a parallel security apparatus posed 
the most serious challenge to the crumbling integrity of the 
armed forces. In 1959 the regime began recruiting a civilian 
militia (Milice Civile) drawn initially from the capital city's 
slums and equipped with antiquated small arms found in the 
basement of the Presidential Palace. The militia became the 
Volunteers for National Security (Volontaires de la Securite 
Nationale — VSN) after 1962. Its control extended into the 



463 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

countryside through a system of information, intelligence, and 
command tied directly to the Presidential Palace. Both 
Francois Duvalier and his son, Jean-Claude, lacked military 
experience; still, they managed to neutralize the army's influ- 
ence through intimidation, bribery, and political maneuvering. 
The Duvaliers also managed to stave off a number of low-level 
opposition plots and invasion attempts, mostly during the 
1960s. 

During the early 1960s, Francois Duvalier pursued measures 
to overpower the mainstream military establishment, often by 
ruthlessly eliminating or exiling any officers who opposed him. 
The Military Academy, a professional and elitist institution that 
represented a potential source of opposition to the regime, was 
closed down in 1961. Officers who attempted to resist Duvalier 
forfeited their careers. In 1963 Duvalier expelled the United 
States military mission, which he had invited to Haiti in 1959; 
Duvalier feared that the military-modernization values 
imparted by United States instructors could lead to resistance 
to the government's restructuring of the armed forces. 

Although referred to as a militia, the VSN in fact became the 
Duvaliers' front-line security force. As of early 1986, the organi- 
zation included more than 9,000 members and an informal cir- 
cle of thousands more. The VSN acted as a political cadre, 
secret police, and instrument of terror. It played a crucial polit- 
ical role for the regime, countering the influence of the armed 
forces, historically the regime's primary source of power. The 
VSN gained its deadly reputation in part because members 
received no salary, although they took orders from the Presi- 
dential Palace. They made their living, instead, through extor- 
tion and petty crime. Rural members of the VSN, who wore 
blue denim uniforms, had received some training from the 
army, while the plainclothes members, identified by their 
trademark dark glasses, served as Haiti's criminal investigation 
force. 

When Jean-Claude Duvalier ("Baby Doc") came to power in 
1971, the country's security forces became less abusive, but they 
still resorted to some brutality. During Jean-Claude's regime, a 
realignment of power between the VSN and the armed forces 
was achieved, ensuring him greater control over the nation's 
security apparatus. Jean-Claude's half-hearted attempt to open 
Haiti to the outside world and to qualify for renewed foreign 
assistance from the United States suggested a need to restrain 
the abuses of the VSN. 



464 



Haiti: National Security 



With United States support, the government created the 
Leopard counterinsurgency unit, which provided the regime 
with a relatively modern tool for responding to internal 
threats. By placing a capable new force under Baby Doc's com- 
mand, the Leopards reduced his dependence on the allegiance 
of the armed forces and the VSN. In 1972 the Military Acad- 
emy reopened, and the first class since 1961 graduated in 1973. 
Because the lower classes could not meet the academy's educa- 
tional requirements, the students were drawn from the middle 
class and were usually sponsored by active-duty officers or other 
officials. The reopening of the academy represented a small 
step toward reprofessionalizing the military. Some moderniza- 
tion of army equipment was also undertaken during this 
period. 

The armed forces largely escaped the immediate wrath of a 
population clearly bent on putting an end to Duvalier rule. 
Popular violence had erupted in 1984, and it continued into 
early 1986 in an expanding sequence of local revolts. In its wan- 
ing days, the regime relied heavily on the VSN and on limited 
local police capabilities to curb violence. Many Haitians 
detected the fissures growing in the nation's security apparatus, 
and some rumors held that the army would move against Duva- 
lier. These rumors, however, proved incorrect; still, Duvalier's 
inability to contain the widespread rioting through political 
measures and the VSN's failure to control the unrest placed the 
military in a pivotal position. Conscious of his precarious hold 
on power, Duvalier reshuffled the cabinet and the military 
leadership in the last days of 1985, but to no avail. Reports of 
brutal excesses by the increasingly desperate VSN further weak- 
ened Duvalier's position. 

The army's discontent with the crumbling regime became 
evident when troops refused to fire on demonstrators, and, in a 
few instances, army personnel turned against the VSN. With 
last-minute assistance from the United States, Haiti's leading 
generals provided the political transition required to ease 
Duvalier out of power in February 1986. In pushing for Duva- 
lier's abdication, the army was not expressing genuine concern 
for the best interests of Haiti. Rather, the army sought to shield 
itself from responsibility for the explosive sociopolitical situa- 
tion. 

The Post-Duvalier Period 

Jean-Claude Duvalier left behind a hastily constructed 



465 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

interim junta, controlled by the armed forces. After Jean- 
Claude's departure, Lieutenant General Henri Namphy, army 
chief of staff, became head of the interim National Council of 
Government. The interim government officially disbanded the 
VSN a few days after Duvalier's departure but avoided the polit- 
ically difficult measure of effectively halting the VSN's activities. 
The failure to do so led angry mobs to set upon members of 
the VSN and set in motion a cycle of instability. Despite the 
popular backlash, some VSN agents managed to survive by 
integrating themselves into military circles. By 1987 the initial 
positive view of the armed forces had given way to anger 
because of the army's failure to dismantle the VSN, which con- 
tinued to thwart proposed government reform. Worse, the 
senior military command was blamed for the failed elections of 
1987 and 1988, isolating the Haitian military from the interna- 
tional community, which had grown skeptical about the role of 
the armed forces. 

In September 1988, another coup brought Lieutenant Gen- 
eral Prosper Avril of the Presidential Guard to power. The 
armed forces continued to face problems. Within a six-month 
period, 140 officers reportedly were retired or were fired, some 
because they were suspected of drug smuggling. Political rifts 
within the senior command split the officer corps into warring 
factions. After a week of internecine conflict in April 1989, 
Avril was able to prevail because he held the loyalty of the Pres- 
idential Guard and enjoyed support from many NCOs. But the 
military was left in a state of crisis, without a clearly defined 
political program. 

Under pressure from the United States and facing severe dis- 
sension at home, Avril fled to Florida in March 1990. Elected 
president in fair elections nine months later, Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide entered office in February of 1991 without opposition 
from the army. He introduced an ambitious program of 
reforms, several of which were bound to disturb the military 
leadership. The top ranks were purged, steps were taken to sep- 
arate the police from the army as called for by the 1987 consti- 
tution, and the position of section chief — key to the FAd'H's 
power in the provinces — was abolished. 

Increasingly perceived as a radical by the military, Aristide 
found it difficult to exert his authority over the military com- 
mand. The return to Haiti of Duvalier supporters and the evi- 
dence of drug-dealing among a number of officers heightened 
civil-military friction. A military-led coup, backed by the eco- 



466 



Haiti: National Security 



nomic elite and right-wing elements, overthrew Aristide in Sep- 
tember 1991, less than eight months into his five-year term. 

A puppet civilian government installed by the armed forces 
effectively dominated the weak and divided civilian politicians 
and managed the country. The main military figure was Lieu- 
tenant General Raoul Cedras, who had been appointed chief 
of staff of the armed forces by President Aristide, but who was 
generally believed to have engineered the coup against Aris- 
tide. Cedras installed his friend, Brigadier General Philippe 
Biamby, as chief of staff of the army. Both Cedras and Biamby 
came from prominent families that had supported the Duvalier 
regime. Another leading coup figure was Lieutenant Colonel 
Joseph Michel Francois, in charge of the Port-au-Prince mili- 
tary zone, with control over the capital's police. Francois also 
was thought to have been responsible for building up a force of 
1,500 plainclothes auxiliaries, known as "attaches," who com- 
mitted most of the abuses and intimidation of opponents of 
the military regime. The attaches were abetted by the provin- 
cial section chiefs and a new group that emerged in 1993, the 
Revolutionary Front for the Advancement and Progress of 
Haiti (Front Revolutionnaire pour l'Avancement et le Progres 
d'Haiti— FRAPH). 

As international pressures mounted against the de facto gov- 
ernment, the armed forces became less and less a professional 
military organization and more a violent business enterprise 
with numerous criminal features. According to an exiled 
former Haitian officer, Kern Delince, "The hierarchy and most 
of the principles upon which armies are organized have van- 
ished. What you have left is a force of mercenaries and preda- 
tors, a military institution that is in its terminal phase. ..." 

The army developed close links with wealthy families and 
controlled most state-owned businesses, such as the telephone 
and electricity companies, the port, and imports of basic goods 
like cement and flour. It was widely believed that the army was 
permeated with officers profiting from the narcotics trade. 
Because the officers were making so much money and because 
of their dislike of Aristide, they had little incentive to end the 
stalemate. In response to the situation, the international com- 
munity instituted an international embargo, which had severe 
effects on the country. The embargo hit the poor the hardest, 
and, ironically, enabled the military to profit from the sale of 
scarce fuel supplies smuggled into the country. Eventually, 
however, the presence of armed civilian gangs, the lack of 



467 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

funds to pay soldiers' salaries and the growing dependence of 
senior and junior officers on the proceeds of drug trafficking 
contributed to the breakdown of military discipline. 

As a result of these economic pressures and the worsening 
domestic situation, in July 1993, a Cedras-led delegation 
accepted a plan, known as the Governors Island Accord for the 
place where it was negotiated, to restore the Aristide govern- 
ment. As one element of the accord, 1,100 police trainers and 
military personnel under UN control were to supervise the 
reform of the Haitian army and to introduce the constitution- 
ally mandated separate police force. The accord did not go 
smoothly. When the first Canadian and United States military 
personnel were about to go ashore from the cargo ship, the 
U.S.S. Harlan County, they were discouraged from landing by a 
FRAPH-led dockside demonstration. With the Governors 
Island Accord thus repudiated, the UN embargo was reim- 
posed, and a renewed campaign of terror was instigated by the 
FAd'H and FRAPH. 

A year later, with stiffened international sanctions that tar- 
geted all trade except food and medicine, and a UN-endorsed 
United States intervention imminent, the Haitian military lead- 
ership capitulated and accepted the "permissive intervention" 
plan negotiated by a delegation headed by former United 
States president Jimmy Carter. 

Disintegration and Demobilization of the Haitian Army, 1993- 
95 

On September 19, 1994, a day after the Carter agreement 
was signed, the first units of the United States-led Multinational 
Force (MNF) landed in Haiti. The military leaders, including 
General Cedras, resigned, as called for by the agreement, and 
went into exile, leaving the FAd'H leaderless and demoralized. 
Aristide, who resumed his presidential term in October 1994, 
quickly moved to reduce the size of the discredited army, 
announcing a reduction in personnel from 6,000 to 3,500. 
Some of the former soldiers were enrolled in a United States- 
sponsored program to ease their return to civilian life by pro- 
viding them with job training and referrals, but few found 
employment. To reduce the danger of violence from weapons 
among civilians and demobilized soldiers, the MNF instituted a 
buy-back program that attracted thousands of firearms but 
failed to uncover all the hidden arms that could be used in a 
future uprising against the legitimate government. Many ordi- 



468 



Haiti: National Security 



nary soldiers were permitted to serve in the Interim Public 
Security Force (IPSF) , which acted as a stopgap until the new 
civilian national police force could be trained and deployed. 
Some 3,300 soldiers were ultimately accepted into the IPSF. 

By January 1995, all officers' commissions had been revoked, 
and the remaining FAd'H personnel who had not been 
accepted into the IPSF were demobilized. Aristide announced 
his intention to ask parliament to take up a constitutional 
amendment to formally abolish the armed forces. Under the 
constitution, action to this effect was not possible until the end 
of the legislative term in 1999. In addition to the weapons col- 
lected by the occupying troops under the buy-back program, 
the military's heavy weapons were impounded and destroyed. 

Structure and Capabilities of the Pre-1995 Armed 
Forces 

Haiti's internal upheavals had repeatedly caused the armed 
forces to assume a decisive role in the conduct of the political 
institutions of the state. Domestic security concerns greatly out- 
weighed external defense considerations in the operations and 
organization of the armed forces. The FAd'H constituted the 
military arm of the Ministry of Interior and National Defense. 
The commander of the FAd'H served a renewable three-year 
term. Under him, the general staff had the usual staff offices 
for operations, intelligence, logistics, and training. Among 
other important officers were the inspector general, an adju- 
tant general, and commanders of the military regions of the 
north and south, and of the metropolitan military region 
(Port-au-Prince). 

The nine military departments under the northern and 
southern military regions operated principally as district 
police. Only the forces assigned to the metropolitan military 
region had a significant tactical capability. The strongest of 
these units was the 1,300-member Presidential Guard, which 
was relatively well-trained and disciplined. Many members of 
the guard were stationed on the grounds of the Presidential 
Palace as a protective force for the president. The Dessalines 
Battalion, with barracks behind the Presidential Palace, was a 
light infantry force of some 750 men. The Leopard Corps was 
an internal security unit of some 700 men equipped with 
United States help. Both the Dessalines Battalion and the 



469 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

Leopard Corps were disbanded after the 1989 conflict within 
the army. 

The FAd'H controlled the Port-au-Prince police and the 
prison system. The capital's police force of about 1,000 ill- 
trained members was in effect a low-level constabulary under 
military command. The armed forces administered the capital 
city's firefighters and the country's customs, immigration, and 
narcotics-control programs. 

Haiti's security services consisted of about 8,000 military and 
police when military rule was ended in 1994. The FAd'H itself 
had a strength of about 6,200. Most officers began their careers 
at the Military Academy at Freres (near Petionville) . After a 
three-year course in a class of about sixty students, academy 
graduates became career officers with the opportunity of rising 
to the most senior FAd'H positions. In the final years of the 
regime, the academy program degenerated. The training was 
only nominal, and officers were selected and promoted not on 
the basis of their records and capabilities but on family ties and 
political orientation. Graduates of the NCO school and train- 
ing camp at Lamentin (near Carrefour) outside Port-au-Prince 
served in mainstream army units or were assigned to rural 
police duties, but the NCO school, too, was not fully opera- 
tional in the last years of the military government. Basic train- 
ing was conducted at the unit level. Although Article 268 of the 
1987 constitution required all men to serve in the military 
when they reached their eighteenth birthday, enlistment was in 
reality voluntary. Women were limited to participating in the 
medical corps. 

Prior to demobilization of all the armed forces — army, navy, 
and air force — the principal small arm for most of the army was 
the Garand Ml rifle of World War II vintage. Some German G3 
and American Ml 6 rifles were distributed to elite units, as were 
Israeli Uzi submachine guns. The Presidential Guard had a few 
armored vehicles and artillery pieces at its disposal. As 
reported by The Military Balance, 1995-96, these consisted of V- 
150 Commando and M2 armored personnel carriers and nine 
75mm and 105mm towed howitzers. The army also had a small 
inventory of 60mm and 81mm mortars, 37mm and 57mm anti- 
tank guns, 20mm and 40mm antiaircraft guns, and some 57mm 
and 106mm rocket launchers. 

The Haitian navy was formed in 1860 and by the turn of the 
century was theoretically the largest naval force in the Carib- 
bean, with two cruisers and six gunboats, manned largely by 



470 



Haiti: National Security 



foreign mercenaries. The navy ceased to exist after the United 
States military occupation in 1915 but reappeared as a coast 
guard unit in the late 1930s. During and after World War II, 
Haiti received several coast guard cutters and converted sub- 
marine chasers from the United States. After the three major 
units of the Haitian coast guard mutinied in 1970, shelling the 
Presidential Palace, the ships were disarmed by the United 
States at Guantanamo, Cuba, where they had fled, and 
returned to Haiti. Francois Duvalier subsequently announced 
plans for a major expansion by the purchase of twenty-four ves- 
sels, including motor torpedo boats, but the project was not 
consummated and was in any event probably beyond the sup- 
port capabilities of the Haitian navy. 

During the 1970s, after Duvalier's death, most of the existing 
fleet units were disposed of or returned to the United States. 
Five small patrol craft were purchased privately in the United 
States, as was an armed tugboat from the United States Navy; 
the tugboat was converted for offshore patrol use. This vessel 
plus two coastal patrol craft were all that remained of the navy 
when the 1991-94 military regime ended. The navy had a sin- 
gle base at Port-au-Prince and a complement of 340 officers 
and men. 

The Haitian air force was formed in 1943 with a number of 
training aircraft and help from a United States Marine Corps 
aviation mission. After World War II ended, several transport 
aircraft, including three Douglas C-47s, were added to form a 
transport unit. In 1950, after the arrival of a United States Air 
Force mission, a combat unit was formed with six F-51D Mus- 
tangs. The F-51s were instrumental in the defeat of the 1970 
naval mutiny when they strafed the rebel vessels bombarding 
the capital. By the early 1980s, the combat units consisted of six 
Cessna 337 counterinsurgency aircraft. Haiti also had a variety 
of transport aircraft and trainers and a unit of eight helicop- 
ters. By the end of the military regime in 1994, the operating 
aircraft were listed as four Cessna 337s, two light transport air- 
craft, and twelve training aircraft. The helicopters were no 
longer in service. The air force's only base was at Port-au- 
Prince, and its personnel strength as of 1993 was estimated at 
300. 

Military Spending and Foreign Assistance 

According to estimates published by the United States Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) , military expendi- 



L 



471 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

tures averaged about US$40 million annually under the mili- 
tary regime. In 1994, the final year of the military government, 
the spending level of US$45 million amounted to 30.2 percent 
of central government expenditures and 2.3 percent of gross 
national product (GNP — see Glossary). However, because of 
the deteriorating economy resulting from government mis- 
management and the international embargo, the share 
assumed by the military was relatively higher than in more nor- 
mal times. Any analysis of spending data is subject to many 
uncertainties. Portions of the nation's expenditures for military 
purposes probably have been unrecorded, or allocated funds 
may have been siphoned off by corrupt officers. 

Between 1975 and 1985, under the Duvaliers, military spend- 
ing averaging US$30 million a year represented about 8 per- 
cent of government expenditures. Between 1987 and 1991, 
when Aristide was ousted by the military, the share of military 
expenditures in the national budget rose from 10.6 percent to 
15.3 percent. Recorded military outlays did not exceed 2 per- 
cent of GNP during the Duvalier era or under any subsequent 
regime. 

Throughout the twentieth century, the United States was the 
primary source of foreign military support in terms of materiel 
and financing. United States military missions to Haiti during 
and after World War II helped to maintain links between the 
two countries. 

Overall, between 1950 and 1977, the United States provided 
US$3.4 million in military aid, which included the cost of train- 
ing for 610 Haitian students in the United States. During the 
1980s, no direct military aid was provided, although some cred- 
its were advanced to permit commercial military purchases. 
The financing program amounted to about US$300,000 a year, 
but the Duvaliers spent a much greater amount in direct com- 
mercial transactions, primarily for crowd-control equipment. 
All forms of military assistance ended when the elections of 
1987 failed. ACDA has recorded no imports of military equip- 
ment since 1987, when US$500,000 worth of military items 
entered the country, presumably acquired through commer- 
cial channels. 

Role of the Army in Law Enforcement Prior to 1995 

Although the 1987 constitution mandated a separate police 
corps and a new police academy under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Justice and Public Security, political realities pre- 



472 



Haiti: National Security 



vented the implementation of these changes. The army feared 
that a separate police would compete for funds and influence 
and would threaten its opportunities for profit. The armed 
forces continued to act as the nation's ultimate law enforce- 
ment agency in spite of their lack of competence in this area. 
The only identifiable police force in Haiti operated in Port-au- 
Prince, its members assigned to it by the armed forces. This 
1,000-member force had few operational or technical capabili- 
ties, even though it was responsible for criminal investigations, 
as well as narcotics and immigration control. Members of the 
FAd'H detailed for police duties received no specific training in 
police methods. They did not have regular beats, investigate 
crimes, or carry out other normal police functions. The police 
could be hired to arrest persons on flimsy evidence. Warrant- 
less arrest was common, as was incommunicado detention. 

There was no true rural police. Small garrisons, operating 
under military department command, with some cooperation 
from the lowest central government administrative heads, the 
military section chiefs, were responsible for rural security. In 
effect, the 562 section chiefs functioned not only as police 
chiefs but also as primary government representatives in rural 
areas. Thus, with little or no oversight from the capital and 
without special training, the officers assigned to keep order 
often acted as prosecutors, judges, and tax assessors in a brutal 
system whose main purpose was to prevent any grassroots 
opposition from developing. 

In addition to its failure to establish a nationwide police 
force as called for in the constitution, the military leadership 
failed to subdue the VSN and other vigilante groups. Direct 
links between the senior army command and remnants of the 
VSN enabled many VSN agents to infiltrate FAd'H units and 
the cadres of the Port-au-Prince police force. Many of the para- 
military groups simply were engaged in a career of banditry 
with no political motivation. The Avril government made some 
effort to crack down on abuses in the internal security services, 
but members of the FAd'H and its various affiliates continued 
to use their monopoly of power to subjugate and mistreat the 
Haitian citizenry. It has been estimated that some 3,000 Hai- 
tians died in the 1991-94 period as a result of the FAd'H's 
oppressive governance. 

Haiti's External and Domestic Security Concerns 

Defense of the nation against external threats was never a 



473 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

prominent factor in the mission of Haiti's armed forces. Since 
the efforts of the French to reconquer the island in the early 
years of the nineteenth century, the country has not been seri- 
ously challenged by any foreign power. In 1822 Haiti occupied 
the eastern part of the island of Hispaniola, which had 
declared itself independent of Spain as the Republic of Santo 
Domingo. Controlling the whole island, however, drained the 
national treasury, and internal struggles so weakened the army 
that it was unable to pursue missions beyond its borders. None- 
theless, under Faustin Soulouque, Haiti made repeated 
attempts to reconquer the eastern part of the island between 
1847 and 1859, following its ejection in 1844. 

The principal sources of the nation's safety until the twenti- 
eth century were the jealousies among the great powers and 
the increasing interest of the United States in a stable order in 
Haiti. The United States Navy deployed to the country's ports 
fifteen times between 1876 and 1913 in order to protect United 
States lives and property. Occupation of Haiti by the United 
States Marines beginning in 1915 was designed to ensure 
domestic law and stability. During this period, the United 
States helped establish the Garde d'Haiti, which was intended 
to be a modern, apolitical military establishment oriented 
toward this goal. 

As a noncommunist country situated only eighty kilometers 
from Cuban territory, Haiti's security falls within the wider 
framework of United States strategic interests in the Caribbean. 
The Marine occupation and a succession of American training 
missions have in effect placed Haiti under a United States secu- 
rity umbrella. The Duvaliers' tight control eliminated all Marx- 
ist influence, and it was not until 1986 that a small communist 
party began to operate openly in the country. Cuba has not 
tried to interfere in Haitian affairs, deterred by the severity of 
Haiti's political and economic difficulties and the high profile 
of the United States in the region. 

Relations with the Dominican Republic, Haiti's neighbor on 
the island of Hispaniola, have been marked by recurrent differ- 
ences, but neither country presents a threat to the other's terri- 
torial integrity or security. The Dominican Republic was an 
important source of smuggled gasoline and other goods during 
the 1991-94 international embargo against Haiti. Under pres- 
sure from the United States, however, the Dominicans 
strengthened their military border posts, reducing if not shut- 
ting off the movement of contraband. By agreement, several 



474 



Haiti: National Security 



thousand Haitian cane cutters migrate annually to assist in the 
harvest of Dominican sugar plantations. Nevertheless, the issue 
of legal and illegal Haitian workers in the Dominican Republic 
is a source of friction. During a visit by Haitian president Rene 
Garcia Preval to the Dominican capital of Santo Domingo in 
1996, the first such event in decades, the authorities of the two 
countries agreed to set up a joint commission on trade, immi- 
gration, and other problems. 

Traditionally, the military has seen its role as an autonomous 
force available to intervene in crises that threaten lawful 
authority. It has, however, been subject to chronic instability 
traceable in part to generational and political differences 
among members of the officer corps and the complicating role 
of the VSN and other paramilitary groups. As of 1999, the 
former military leaders and agents of the paramilitary groups 
still presented a latent threat to the post-1994 government. 
Many of these figures live in exile in the Dominican Republic 
or in one of the Central American countries. Other former sol- 
diers are employed by private security companies and as per- 
sonal bodyguards of wealthy families. The private security firms 
are larger and better armed than the Haitian police. Arms are 
easily available to dissident elements. Only about 30,000 of 
roughly 175,000 guns in Haiti have been seized or turned in 
under the United States-sponsored buy-back program. 

Armed groups could potentially bring about the collapse of 
Haiti's civilian government by assassinations of leading politi- 
cians, aiding plots by disaffected elements, or taking advantage 
of mounting turmoil growing out of street violence and eco- 
nomic distress or politically manipulated demonstrations. The 
continued presence of small United States military contingents 
and UN-sponsored personnel acts as a limited deterrent on 
actions intended to overturn domestic institutions. 

Government officials have charged that former military fig- 
ures have encouraged paramilitary gangs to demoralize and 
destabilize the political situation by demonstrating that the 
PNH is unable to ensure the nation's internal security. An inci- 
dent in May 1999 in which eleven detainees were gunned down 
by the police in Port-au-Prince has been cited as a deliberate 
plot to tarnish the image of the PNH. Seven officers were 
arrested, including the Port-au-Prince police commissioner, a 
former army officer. 

Episodes of violence are common in Haiti, particularly in 
the slum area of Port-au-Prince known as Cite Soleil, which the 



475 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

police are often reluctant to penetrate. Most of this crime is 
associated with five or six criminal gangs. Although these gangs 
are formless and undisciplined, they represent a danger to the 
established order by contributing to a sense of chaos and law- 
lessness that weakens public confidence in the government's 
power to maintain control. Most of the lawless behavior lacks a 
political motivation, although the police have been the target 
of a number of attacks, some resulting in their deaths. In earlv 
1998, the station chief in Mirebalais was lynched by a gang of 
young men linked to Aristide's political movement. 

Violence has spread from gang-ridden areas to more pros- 
perous parts of the city and to the countryside, driven by 
increasing economic desperation and a limited police pres- 
ence. The looting of warehouses, truck hijackings, and holdups 
of buses are among the most common forms of armed crime. A 
rash of kidnappings and robberies of wealthy and middle-class 
Haitians has been a further feature of the crime wave. Vigilante 
groups, sometimes organized with government approval, act to 
enforce rough "street justice" where the police are unable or 
unwilling to act, or where confidence is lacking in the court sys- 
tem. Angry mobs often kill suspected thieves, murderers, and 
rapists. According to police records, some 100 deaths resulted 
from such incidents in the first half of 1998. Occasionally, 
timely police intervention has prevented lynchings. 

Some armed, unemployed ex-FAd'H soldiers have turned to 
crime. Other demobilized troops with legitimate grievances 
over the loss of their careers and pensions and the lack of jobs 
and army severance pay present a potentially dangerous anti- 
government element. Several hundred ex-soldiers staged a pro- 
test in the capital in 1996, threatening to take up arms if their 
demands were not met. Subsequently, the police arrested 
twenty members of the extreme right-wing Mobilization for 
National Development, most of whose members were ex-sol- 
diers, on charges of plotting the assassination of public offi- 
cials. Two of the group's leaders were later found murdered, 
apparently by members of the Presidential Guard. Rene Preval, 
who became president in February 1996, came under United 
States pressure to purge his bodyguard unit but, apparently 
fearful for his own safety, was unwilling to do so until a security 
detail from the United States and Canada was assigned to 
guard him. The detail was withdrawn a year later. 



476 



Haiti: National Security 



Internal Security since 1994 

Upon President Aristide's return to Haiti in October 1994, 
the military was divested of all of its previous internal security 
functions, and steps were immediately undertaken to replace it 
with a separate national police force as stipulated in the consti- 
tution. As an initial measure, the Interim Public Security Force 
(IPSF) was formed under the supervision of more than 1,000 
international police monitors. Nearly 1,000 of the IPSF mem- 
bers were drawn from Haitian migrants in the United States 
safe haven in Guantanamo, Cuba. Most of the remainder, 
about 3,300, were former FAd'H personnel who had been 
screened to eliminate any suspected of human rights abuses or 
criminal conduct. After an inadequate six-day training period 
that emphasized human rights, the interim police were 
deployed to cities and larger towns with the international mon- 
itors serving as mentors to the untried new officers and help- 
ing to reduce violations of human rights. 

The effort to establish a permanent professional police force 
got underway with the opening of a police academy in January 
1995 at Camp d' Application outside of Port-au-Prince. A series 
of four-month courses was instituted to enable the newly 
trained policemen to begin replacing the IPSF in June 1995. In 
December 1995, the government phased out the IPSF by incor- 
porating its remaining 1,600 members into the permanent 
police force. 

National Police 

The Haitian National Police (Police Nationale d'Haiti — 
PNH) reached its targeted strength of 6,500 by early 1998, but, 
by late 1999, its strength had fallen to 6,000 as a result of dis- 
missals. Its goal is to have 9,500-10,000 policemen by 2003, a 
goal that many observers doubt is attainable. For a nation of 
Haiti's size, the police complement is considered modest in 
comparison with other countries of the region. New York City, 
with a similar population, has a police force five times the size 
of Haiti's. 

The PNH represents a signal departure from Haiti's histori- 
cal reliance on the army to maintain internal security. Under 
the police law passed by the Haitian congress in November 
1994, the PNH falls under the immediate jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Justice and Public Security and the secretary of 
state for justice and public security. Ultimate authority rests 



477 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



MINISTER OF JUSTICE 



SPECIAL ADVISER 
ON 

NARCOTICS MATTERS 



SECRETARY OF STATE 
FOR JUSTICE 
(PUBLIC SECURITY) 



SUPERIOR COUNCIL 
OF 

THE NATIONAL POLICE 



INSPECTOR GENERAL 



DIRECTOR GENERAL 
OF THE HAITIAN 
NATIONAL POLICE 



NATIONAL 
PENITENTIARY 
ADMINISTRATION 



j DIRECTOR OF THE 


JUDICIAL POLICE 






DIRECTORS OF 






DEPARTMENTS (9) 






SPECIAL 






INVESTIGATIVE 




UNIT 



DIRECTORS OF 
DEPARTMENTS (9) 



CITY POLICE CHIEFS 
(133) 

CHIEF INSPECTORS 
(185) 

SERGEANTS— 
SUBPRECINCTS AND 
RURAL POSTS (577) 



ADMINISTRATIVE AND 
GENERAL SERVICES 
DIRECTOR 



SPECIAL WEAPONS AND 
TACTICS (SWAT) TEAM 



CROWD CONTROL UNIT 



HAITIAN COAST GUARD 



BUREAU OF CRIMINAL AFFAIRS 



NATIONAL PALACE 
RESIDENTIAL GUARD 



PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY UNIT 



MINISTERIAL SECURITY CORPS 



Figure 14. Organization of the Haitian National Police, 1999 



with the Superior Council of the National Police, which 
includes the ministers of justice and interior, and the director 
general and inspector general of police. Pierre Denize, a civil- 
ian lawyer with a reputation for being tough on crime and cor- 
ruption, was appointed director general of police in 1996. The 
director general is chosen by the president from police direc- 
tors or divisional commanders for a renewable three-year term. 
His appointment is subject to Senate approval. 

Recruitment to other command positions has been opened 
to both military officers and civilian university graduates. Both 
groups are required to go through the same examination pro- 
cess and training. No more than one-third of PNH officers are 
former military, and the highest posts at PNH headquarters 
and departmental directorates are all held by civilians. 

Neither military nor civilian officers have proven to be well 
qualified, with wide differences in capacities of individual offic- 
ers. Deployed after the first agents were already in place, the 
officers have had difficulty gaining the respect of their subordi- 
nates. Many officers meeting the academic criteria have shown 
poor leadership skills. In addition, many have failed to enforce 
discipline against the agents under their command and have 
failed to implement regulations and codes of discipline. 

The PNH is divided into two main units, the Administrative 
Police with responsibility for day-to-day public security and 



478 



Haiti: National Security 



crime prevention, and the Judicial Police, a detective force that 
assists the courts in carrying out criminal investigations (see 
fig. 14). A separate unit, the Office of the Inspector General, 
which reports to both the director general and the minister of 
justice, investigates complaints against the police of human 
rights abuses. The Office of the Inspector General also con- 
ducts periodic inspections of police establishments and the 
Police Academy to assure compliance with police regulations 
and to evaluate the PNH's effectiveness. The office had seventy- 
two people assigned to it in 1997, and more personnel were 
being added. Its head was said to be seriously committed to 
purging the PNH of abusive and criminal elements, but the 
staff was overwhelmed as a result of trying to pursue cases of 
police misbehavior while at the same time carrying out its on- 
site inspection schedule. 

Each of Haiti's nine departments has a departmental police 
director. Beneath them are the positions of chief commission- 
ers (commissaires principaux) and some 130 posts of city police 
chiefs or municipal commissioners ( commissaires municipaux) . 
The next subdivisions are the 185 subcommissariats under 
chief inspectors (inspecteurs principaux) and, finally, 577 supervi- 
sory positions of sergeants {inspecteurs) in the sub-precincts of 
smaller towns and the smallest police divisions in rural and 
urban areas. These smallest offices may be staffed by as few as 
three policemen. 

Specialized forces — the 200-member National Palace Resi- 
dential Guard, the eighty-seven member Presidential Security 
Unit, and the Ministerial Security Corps — provide protection 
to the political leadership. There is also a crowd control unit, 
the Company for Intervention and Maintaining Order 
(Compagnie d'Intervention et Maintien d'Ordre — CIMO), and 
a SWAT team, the Intervention Group of the Haitian National 
Police (Groupe d'Intervention de la Police Nationale d'Haiti — 
GIPNH) . Each of the nine administrative regions also has its 
own crowd control force. Two specialized units that had been 
undergoing training began to be deployed in 1997. One was 
the Haitian Coast Guard with ninety-four members; the other 
was the Counternarcotics Unit under the Bureau of Criminal 
Affairs with only twenty-five members. 

The government has established a Special Investigative Unit 
under the director of the Judicial Police to look into notorious 
homicides — generally politically motivated — dating back to the 
mid-1980s. About seventy such cases have been brought under 



479 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

investigation, including deaths that occurred under the mili- 
tary regime after 1991, and high-profile killings following Aris- 
tide's return to office. However, the unit is ill-equipped and 
inexperienced and had made only limited progress on these 
cases by the close of 1999. 

Some mayors have formed quasi-official forces to supple- 
ment the work of the PNH in their communities. These forces 
remain small and lack legal standing or the right to carry weap- 
ons. The municipalities have openly resisted the national gov- 
ernment's demands that their arms be turned in to the PNH. 
In some cases, they assume arrest authority without the sanc- 
tion of the law. The Port-au-Prince extra-legal force is believed 
to number several dozen persons, and the adjoining suburb of 
Delmas has about thirty. Other communities have smaller 
corps. 

Recruitment, Training, and Equipment 

Initial recruitment for the PNH was carried out by traveling 
teams that tested thousands of applicants. Only a small per- 
centage was able to pass the examination, in part because liter- 
acy in French and the equivalent of a high-school diploma were 
required. This relatively high education level created some 
problems for the police in dealing with the mostly illiterate 
population, especially in rural areas, and the education 
requirement has since been reduced to a tenth-grade level. 
Members of the IPSF were allowed to apply on the basis of rec- 
ommendations from international police monitors but were 
still required to pass the entrance test. 

The academy course has been expanded from four to nine 
months, although, realistically, adequate training would 
require twelve to eighteen months. The program includes 
instruction in police procedures, tactical skills, police manage- 
ment and administration, law, and a course in "human dignity." 
Under pressure to train large numbers of recruits rapidly, the 
initial classes were brought to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, 
for the portion of the program dealing with practical police 
skills. Short-term specialized courses also have been introduced 
to sharpen the skills of police and officers in the field. 

The training program was developed by the United States 
Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative 
Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) . Haitian lawyers focus 
on the constitution and Haitian laws, while personnel of ICI- 
TAP, together with Canadian and French police trainers, deal 



480 



National Police, Port-au-Prince 
Courtesy United States Agency for International Development 

with patrol, arrest, and investigative techniques. Haitian 
instructors are scheduled to fill all positions at the academy. 

The highest 10 percent of the members of the initial classes 
received additional training for supervisory positions. Other 
members of each class were selected to receive additional inves- 
tigative training for service in the Judicial Police. Women com- 
prised about 7 percent of the original classes and were assigned 
to regular patrol duties after graduation. 

The monthly salary ranges between US$250 and US$400, 
with sergeants earning US$500-600. These wages are generous 
by Haitian standards. Nevertheless, the police have demon- 
strated for higher rates on the grounds that higher salaries will 
reduce a force member's temptation to resort to bribery and 
drug trafficking. However, it seems unlikely that the Haitian 
government can afford to maintain this pay scale if the econ- 
omy continues to decline. In 1998 consideration was being 
given to establishing a separate rural police force that would be 
less well paid and have lower entrance standards. Many PNH 
recruits are reluctant to serve outside Port-au-Prince, in some 
cases because they are concurrently continuing university stud- 
ies. However, a policy of redeployment has been instituted to 
bring police who have served in rural areas for several years 



481 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

into towns and making members of the PNH in the Port-au- 
Prince area subject to reassignment to the provinces. 

Each new officer is provided with a gun, shoes, and one uni- 
form. The uniform consists of blue trousers with a vertical yel- 
low stripe and a pale tan shirt, usually short sleeved. Rank 
insignia are worn on epaulets. Members of CIMO wear distinc- 
tive black uniforms. 

The police are restricted by law to carrying only sidearms. 
Special units are equipped with shotguns, Ml 6 semiautomatic 
rifles, and Uzi submachine guns, but in some cases police on 
routine assignments are seen with them as well. Some riot 
shields and bulletproof vests have been distributed. Mainte- 
nance of equipment, including firearms, is poor, and control 
systems are described as embryonic. Vehicles are in seriously 
short supply. A number of new vans were donated to the police, 
but most quickly became inoperable because of insufficient 
maintenance and repair and the high accident rate attributed 
to the inexperience of the recruits. Radio communication 
exists between the capital and the departmental directors and 
major urban areas, but communications remain poor in rural 
areas. The police stations were at first in wretched condition, 
some entirely uninhabitable, especially outside the capital. 
They lacked furniture, office equipment, and holding cells. 
Typewriters, filing cabinets, and some other equipment have 
since been made available with the aid of outside agencies. 

Among the problems still confronting the new police force 
are weak leadership and political influence over appointments 
and promotions. Excessive use of force continues to be at a 
worrisome level (see Respect for Human Rights, this ch.). 
Police often also display an arrogant attitude toward the local 
community. PNH personnel are reluctant to descend from 
their vehicles, to carry out routine patrolling, or to thoroughly 
investigate crimes. In addition, supervisors are frequently 
absent from their posts. However, Rachel M. Neild of the Wash- 
ington Office on Latin America, who has closely followed the 
emergence of the PNH, observed in early 1998 that in spite of 
these problems the PNH had gained confidence in 1997, its 
second full year, and had become less dependent on foreign 
police monitors in carrying out its operations." 

The United States Department of State observed in 1999 
that the PNH was continuing to gain experience and to benefit 
from training. Nevertheless, the PNH found itself still grap- 



482 



Haiti: National Security 



pling with problems of attrition, corruption, incompetence, 
narcotics trafficking, and human rights abuses within its ranks. 

Respect for Human Rights 

State violence and terror have been features of Haitian life 
since the nation broke away from colonial rule in 1804, and 
even before. Between Aristide's overthrow in 1991 and his res- 
toration in 1994, the use of paramilitary groups against individ- 
uals thought to be opposed to the regime became common. 
Control of the populace was enforced by acts of kidnapping, 
extrajudicial killings, rape, and "disappearances." Mutilated 
bodies were left in the streets as warnings against disobedience. 
A pattern of judicial corruption, arbitrary arrest, and pro- 
longed detentions was inherited from the previous Duvalier era 
as a method of governance. The FAd'H and its various affiliates 
used their monopoly to subjugate and abuse the Haitian citi- 
zenry. Their abuses escalated in the final months of the mili- 
tary regime's existence. 

The arrival in 1994 of the international military and police 
missions and the return of President Aristide brought a dra- 
matic reduction in the level of institutional violence. The shift 
in responsibility for law enforcement from the FAd'H to a new 
police organization and the subsequent disbanding of the 
FAd'H introduced fundamental changes to the human rights 
landscape. The transformation has by no means been com- 
plete, however. Continuing political feuds and bitter hatreds, 
combined with the inexperience of the new police force, have 
accounted for many brutal criminal acts, but far beneath the 
scale of the past. In the first three years following the entry of 
the international forces in September 1994, about two dozen 
executions were recorded that may have been politically moti- 
vated. The most notorious cases in which a government role 
was suspected were those of Mireille Bertin, the spokeswoman 
for an opposition party, in 1995, and two right-wing extremist 
leaders the following year. In October 1999, Jean Lamy, a 
former army colonel who was slated to become secretary of 
state for justice (public security), was assassinated by unknown 
gunmen. 

There were sixty-six cases of extrajudicial killings by the 
police in 1999, according to the Organization of American 
States (OAS) /UN International Civilian Mission (ICM). 
Although a continuing problem, these killings were not politi- 
cal but resulted from excessive use of force and lack of profes- 



483 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

sionalism on the part of the police. Many were believed to be 
summary executions of suspects and detainees. Others 
occurred during police actions against gangs and mobs. Cases 
of police executions and serious police crimes were investi- 
gated by the Office of the Inspector General, although police 
beatings were likely to be overlooked. 

In January 1999, the secretary of state for justice and public 
security announced that 500 police implicated in various 
infractions had been removed from the force. However, the 
weakness of the judiciary has precluded successful prosecu- 
tions of police for unjustified deaths. This apparent impunity 
was underscored in 1997, when an investigative judge released 
without trial six members of the PNH who had been charged 
with participating in three separate incidents of summary exe- 
cutions. The judge involved was later removed from office, and 
Haitian authorities were making efforts to reinstitute charges. 

Police mistreatment of detainees appears to be on the 
increase. The ICM recorded 191 such incidents in 1998. This 
rise, which went up nearly five times in a single year, may have 
been linked to the beatings of large groups of inmates in con- 
nection with escape attempts at two prisons. Many reports 
involved beatings of armed gang members, excessive force in 
dealing with demonstrators, application of psychological pres- 
sures, and administration of shock treatment to prisoners while 
they were under questioning. However, these incidents of 
human rights violations by the PNH failed to substantiate a pol- 
icy of deliberate or systematic abuse. The inspector general has 
focused most of his resources on police criminal activities and 
has not punished many cases of abuse. Complaints against 
indiscriminate use of firearms by the police have declined in 
spite of the increase in the number of police deployed. The 
inexperience and youth of the recruits as well as training short- 
comings and fears for their own safety accounted for many of 
the problems of the new force. 

Multinational Security Assistance 

The coup of September 1991 against Haiti's first democrati- 
cally elected president brought condemnation by the UN Secu- 
rity Council and the imposition of sanctions by the OAS. 
Diplomatic efforts by the OAS to restore the Aristide govern- 
ment lacked force in part because the OAS embargo was so 
porous. It was not until June 1993, when the Security Council 
imposed a worldwide fuel and arms embargo, that the leaders 



484 



Haiti: National Security 



of the illegal Haitian military regime agreed to negotiations to 
restore democracy to the country. However, the ten-point Gov- 
ernors Island Accord of July 3, 1993, failed when an advance 
team of the UN-sponsored police trainers and military person- 
nel was prevented from coming ashore (see The Post-Duvalier 
Period, this ch.) 

More resolute pressures by the United States and the UN, 
plus preparations by the United States for an actual invasion, 
finally persuaded the de facto Haitian leaders to agree to the 
landing of troops on the basis of "permissive intervention." 
The United States-led Multinational Force (MNF) quickly grew 
to 21,000 troops, of which 2,500 were from other countries. 

The MNF was welcomed as a liberating force by ordinary 
Haitians, who celebrated their restored freedom and the hope 
of a resumption of democratic government. Relations with the 
Haitian military were less cordial. The MNF was obliged to 
send patrols into the countryside to replace Haitian troops car- 
rying out rural police functions. In the cities, the FAd'H was 
confined to barracks and divested of its arms. The coup leaders 
soon departed the country, leaving the army demoralized and 
leaderless. 

In March 1995, the MNF was formally replaced by the UN 
Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) under the terms of a UN resolution 
providing for a force of 6,000 military peacekeepers. The 3,300 
United States military personnel then remaining in Haiti 
formed the core, with most of the other troops coming from 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, and Canada. The UNMIH was 
organized into five infantry battalions, including a United 
States quick-reaction force, a military police battalion, and 
engineering, aviation, logistics, military intelligence, and civil 
affairs units. The group had its headquarters in Port-au-Prince, 
with six subheadquarters. United States Special Forces were 
detailed to twenty-five rural areas to supervise ad hoc arrange- 
ments with local army units. 

In 1996 Canada assumed a principal role in the operation, 
agreeing to supply the UNMIH force commander. The mission 
was gradually drawn down until its last contingents of 650 
Canadian and 550 Pakistani troops began their departures in 
November 1997. A separate United States contingent of 480 
active-duty soldiers and reservists remained in Haiti from the 
original force of 20,000 in 1994. Mainly civil engineers and 
medical personnel, they helped with construction of schools, 
roads, and bridges and provided medical assistance. The troops 



485 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

were scheduled to be withdrawn in January 2000, to be 
replaced by reserve and National Guard forces on short assign- 
ments to continue medical programs and engineering projects. 

The UN was also responsible for some 900 police trainers 
from more than twenty countries, who assisted in the forma- 
tion and professionalization of the PNH. This multinational 
mentoring and training force had been reduced to 290 civilian 
police specialists from eleven countries by 1998, of whom 
twenty-three were detached from the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police and from local police forces in Canada, thirty from the 
United States, many of them of Haitian origin, and thirty-five 
from France. Argentina supplied 140 federal police to provide 
security for the police trainers. The training mandate was 
scheduled to expire March 15, 2000, with a follow-up technical 
support program planned. 

Justice System 

Haiti's legal system reflects its colonial origins. It has a 
French structure superimposed on a traditional African-Carib- 
bean society and thus lacks the parallel or indigenous legal sys- 
tem often found in modern Africa. The civil law system is based 
on the Napoleonic Code. The Criminal Code dates from 1832 
(see Governmental Institutions, ch. 9). 

For nearly 200 years, the justice system has been noted for its 
rampant corruption. Most crimes go unsolved and unpun- 
ished. The Duvalier dictatorships and the military regimes that 
followed left a judicial system that was barely functioning. The 
best judges and lawyers fled the country, in some cases to serve 
as judicial officials of newly independent francophone African 
states. 

The OAS/UN International Civilian Mission to Haiti deliv- 
ered a devastating indictment of the judicial system after the 
monitors had completed a study of the system's most pressing 
weaknesses in 1993 while the military was still in power. Their 
report found that judges, prosecutors, and lawyers had been 
threatened, beaten, and killed for attempting to follow the rule 
of law. Judges and prosecutors were afraid even to investigate 
cases involving the military, the attaches, or their supporters. 
Corruption and extortion permeated every level of the judicial 
system. Despite the requirement that justices of the peace have 
a law degree and complete a minimum one-year probationary 
period, many justices of the peace did not know how to read 
and write. People viewed the court system with contempt and 



486 



Haiti: National Security 



avoided it by settling disputes on their own, sometimes by Vigi- 
lante justice." The impunity of the most powerful sectors of 
Haitian society fed the country's cycle of violence. Judicial pro- 
cedures and protections were systematically breached by deten- 
tions and warrantless arrests that amounted simply to 
abduction. 

The restored civilian government has undertaken limited 
measures to redress the abuses of the 1991-94 period, but as of 
1999 the judicial system remained weak and corrupt. Sweeping 
judicial reforms are planned. Congress passed a judicial reform 
law in 1998, but it did not contain sufficiently precise measures 
to produce material changes. Persons are still detained for long 
periods without trial, and normal protections against arbitrary 
arrest are routinely violated. A large proportion of crimes, 
including grave political offenses, are never brought to trial 
even when strong evidence could be presented against the pre- 
sumed perpetrators. 

With the help of international donors, the Ministry of Justice 
and Public Security has opened a magistrates' school offering a 
twenty-four-week course. The first two classes in 1998 and 1999 
trained a corps of 100 new magistrates. In addition, 120 justices 
of the peace attended training seminars. The ministry has 
improved the functioning of the public prosecutor's office and 
brought about better case presentation and judicial supervi- 
sion. In spite of some salary increases, there have been 
repeated strikes of justices of the peace and prosecutors 
demanding pay raises and better working conditions. Many 
lower courts are barely functional, lacking proper quarters, 
electricity, record-keeping, or stationery. Corrupt judges from 
the coup period, many regarded as irredeemable, continue on 
the bench. Failure to reform the code of criminal procedure 
contributes to a large backlog of cases. The code stipulates that 
the fifteen courts of first instance hold only two criminal court 
sessions per year, each lasting for two weeks, to try all major 
crimes, primarily murder, requiring a jury trial. 

At the end of 1999, about 80 percent of prison inmates were 
unsentenced and awaiting trial. No compensation is granted to 
those ultimately found innocent. A new Office to Control Pre- 
ventive Detention was formed by the Ministry of of Justice in 
1998 to accelerate the review and processing of cases stagnat- 
ing in the prison system. By improving judges' access to detain- 
ees, this office facilitated the review of 1,198 cases and the 



487 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

release of 477 prisoners and referral of 160 detainees to the 
courts. 

The constitution stipulates that a person may be arrested 
only if apprehended during commission of a crime or if a war- 
rant has been issued. The detainee must be brought before a 
judge within forty-eight hours of arrest. The police often take a 
cavalier attitude toward the legal requirements for the issuance 
of valid search and arrest warrants, adequate evidence for 
arrests, and presentation of suspects before a judge within 
forty-eight hours. The constitution prohibits the interrogation 
of those charged with a crime unless the suspect has legal coun- 
sel present or waives this right. Most accused cannot afford 
counsel, and, despite efforts of local and international human 
rights groups to provide legal aid, many interrogations con- 
tinue to be held without counsel present. During actual trials, 
most defendants have access to counsel. Notwithstanding the 
order of the minister of justice that Creole be used in the 
courts, most legal proceedings continue to be conducted in 
French, which only about 10 percent of the population speaks. 

Under the post-1994 civilian regime, there were no reported 
cases of the previously common practice of secret detention. 
The number of arbitrary arrests also declined significantly. The 
government has detained political opponents and persons 
associated with the former military regime, often on vague 
charges of plotting against the state. In some cases the authori- 
ties have responded to court orders to release such prisoners, 
but in others political prisoners have continued to be held con- 
trary to court rulings. 

The Ministry of Justice and Public Security is said to have 
made a sincere effort to overcome the stagnation of the trial 
system, releasing those who had already served more time than 
if they had been found guilty. As part of a new project, law stu- 
dents assist detainees to prepare their cases. The constitution 
provides protection against unnecessary force, psychological 
pressure, or physical brutality to extract confessions. However, 
police mistreatment of suspects at the time of arrest remains 
common. 

Prison System 

Haiti's prisons have long been notorious for their inhumane 
conditions and often cruel treatment of inmates. A United 
States Marine Corps report described them in 1934 as "a dis- 
grace to humanity." Under the military regime of 1991-94, the 



488 



Haiti: National Security 



prisons deteriorated still further. Detainees suffered from a 
lack of the most basic hygiene as well as from inadequate food 
and health care. Prisoners had to rely on families for food and 
medicines. Most of the seventeen prisons were remnants of gar- 
risons built for United States troops in the 1920s and lacked 
electricity, potable water, and toilets; many prisoners were 
forced to sleep on the floor in densely overcrowded quarters. 

The civil governments of Aristide and Preval have taken 
some measures to improve the situation, with the help of inter- 
national humanitarian bodies. The government created Haiti's 
first civilian prison agency, the National Penitentiary Adminis- 
tration (Administration Penitentiare Nationale — Apena) , and 
formed a corps of trained prison guards. The agency was 
placed under the PNH in 1997 but retained most of its auton- 
omy. The prison population was 3,494 in late 1998. One section 
of Fort National, the main penitentiary in Port-au-Prince, has 
been refurbished to house women and juveniles. In other pris- 
ons, overcrowding often prevents strict separation of juveniles 
from adults or convicts from those in trial detention. In 1998 
prisoners generally received one or two adequate meals a day, 
often supplemented by food brought by family members. In 
police station holding cells, where politically sensitive prisoners 
have often been kept, detainees continued to be dependent on 
their families for food. Prisoner health is a serious problem. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) paid 
for the installation of rudimentary clinics, but the government 
has failed to keep them adequately staffed with medicines. 
Human rights groups such as the ICRC and the Haitian Red 
Cross are freely permitted to visit prisons and police stations to 
monitor treatment of prisoners and to provide needed medical 
care, food, and legal aid. 

Narcotics Trafficking 

Haiti's geographic location between Colombia and the 
United States, coupled with its long, unpatrolled coastline, 
mountainous interior, and the presence of numerous airstrips, 
makes the country an ideal transshipment and storage point 
for Colombian cocaine suppliers. A lesser amount of marijuana 
also transits Haiti. Haiti itself is not an important producer of 
illegal drugs, nor has domestic drug consumption been a sig- 
nificant problem. Narcotics shipments from Colombia reach 
Haiti's southern coast via high-speed boats and by land and sea 
drops from light aircraft. A portion of the drugs are exported 



489 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

directly, but most are smuggled across the border to the 
Dominican Republic for onward transit to the United States, 
Canada, and Europe. 

The de facto military government of 1991-94 maintained a 
minimal drug enforcement effort, with the primary responsi- 
bility for antidrug operations assigned to the army and police 
units under army control. The air force and navy did not have 
the resources to make a material contribution to drug interdic- 
tion. Rumors abounded of senior officials linked to drug traf- 
ficking, although direct evidence was lacking. After the army 
command announced that any member linked to drug traffick- 
ing would be expelled from the military and subjected to civil 
prosecution, some low-ranking officers and enlisted personnel 
were reassigned or dismissed. However, the civil judicial system 
declined to prosecute military personnel on drug charges. 
United States efforts to help the Haitian counternarcotics 
effort were suspended while the military regime was in power. 

Under the Preval government, primary responsibility for 
drug suppression was brought under the Ministry of Justice 
and Public Security's special adviser on narcotics matters. 
Enforcement is primarily the responsibility of the Counternar- 
cotics Unit of the national police. The Haitian Coast Guard, 
activated with United States help, cooperated with the United 
States Coast Guard in several significant seizures in 1997, its 
first year. As a result of these operations, the Haitian Coast 
Guard was able to add to its inventory three high-speed vessels 
that had been confiscated from drug dealers. 

Although Haiti's role is secondary to that of the Dominican 
Republic in the drug transit trade, the feeble resources of the 
PNH and the corruption of the Haitian justice system have 
made Haitian territory increasingly inviting for illegal narcotics 
shipments. Oceangoing speedboats can leave Colombia at dusk 
and arrive at the Haitian coast before daybreak with little risk 
of detection. Drug loads can then be carried across the border 
to the Dominican Republic or smuggled to Florida on freight- 
ers. United States authorities have estimated that nearly sixty- 
seven tons of cocaine passed through Haiti in 1999. This figure 
represented 14 percent of the total amount of cocaine pro- 
duced in South America in that year. 

In 1998 the PNH made eighty-six drug-related arrests; none 
of those arrested were considered major drug traffickers. Of 
those detained, thirty-four were Colombians. None of those 
brought before the courts in 1997 or 1998 resulted in success- 



490 



Haiti: National Security 



ful prosecutions. Although 100 PNH officers were dismissed 
for drug-related offenses and ten arrested as a preliminary to 
prosecution, internal corruption persists. Seized cocaine is 
believed to be marketed by the police. Poorly paid customs 
agents and judges (whose salaries are often lower than those of 
the police) contribute to the difficulty of preventing official 
corruption. 

Haiti's enforcement effort remains beyond the capacity of 
the Haitian security forces alone to control. Haiti's laws are 
strong, but the country's weak judicial system has brought few 
traffickers to trial. The Office of the Special Adviser has drafted 
new legislation to improve narcotics control and to introduce 
the first law to combat money laundering, but the political 
impasse of 1998-99 prevented enactment of these measures by 
parliament. 

As of 1999, the Haitian government was still struggling in its 
attempts to establish functioning internal security and justice 
administrations in place of systems that had never enjoyed any 
credibility with the Haitian people. The police continued to be 
prone to unwarranted abuses, and their inexperience in con- 
fronting criminal behavior has led to numerous unjustified kill- 
ings. Nevertheless, hundreds of police have been cited for 
misconduct, many have been discharged, and some even jailed. 
Such efforts to impose a standard of behavior on the security 
forces have been almost unknown in Haiti's history. 

The new police force faces serious challenges in controlling 
major crime, violence directed against the democratic govern- 
ment, and international commerce in narcotics. It must also 
build and uphold professional standards against the threats of 
corruption and politicization. Although the Haitian army and 
its affiliated organizations have all been dissolved, many of 
their former members are armed and capable of creating cha- 
otic conditions endangering the regime. As the sole agency in 
Haiti dedicated to the maintenance of law and order, the PNH 
is essential to the preservation of a secure environment for 
democratic government. 

* * * 

Among the considerable number of scholars who have 
examined the collapse of the military regime in Haiti in 1994 
and the resumption of civilian government, the reports by 
Rachel M. Neild published by the Washington Office on Latin 



491 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

America are notable for their detailed record of the develop- 
ment of the Haitian National Police, based on periodic visits 
for personal observation. In several studies, Donald E. Schulz 
of the Army War College analyzes the country's internal secu- 
rity problems in a broader framework. The 1998 United 
Nations report on its civilian police mission appraises the suc- 
cess of its efforts to improve the police and judicial systems 
three years after the return of civilian rule. A vivid account by 
Elizabeth Rubin in the New York Times Magazine relates the 
experiences of a Haitian-born New York City policeman help- 
ing to deal with the enormous problems of bringing order to a 
society with no tradition of law and justice. 

The political role of the army from the close of the Duvalier 
era in 1986 until the restoration of democratic rule in 1994 is 
recounted in Haitian Frustrations: Dilemmas for U.S. Policy, edited 
by Georges A. Fauriol. The deplorable state of the Haitian judi- 
cial system is addressed by William G. O'Neill in a contribution 
to Haiti Renewed: Political and Economic Prospects. 

A treatment of the structure, internal conflicts, and ultimate 
breakdown of the armed forces can be found in the Fauriol 
work. Two earlier publications, Armed Forces of Latin America by 
Adrian J. English and World Armies, edited by John Keegan, pro- 
vide historical background on the evolution of the FAd'H. (For 
further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



492 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Dominican Republic: Population and Percentage Increase, 

1981 Census and 1993 Census 

3 Dominican Republic: School Attendance, Population Five 

Years of Age and Older by Level of Instruction, 1993 
Census 

4 Dominican Republic: Health Facilities and Personnel, 

1996-97 

5 Dominican Republic: Leading Causes of Death by Sex, 

1994 

6 Dominican Republic: Employment by Sector, 1996 

7 Dominican Republic: Agricultural and Livestock Produc- 

tion, 1997 

8 Dominican Republic: Mineral Production, 1993-97 

9 Dominican Republic: Tourism, 1993-97 

10 Dominican Republic: Imports and Exports, 1988-97 

11 Dominican Republic: United States Assistance, FY 1962-97 

12 Dominican Republic: Major Army Equipment, 1998 

13 Dominican Republic: Major Navy Equipment, 1999 

14 Dominican Republic: Major Air Force Equipment, 1998 

15 Haiti: Estimated Population by Geographic Department and 

Rural-Urban Residence, 1995 

16 Haiti: Estimated Population by Department and Arondisse- 

ment, 1995 

17 Haiti: Education Facilities and Personnel by Department, 

1996-97 

18 Haiti: Education Facilities by Level of Instruction and 

Sector, 1996-97 

19 Haiti: Health Facilities and Personnel by Department, 

1994 

20 Haiti: Imports and Exports, 1988-97 

21 Haiti: External Debt, Fiscal Years 1991-95 

22 Haiti: Grants Received, FY 1991-92-FY 1996-97 

23 Haiti: Sources and Amounts of Development Assistance, 

1990-99 



493 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



24 Haiti: Heads of State, 1971-99 

25 Haiti: Prime Ministers, 1988-99 

26 Haiti: Civil Jurisdictions and Government Institutions, 2000 

27 Haiti: Cabinet Ministers, December 1999 



494 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know 


Multiply by 


To find 


Millimeters 


0.04 


inches 


Centimeters 


0.39 


inches 


Meters 


3.3 


feet 


Kilometers 


0.62 


miles 


Hectares 


2.47 


acres 


Square kilometers 


0.39 


square miles 


Cubic meters 


35.3 


cubic feet 


Liters 


0.26 


gallons 


Kilograms 


2.2 


pounds 


Metric tons 


0.98 


long tons 




1.1 


short tons 




2,204 


pounds 


Degrees Celsius (Centigrade) 


1.8 


degrees Fahrenheit 




and add 32 





495 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



Table 2. Dominican Republic: Population and Percentage Increase, 
1981 Census and 1993 Census 

Region Population T 

% , r Increase 

Subregion ,. , 

Province 1981 1993 (m percentages) 



Cibao 
Central Cibao 

Espaillat 163,860 202,376 23.5 

La Vega 277,018 344,721 24.4 

Puerto Plata 201,893 261,485 29.5 

Santiago 533,102 710,803 33.3 

MonsenorNouel 1 112,932 149,318 32.2 

Total Central Cibao 1,288,805 1,668,703 29.5 

Eastern Cibao 

Duarte 227,798 281,879 23.7 

Maria Trinidad Sanchez 99,731 124,957 25.3 

Salcedo 94,173 101,810 8.1 

Samana 64,537 75,253 16.6 

Sanchez Ramirez 119,866 163,166 36.1 

Total Eastern Cibao 606,105 747,065 23.3 

Western Cibao 

Dajabon 54,675 68,606 25.5 

Monte Cristi 83,124 95,705 15.1 

Santiago Rodriguez 56,144 62,144 10.7 

Valverde 94,579 152,257 61.0 

Total Western Cibao 288,522 378,712 31.3 

Total Cibao 2,183,432 2,794,480 29.5 

Southwest 
Enriquillo 

Bahoruco 78,042 105,206 34.8 

Barahona 141,313 164,835 16.6 

Independencia 35,908 39,541 10.1 

Pedernales 15,493 18,054 16.5 

Total Enriquillo 270,756 327,636 21.0 

De Valle 

Azua 140,914 199,684 41.7 

Ellas Piha 61,895 64,641 4.4 

SanJuandelaMaguana . . . 231,509 252,637 9.1 

Total De Valle 434,318 516,962 19.0 

Total Southwest 705,074 844,598 19.8 

Southeast 
Valdesia 

National District 1,540,786 2,193,046 42.3 

Peravia 169,067 201,851 19.4 

San Cristobal 289,340 420,820 45.4 



496 



Appendix 



Table 2. ( Continued) Dominican Republic: Population and 
Percentage Increase, 1981 Census and 1993 Census 



Region 

Subregion 
Province 


Population 


Increase 


1981 


1993 


(in percentages) 


j 

Monte Plata 


155,608 


167,148 


7.4 


Total Valdesia 


2,154,801 


2,982,865 


38.4 


Yuma 








El Seybo 


83,230 


96,770 


16.3 


La Altagracia 


96,009 


115,685 


20.5 


La Romana 


107,021 


166,550 


55.6 


San Pedro de Macoris 


147,777 


212,368 


43.7 


Hato Mayor^ 


68,397 


80,074 


17.1 


Total Yuma 


502,434 


671,447 


33.6 


Total Southeast 


2,657,235 


3,654,312 


37.5 


TOTAL 


5,545,741 


7,293,390 


31.5 



These provinces became a part of the category after the 1981 census. 

Source: Based on information from Dominican Republic, Oficina Nacional de 
Estadistica, Republica Dominicana en Cifras, 1997, Santo Domingo, 1998, 47. 



497 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



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499 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



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500 



Appendix 



Table 4. Dominican Republic: Health Facilities and Personnel, 

1996-97 



Facility Personnel 



Health facilities 1,334 

Hospitals 213 

Hospital beds 15,236 

Medical schools 10 

Dental schools 8 

Nursing schools 5 

Physicians 17,460 

Dentists 1,898 



Source: Based on information from Pan American Health Organization, Health Condi- 
tions in the Americas, 2, Washington, 1994, 183-84; Health in the Americas, 1, 
Washington, 1998, 269, 284-86, 293, 308, and 2, Washington, 1998, 237-38. 



Table 5. Dominican Republic: Leading Causes of Death by Sex, 1994 

(in percentages) 



Sex 

Causes of Death 

Female Male 





38.2 


30.7 


Malignant neoplasms 


13.6 


10.8 




11.9 


11.3 




, , 5.8 


18.0 


Other causes 


30.5 


29.2 


TOTAL 


100.0 


100.0 



Source: Based on information from Pan American Health Organization, Health in the 
Americas, 2, Washington, 1998, 229-30, 232. 



501 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



Table 6. Dominican Republic: Employment by Sector, 1 996 

Sector Employees 

Agriculture 310,500 

Commerce 545,700 

Construction 126,600 

Energy 13,700 

Manufacturing 428,400 

Mining 8,800 

Transportation and Communications 185,700 

Source: Based on information from Banco Central de la Republica Dominicana. 



Table 7. Dominican Republic: Agricultural and Livestock Production, 

1997 
(in tons) 

Product Production 

Beef 79,000 

Cocoa 56,000 

Coffee 96,000 

Poultry 156,000 

Rice 521,000 

Sugarcane 6,296,000 

Tobacco 38,000 

Source: Based on information from Banco Central de la Republica Dominicana. 



Table 8. Dominican Republic: Mineral Production, 1993-97 



Mineral 


1993 


1994 


1995 


1996 


1997 


Gold (troy ounces) 


8,000 


49,000 


106,000 


118,000 


76,000 


Silver (troy ounces) 


39,000 


296,000 


677,000 


547,000 


399,000 


Nickel (tons) 


13,000 


31,000 


31,000 


30,000 


33,000 



Source: Based on information from Banco Central de la Republica Dominicana. 



502 



Appendix 



Table 9. Dominican Republic: Tourism, 1993-97 





1993 


1994 


1995 


1996 


1997 


Number of stopover 












visitors 


1,719,000 


1,766,800 


1,490,200! 


1,930,000 


2,211,000 


Number of hotel rooms 


26,800 


28,965 


32,475 


35,750 


38,250 



1 Non-Dominican only. 

Source: Based on information from Dominican Republic, Secretariat of State for Tour- 
ism. 



Table 10. Dominican Republic: Imports and Exports, 1988-97 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



Year Imports Exports 



1988 1,608 889 

1989 1,963 924 

1990 1,792 734 

1991 1,728 658 

1992 2,174 562 

1993 2,118 110 

1994 2,883 644 

1995 2,588 766 

1996 3,205 816 

1997 3,582 881 



Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, International Finan- 
cial Statistics, 1 998, Washington, 1998, 377. 



503 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



Table 11. Dominican Republic: United States Assistance, FY 1962-97 J 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



FY 1 


Development Assistance 


PL-480 
Programs 2 


ESF 


Total 


1962 


24.7 


23.9 


22.8 


71.4 


1963 


2.1 


9.6 


0.0 


11.7 


1964 


0.0 


0.0 


4.9 


4.9 


1965 


1.4 


3.3 


84.3 


89.0 


1966 


21.8 


5.4 


72.5 


99.7 


1967 


21.5 


4.3 


32.2 


58.0 


1968 


27.1 


14.2 


16.4 


57.7 


1969 


12.3 


13.2 


0.0 


25.5 


1970 


5.2 


14.0 


0.0 


19.2 


1971 


13.5 


12.8 


0.0 


26.3 


1972 


7.4 


19.0 


0.0 


26.4 


1973 


1.0 


14.2 


0.0 


15.2 


1974 


12.6 


4.2 


0.0 


16.8 


1975 


5.6 


5.5 


0.0 


11.1 


1976 


16.1 


11.4 


0.0 


27.5 


1977 


0.9 


11.9 


0.0 


12.8 


1978 


1.3 


3.9 


0.0 


5.2 


1979 


26.4 


20.7 


0.0 


47.1 


1980 


34.6 


19.7 


0.0 


54.3 


1981 


17.4 


18.6 


0.0 


36.0 


1982 


19.0 


20.6 


41.0 


80.6 


1983 


26.5 


25.3 


8.0 


59.8 


1984 


27.8 


21.6 


34.0 


93.4 


1985 


30.1 


45.1 


95.0 


170.2 


1986 


26.5 


34.6 


40.0 


101.1 


1987 


19.5 


85.3 


0.0 


104.8 


1988 


18.6 


33.3 


13.0 


64.9 


1989 


20.1 


25.0 


0.0 


45.1 


1990 


18.0 


4.4 


0.0 


22.4 


1991 


13.9 


3.3 


0.0 


17.2 


1992 


11.0 


4.5 


5.0 


20.5 


1993 


17.8 


2.4 


1.7 


21.9 


1994 


10.7 


4.8 


0.0 


15.5 


1995 


9.0 


4.3 


0.0 


13.3 


1996 


9.7 


3.3 


0.0 


13.0 


1997 


11.0 


0.0 


0.3 


11.3 


TOTAL 


542.1 


557.6 


471.1 


1,570.8 



1 FY — fiscal year, e.g., October 1, 1962-September 30, 1963. 
2 PL— Public Law (see Glossary). 
3 ESF — Economic Support Funds. 

Source: Based on information from US Agency for International Development. 



504 



Appendix 



Table 12. Dominican Republic: Major Army Equipment, 1998 



Description 


Country of Origin 


Inventory 


AMX-13 light tanks, 76mm gun 


France 


12 


M-41A1 light tanks, 76mm gun 


United States 


12 


V-150 Commando armored personnel carriers 


United States 


8 


M-2/M-3 half-track armored personnel carriers 


United States 


20 


M-101 105mm howitzers, towed 


United States 


22 


Mortars, 120mm 


United States 


24 




United States 


n.a. 1 


1 n.a. — not available. 






Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1998-99, London, 1998, 222. 


Table 13. Dominican Republic: Maj 


or Navy Equipment, 1999 


Description 


Country of Origin 


Inventory 


Corvettes 






Cohoe class, 855 tons, two 76mm guns 


United States 


2 


Patrol forces 






Balsam class cutter, 1,034 tons, two 12.7mm 
machine guns 


United States 


1 


Admiral class gunships, 905 tons, one 76mm 
gun 


United States 


1 


Satoyomo class patrol boat, 960 tons, one 76mm 
gun 


United States 


1 


Canopus class large patrol craft, 95 tons, one 
40mm gun 


United States 


2 


PGM-11 class large patrol craft, 145 tons, one 
20mm machine gun 


United States 


1 


Bellatrix class coastal patrol craft, 60 tons, three 
12.7mm machine guns 


United States 


4 



Source: Based on information from Jane's Fighting Ships, 1999-2000, Alexandria, Vir- 
ginia, 1999, 169-71. 



505 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



Table 14. Dominican Republic: Major Air Force Equipment, 1998 



Description 



Country of Origin 



Inventory 



Counterinsurgency aircraft 

Cessna A-37B Dragonfly United States 8 

Transport 

C-47 Douglas Dakota United States 3 

Aero Commander 680 United States 1 

Liaison 

Cessna 210 United States 1 

PA-31 Navajo United States 2 

Beechcraft Queen Air 80 United States 3 

Beechcraft King Air United States 1 

Helicopter 

Bell 205 United States 8 

Aerospatiale SA-318C France 2 

Aerospatiale SA-365 France 1 

Trainer 

North American AT-6 United States 2 

Beech T-34B Mentor United States 6 

Beech T-41D Mescalero United States 3 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1998-99, London, 1998, 222. 



506 



Appendix 



Table 15. Haiti: Estimated Population by Geographic Department and 
Rural-Urban Residence, 1995 1 



Department 


Population 


Percent 


Percent 
Urban 


Percent Rural 


Artibonite 


1,013,779 


14 


23 


77 


Centre 


490,790 


7 


14 


86 


Grand' Anse 


641,399 


9 


13 


87 


Nord 


759,318 


11 


27 


73 


Nord-Est 


248,764 


3 


25 


75 


Nord-Ouest 


420,971 


6 


14 


86 


Ouest 


2,494,862 


35 


60 


40 


Sud 


653,398 


9 


14 


86 


Sud-Est 


457,013 


6 


8 


92 


TOTAL 


7,180,294 


100 


33 


67 



Population projections are based on national census data from 1950 and 1982. The population of urban areas may 
be underestimated, especially for the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area (Ouest). The most recent national census 
of Haiti occurred in 1982. 



Source: Based on information from Institut Ha'itien de Statistique et d'Informatique, 

Tendances et perspectives de la population d' Haiti au niveau regional (departement, 
arrondissement, et commune), 1980-2005, Port-au-Prince, 1992, 12, 15, 35. 



■ 



507 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



Table 1 6. Haiti: Estimated Population by Department and 
Arrondissement, 1995 



Department 



Arrondissement 



Population 



Artibonite 

Total Artibonite . . 
Centre 

Total Centre 

Grand' Anse 

Total Grand' Anse. 
Nord 

Total Nord 

Nord-Est 

Total Nord-Est 

Nord-Ouest 

Total Nord-Ouest . 



Gonaives 
Gros Morne 
Saint-Marc 
Dessalines 
Marmelade 



Hinche 
Mirebalais 
Lascahobas 
Cerca la Source 



Jeremie 
Anse-d'Hainault 
Corail 
Miragoane 
Anse-a-Veau 



Cap-Haitien 
Acul du Nord 
Grande Riviere du Nord 
Saint-Raphael 
Borgne 
Limbe 
Plaisance 



Fort Liberte 
Puanaminthe 
Trou du Nord 
Vallieres 



Port-de-Paix 
Saint-Louis du Nord 
Mole Saint-Nicolas 



188,930 
142,675 
235,808 
311,545 
134,821 
1,013,779 

148,186 
150,217 
124,817 
67,570 
490,790 

189,237 
82,742 

114,800 
97,506 

157,114 

641,399 

173,779 
125,126 
62,534 
129,674 
91,619 
57,227 
119,359 
759,318 

41,849 
82,763 
69,168 
54,984 
248,764 

174,550 
77,022 
169,399 
420,971 



508 



Appendix 



Table 16. ( Continued) Haiti: Estimated Population by Department 
and Arrondissement, 1 995 1 



Department 



Arrondissement 



Population 



Ouest 

Port-au-Prince 1,639,774 

Leogane 295,675 

Croix des Bouquets 315,175 

Arcahaie 155,471 

lie de la Gonave 88,767 

Total Ouest 2,494,862 

Sud 

Cayes 264,426 

Port-Salut 73,971 

Aquin 166,955 

■ Coteaux 56,910 

Chardonnieres 91,136 

Total Sud 653,398 

Sud-Est 

". Jacmel 248,462 

Bainet 128,650 

Belle-Anse 79,901 

Total Sud-Est 457,013 

1 Population projections are based on national census data from 1950 and 1982. The population of urban areas may 
be underestimated. 

Source: Based on information from Institut Hai'tien de Statistique et d'Informatique, 

Tendances et perspectives de la population d' Haiti au niveau regional (departement, 
arrondissement et commune), 1980-2005, Port-au-Prince, 1992, 38-62. 



509 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



Table 1 7. Haiti: Education Facilities and Personnel by Department, 

1996-97 1 



Department 




Primary Schools 




Secondary Schools 


Schools 


Students 


Teachers 


Schools 


Students 


Artibonite 


1,667 


222,754 


6,901 


129 


28,127 


Centre 


653 


83,258 


2,215 


60 


12,607 


Grand' Anse 


1,099 


149,799 


3,552 


60 


15,439 


Nord 


1,027 


162,962 


4,613 


119 


23,796 


Nord-Est 


320 


62,173 


1,459 


34 


8,339 


Nord-Ouest 


744 


103,912 


2,941 


71 


13,727 


Ouest 


2,332 


419,166 


12,814 


557 


191,558 


Sud 


987 


128,870 


3,935 


97 


23,381 


Sud-Est 


699 


96,386 


2,740 


43 


11,007 


TOTAL 


9,528 


1,429,280 


41,170 


1,170 


327,981 



These figures are based on statistics drawn from the education census of 1996-1997. 

Source: Based on information from Haiti, Ministry of National Education, Youth, and 
Sports, Annuaire statistique des ecoles fondamentales et secondaires d' Haiti, Port-au- 
Prince, 1998, 12, Annex A, tables 1 and 12, Annex B, tables 1 and 11. 



Table 18. Haiti: Education Facilities by Level of Instruction and 
Sector, 1996-97 1 



Level Public Private Total 



Preschool 409 4,949 5,358 

Primary 1,071 8,457 9,528 

Secondary 144 1,026 1,170 

Higher 7 52 59 



1 Data on preschool, primary, and secondary education are based on the education census of 1996-97 undertaken 
by the Ministry of Education. Data on higher education are from 1994-95. 

Source: Data on preschool, primary, and secondary education based on information 
from Haiti, Ministry of National Education, Youth, and Sports, Annuaire statis- 
tique des ecoles fondamentales et secondaires d'Haiti, Port-au-Prince, 1998. Data on 
higher education based on information from Research Triangle Institute, 
Academy for Educational Development, and Educat, S.A., Technical Diagnosis of 
the Haitian Education System, Port-au-Prince, Projet d'elaboration du plan 
national d'education 2004, 1997. 



510 



Appendix 



Table 1 9. Haiti: Health Facilities and Personnel by Department, 

1994 1 



Department 


riealtn 
Facilities 


Hospitals and 
In-patient 
Facilities 


Beds 


Beds/ 
100,000 
Population 


Physicians 


Nurses 


Artibonite 


84 


15 


572 


56 


69 


33 


Centre 


44 


3 


205 


42 


14 


9 


Grand' Anse 


60 


11 


421 


66 


13 


22 


Nord 


52 


11 


776 


102 


31 


52 


Nord-Est 


22 


5 


113 


45 


15 


11 


Nord-Ouest 


59 


8 


261 


62 


19 


29 


Ouest 


235 


42 


3,372 


135 


561 


527 


Sud 


71 


12 


581 


89 


30 


61 


Sud-Est 


36 


3 


172 


38 


21 


41 


TOTAL 


663 


110 


6,473 




773 


785 



Figures are based on 1994 data for physicians and nurses and population projections for 1995. 

Source: Based on information from Pan American Health Organization, Health Situa- 
tion Analysis, Haiti, Port-au-Prince, 1996, 93, 102. 



Table 20. Haiti: Imports andExports, 1 988-97 
(in millions of Haitian gourdes) 1 



Year Imports Exports 



1988 1,721 896 

1989 1,455 720 

1990 1,661 801 

1991 2,414 1,005 

1992 2,727 719 

1993 4,555 1,029 

1994 3,783 1,236 

1995 9,866 1,666 

1996 10,448 1,413 

1997 10,792 1,995 



For value of gourde, see Glossary. 
Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, International Finan- 
cial Statistics, 1998, Washington, 1998, 469. 



511 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



Table 21. Haiti: External Debt, Fiscal Years 1 991-95 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



Year Long-term Short-term 



1991 621 105 

1992 638 112 

1993 648 121 

1994 635 47 

1995 752 26 



Source: Based on information from World Bank, Global Development Finance, Washing- 
ton, 1997. 



Table 22. Haiti: Grants Received, FY 1 991-92-FY 1 996-97 
(in millions of Haitian gourdes) 1 

Year Grants Received 

FY 1991-92 14.0 

FY 1992-93 1.1 

FY 1993-94 2.2 

FY 1994-95 696.7 

FY 1995-96 354.3 

FY 1996-97 694.6 

1 For value of gourde, see Glossary. 

Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, International Finan- 
cial Statistics, Washington, 1997. 



512 



Appendix 



Table 23. Haiti: Sources and Amounts of Development Assistance, 

1990-99 

(in millions of United States dollars) 

Year United States France Canada European Union 



1990 54 

1991 78.5 

1992 63.6 16.6 9.4 12.6 

1993 49.8 16.5 14.6 10.0 

1994 90.6 14.9 14.9 13.6 

1995 193.7 31.1 18.4 85.8 

1996 135.6 29.6 24.4 67.4 

1997 99.1 

1998 " 97.3 1 

1999 97.0 1 

1 Planned. 

Source: Based on information from United States Agency for International Develop- 
ment, Washington, and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel- 
opment, Paris, 1998. 



513 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



Table 24. Haiti: Heads of State, 1971-99 



Name 


Period 


Title 


Jean-Claude Duvalier 


1/1/71 - 


2/7/86 


President-for-Life 


General Henri Namphy 


2/7/86- 


2/7/88 


Chairman, National Council 


Leslie F. Manigat 


2/7/88- 


6/20/88 


President 


General Henri Namphy 


6/20/88 


-9/17/88 


President, Military Government 


General Prosper Avril 


o /i i /qq 

y/ 1 / /oo 


Q/iq /on 


President, Military Government 


General Herard Abraham 


3/10/90 


-3/13/90 


President, Provisional Military Govern- 
ment 


Ertha Pascal-Trouillot 


3/13/90 


-2/7/91 


President, Provisional Government 


Jean-Bertrand Aristide 


2/7/91 - 


10/1/91 


President 


Jean-Bertrand Aristide 


10/1/91 


-10/11/94 


President-in-exile 


General Raoul Cedras 


10/1/91 


- 10/10/91 


President, Military Junta 


Joseph C. Nerette 


10/10/91 


-6/19/92 


Provisional President under Military 
Rule 


Marc-Louis Bazin 


6/19/92 


-6/15/93 


Provisional President and Prime Minis- 
ter under Military Rule 


Jean-Bertrand Aristide 


6/15/93 


-5/12/94 


President recognized by Military Junta 
following the Governors Island 
Agreement 


Emilejonassaint 


6/11/94 


- 10/12/94 


Provisional President under Military 
Rule 


Jean-Bertrand Aristide 


10/12/94-2/7/96 


President 


Rene Garcia Preval 


2/7/96 - 




President 



Table 25. Haiti: Prime Ministers, 1988-99 



Name 


Period 


Martial Celestine 


1988 


Rene Garcia Preval 


1991 


Jean-Jacques Honorat 


1991 -1992 (interim) 


Marc Bazin 


1992 - 1993 


Robert Malval 


1993-1994 


Smark Michel 


1994 - 1995 




1995 - 1996 




1996 - 1997 




1997 - 1999 




1999 - 



514 



Appendix 



Table 26. Haiti: Civil Jurisdictions and Government Institutions, 

2000 



ADMINISTRATIVE 
JURISDICTION 



LEGISLATIVE 
BRANCH 



EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH 



THE JUDICIARY 



National 



National Assembly 

- Senate 

- Chamber of Deputies 



President 

Council of Ministers 

Permanent Electoral 
Council 



Court of Cassation 
(Supreme Court) 



Departments 

(9 departements) 



Municipalities 
(133 communes) 

Communal Sections 
(565 sections commu- 
nales) 



Interdepartmental 
Councif- 



Municipal Assembly 



Communal Section 
Assembly^ 



Delagates and Vice 
Delegates 



Departmental Assembly^ Departmental 



Council 



Courts of Appeal 

Courts of First 
Instance 



Municipal Council Justice of the 
Peace Courts 

Communal Section 

Administrative 

Council 



Not yet formally in place. 



515 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



Table 27. Haiti: Cabinet Ministers, December 1999 

Office Incumbent 

Prime Minister, Minister of Interior and Territorial 

Collectivities Jacques Edouard Alexis 

Minister of Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Rural 

Development Francois Severin 

Minister of Commerce and Industry Gerald Germain 

Minister of Culture Jean-Robert Vaval 

Minister of Economy and Finance Fred Joseph 

Minister of Environment Yves Cadet 

Minister of Foreign Affairs Fritz Longchamp 

Minister of Haitians Living Overseas Jean Geneus 

Minister of Justice and Public Safety Camille Leblanc 

Minister of National Education, Youth, and Sports Paul Antoine Bien-Aime 

Minister of Planning and External Cooperation Anthony Dessources 

Minister of Public Health and Population Michaelle Amedee Gedeon 

Minister of Public Works, Transportation, and 

Communication Max Alee 

Minister of Social Affairs Mathilde Flambert 

Minister of Women's Affairs Nonie Mathieu 



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Glossary 



Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) — A major United States for- 
eign economic policy toward Latin America and the Carib- 
bean enacted by the United States Congress as the 
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act in 1984. The act 
was revised on August 20, 1990, and given an indefinite 
life. Primarily a trade promotion program, the CBI pro- 
vides duty-free access to the United States market for some 
3,000 products, provides expanded bilateral economic 
assistance, and allows some limited tax breaks for new 
United States investments in the region. The CBI has 
helped serve as a catalyst toward economic diversification 
in a number of Caribbean Basin countries. 

Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom) — Car- 
icom was formed in 1973 by the Treaty of Chaguaramas, 
signed in Trinidad, as a movement toward unity in the Car- 
ibbean. The Dominican Republic is an observer; Haiti was 
accepted as a full member in July 1997. The organization 
is headed by a Community Council of Ministers, which is 
responsible for developing strategic planning and coordi- 
nation in the areas of economic integration, functional 
cooperation, and external relations. 

colono(s) — As used in the Dominican Republic, refers to a small 
independent sugarcane grower. In other Latin American 
countries, the word usually designates a settler or a tenant 
farmer. 

Dominican Republic peso (RD$) — Dominican monetary unit, 
divided into 100 centavos. The Dominican government 
officially maintained a one-to-one exchange rate between 
the peso and the United States dollar until 1985, when the 
peso was allowed to float freely against the dollar for most 
transactions. After experiments with multiple exchange 
rates, all rates were unified in 1997 on a free-market basis 
and at an initial rate of US$1 = RD$14. After Hurricane 
Georges, official rate dropped to US$1 = RD$15.46. Com- 
mercial rate was US$1 = RD$16 in October 1998. 

fiscal year (FY) — The Dominican Republic's fiscal year is the 
calendar year, except in the case of the State Sugar Coun- 
cil (Consejo Estatal del Azucar — CEA), which runs in the 
cycle of October 1 to September 30. Haiti's fiscal year is 



557 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

the same as that of the United States government, running 
from October 1 to September 30. Fiscal year dates of refer- 
ence for these two countries therefore correspond to the 
year in which the period ends. For example, FY 2000 
began on October 1, 1999, and ends on September 30, 
2000. 

Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) — The United States 
Generalized System of Preferences provides preferential 
duty-free entry for more than 4,650 products from some 
140 beneficiary countries and territories. The program's 
intent is to foster economic growth by expanding trade 
between the United States and the developing GSP benefi- 
ciaries. Instituted January 1, 1976, the GSP authorization 
has been renewed by Congress a number of times since. 
The latest renewal occurred in December 1999. 

gourde (G) — The Haitian monetary unit, divided into 100 cen- 
times. The official exchange rate was originally set in 1919 
at G5 = US$1. Political crises of the early 1990s, the inter- 
national embargo, and the sharp drop in government rev- 
enues had reduced the value of the gourde by about 80 
percent as of 1994. In 1999 the value of the gourde fluctu- 
ated between G17.5 and G18.3 to US$1. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — A value measure of the flow of 
domestic goods and services produced by an economy 
over a period of time, such as a year. Only output values of 
goods for final consumption and investment are included 
because the values of primary and intermediate produc- 
tion are assumed to be included in final prices. GDP is 
sometimes aggregated and shown at market prices, mean- 
ing that indirect taxes and subsidies are included; when 
these have been eliminated, the result is GDP at factor 
cost. The word gross indicates that deductions for deprecia- 
tion of physical assets have not been made. See also gross 
national product. 

gross national product (GNP) — The gross domestic product 
(q.v.) plus the net income or loss stemming from transac- 
tions with foreign countries. GNP is the broadest measure- 
ment of the output of goods and services by an economy. 
It can be calculated at market prices, which include indi- 
rect taxes and subsidies. Because indirect taxes and subsi- 
dies are only transfer payments, GNP is often calculated at 
factor cost by removing indirect taxes and subsidies. 

industrial free zone(s) — Also known as free trade zones, or free 



558 



Glossary 

zones, these industrial parks play host to manufacturing 
firms that benefit from favorable business conditions 
extended by a given government in an effort to attract for- 
eign investment and to create jobs. In the Dominican 
Republic, free-zone enterprises pay no duties on goods 
directly imported into, or exported from, the free zone. 
These enterprises also enjoy exemptions from Dominican 
taxes for up to twenty years, and they are allowed to pay 
workers less than the established minimum wage. 
International Development Association (IDA) — EWorld 
Bank. 

International Finance Corporation (IFC) — See World Bank. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with 
the World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized 
agency affiliated with the United Nations; it is responsible 
for stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. 
The main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to 
its members (including industrialized and developing 
countries) when they experience balance-of-payments dif- 
ficulties. These loans frequently carry conditions that 
require substantial internal economic adjustments by the 
recipients, most of which are developing countries. 

latifundio — A piece of landed property, usually a great landed 
estate with primitive agriculture and labor, often in a state 
of partial servitude. 

Lome Convention — A series of agreements between the Euro- 
pean Economic Community (EEC, subsequently the Euro- 
pean Union — EU) and a group of African, Caribbean, and 
Pacific (ACP) states, mainly former European colonies, 
that provide duty-free or preferential access to the EEC 
market for almost all ACP exports. The Stabilization of 
Export Earnings (Stabex) scheme, a mechanism set up by 
the Lome Convention, provides for compensation for ACP 
export earnings lost through fluctuations in the world 
prices of agricultural commodities. The Lome Convention 
also provides for limited EEC development aid and invest- 
ment funds to be disbursed to ACP recipients through the 
European Development Fund and the European Invest- 
ment Bank. The Lome Convention has been updated 
every five years since Lome I took effect on April 1, 1976. 
Lome IV, which included the Dominican Republic and 
Haiti for the first time, entered into force in 1990 and was 
to cover the ten-year period 1990-99. 



559 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 

minifundio — A small landed estate (see latifundio) . 

Organization of American States (OAS) — Established bv the 
Ninth International Conference of American States held 
in Bogota on April 30, 1948, and effective since December 
13, 1951. Has served as a major inter-American organiza- 
tion to promote regional peace and security as well as eco- 
nomic and social development in Latin America. 
Composed of thirty-five members, including most Latin 
American states and the United States and Canada. Deter- 
mines common political, defense, economic, and social 
policies and provides for coordination of various inter- 
American agencies. Responsible for implementing the 
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio 
Treaty) when any threat to the security of the region arises. 

Paris Club — The informal name for a consortium of Western 
creditor countries (Belgium, Britain, Canada, France, Ger- 
many, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and the United States) that have made loans or guaran- 
teed export credits to developing nations and that meet in 
Paris to discuss borrowers' abilitv to repay debts. Paris Club 
deliberations often result in the tendering of emergency 
loans to countries in economic difficulty or in the resched- 
uling of debts. Formed in October 1962, the organization 
has no formal or institutional existence. Its secretariat is 
run by the French treasury. It has a close relationship with 
the International Monetary Fund (q.v.), to which all of its 
members except Switzerland belong, as well as with the 
World Bank (q.v.) and the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The Paris Club is 
also known as the Group of Ten (G-10). 

Public Law-480 (PL-480) — Law passed by the United States 
Congress in 1954 authorizing the shipment of surplus 
United States agricultural produce to nations in need in 
return for local currencies at advantageous rates. The 
local currencies have been used primarily to cover 
expenses of United States diplomatic installations over- 
seas. 

special drawing rights (SDRs) — Monetary units of the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund (q.v.) based on a basket of interna- 
tional currencies including the United States dollar, the 
German deutsche mark, the Japanese yen, the British 
pound sterling, and the French franc. 

World Bank — Name used to designate a group of four affiliated 



560 



Glossary 



international institutions that provide advice on long-term 
finance and policy issues to developing countries: the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD), the International Development Association 
(IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and 
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) . 
The IBRD, established in 1945, has the primary purpose of 
providing loans to developing countries for productive 
projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund adminis- 
tered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish 
credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier 
terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, 
founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD 
through loans and assistance designed specifically to 
encourage the growth of productive private enterprises in 
the less-developed countries. The president and certain 
senior officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the 
IFC. The MIGA, which began operating in June 1988, 
insures private foreign investment in developing countries 
against such noncommercial risks as expropriation, civil 
strife, and inconvertibility. The four institutions are owned 
by the governments of the countries that subscribe their 
capital. To participate in the World Bank group, member 
states must first belong to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF — q.v.). 



561 



Index 



AAN. See National Airport Authority 
abuelismo, 202 

Acaau, Louis Jean-Jacques, 277 

ACDA. See United States Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency 

acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS): in Dominican Republic, 104, 
155; in Haiti, 253, 292, 357-58, 406 

Acul, 268 

Adams, Alvin, 299 

AFL-CIO. See American Federation of 
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organi- 
zations 

affranchis, 266, 267, 329 

African swine fever: in Haiti, 292, 395-96 

Afro-Haitians, 332 

agrarian reform: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 121; in Haiti, 420 

Agricultural Bank of the Dominican 
Republic (Banco Agricola de la 
Republica Dominicana — Bagricola), 
136 

agriculture: in Dominican Republic, 3, 
126-39; in Haiti, 253, 313, 318, 323, 
324, 384, 387-96 
Aid and Housing Institute, 70, 105 
AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome 

air force: in Dominican Republic, 212, 

231-32; in Haiti, 471 
Air Haiti, 404 

airports: in Dominican Republic, 5, 148; 
in Haiti, 255, 404 

Alexis, Jacques Edouard, 254, 256, 374, 
422, 431 

Alliance for Progress, 383 

American Federation of Labor-Congress 
of Industrial Organizations (AFL- 
CIO), 205 

Anse Rouge, 319 

Apena. See National Penitentiary Admin- 
istration 

Arabs: in Dominican Republic, 73, 77; in 
Haiti, 331 

Arawak (see also Taino Indians), 14, 15, 



70, 272 
Ardouin, Beaubrun, 277 
Arias, Desiderio, 37 

Aristide, Jean-Bertrand, 222, 253, 255, 
263, 296, 298, 300, 310, 328, 369, 370, 
374, 413, 414, 415, 416, 419, 423, 424, 
437, 438-39, 440, 447, 449, 453, 459, 
466, 467, 468 

armed forces, in Dominican Republic: 
200-204, 211-13; history and develop- 
ment of, 213-20; manpower of, 232- 
33; missions of, 222; organization, 
training, and equipment of, 224-32; 
role in public life, 220 

armed forces, in Haiti (see also Garde 
d'Haiti; Armed Forces of Haiti): 257 

Armed Forces of Haiti (Forces Armees 
d'Haiti— FAd'H), 257, 414, 416, 417, 
427, 447, 459, 462-73 

Armed Forces Staff College, 228 

Armed Forces Training Center, 228 

army, in Dominican Republic: 212, 216, 
225-28; in Haiti, 313 

Artibonite region, 270, 321 

Artibonite River, 285, 315, 316, 317, 366, 
400, 420 

Assemblies of God, 94 

assembly industry: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 139, 140-41; in Haiti, 308, 337, 
384, 387, 398-99 

Association of Caribbean States, 257 

Association of Landowners and Agricul- 
turists (Asociacion de Hacendados y 
Agricul tores) , 195 

audiencia, 16 

austerity measures: in Dominican 
Republic, 115, 116 

autonomous and semiautonomous agen- 
cies. 5^ public enterprises 

Autonomous University of Santo Dom- 
ingo (Universidad Autonoma de 
Santo Domingo— UASD), 2, 98, 100 

Avril, Prosper, 295, 298, 299, 466 

Ayiti Libere (Liberated Haiti), 413 

ayuntamientos, 36 



563 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



Azile, 321 

"Baby Doc," 290, 369, 464, 465 
baccalaureate, 353 
bachillerato, 97 
baecismo, 27 

baecistas, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30 

Baez Machado, Ramon, 37 

Baez Mendez, Buenaventura, 23, 25, 26, 

29, 30, 32, 37, 171, 214 
Bagricola. See Agricultural Bank of the 

Dominican Republic 
Bahia de Neiba, 59, 60 
Bahia de Ocoa, 59 
Bahia de Samana, 58, 70 
Baie de Baraderes, 322 
Baie de l'Acul, 321 
Baie de Port-au-Prince, 315, 322 
Baker, James, 304 

Balaguer Ricardo, Joaquin, 6, 14, 40, 43, 
45, 46-47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 70, 71-72, 74, 
75, 76, 80, 83, 84, 96, 114, 115, 116, 
129, 139, 163, 164, 166, 168, 172-73, 
178, 181, 183, 186, 189, 190, 192, 193, 
197, 201, 202, 203, 206, 211, 219, 220, 
222, 452 

balance of payments: in Dominican 
Republic, 4, 152-54; in Haiti: 254, 
379-80 

banana production: in Dominican 

Republic, 137; in Haiti, 394 
banking: in Dominican Republic, 120; in 

Haiti, 374-75 
Bank of the Republic of Haiti (Banque 

de la Republique d'Haiti— BRH), 374 
Baptists: in Haiti, 348 
Barahona, 148, 196, 228, 229, 231, 240 
bateyes, 75, 86 
Batraville, Benoit, 282 
bauxite: in Haiti, 320, 400 
Bavaro, 151 

Bazin, Marc, 296, 300, 438, 445 
bean production: in Haiti, 394 
Bennett, Ernest, 291 
Bennett, Michele, 290 
Bertin, Mireille, 483 
Betancourt, Romulo, 42-43 
Biamby, Philippe, 467 
Biassou, Georges, 268, 269, 270 
Billini, Francisco Gregorio, 31 
biodiversity: in Haiti, 322-23 



birthrate: in Haiti, 325 

black consciousness: in Haiti, 331 

Blue Party (Partido Azul), 29, 32, 34, 172 

Bobadilla, Francisco de, 16 

Boca Chica, 148 

Bois Cayman, 268 

boko, 268 

Bolivar, Simon, 21 
Bonao, 136, 143 
Bonaparte, Napoleon, 20, 271 
Bordas Valdesjose, 36, 37 
Borno, Louis, 281 

Bosch Gaviho, Juan, 6, 14, 44, 45, 49, 50, 
51, 52, 80, 95, 163, 164, 166, 172, 185, 
190, 191, 192, 192-93, 218, 219, 238, 
289 

Boukman, 268 

Bourbon dynasty, 18, 269 

Boyer, Jean-Pierre, 21, 22, 275, 276 

BRH. See Bank of the Republic of Haiti 

buccaneers, 68, 112, 265, 266, 365 

budget, government: in Dominican 

Republic, 101, 105-06, 167; in Haiti, 

377-79, 421 
budget deficits: in Dominican Republic, 

116; in Haiti, 298, 371, 372, 377-78 
Bureau of Ethnology, 287 

cabinet: in Dominican Republic, 175-76; 
in Haiti, 428, 431 

Cabral Luna, Jose Maria, 29 

Caceres, Jose Nunez de, 20 

Caceres Vasquez, Ramon, 33, 36 

cacos, 277, 278, 280, 282, 459, 462, 463 

CACM. See Central American Common 
Market 

Cadrasses, 322 

Calixte, Demosthenes, 285 

Camp Perrin, 321 

campuno, 64 

Canal, Boisrond, 278 

Canary Islanders: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 73 

Cap-Francais, 268, 269 

Cap-Francois, 266, 268 

Cap-Haitien, 264, 266, 325, 326, 403 

Caracol, 321 

Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), 116, 

134, 140, 386, 398 
Caribbean Community and Common 

Market (Caricom), 152-53, 256, 257, 



564 



Index 



449, 453 
Caribs, 264 

Caricom. See Caribbean Community and 

Common Market 
Carter, Jimmy, 47, 307, 468 
CasaVicini, 85, 128, 132 
cash crops: in Dominican Republic, 86, 

126, 131-37; in Haiti, 313, 366, 388, 

391-92 
Castro Ruz, Fidel, 218, 223 
Cavaillon River, 316 
Cayemites archipelago, 322 
CBI. See Caribbean Basin Initiative 
CDE. See Dominican Electricity Corpora- 
% tion 
CEA. See State Sugar Council 
Cedopex. See Dominican Center for the 

Promotion of Exports 
Cedras, Raoul, 255, 302, 304, 305, 307, 

327, 334, 414, 467, 468 
census: in Dominican Republic, 61, 65, 

68-69, 82, 99; in Haiti, 325, 326-27, 

389 

Center for Free Enterprise and Democ- 
racy (Centre pour la Libre Entreprise 
et la Democratic— CLED), 448 

Central American Common Market 
(CACM), 152-53 

Central Bank: in Haiti, 374, 375, 376, 
378, 379 

Central Bank of the Dominican Repub- 
lic (Banco Central de la Republica 
Dominicana— BCRD), 3-4, 117, 118, 
119, 120, 151, 183 

Central Electoral Board (Junta Central 
Electoral— JCE), 166, 177, 179, 186, 
187, 188 

Central Plateau, 315, 316, 321 

Central Romana, 85, 128, 132 

CEP. See Provisional Electoral Council 

Chaine des Matheux, 315 

Chaine du Trou d'Eau, 315 

Chamber of Deputies: in Dominican 
Republic, 5, 53, 168, 176-78, 180; in 
Haiti, 421, 422, 428, 431 

charcoal production: in Haiti, 320, 395, 
400 

Chinese: in Dominican Republic, 72, 74, 

77 

Christian Democratic Union, 190, 204 
Christian Democrat Party of Haiti (Parti 
Democrate Chretien d'Haiti — 



PDCH),444, 445 
Christophe, Henry, 271, 273, 274, 275, 

277, 349, 365, 366 
cibaenos, 29 

Cibao, 23, 26, 29, 33, 34, 36, 37, 63, 64, 
66, 67-68, 71, 113, 130, 171 

Cimenterie d'Haiti, 373, 374 

CIMO. See Company for Intervention 
and Maintaining Order 

Cite Soleil, 335, 336, 475 

citrus production: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 137 

Ciudad Trujillo, 39 

civic-action programs: in Dominican 
Republic, 224 

Civil Aeronautics Directorate, 232 

civilian police mentors (Civpols): in 
Haiti, 417, 460 

Civilian Police Mission (UN), 425 

civil rights: in Dominican Republic, 241- 
43; in Haiti, 427, 428 

civil service. See public administration 

civil service legislation: in Dominican 
Republic, 181; in Haiti, 376, 428 

civil war: in Dominican Republic, 6, 43- 
45, 163, 172, 211, 213, 215, 219, 238 

Civpols. See civilian police mentors 

class stratification: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 76-81; in Haiti, 314 

Claude, Silvio, 304, 444, 445 

CLED. See Center for Free Enterprise 
and Democracy 

clientelist ties {see also patronage), 161, 
181, 182, 191-92 

climate: in Dominican Republic, 2, 60- 
61; in Haiti, 252, 316-17 

Clinton, William, 305, 306, 307 

CMEP. See Council for the Moderniza- 
tion of Public Enterprises 

CNG. See National Council of Govern- 
ment 

CNZF. See National Council for Free 
Zones 

Coalition to Defend Democracy 
(L'Espace de Concertation pour la 
Sauvegarde de la Democratic), 423 

coastal resources: in Haiti, 321-22 

cocoa production: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 133-34; in Haiti, 392 

Codetel. See Dominican Telephone Com- 
pany 

coffee production: in Dominican Repub- 



565 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



lie, 133; in Haiti, 391 
collective bargaining: in Dominican 

Republic, 124; in Haiti, 387 
College St. Louis de Gonzague, 350 
Colonial Assembly, 268, 271 
colonial rule: by France, 263, 265, 266- 

68, 365; by Spain, 14, 19, 112, 263-66, 

365 

colonos, 85, 86, 93-94 

Columbus, Bartolome, 264 

Columbus, Christopher, 14, 15, 16, 94, 

112, 128, 131, 144, 264, 328, 365, 391 
Columbus, Diego, 16 
Columbus Lighthouse (Faro Colon), 96 
Commission for the Reform of Public 

Enterprise, 118 
Commission on Health of the Chamber 

of Deputies, 104 
communal section assemblies: in Haiti, 

420, 430 

communal section councils: in Haiti, 
418, 430 

communal sections: in Haiti, 430 

communism, 40-41, 44, 238, 285 

Communist Party of Haiti (Parti Com- 
muniste d'Haiti— PCH) , 285, 444 

compadrazgo, 81-82, 91 

Company for Intervention and Main- 
taining Order (Compagnie d'lnter- 
vention et Maintien d'Ordre — 
CIMO),479 

comunidades de base, 93 

Conacom. See National Committee of 
the Congress of Democratic Move- 
ments 

Conapofa. See National Council on Pop- 
ulation and Family 

Conciliation Commission, 428 

concordat, with the Vatican: Dominican 
Republic: 40, 93; Haiti: 278, 289, 297, 
346, 349 

Conep. See National Council of Private 
Enterprise 

Cones. See National Council of Higher 
Education 

Congressional Black Caucus, 366 

Constant, Felix d'Orleans Juste, 285 

Constanza, 228, 232 

Constituent Assembly, 273 

Constitutional Assembly, 170 

constitutional development: in Domini- 
can Republic, 44, 170-73, 180; in 



Haiti, 284, 285, 299, 341, 368, 369, 
427-29 

Constitutionalists, 6, 45, 218, 219, 238 
constitutional reforms: in Dominican 
Republic, 5-6, 44, 166, 168, 172, 173, 

180, 181, 244 

construction industry: in Dominican 
Republic, 143-45; in Haiti, 399 

Controller's Office, 177 

cooperatives: in Dominican Republic, 
89-90 

Coordination of Popular, Peasant, and 

Union Organizations, 238 
copper production: in Haiti, 320-21, 400 
Corde. See Dominican State Enterprises 

Corporation 
Cordillera Central, 59, 60, 315 
Cordillera Oriental, 59-61 
Cordillera Septentrional, 58, 59 
corn production: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 136-37; in Haiti, 394 
corruption: in Dominican Republic; 

181, 182, 183, 184, 191-92, 212-13, 
215, 249; in Haiti, 286, 290, 291, 302, 

330, 370, 377-78, 416, 424-25, 433, 
435, 460, 486 

Cortes, Hernan, 17 

Cotes de Fer, 319 

cotton production: in Haiti, 392 

Council for the Modernization of Public 
Enterprises (Conseil de Modernisa- 
tion des Entreprises Publiques — 
CMEP), 373 

Council of Ministers: in Haiti, 431 

Council of State: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 128; in Haiti, 299 

Council of the Magistrature (Consejo de 
la Magistratura) : in Dominican 
Republic, 6, 52, 168, 180, 181 

counternarcotics: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 247-48; in Haiti, 489-91 

coups: in Dominican Republic, 44; in 
Haiti, 277, 288, 297, 298, 301, 303-04, 
368, 369, 370, 379, 383, 396, 414, 445, 
449, 453, 459, 460, 462, 463 

Courts of Appeals: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 179; in Haiti, 432 

Courts of First Instance: in Dominican 
Republic, 1679; in Haiti, 432 

Creole language, 284, 295, 302, 313, 314, 

331, 339-43, 347, 348, 406, 428, 442, 
443 



566 



Index 



crime: in Dominican Republic, 247-49; 

in Haiti, 475, 476 
criminal justice system: in Dominican 

Republic, 212, 213, 241-44; in Haiti, 

486-89 
Cromwell, Oliver, 17 
Cuban-Dominican Sugar Company, 131 
Cuban Revolution, 43, 217 
Cubans: in Dominican Republic, 73 
cultura criolla, 96 
culture: Dominican, 94-97 
Curacao, 27, 73 
curanderos, 93 

currency: in Dominican Republic, 3-4, 

119; in Haiti, 254, 375 
customs receivership, by United States: 

in Dominican Republic, 34-35, 41, 

113, 216 



Dajabon, 232 

Dartiguenave, Philippe Sudre, 280, 281 
death, causes of: in Dominican Republic, 

103-104; in Haiti, 325, 356-58 
debt, foreign: in Dominican Republic, 

115-16, 117; in Haiti, 380 
DeCamps, Hatuey, 192 
decentralization (political): in Haiti, 

419-20, 435 
defense budget: in Dominican Republic, 

212 

defense industry: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 234 

defense spending: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 233-34 

deforestation: in Dominican Republic, 
130-31, 138; in Haiti, 292, 318, 319- 
20, 388, 395 

Dejoie II, Louis, 445 

Del Valle, 63 

Denis, Herve, 422 

Denis, Lorimer, 287 

Denize, Pierre, 424, 478 

departements: in Haiti, 430, 479 

departmental assemblies: in Haiti, 430, 
431 

departmental councils: in Haiti, 430, 431 
deportations, of Haitians, from Domini- 
can Republic, 207, 239 
desertification: in Haiti, 395 
Desroches, Rosney, 295 
Dessalines, Jean-Jacques, 20, 271, 272, 



365, 366 

Dessalines Battalion, 469, 470 

devaluation: of the peso, 3-4, 115, 119 

Directorate of Prisons, 246 

diversification, economic: in Dominican 
Republic, 116 

divorce: in Dominican Republic, 44, 91; 
in Haiti, 271, 338 

DNCD. National Drug Control Direc- 
torate 

DNI. See National Department of Investi- 
gations 

Dominican Agrarian Institute (Instituto 
Agrario Dominican o— IAD), 83, 128, 
136 

Dominican Center for the Promotion of 
Exports (Centro Dominicano de Pro- 
mocion de Exportaciones — 
Cedopex), 134-35 
Dominican Communist Party, 238 
Dominican Constabulary Guard, 216, 
239-40 

Dominican Electricity Corporation (Cor- 
poracion Dominicana de Electri- 
cidad— CDE), 117, 121, 145-46, 183- 
84 

Dominican Evangelical Church, 94 

Dominican Leftist Front, 239 

Dominican Military Aviation, 40 

Dominican Municipal League, 185-86 

Dominican Party (Partido Domini- 
cano), 42, 189 

Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido 
Revolucionario Dominicano — PRD), 
6, 44, 47-53, 75, 80, 163-65, 167-68, 
183, 186, 189-94, 197, 201, 220 

Dominican Social Security Institute 
(Instituto Dominicano de Seguro 
Social— IDSS), 102, 105, 125 

Dominican State Enterprises Corpora- 
tion (Corporacion Dominicana de 
Empresas Estatales — Corde), 183-84 

Dominican Telephone Company 
(Compahia Dominicana de Tele- 
fonos — Codetel), 149 

Dominico-Haitians, 75, 384, 386, 452 

"Domyork," 66 

drainage: in Dominican Republic, 60; in 
Haiti, 316-17 

Drake, Francis (Sir), 17, 265 

drug trafficking: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 247-49; in Haiti: 291, 297, 302, 



567 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



424-25, 451, 461, 467, 489-91 
Duarte, Juan Pablo, 22, 23, 24 
Duarte, Vicente, 22 
Dufort, 321 
Dumesle, Herard, 276 
Duvalier, Francois, 263, 283, 286-90, 

291, 326, 330, 331, 346, 347, 348, 368, 

438, 439, 444, 459, 463-64 
Duvalier, Jean-Claude, 263, 291-94, 298, 

301, 331, 334, 369, 440, 441, 459, 464, 

465-66 

Duvalier, Simone Ovide, 290 
Duvalierism, 295-96, 300, 301, 305 
Duvalierists, 294, 296, 299, 306, 446-47 



ECLAC. See Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean 

Economic Commission for Latin Amer- 
ica and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 206 

economic development: in Dominican 
Republic, 112-16, 128, 155-57, 365- 
70, 408, 420; in Haiti, 365-70 

economic sanctions: against Haiti, 304, 
305, 306, 307, 370, 373, 375, 379, 415, 
449, 452, 460, 467, 468, 472, 474 

Economic Support Funds (ESF), 155 

EdH. See Electricite d'Haid 

education: in Dominican Republic, 2, 
97-101; in Haiti, 252, 342-43, 349-55 

EERP. See Emergency Economic Recov- 
ery Plan 

El Cortecito, 151 

elections: in Dominican Republic, 6, 
166-68, 172, 173, 176-77, 178, 179, 
186, 187-89, 192-93, 203, 218, 220; in 
Haiti: 255, 256, 284, 287, 296, 297, 
299-300, 310, 341, 369, 414, 418, 419, 
420, 421, 422, 423-24, 425, 426, 429, 
430, 466 

Electoral Board, 50, 51 

electoral fraud: in Dominican Republic, 
173; in Haiti, 297, 309, 421, 426 

electoral laws: in Dominican Republic, 
188-89 

electoral system: in Dominican Republic, 
187-89; in Haiti, 429-30 

electricity. See energy 

Electricite d'Haiti (EdH), 373 

elites: in Dominican Republic, 76-78, 
195-96, 213, 214, 216, 217; in Haiti, 
300, 303, 313, 329, 330, 331, 347, 368, 



413, 418, 437-38, 443, 444, 447-48, 
466-67 
El Seibo, 24, 38 

embargo. See economic sanctions 

Emergency Economic Recovery Plan 
(EERP), 371-72 

employment {see also labor): in Domini- 
can Republic, 116; in Haiti, 336 

encomenderos, 15, 264 

encomienda system, 15, 16, 112, 264 

energy: in Dominican Republic, 145-46; 
in Haiti, 319-20, 400-401 

English, as a second language: in Haiti, 
328, 342 

Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facil- 
ity, 372, 376 

Enriquillo, 63 

Episcopalians: in Haiti, 348 

erosion: in Haiti, 318, 387, 394, 395 

ESAF. See Enhanced Structural Adjust- 
ment Facility 

ESF. See Economic Support Funds 

Espaillat, Santiago, 25 

Espaillat Quihones, Ulises Francisco, 29 

Espaha Boba (Foolish Spain), 20 

Estime, Dumarsais, 263, 285, 286, 287, 
291, 331, 368, 463 

Estrella Urena, Rafael, 39 

Etang Saumatre, 316, 319 

ethnic groups: in Dominican Republic, 
2, 70-76; in Haiti, 252, 328-30, 339-41 

EU. See European Union 

Eucharistic and Marial Congress, 292 

European Union (EU), 137, 153, 154, 
20-7, 256, 382, 453 

evangelical groups: in Dominican 
Republic, 94 

exchange rate: of the peso, 3-4, 119; of 
the gourde, 254, 375 

executive branch: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 173-76; in Haiti, 428, 431 

Executive Commission on Health 
Reform, 104 

expenditures, government: in Domini- 
can Republic, 101, 105-06; in Haiti, 
377-79 

Export-Import Bank, 285 

exports: Dominican Republic: 4, 126, 
132, 133, 134, 136, 140-41, 142, 143, 
152, 153; Haiti: 254, 313, 370, 379-80, 
388, 391,392 



568 



Index 



FAd'H. See Armed Forces of Haiti 
Faille-Perches, 321 
Falconbridge, 143 
Family Is Life, 301 

family life: in Dominican Republic, 90- 

92; in Haiti, 336-39 
family planning: in Dominican Republic, 

62-63; in Haiti, 355-56 
Fanjul group, 85 

farming: in Dominican Republic, 86-89; 

in Haiti, 387-94 
Fauntroy, Walter, 294 
Fausdn I (Emperor), 277-78 
FED. See Foundation for Economics and 

Development 
Ferdinand VII (King), 20 
fermage (forced labor), 271, 274, 275 
Fernandez Reyna, Leonel, 4, 6, 51, 52, 

97, 106, 117, 166, 167, 173, 178, 182, 

183, 184, 190, 193, 203, 207, 208, 211, 

221, 246, 452 
fertility rate: in Dominican Republic, 61; 

in Haiti, 326, 328, 355-56 
Fiallo, Viriato, 44 
Fignole, Daniel, 285, 287 
financial services. See banking 
fiscal policy: in Dominican Republic, 4, 

118-120; in Haiti: 254, 374-77 
fiscal year: in Dominican Republic, 4; in 

Haiti, 254 

fishing industry: in Dominican Republic, 

138-39; in Haiti, 322, 396 
FL. See Lavalas Family 
Flaville, 268 

FNC. See National Cooperative Front 
FNCD. See National Front for Change 

and Democracy 
Fonhep. See Haitian Private School 

Foundation 
Food and Agriculture Organization 

(FAO), 122, 319, 323, 332, 356, 384, 

395 

food crops: in Dominican Republic, 126, 
136, 137; in Haiti, 313, 317, 388, 394 

food subsidies: in Dominican Republic, 
136 

Forbes, W. Cameron, 283 

foreign aid: to Dominican Republic, 
154-55; to Haiti, 294, 303, 308, 309, 
382-84, 407-408, 418, 420, 421, 433, 
436, 450, 453 

foreign investment: in Dominican 



Republic, 118, 120, 153 
Foreign Military Sales Program, 234 
foreign relations: Dominican Republic, 

6-7, 204-208; Haiti, 256-57, 449-54 
foreign trade: Dominican Republic, 

151-53; Haiti, 254, 379 
forestry: in Dominican Republic, 138; in 

Haiti, 319-20, 395 
Fort Dimanche, 296, 301, 302 
Fort Liberte, 321, 403 
Foundation for Economics and Develop- 
ment (Fondacion Economia y Desar- 

rollo— FED), 156 
Fourth General Conference of Latin 

American Bishops, 94 
Franco-Haitians, 332 
Francois, Joseph Michel, 307, 467 
Frank Feliz Miranda Aviation School, 

232 

FRAPH. See Revolutionary Front for the 
Advancement and Progress of Haiti 

free-trade zones (FTZs) {see also indus- 
trial free zones) : in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 122-24, 399; in Haiti, 396 

FRH. See Haitian Revolutionary Front 

FTZs. See free-trade zones 

Free-Zone Law 145 (1983), 140 

French language, 283, 284, 330, 331, 
332, 339-42, 348, 406, 428, 442, 443 

French National Assembly, 268, 269, 270 

French Revolution , 267 

French West India Company, 18, 265 

Friends of Haiti, 307, 449 

Front Against Repression (Front Contre 
la Repression) , 299 

fuelwood: in Haiti, 319-20 



Garcia Godoy, Hector, 45 

Garde d'Haiti, 282, 283, 284-85, 286, 

459, 463, 474 
gavilleros, 38 

GDP. See gross domestic product 

Geffrard, Nicholas, 278 

Gendarmerie d'Haiti, 463 

gender roles: in Dominican Republic, 
92; in Haiti, 336-39 

General Customs Receivership, 35 

General Directorate for Military Train- 
ing, 225 

General Directorate for Telecommunica- 
tions, 149 



569 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



Generalized System of Preferences 

(GSP), 398 
General Juan Pablo Duarte Military 

Institute of Advanced Studies, 225 
General Lilis, 32 

geography: Dominican Republic, 1-2, 

58-61; Haiti, 251-52, 314-16 
Germans: in Dominican Republic, 73-74 
Gilles, Serge, 444 

GIPNH. See Intervention Group of the 
Haitian National Police 

GNP See gross national product 

gold production: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 142; in Haiti, 400 

Gonaives, 269, 319, 321, 325, 326, 403 

Gonzalez, Narciso, 24 

Gonzalez Santin, Ignacio Maria, 30 

gourde, 254, 282, 375 

Gourgue, Gerard, 295, 296, 445 

government system: in Dominican 
Republic, 5-6, 168-89; in Haiti, 255- 
56, 429-36 

Governors Island Accord, 305, 485 

Grand-Anse River, 316 

Grande Cayemite, 315, 321 

Grand Gosier, 319 

grands blancs, 329 

Grant, Ulysses S., 29 

Great Depression, 40 

gross domestic product (GDP): in 
Dominican Republic, 3, 111, 112, 114, 
116, 117, 126, 138, 139, 140, 141, 145, 
149, 153; in Haiti, 253, 365, 370, 372, 
376, 378, 380, 388, 396, 398, 399-400, 
409 

gross national product (GNP) : in 
Dominican Republic, 233; in Haiti, 
323, 328, 472 

Group of 57, 445 

GSP. See Generalized System of Prefer- 
ences 

Guayamouco River, 316 
Guerrier, Philippe, 277 
Guillaume Sam, Vilbrun, 280 
Guillermo Bastardo, Cesareo, 31 
Gulf and Western Corporation, 131, 140 
Guzman Fernandez, Silvestre Antonio, 
6, 47, 48, 63, 72, 80, 83, 96, 164, 178, 
181, 191, 197, 201, 202, 219, 220 
gwoupman, 334 



Habsburgs, 18 

Haina: port, 148; sugar mill, 132 
Haitian Academy, 428 
Haitian-American Convention, 280 
Haitian-American Sugar Company 

(HASCO),392 
Haitian "boat people," 327, 369, 406 
Haitian Coast Guard, 460, 479, 490 
Haitian League for Human Rights, 295 
Haitian National Police (Police Nation- 
ale d'Haiti— PNH), 257, 308, 309, 417, 
419, 424, 425, 432, 459, 460, 461, 477- 
83 

Haitian People's Bank (Banque Popu- 
late Haitienne) , 375 
Haitian Private School Foundation (Fon- 

dation Haitienne d'Enseignement 

Prive— Fonhep), 350 
Haitian Revolution, 22, 268, 274, 329, 

346, 365, 450 
Haitian Revolutionary Front (Front 

Revolutionnaire Haitien — FRH), 444 
Haitians: in Dominican Republic, 74, 75, 

76, 86, 124-25, 198, 207, 239, 327-28, 

342, 384-85, 451,452, 475 
Haitian Statistical Institute, 376 
Harding Plan, 38 

HASCO. See Haitian-American Sugar 
Company 

health care: in Dominican Republic, 2, 
101-04; in Haiti, 252, 281-82, 355-59 

Heureaux, Ulises, 30-31, 32, 33, 40, 43, 
162, 215 

High Court of Justice: in Haiti, 432 
Higiiey, 151 
hispanidad, 95, 96 

Hispaniola (La Isla Espahola), 14, 18, 19, 
26, 58, 112, 131, 204, 213, 263, 264, 
265, 266, 270, 275, 314, 317, 319, 365, 
391, 474 

Holy Ghost Fathers, 289 

Honorat, Jean-Jacques, 304 

Hoover, Herbert, 283 

horacistas, 33, 34, 36, 37 

Hotel Social Fund,105 

House of Trade (Casa de Contratacion), 
17 

housing: in Dominican Republic, 69-70; 

in Haiti, 335-36 
Hoya de Enriquillo, 59, 60, 61 
human rights: in Dominican Republic, 

93, 94, 241, 242, 244-245; in Haiti, 



570 



Index 



290, 295, 302, 304, 347, 417, 427, 447, 
460-61, 477, 482, 483-84, 488 

Human Rights Watch, 205 

Hungarians: in Dominican Republic, 74 

Hurricane Allen, 292 

Hurricane Georges, 4, 118, 119, 121, 
130, 133, 151, 152, 153, 388-89 

Hurricane Hazel, 286 

Hyppolite, Florvil, 279 

Hyppolite Public Market, 303 

IAD. Dominican Agrarian Institute 
IAEA. See International Atomic Energy 
Agency 

ICA. See International Coffee Agreement 

ICAO. See International Civil Aviation 
Organization 

ICITAP. See International Criminal Inves- 
tigative Training Assistance Program 

ICO. See International Coffee Organiza- 
tion 

ICRC. See International Committee of 
the Red Cross 

IDA. See International Development 
Association 

IDB. See Inter-American Development 
Bank 

IDSS. See Dominican Social Security 
Institute 

IFC. See International Finance Corpora- 
tion 

IleaVache, 315, 321,322 

lie de la Gonave, 315, 320, 321 

ile de la Tortue, 315 

ILO. See International Labour Organisa- 
tion 

Imbert, Jose Maria, 23 
Imbert, Segundo, 31 

IMET. See International Military Educa- 
tion and Training 
IMF. See International Monetary Fund 
IMF stand-by agreement: with Haiti, 372 
immigration: to Dominican Republic, 

72-76; to Haiti, 331 
imports: to Dominican Republic, 4, 146, 
152, 154; to Haiti, 254, 313, 373, 379- 
80 

import-substitution industries: in Haiti, 
447 

Inara. See National Institute of Agrarian 
Reform 



income distribution: in Dominican 

Republic, 122; in Haiti, 314 
independence: Dominican Republic, 6, 

19-23, 214; Haiti, 263, 268-72, 313, 

365, 391,413 
Independence Day: in Dominican 

Republic, 23 
Independencia, 64 

Independent Revolutionary Party 
(Partido Revolucionario Independi- 
ente— PRI), 192 

indigenismo, 95 

industrial free zones: in Dominican 
Republic, 63, 64, 69, 111, 122-24, 132, 
139, 140-41 

Industrial Incentive Law (Law 299), 139, 
140 

industry: in Dominican Republic, 3, 
139-46; in Haiti, 253, 396-400 

Inespre. See National Price Stabilization 
Institute 

infant mortality rate: in Dominican 

Republic, 103; in Haiti, 252 
inflation: in Dominican Republic, 114, 

115, 116, 120; in Haiti, 309, 370, 372, 

375 

informal sector: in Haiti, 336, 387 

INS. See United States Immigration and 

Naturalization Service 
insurgencies: in Dominican Republic, 

223 

Intelsat. See International Telecommuni- 
cations Satellite Organization 

Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB), 7, 118, 146, 147, 154, 204, 206, 
257, 374, 382, 388-89, 421-22, 448, 
453-54 

Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance (Rio Treaty), 6, 206 

Interdepartmental Council: in Haiti, 431 

interest groups: in Dominican Republic, 
194-204; in Haiti, 443-49 

Interim Public Security Force (IPSF), 
417, 469, 477, 480 

internal security: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 235-38; in Haiti, 477-83 

International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), 206 

International Civil Aviation Organiza- 
tion (ICAO), 206 

International Coffee Agreement (ICA), 
133 



571 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



International Coffee Organization 

(ICO), 133, 391 
International Committee of the Red 

Cross (ICRC), 489 
International Court of Justice, 206 
International Criminal Investigative 

Training Assistance Program (ICI- 

TAP), 480 

International Development Association 

(IDA), 206 
International Finance Corporation 

(IFC), 206 

International Labour Organisation 

(ILO), 75, 206, 386, 387 
International Military Education and 

Training (IMET), 234 
International Monetary Fund (IMF): 

and Dominican Republic, 7, 49, 50, 

111, 115, 116, 119, 153, 154, 165, 204, 

206; and Haiti, 257, 303, 371, 372, 376, 

378, 379, 388, 394, 454 
International Police Monitors (IPMs), 

417 

International Telecommunications Sat- 
ellite Organization (Intelsat), 149, 206 

International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU), 206 

intervention, by United States: in 
Dominican Republic, 34-39, 44-45, 
219; in Haiti, 306-307, 367, 370, 413, 
415, 447, 468 

Intervention Group of the Haitian 
National Police (Groupe d'lnterven- 
tion de la Police Nationale d'Haiti — 
GIPNH),479 

IPMs. See International Police Monitors 

IPSE See Interim Public Security Force 

iron production: in Haiti, 400 

irrigation: in Haiti, 318-19, 387-88 

Isabela (colony), 264 

Isabella (Queen), 16 

Italians: in Dominican Republic, 73 

ITU. See International Telecommunica- 
tions Union 

Izmery, Antoine, 305 

Jacmel, 402, 403 

Japanese: in Dominican Republic, 74 
JCE. See Central Electoral Board 
Jean-Francois, 268, 269, 270 
JeanRabel, 301, 303 



Jehovah's Witnesses 
Jeremie, 270, 403 

Jimenes Pereyra, Juan Isidro, 33, 34, 37 

Jimenez, Manuel, 24-25 

jimenistas, 33, 34, 36, 37 

John Paul II (Pope), 94, 292, 347 

Joint Agricultural Consultative Commit- 
tee, 136 

Jonaissant, Emile, 306 

Jorge Blanco, Salvador, 6, 48, 49, 72, 80, 
83, 96, 115, 119, 164-65, 178, 181, 
183, 191-92, 197, 201, 219 

Joseph, Lafontant, 298 

Judicial Police: in Haiti, 460, 479, 481 

judiciary: in Dominican Republic, 5-6, 
168, 179-81, 243-44; in Haiti: 308, 
327, 428, 431-32, 486-88 

Juma, 136 

justice of the peace courts: in Haiti, 431- 
32, 486 

Kennedy, John F, 43, 288-89, 383 

KID. Unified Democratic Committee 

kinship: in Dominican Republic, 90-92; 

in Haiti, 334 
Knapp, Harry S., 38 

KOREGA. See Resistance Committee of 
Grand' Anse 



Labadie (bay), 322 

labor: in Dominican Republic, 86-87, 

122- 26, 140, 197-98; in Haiti, 384-87, 
388, 398, 399-400 

Labor Code: in Dominican Republic, 
1951, 79-80; 1992, 123, 124, 125, 197, 
205; in Haiti, 386, 387 

La Borgne-Anse-a-Foleur, 319 

labor unions: in Dominican Republic, 

123- 24, 197-98; in Haiti, 387 
Lac de Peligre, 316 

Lafontant, Roger, 293, 299, 300, 301 

la gente buena, 76, 78 

Lago Enriquillo, 60 

Lake, Anthony, 374 

La Minoterie (flour mill), 374 

Lamy, Jean, 483 

land reform: in Dominican Republic, 
83-84, 121, 128-30, 136; in Haiti: 309, 
329, 366, 389-90 

land tenure: in Dominican Republic, 82- 



572 



Index 



90, 128-30; in Haiti, 313, 318, 332-34, 

366, 388, 389-91 
land use: in Dominican Republic, 85-86, 

130-31; in Haiti, 317-19 
language: in Dominican Republic, 2; in 

Haiti, 252 

La Romana, 64, 69, 81, 140, 148, 196, 

229, 231 
La Ruche (The Beehive) , 284 
Las Americas, 148 
Las Calderas, 231 
Las Carreras, 24 
Las Casas, Bartolome de, 94 
latifundio, 128 
La Trinitaria, 22 
La Union, 231 

Lavalas, 302, 309, 373, 417, 419, 420, 445 
Lavalas Development Model, 302 
Lavalas Family (La Famille Lavalas — FL) , 

255, 256, 420, 421, 423, 424, 446 
Lavalas Political Organization (Organi- 
sation Politique Lavalas — OPL), 255, 

256, 302, 309, 418, 419, 420, 421, 423, 
424, 445, 446 

Lavalas Political Platform (Plate-forme 
Politique Lavalas— PPL) , 418, 446 

Laveaux, Etienne-Maynard, 270 

La Victoria, 246 

La Visite National Park, 323 

Lebanese: in Dominican Republic, 73; in 
Haiti, 331 

Leclerc, Charles Victor Emmanuel, 271 

legal codes: in Dominican Republic, 179; 
in Haiti, 431,486 

legal system: in Dominican Republic, 
179; in Haiti, 486-88 

legislative branch: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 5, 176-79; in Haiti, 255-56, 428, 
431-32 

Lend-Lease, 217 

Leopard Corps, 303, 465, 469, 470 

Les Arcadins, 322 

Les Cayes, 283, 325, 326, 402, 403 

Lescot, Elie, 284, 368 

Les Griots, 287 

L'Estere River, 316, 317 

Liberal Party (Parti Liberal— PL), 277, 

279, 444 
Liberal Union, 27 
liberation theology, 200 
Libon River, 316 
liceo, 97 



life expectancy: in Dominican Republic, 

103; in Haiti, 325 
Ligonde, Francois Wolff (Archbishop), 

301 
Limbe, 268 

Lincoln, Abraham, 450 

literacy: in Dominican Republic, 2, 99; in 
Haiti, 252, 277, 332, 335, 343, 352, 398 

literature: Dominican, 94-96 

livestock: in Dominican Republic, 137- 
38; in Haiti, 395-96 

Llanura de Azua (Plain of Azua), 59 

local government: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 6, 184-86; in Haiti, 430-31 

Lome Convention: 154, 204, 207, 257, 
454 

Los Minas, 146 
loua, 344-45, 348 
Loyalists, 6, 45 

Luperon, Gregorio, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 
172 



Macandal, Francois, 268 
Magloire, Paul, 284, 286, 368, 463 
Majluta Azarjacobo, 48, 49, 50, 192 
makout, 288, 291-92, 294, 295, 298, 299, 

300, 302, 303, 413, 446-47 
Malary, Francois Guy, 305, 454 
malnutrition: in Haiti, 318, 356, 388 
Manigat, Leslie Francois, 297, 369, 444, 

445 

Manuel, Robert, 425 

manufacturing: in Dominican Republic, 

139-41; in Haiti, 396-99 
marine resources: in Haiti, 321-22 
maroons (marrons), 267, 268, 389 
marriage: in Dominican Republic, 91; in 

Haiti, 336-39 
Mars, Price, 287 
Massacre River, 314 
Massif de la Selle, 319, 323 
Massif de la Hotte, 315, 323 
Massif duNord, 315, 316 
mass media: in Dominican Republic, 

199; in Haiti, 441-43 
mayors: in Dominican Republic, 185 
Medina, Danilo, 168, 193 
Mejia, Hipolito, 168, 192 
Mella, Ramon, 22, 23, 24 
Mennonites: in Haiti, 348 
Merino, Fernando Arturo de , 30 



573 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



Methodists: in Dominican Republic, 72; 
in Haiti, 348 

Michel, Smarck, 417, 418 

middle class: in Dominican Republic, 
78-79, 196-97; in Haiti, 330, 331-32, 
368, 413, 448 

MIDH. ^Movement for the Installation 
of Democracy in Haiti 

migration: Dominican Republic, 63, 64- 
68, 79, 84, 198, 207; in Haiti, 314, 326- 
28, 330, 388 

Military Academy: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 228; in Haiti, 289, 464, 465, 470 

military assistance: to Dominican Repub- 
lic, 234 

military ranks, uniforms, and insignia: in 

Dominican Republic, 234-35 
minifundio, 128 

minimum wage: in Dominican Republic, 

123, 125-26; in Haiti, 386-87 
mining: in Dominican Republic, 141-43; 

in Haiti, 320-21,399-400 
Ministry of Agriculture, Natural 

Resources, and Rural Development, 

433, 436 
Ministry of Defense, 218 
Ministry of Economy and Finance, 377, 

378 

Ministry of Interior, 256, 422, 426 
Ministry of Interior and National 

Defense, 469 
Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 

308, 417, 472-77, 487, 490 
Ministry of National Education, Youth, 

and Sports, 342, 343, 352, 353, 372, 

422, 433 

Ministry of Planning and External Coop- 
eration, 378 

Ministry of Public Health and Popula- 
tion, 372, 383, 433 

Ministry of Public Works, 279 

Ministry of Public Works, Transporta- 
tion, and Communications, 404 

Ministry of Social Affairs, 387 

Mir, Pedro, 95 

Miragoane, 320, 321, 402, 403 
MNF. See Multinational Force 
Mobilization for National Development: 

in Haiti, 476 
Mole Saint-Nicolas, 264, 270 
Mona Passage, 58, 223, 229 
Monroe Doctrine, 21, 34, 279 



Montagnes Noires, 315 
Monte Cristi, 58, 196, 229 
Montrouis, 403 

MOP. See Worker Peasant Movement 
Morales Languasco, Carlos Felipe, 34 
Morne de la Selle, 315, 323 
mortality rate: in Dominican Republic, 

103, 104; in Haiti, 252-53, 277, 325, 

356-58 

Movement for the Installation of Democ- 
racy in Haiti (Mouvement pour 
l'lnstauration de la Democratic en 
Haiti— MIDA), 300, 444-45 

Moya, Casimiro de, 31 

Multinational Force (MNF): in Haiti, 
306, 415, 416, 419, 425, 447, 453, 460, 
468, 485 

municipal assemblies: in Haiti, 430 
municipal code: in Dominican Republic, 
184 

municipal councils: in Dominican 
Republic, 185; in Haiti, 418, 430 

municipalities: in Dominican Republic, 
184, 185; in Haiti, 430 



Nagua, 58 
Najayo, 246 

Namphy, Henri, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 
466 

Napoleonic Code, 431, 486 

National Agricultural Industrial Party 

(Parti Agricole et Industriel 

National— PAIN), 444, 445 
National Airport Authority (Autorite 

Aeroportuaire Nationale — AAN) , 404 
National Army (Ejercito Nacional), 216 
National Assembly: in Dominican 

Republic, 175, 177; in Haiti, 278, 285, 

295, 297, 302, 427, 428, 431 
National Civic Union (Union Civica 

Nacional— UCN), 44 
National Civil Aviation Office (Office 

National de l'Aviation Civile — 

ONAC), 404 
National Commission of Truth and Jus- 
tice, 308 

National Committee of the Congress of 
Democratic Movements (Comite 
National du Congres de Mouvements 
Democratiques — Conacom), 445 

National Convention, 172 



574 



Index 



National Cooperative Front (Front 
National de Concertation — FNC), 
296, 445 

National Council for Free Zones (Con- 

sejo Nacional de Zonas Francas — 

CNZF), 140 
National Council of Government (Con- 

seil National de Gouvernement — 

CNG), 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 466 
National Council of Higher Education 

(Consejo Nacional de Educacion 

Superior — Cones), 100 
National Council of Private Enterprise 

(Consejo Nacional de la Empresa Pri- 

vada — Conep), 196 
National Council on Population and 

Family (Consejo Nacional de 

Poblacion y Familia — Conapofa), 62- 

63 

National Credit Bank (Banque Nation- 
ale de Credit), 375 

National Department of Investigations 
(Departamento Nacional de Investiga- 
ciones — DNI) , 7, 239, 240-41 

National District, 63, 64, 102, 176, 177, 
184 

National Drug Council (Consejo Nacio- 
nal de Drogas) , 248 

National Drug Control Directorate 
(Direccion Nacional de Control de 
Drogas— DNCD), 7, 239, 245, 247, 248 

National Education Plan: in Haiti, 343, 
353 

National Federation of Free Trade Zone 

Workers, 124 
National Food and Nutrition Plan, 104 
National Front for Change and Democ- 
racy (Front National pour le Change- 
ment et la Democratic — FNCD), 300, 
445, 446 

National Guard (Guardia Nacional), 38, 
282 

National Health Commission, 104 

National Housing Institute, 70 

National Institute of Agrarian Reform 
(Institut National de la Reforme 
Agraire— Inara) , 391, 420, 428 

National Liberal Party (Partido Nacional 
Liberal), 29 

National Palace, 416 

National Palace Residential Guard, 479 

National Party (Parti National — PN), 



277,444 

National Pedagogic Institute, 342 

National Penitentiary Administration 
(Administration Penitentiare Nation- 
ale — Apena) , 489 

National Police: in Dominican Republic, 
7, 211, 216, 217, 239-41, 245; in Haiti 
{see also Haitian National Police) , 257 

National Political Assembly of Demo- 
crats (Rassemblement Democratique 
National Politique— RDNP), 444, 445 

National Price Stabilization Institute 
(Instituto Nacional de Estabilizacion 
de Precios — Inespre), 121 

National Progressive Revolutionary Hai- 
tian Party (Parti National Progressiste 
Revolutionnaire Haitien — Panpra), 
444, 445 

National Republic Bank of Haiti, 374 
National Salary Committee, 125 
National School for the Judiciary, 181 
National Secretariat for Literacy, 309 
National Union of Revolutionary Stu- 
dents, 223 

National Unity Party (Parti Unite 
National— PUN), 444 

natural regions: in Dominican Republic, 
58-60; in Haiti, 315-16 

natural resources: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 141-43; in Haiti, 317-25, 399 

Naval Academy, 231 

Navidad, 264 

navy: in Dominican Republic, 212, 229- 
31; in Haiti, 470-71 

Nazarenes: in Haiti, 348 

negritude movement: in Haiti, 287, 331 

Nerette, Joseph, 304 

New Spain (Mexico), 265 

NGOs. See nongovernmental organiza- 
tions 

nickel production: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 143; in Haiti, 400 
noiristes, 285 

nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), 155, 195, 197, 204, 205, 206, 
314, 352, 377, 383, 384, 413, 433, 434, 
443, 448, 449 

nontraditional agricultural exports: in 
Dominican Republic, 134-35 

Nouel Bobadilla, Adolfo Alejandro, 36 

Nunn, Sam, 307 

nutrition: in Haiti, 318, 356, 388 



575 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



OAS. See Organization of American 
States 

occupation by the United States: Domin- 
ican Republic, 34-39, 113, 162, 181, 
229, 239-40; Haiti, 279-83, 331, 341, 
349, 367, 444, 450, 459, 462, 463, 471, 
474 

Ocoa River, 59 
O'Donnell, Leopoldo, 27, 28 
Office of Citizen Protection: in Haiti, 
428 

Oge, Vincent, 268 

oil imports: by Dominican Republic, 
146, 152 

ONAC. See National Civil Aviation Office 
OPEC. See Organization of the Petro- 
leum Exporting Countries 
Open Gate Party (Parti Louvri Barye — 

PLB), 446 
Operation Uphold Democracy, 306 
OPL. See Lavalas Political Organization 
Organic Law of the Armed Forces, 202 
Organization for the Social Rights of 

Man and Citizen, 276 
Organization of American States (OAS), 
7, 43, 45, 51, 206, 253, 256, 257, 289, 
300, 304, 369, 396, 449, 453-54, 483, 
484-85 

Organization of Struggling People 
(Organisation de Peuple en Lutte), 
420, 446 

Organization of the Petroleum Export- 
ing Countries (OPEC), 48 

Ovando, Nicolas de, 16, 264 

Overseas Private Investment Corpora- 
tion, 383 

Ozama River, 70 



Pact for Democracy, 51 
Pact of Bogota, 206 

PAHO. &?<?Pan American Health Organi- 
zation 

PAIN. See National Agricultural Indus- 
trial Party 

Palestinians: in Dominican Republic, 73 

Pan American Health Organization 
(PAHO), 69, 104 

Panpra. See National Progressive Revolu- 
tionary Haitian Party 

"Papa Doc," 287, 448 

parastatals. See public enterprises 



Paris Club, 115, 380 

Party of Dominican Liberation (Partido 
de la Liberacion Dominicana — PLD), 
6, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 164, 166, 167, 
168, 189, 190, 192, 193, 197 

patrimonial politics: in Dominican 
Republic, 161, 163, 165, 167, 169-70; 
in Haiti, 413-15 

"Patriotic Pact," 51, 167 

patronage: in Dominican Republic, 161, 
181, 182-83, 184; in Haiti, 288, 330, 
334, 416, 432-33, 440-41, 446, 448 

Paul, Evans, 445, 446 

PCH. See Communist Party of Haiti 

PDCH. See Christian Democrat Party of 
Haiti 

Peace Corps, 382 

peasant councils: in Haiti, 334 

peasant organizations: in Haiti, 390 

peasant society: in Haiti, 313, 314, 332- 
35 

Pedernales, 229, 231-32, 314 

Pedro Henriquez Ureha National Uni- 
versity (Universidad Nacional Pedro 
Henriquez Ureha— UNPHU) , 98, 100 

Peligre Dam, 316, 400 

Peha Gomez, Jose Francisco, 49, 50, 51, 
52, 53, 75, 166-67, 168, 191, 192, 220 

peninsulares, 264 

Penn, William (Sir), 17 

pentecostals: in Dominican Republic, 
94; in Haiti, 348 

Peralte, Charlemagne, 282, 454 

Peravia, 68 

Permanent Electoral Council (Conseil 
Electoral Permanent), 299-300, 310, 
426, 428, 429 

peso: Dominican Republic, 4, 105, 114, 
115, 119 

Petion, Alexandre, 268, 271, 274, 275, 

329, 349 
Petit Goave, 299 
petits blancs, 329 
Peynado, Francisco J., 39 
Peynado, Jacinto, 51, 167 
Pezzullo, Larry, 301 
Pic de Macaya, 315, 317, 319, 323 
Pic de Macaya National Park, 323 
Pico Duarte, 39, 40, 59, 60 
Pico Trujillo, 39-40 
Pierre, Ericq, 421 
Pierre-Charles, Gerard, 445, 446 



576 



Index 



Pierrot, Jean-Louis, 277 

Pimentel Chamorro, Pedro Antonio, 28 

Pine Forest Reserve, 323 

piquets, 277, 459, 462 

Plaine de l'Arbre, 315 

Plaine de Leogane, 315 

Plaine de 1'Estere, 315 

Plaine des Cayes, 315, 317 

Plaine des Gonaives, 315 

Plaine des Moustiques, 315 

Plaine du Cul-de-Sac, 315, 316, 317 

Plaine du Nord, 315, 317, 321 

Plan for Educational Reform, 98 

plantation system: in Haiti, 313, 329, 

365, 366 
plasaj, 338 

Plaza de la Cultura, 96 

PL. See Liberal Party 

PLB. See Open Gate Party 

PLD. See Party of Dominican Liberation 

PN. See National Party 

PNH. See Haitian National Police 

police. See National Police; Haitian 
National Police 

political culture: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 161; in Haiti, 413-15, 425-26, 439- 
40 

political dynamics: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 189-204; in Haiti, 436-43 

political participation: in Dominican 
Republic, 194-98; in Haiti, 413-15, 
434-36, 437-38, 440-41, 448-49 

political parties: in Dominican Republic, 
6, 189-94; in Haiti, 255-56, 443-46 

politique de doublure, 273, 447 

pollution: in Haiti, 324-25 

Pontifical Catholic University Mother 
and Teacher (Pontificia Universidad 
Catolica Madre y Maestra — UCMM), 
93-94, 98, 99 

Popular Movement, 80 

Popular Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste 
Populaire— PSP), 444 

population, density of: in Dominican 
Republic, 63; in Haiti, 313-14, 318, 
325, 335, 387, 390 

population, distribution of: in Domini- 
can Republic, 63-64; in Haiti, 324 

population, size and growth of: in 
Dominican Republic, 2, 61-63; in 
Haiti, 252, 313, 325, 365 

Port-au-Prince, 270, 325, 326, 435, 436, 



438 

Port-Salut, 301 

ports: in Dominican Republic, 5, 148; in 

Haiti, 255, 403 
poverty: in Dominican Republic, 79-81, 

122, 156; in Haiti, 277, 302, 308, 314, 

323, 332, 365, 369, 383, 406-407 
Powell, Colin, 307 
PPL. See Lavalas Political Platform 
PR. See Reformist Party 
PRD. See Dominican Revolutionary Party 
preferential import quota system 

(United States), 132-33 
Presbyterians: in Haiti, 348 
presidency: in Dominican Republic, 5, 

173, 175, 176, 180, 224; in Haiti, 255- 

56, 428, 431, 439-40 
Presidential Commission for State 

Reform and Modernization, 98, 104 
Presidential Guard, 275, 277, 288, 289, 

298, 466, 469, 470 
Preval, Rene Garcia, 255-56, 257, 302, 

309, 371, 415, 419, 420, 422, 423, 424, 
439, 440, 446, 447, 452, 475, 476, 489, 
490 

PRI. See Independent Revolutionary 
Party 

price controls: in Dominican Republic, 

120-21; in Haiti, 346-48 
priests: in Dominican Republic, 92, 93 
prison system: in Dominican Republic, 

246; in Haiti, 487, 488-89 
privatization: in Dominican Republic, 

117-18, 121, 132, 184; in Haiti, 308, 

310, 371, 373, 374, 418, 420 
Procurrente de Barahona (Cape of Bara- 

hona) , 60 

professionalism, military: in Dominican 

Republic, 203-204 
Protestantism: in Dominican Republic, 

94, 195, 200; in Haiti, 253, 344, 348-49 
Protocol of Revision of the Frontier 

Treaty (Tratado Fronterizo), 58, 314 
provinces: in Dominican Republic, 8, 

184, 185 

Provisional Electoral Council (Conseil 
Electoral Provisoire— CEP) , 256, 296, 
297, 309, 418, 421, 423, 429 

PRSC. See Reformist Social Christian 
Party 

PSP. See Popular Socialist Party 

public administration: in Dominican 



577 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



Republic, 181-84 
Public Enterprise Reform Law (1997), 
184 

public enterprises: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 117, 118, 121, 183-84; in Haiti, 
291, 310, 371, 373, 387, 418, 420, 433, 
434, 447, 467 
Public Health Code, 101-102 
Public Law-480 (PL-480), 155, 383 
public transportation: in Haiti, 403 
PUCH. See Unified Haitian Communist 
Party 

Pueblo Viejo mine, 93, 142 
Puerto Plata, 64, 73, 81, 146, 151, 229, 
231 

Puerto Ricans: in Dominican Republic, 
73 

Puerto Rico, 57, 65, 149 
PUN. See National Unity Party 
Punta Cana, 148, 151 



racial groups: in Dominican Republic, 
70-74; in Haiti, 266-68, 328-30 

Radio Nationale d'Haiti, 404 

Radio Soleil, 293, 294, 347, 404, 441 

railroad system: in Dominican Republic, 
5, 147-48; in Haiti, 255, 402 

rainfall: in Dominican Republic, 60, 61; 
in Haiti, 316-17 

RDNP. See National Political Assembly of 
Democrats 

Reagan administration, 294, 383 

Red Party (Partido Rojo), 29, 32, 34, 171 

reforestation: in Haiti, 395 

Reformist Party (Partido Reformista — 
PR), 45, 47, 163, 189, 190 

Reformist Social Christian Party (Partido 
Reformista Social Cristiano — PRSC) , 
49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 167, 168, 186, 189, 
190, 192, 193, 194, 197, 220 

Regala, Williams, 294, 295, 299 

Regla Mota, Manuel de la, 26 

Reid Cabral, Donald, 44 

religion: in Dominican Republic, 2-3, 
92-94; in Haiti, 253, 344-49 

remittances, cash: in Dominican Repub- 
lic 66-67, 84, 205; in Haiti, 328, 379, 
433 

repartimien to system, 15, 16, 112, 264 
Republic of Gran Colombia, 20-21 
Resistance Committee of Grand' Anse 



(KOREGA),446 
Revolutionary Army of the People, 223 
Revolutionary Front for the Advance- 
ment and Progress of Haiti (Front 
Revolutionnaire pour lAvancement et 
le Progres d'Haiti— FRAPH) , 305, 447, 
467, 468 

Revolution of 1843 (Haiti), 22, 276 
Revolution of 1857 (Dominican Repub- 
lic), 27 

Revolution of 1946 (Haiti), 283, 285 

Reynolds Aluminum, 292 

rice production: in Dominican Republic, 

136; in Haiti, 315, 388, 394 
Rice Research Center, 136 
Riche, Jean-Bap tiste, 277 
Rigaud, Andre, 268, 270 
Rio Treaty. See Inter-American Treaty of 

Reciprocal Assistance 
Riviere-Herard, Charles, 22, 276, 277 
road network: in Dominican Republic, 5, 

147; in Haiti, 254-55, 401-402 
Robinson, Randall, 306 
Rochambeau, Donatien, 271, 272 
Rochelois Plateau, 320 
Roman Catholic Church: in Dominican 

Republic, 17, 21, 22, 42, 43, 44, 51, 62, 

91, 92, 93, 94, 100, 101, 103, 163, 195, 

196, 199, 200; in Haiti, 253, 271, 278, 

284, 286, 289, 290, 295, 297, 303, 313, 

343, 344, 346-48 
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 281, 283 
Roosevelt, Theodore, 34 
Roosevelt Corollary, 34, 279 
Rosario Dominicana, 142 
Rosario Resources, 142 
Royal and Supreme Council of the 

Indies (Real y Supremo Consejo de 

Indias), 16, 17 
Royal Audiencia of Santo Domingo 

(Audiencia Real de Santo Domingo), 

16 

Royal Dahomets, 274 

Royal Patronage of the Indies (Real Patr- 

onato de Indias), 17 
Rural Code (Code Rural): in Dominican 

Republic, 21; in Haiti, 275 
rural life: in Dominican Republic, 81- 

89; in Haiti, 434-36 



Saget, Nissage, 278 



578 



Index 



Saint-Domingue, 18, 19, 20, 112, 263, 

266-72, 329, 365 
St. Jean Bosco, 298, 301, 303 
Saint-Marc, 325, 326 
Salcedo, Jose Antonio, 28 
sales tax: in Haiti, 378 
Salnave, Sylvain, 278 
Salomon, Louis Lysius Felicite, 278, 279 
Salvation Army, 348 
Samana Peninsula, 25, 26, 32, 58, 73 
Sanchez, Francisco del Rosario, 22, 27 
San Cristobal, 39, 64, 224-26, 234, 240 
San Domingo Improvement Company, 

33, 35 

San Francisco de Macoris, 67, 81, 179, 
196, 240 

San Isidro Air Base, 218, 231, 232 
sanitation: in Dominican Republic, 69, 

156; in Haiti, 281, 324-25, 336, 357, 

365, 435 
San Jose agreement, 146 
San Pedro de Macoris, 33, 38, 64, 144, 

148, 179, 196, 228, 229, 240 
Santana Familias, Pedro, 23, 24, 25, 26, 

27, 28, 30, 32, 170-71, 214, 215 
santanismo, 27 
santanistas, 21, 25 

Santiago de los Caballeros (Santiago), 
23, 27, 69, 73, 77, 79, 144, 179, 196, 
228, 240 

Santo Domingo: as capital city: 33, 37, 
39, 45, 63, 64, 68, 70, 75, 76, 77, 79, 81, 
144, 148, 179, 228, 231, 234, 240; 
republic of, 474; as Spanish settlement 
and colony: 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 
22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 96, 264, 265, 275 

Santos, Emilio de los, 44 

Savane Desolee, 319 

School of the Magistrature, 432 

Secretariat of Agriculture, 104 

Secretariat of State for Education and 
Culture (Secretaria de Estado de Edu- 
cacion y Cultura— SEEC) , 98 

Secretariat of State for Foreign Rela- 
tions, 207 

Secretariat of State for Industry and 

Commerce, 140 
Secretariat of State for Labor, 123, 125 
Secretariat of State for Public Health 
and Social Welfare (Secretaria de 
Estado de Salud Publica y Asistencia 
Social— SESPAS), 62-63, 101-102, 



103, 105, 155 
Secretariat of State for Public Works and 

Communications, 149 
Secretariat of State for the Armed 

Forces, 225 
secretary of state for finance, 54 
secretary of state for interior and police, 

240 

secretary of state for the armed forces, 
221, 224 

SEEC. See Secretariat of State for Educa- 
tion and Culture 

Senate: in Dominican Republic, 5, 53, 
164, 168, 171, 176-78, 180, 187; in 
Haiti, 420, 421, 422, 423, 426, 431 

Sephardic Jews: in Dominican Republic, 
73 

services sector: in Dominican Republic, 
3, 146-51; in Haiti, 336, 337 

Service Technique, 282 

SESPAS. See Secretariat of State for Pub- 
lic Health and Social Welfare 

Seventh Day Adventists: in Dominican 
Republic, 94; in Haiti, 348 

sharecropping: in Dominican Republic, 
87-88, 89 

Sierra de Baoruco, 59, 60 

Sierra de Martin Garcia, 59 

Sierra de Neiba, 59, 60, 315 

Sierra de Ocoa, 59 

Sierra de Seibo, 59 

Sierra de Yamasa, 59, 60 

silver production: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 142; in Haiti, 400 

Simon, Antoine, 280 

slave rebellion: in Haiti, 268-69, 329, 
365, 462 

slavery: in Dominican Republic, 18, 19, 
20, 70; in Haiti, 263, 266, 267, 269, 
270, 272, 275, 313, 329, 365, 366 

Smarth, Rosny, 255, 419, 420, 421, 426 

Socialist International, 190, 191, 204 

social mobility: in Haiti, 328 

social security: in Dominican Republic, 
105; in Haiti, 359 

Social Security Institute of the Armed 
Forces and National Police, 102 

social structure: in Dominican Republic, 
76-80; in Haiti, 328-36 

Sonthonax, Leger-Felicite, 269, 270 

sorghum production: in Haiti, 394 

Soulouque, Faustin, 24, 26, 277, 474 



579 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



Spaniards: in Dominican Republic, 74 
special drawing rights (SDRs), 153-54 
squatter settlements: in Dominican 

Republic, 70, 336, 390 
standard of living: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 69, 88, 156 
state-owned industries. See public enter- 
prises 

State Security Secretariat, 217 

State Sugar Council (Consejo Estatal del 

Azucar— CEA), 74-75, 85, 121, 124, 

132, 136, 137, 183, 184 
structural adjustment program: in Haiti, 

371-74, 378 
Subervi, Rafael, 192 

subsistence agriculture: in Dominican 
Republic, 21, 86, 87; in Haiti, 366, 384 

sugar industry: in Dominican Republic, 
85-86, 131-33; in Haiti, 391-92 

Summers, Larry, 374 

Superior Council of the National Police, 
478 

Supreme Court, 299, 422, 428, 431, 432 

Supreme Court of Auditors and Admin- 
istrative Disputes, 428, 432 

Supreme Court of Justice, 5-6, 52, 168, 
175, 179, 180, 181, 243, 244 

Syrians: in Dominican Republic, 73; in 
Haiti, 331 



Taft, William H., 36 

Taino (Arawak) Indians, 14, 15, 70, 71, 

112-13, 263-64 
Taiwan, 72, 74 
"tap-taps," 403, 405 

tax collection: in Dominican Republic, 

117; in Haiti, 372-73, 376, 433, 434 
tax evasion: in Dominican Republic, 117; 

in Haiti, 372 
Technical Secretariat of the Presidency, 

70, 155, 182 
Teleco. ^Telecommunications d'Haiti 
telecommunications: in Dominican 

Republic, 5, 148-49; in Haiti, 255, 

404, 441-43 
Telecommunications d'Haiti (Teleco), 

373, 404 
Tele-Haiti, 404 

Television Nationale d'Haiti, 404-406 
Terre Neuve, 320 

terrorism: in Dominican Republic, 223 



tiempo muerto, 131 
ti-kgUz, 293, 303 

Tobacco and Matches Administration 
(Regie du Tabac et des Allumettes), 
291 

tobacco production: in Dominican 

Republic, 134 
topography: in Dominican Republic, 2, 

58-60; in Haiti: 252, 314 
Tortuga Island (lie de la Tortue), 18, 265 
tourism: in Dominican Republic, 149- 

51; in Haiti, 406 
Tourist Incentive Law: in Dominican 

Republic, 150 
Toussaint, Yvon, 423 

Toussaint Louverture, Francois Domin- 
ique, 20, 268, 269, 270, 271, 274, 365 

trade deficits: in Dominican Republic, 
151-53; in Haiti, 379 

trade embargoes. See economic sanctions 

TransAfrica, 306 

transportation system: in Dominican 
Republic, 5, 146-48; in Haiti, 254-55; 
401-404 

Treaty of Basel, 270 

Treaty of Ryswick, 18, 112, 266, 365 

Trinitarios, 22 

Triumvirate, 44 

Trois Rivieres, 316 

Trouillot, Ertha Pascal, 299, 301 

Trujillo, Ramfis, 40 

Trujillo Molina, Rafael Leonidas, 6, 13, 
39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 52, 57, 63, 69, 
71, 72, 74, 83, 93, 113-14, 131, 162, 
181, 189, 201, 216, 217, 234, 238, 283, 
284, 452 

tutumpote, 77 

UASD. Autonomous University of 
Santo Domingo 

UCMM. See Pontifical Catholic Univer- 
sity Mother and Teacher 

UCN. See National Civic Union 

UN. See United Nations 

underemployment: in Dominican 
Republic, 65, 197; in Haiti, 292, 407 

unemployment: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 4, 65, 79, 112, 122, 197; in Haiti, 
292, 308, 309, 384, 387, 407 

UNESCO. See United Nations Educa- 
tional, Scientific, and Cultural Organi- 



580 



Index 



zation 

Unified Democratic Committee (KID), 
445 

Unified Haitian Communist Party (Parti 
Unifie des Communistes Haitiens — 
PUCH),444 

Union for National Reconciliation, 299 

United Confederation of Workers, 80 

United Nations (UN), 7, 206, 222, 253, 
256-57, 300, 303, 309, 382, 415, 417, 
425, 449, 453-54, 460, 483 

United Nations Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), 206, 349 

United Nations embargo {see also eco- 
nomic sanctions): against Haiti, 222, 
253, 256, 396, 468, 484-85 

United Nations General Assembly 425 

United Nations peacekeeping mission: 
in Haiti, 419, 425, 449, 485 

United Nations Security Council, 304, 
305, 306, 307, 419, 484 

United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), 62, 100, 154- 
55, 157, 350, 383, 384, 389, 395 

United States Arms Control and Disar- 
mament Agency (ACDA), 471, 472 

United States Geological Survey, 143 

United States Immigration and Natural- 
ization Service (INS), 327 

United States Marines: in Dominican 
Republic, 36, 37, 229; in Haiti, 280, 
280-81, 282-83, 367, 462, 463, 471, 
474 

United States Navy, 280 

United States South Porto Rico Com- 
pany, 131 

United States Virgin Islands, 149 

United States-Haitian Business Develop- 
ment Council, 383 

Universal Postal Union (UPU), 206 

University of Haiti, 354, 428 

UNPHU. See Pedro Hendquez Urefia 
National University 

UPU. See Universal Postal Union 

urbanization: in Dominican Republic, 
68-70, 126; in Haiti, 314, 325-26, 434- 
36 

urban slums: in Haiti, 335, 336, 475 
USAID. See United States Agency for 
International Development 



Valdesia, 63 

Valle de Constanza, 59 

Valle de la Vega Real, 58 

Valle del Cibao (Cibao Valley), 58 

Valle de Neiba, 61 

Valle de San Juan, 59 

Valle de Santiago, 58 

Valles, Max, 295 

Vallieres, 321 

value-added tax: in Haiti, 372 
Valverde, 64, 228, 

Vasquez Lajara, Horacio, 33, 34, 37, 39 

Vega Real, 130 

Velasquez, Federico, 33 

Venezuelans: in Dominican Republic, 74 

Vertieres, 272 

vice presidency: in Dominican Republic, 
175 

Viceroyalty of New Spain, 265 

Vicini Burgos, Juan Bautista, 39 

Victoria y Victoria, Eladio, 36 

Vincent, Jean-Marie, 454 

Vincent, Stenio, 282, 284 

Vocational School of the Armed Forces 

and Police, 225 
Volunteers for National Security (Volon- 

taires de la Securite Nationale — VSN) , 

288, 295, 459, 463-64, 465, 466, 473, 

475 

voodoo, 94, 253, 268, 271, 283, 284, 286, 

288, 295, 297, 313, 344-46 
VSN. See Volunteers for National Security 



War of Restoration, 28, 73, 76 
War of the Castes, 270 
War of the Grand Alliance, 266 
Welles, Sumner, 39 
Werleigh, Claudette, 418 
Wessin y Wessin, Elias, 45, 46, 218, 219 
wetlands, mangrove: in Haiti, 321-22 
wheat production: in Dominican Repub- 
lic, 137 

WHO. See World Health Organization 

Wilson, Woodrow, 37, 216, 282 

"Wilson Plan," 37 

Windward Passage, 314 

women's organizations; in Haiti, 338-39 

women's rights: in Haiti, 338 

Worker Peasant Movement (Mouve- 

ment Ouvrier Paysan — MOP), 285, 

287, 444, 446 



581 



Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies 



World Bank: and Dominican Republic, 
111, 118, 122, 146, 154, 204, 206; and 
Haiti, 257, 296, 300, 349, 365, 371, 
382, 402-403, 409, 453-54 
World Health Organization (WHO), 206 
World Trade Organization, 7, 207, 257, 
454 

World War I, 282 

World War II, 41, 217, 331 



Yaque del Norte River, 60 

Yaque del Sur River, 59, 60 

Young Revolutionary Junta (Junta Rev- 

olucionaria dejovenes), 33 
Yuma, 63 



zafra, 131 
zinglins, 277 



582 



Contributors 



Anne Greene has written on Haiti in various scholarly publica- 
tions and taught at a number of academic institut.ions. 

Jonathan Hartlyn, professor of political science at the Univer- 
sity of North Carolina, is the author of a book on the poli- 
tics of the Dominican Republic and numerous articles on 
the country. 

Robert E. Maguire, currently director of programs in interna- 
tional affairs at Trinity College, Washington, DC, has been 
involved with Haiti for some twenty years through work at 
the Inter-American Foundation, the Department of State, 
and Georgetown University. 

Boulos A. Malik, a retired Foreign Service Officer, has covered 
the United Nations in New York and taught at the 
National War College. 

Helen Chapin Metz is a senior analyst in the Middle East/ 
Africa/Latin America Unit, Federal Research Division, 
Library of Congress. 

Glenn R. Smucker is a consultant in the field of applied anthro- 
pology who has done considerable work on Haiti for the 
United States Agency for International Development and 
for foundations. 

Jean R. Tartter is a retired Foreign Service Officer who has 
written widely on various areas of the world for the Coun- 
try Studies series. 

Larman C. Wilson, professor emeritus of international rela- 
tions at American Universtiy, has specialized in the Carib- 
bean area and published widely on the Dominican Repub- 
lic and Haiti. 



583 



Published Country Studies 
(Area Handbook Series) 



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550-160 Romania 550-171 



Russia 

Rwanda and Burundi 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 

Singapore 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Soviet Union 
Spain 

Sri Lanka 

Sudan 

Syria 

Tanzania 

Thailand 

Tunisia 

Turkey 

Uganda 

Uruguay 

Venezuela 

Vietnam 
Yemens, The 
Yugoslavia 
Zaire 
Zambia 

Zimbabwe 



586 



trip 



PIN: 068897-000 



